Javier Echenique’s Artistotle’s ‘Ethics’ and Moral Responsibility departs from the standard Kantian and consequentialist accounts of moral responsibility to offer a distinctively aretaic or virtue-based theory, which is grounded in Artistotle’s Ethica Nichomachea and Ethica Eudemia. More precisely, Echenique sets out to see whether such an account is defensible and whether it is supported in an internally coherent form by these texts. If he succeeds in doing this, he will have contributed significantly to the current state of the literature by offering a means of bypassing the Kantian-consequentialist debate, which is currently at an impasse.
Echenique begins his inquiry by refuting A.W.H. Adkin’s influential claim that Aristotle fails to provide a satisfactory account of moral responsibility because (a) his emphasis on the virtues is distinctively un-Kantian, and (b) modern Western thought is committed to a Kantian notion of moral responsibility connected with duty and obligation. This, of course, is a patently question-begging objection, but it does lay the groundwork for what sort of argumentative strategy a virtue ethicist will have to pursue in order to navigate the philosophical waters. In view of Adkin’s challenge, Echenique sets out to parry two prominent interpretations of Aristotelian ethics. The first is the “Strawsonian interpretation”, which embodies the Kantian emphasis on accountability, desert, and retrospective judgment; and the second is this view’s contrary, i.e., the consequentialist view, which is related to the utilitarian theories of C.L. Stevenson and J.J.C. Smart. Echenique calls this interpretation the “prospective conditioning view” because it regards responsibility ascriptions as forms of operant conditioning or behavioural control that aim to bring about desirable consequences. These arguments comprise the first section of the book, while the second section is devoted to outlining the defeaters of ethical ascription such as coercion, necessity, and duress.
The first section is the more interesting half, from the perspective of the non-Aristotelian scholar, as it engages with the current scholarship on moral responsibility, while the second section delves into the hermeneutics of Artistotelian ethics to derive an account of excuses and justifications. In the first chapter, Echenique rebuts the Strawsonian interpretation of Aristotelian ethics, according to which holding people responsible for their actions consists in expressing the “reactive attitudes” of resentment, indignation, approbation, forgiveness, hurt feelings, and so on. This is an accountability (or answerablity) view because it regards the agent as an appropriate target of the reactive attitudes insofar as she is capable of acknowledging and responding to the general demand for goodwill or regard on the part of the moral community. Echenique’s criticism has three parts. First, he contends that Aristotelian praise and blame cannot properly be construed as a deployment of the reactive attitudes, since these notions are not connected with the notion of accountability as such. More specifically, on Aristotle’s conception, whether a person is “praiseable” or “blameable” depends on whether the person’s actions reflect an objectively choiceworthy end from an aretaic perspective, i.e., from the perspective of a virtuous observer. This is a separate question from whether the person’s actions deserve the reactive attitudes, or punitive sanctions, from the perspective of the wronged party or the moral community on her behalf. In contrast to the accountability view, Aristotle nowhere mentions the notions of “desert” or “merit,” or the idea of “sanctions.” Hence, his view is not reducible to an accountability theory in line with Strawson’s view. Second, Echenique says that the apt target of the Strawsonian reactive attitudes and the apt target of Aristotelian praise and blame are not identical or coextensive, since the former is supposed to be a full-fledged member of the moral community, whereas the Aristotelian concept encompasses both full-fledged rational agents and partial or prospective ones. This marks a difference in terms of the two theories’ practical scopes, since Strawson’s view, according to Echenique, excludes animals, children, and incontinents from moral responsibility, whereas Aristotle’s view, properly understood, includes children and incontinents. This is because these types of agents, although not fully rational, are still capable of being rationally persuaded to act according to reason. Third, Echenique argues that Strawson’s theory is a purely retrospective one which prohibits the use of prospective praise and blame, whereas Aristotle’s theory embraces this application. The reason why Strawson forbids prospective responsibility is allegedly because he regards this type of justification as a form of insturmentalisation which essentially demeans or objectifies the target agent. In response, Echenique contends that Strawson fails to recognize an important non-instrumental application of prospective responsibility—namely, when it is applied for the explicit purpose of morally educating children or immature individuals who stand to benefit from this treatment. This is different from the utilitarian’s defense of operant conditioning because it treats the agent as a rational being in her own right, and it is done for the agent’s own sake, as opposed to some further social end. This last argument also constitutes Echenique’s core response to the utilitarian view, which positions his version of Aristotelian ethics outside of the parameters of either of the two dominant theories of responsibility.
In his second chapter, Echenique reinforces the arguments of his first chapter and outlines Aristotle’s positive account of moral responsibility. He says that on Aristotle’s view, an apt target of praise and blame is someone who is capable of understanding these concepts by virtue of possessing, or being capable of acquiring, an ethical condition. That is, it is someone who is capable of responding to reason, since such a person is uniquely capable of acquiring the ethical condition that is the basis for praise and blame. This approach, which he calls “ethical ascription” (to distinguish it from moral attribution), rules out the accountability view and the instrumentalist view because it emphasizes the agent’s moral character (as opposed to the agent’s eligibility for sanctions) and the importance of moral training. On a practical level, it includes children and incontinents in the scope of moral responsibility, while ruling out animals and psychopaths.
In the second section of the book, Echanique delimits the defeasibility conditions for ethical ascription based on close scrutiny of Aristotle’s ethical texts. He shows that his interpretation of Aristotelian praise and blame is compatible with Aristotle’s account of the two main defeating conditions, violence and factual unawareness, as described in the Nichomachean Ethics. This shows that Aristotle’s account is not only coherent, but is also capable of accommodating our intuitions about core excusing conditions.
Overall, Echenique is successful at defending a coherent Aristotelian theory of moral responsibility that avoids reduction to Kantian or consequentialist terms, and which preserves Aristotle’s preeminent concern with the ethical condition of the virtuous agent. This is a viable alternative to the standard binary accounts in the literature and deserves attention in its own right as a virtue-centered theory of moral responsibility. Echenique’s critical analysis of Aristotle’s ethical texts in the second section of the book is eminently plausible. However, one may question some of his assumptions in the first section. In particular, one may wonder if it is fair to describe Strawson as a Kantian and a merit-based theorist, given that Strawson himself would reject these classifications. Strawson, in fact, intended his theory to be an essentially sentimentalist approach which could not be reduced to either Kantian or consequentialist terms. He is famous for arguing that the reactive attitudes neither call for nor admit any rational explanation, including a Kantian one.
Moreover, one might wonder whether Strawson’s theory (as well as other accountabilist ones) is not, in fact, compatible with Aristotelian ethical ascription. According to Echenique, Strawson’s view excludes children and incontinents from the domain of moral responsibility because these individuals are not full-fledged moral agents. This is based on the assumption that these agents are not capable of responding to the reactive attitudes. However, if Echenique is right and children and incontinents are partly reason-responsive—and so, by implication, partly able to acknowledge and respond to the reactive attitudes—then a Strawsonian ought to be able to admit that these agents are pro tanto morally responsible. This would require a revision to Strawson’s original view of children’s rational capacities, but it is not an inadmissible move. What one might want to do to the Strawsonian view, as well as the Aristotelian view, is introduce an explicitly scalar component to moral responsibility ascriptions that would permit them to lie on a spectrum.
These considerations do not impugn the eligibility of Echenique’s Aristotelian account; they merely suggest that Aristotle’s theory of ethical ascription may not be as distinct from Strawson’s theory of the reactive attitudes as Echenique would like to think. However, Aristotle’s theory still differs from the accountability approach in virtue of its distinctive emphasis on the moral character of the agent as opposed to the agent’s answerability to others, and in its explicit focus on the importance of non-instrumental moral education. Overall, then, Echenique presents a coherent and compelling virtue-based account of moral responsibility which contributes to the debate and may permit us to make headway by avoiding the traditional binaries.
