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The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2019

Phillip Y. Lipscy  and
Haillie Na-Kyung Lee

Abstract

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Information

Type
Addendum
Information
International Organization , Volume 73 , Issue 2 , Spring 2019 , pp. 489
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2019 

In the original publication of this article, the acknowledgement section should also include the following editor's note:

Editor's note: IO's conflict-of-interest policy ensures that editors do not make decisions on manuscripts written by authors at the same institution, current or former students, or current or former co-authors.

References

Lipscy, P., & Lee, H.. 2019. The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises. International Organization 73 (1): 35–64.Google Scholar