Harry Clor knows that moderation may seem banal. But his new book means to show that it is crucial, ubiquitous, and, indeed, disputed. Still, is there such a general thing as moderation? How far beyond “transient and parochial” considerations can one get? That is a question, and Clor's book is an inquiry. This search, together with his aim to defend moderation as a virtue, has to engage the many philosophic challenges. There are, then, three levels to this little book: a spelling out of moderate practice, the plain case for (and against!) such an outlook, and a weighing of the philosophic and religious arguments for and against. A feast of consideration starts with everyday food.
Clor wishes to reach the thoughtful general reader as well as the academic specialist. He deserves to succeed. His Moderation is a perfected little composition (121 pages of text), drawn from thoughts “on his mind for so many years.” (Clor is an emeritus professor at Kenyon College.) The result is economy in thought and speech, with not an ounce of deadening pedantry or artful artifice.
Clor does not start with presuppositions of method or justice, abstractions to be swallowed whole but that choke a thoughtful reader. He begins with “pervasive experiences” (5) and the various common opinions. Some suppose that political moderation amounts to middling centrism, for example, or that personal moderation is foreign to ardent love (“Do you want to love and be loved only moderately?” [3]). Clor advances by taking such views seriously, that is, by showing truth, difficulties, and contradictory opinions. A merely middling way between fanatic extremes can be another fanaticism, not moderate politics. When “you” fall in love, you'd better consider your beloved's character. With such considerations our author takes you into his confidence. He weighs and punctures much we take for granted and much we leave in obscurity. One learns a lot about reasonable living from this little book.
Clor aims also to persuade academics. His book offers a plausible phenomenology of reasonable conduct, and it assesses the critics of reasonableness. His style of phenomenology deals with the important phenomena (not mere objects), which are moral phenomena broadly speaking; it does not disdain everyday fairness, honesty, and nobility. Clor would arrive at realities, not merely phenomena. This helps explain his fear of modern irrationalism, especially postmodernism's general skepticism of intellect's promptings.
The book's subtitle, nevertheless, is somewhat misleading. “Defending an ancient virtue in a modern world” could make one think moderation is but an ancient virtue. Clor treats it as virtue right now. It is present in everyday reasonableness and obscurities, even if often absent, and even if somewhat undermined in practice by modern theories. Clor does not begin with ancient conduct, texts, or theories, nor does he rely solely on ancient authorities. He looks to Edmund Burke (for the “balancing” of political principles), and also to Michel de Montaigne (for intelligent skepticism). Still, Clor seems most aided by Aristotle's understanding of virtue as a mean between vices, and his dialectical procedure reminds one of the Socratics generally. He questions most the theories of Machiavelli, Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Max Weber. The subtitle is not completely misleading.
Any summary of Clor's sinuous argument will sound misleadingly trite. Moderation itself seems trite, as he acknowledges. But in actuality triteness won't do: “tepid centrism” is shortsighted and not reasonable. What Clor fears just now, however, is less the tepid than the zealous: those who adopt a categorical imperative with respect to “autonomy,” rights, and religious duty. The fashionable remedy is pluralism. That also won't do. For plural fanaticisms can lead to civil strife, including civil war. A more promising way is Burke's “balancing” of principles according to due “proportion.” You can't have it all (21). The point is not conservatism but good judgment. Clor, who in other books has stood tall against obscenity and other excesses of free expression, likes Burke's formulation for modern free societies: sound democratic citizenship requires “a moral, regulated liberty” (23). Still, for good judgment and sound liberty, both, balancing is not enough. One needs sobriety in principle itself. Doctrines that suppose human being to be wholly malleable, such as Marxism, make moderation impossible. Clor praises more sober expectations. He praises persuasions that acknowledge human selfishness and thus the limits of political aspiration, although without himself supposing that selfishness exhausts human being. He praises generally a rule of law, despite the problems of generality and political variations. Law, like a liberal education that weighs the important outlooks, encourages impartiality in controversies of the day. Law and liberal education provide a “distancing function” (45).
As to personal moderation, Clor sets himself a question. Can the center hold in face of the claims of great ambition and ardent love, as well as contemporary doctrines of will to power, sexual satisfaction, and self-expression? We get illuminating little appraisals of Nietzsche, D. H. Lawrence, Freud, and contemporary psychology, and of compassion and that mystery, “the self.” We even get a comparison of Clor's old businessman uncle with the Marquis de Sade (Uncle comes out on top if you want a friend [54–55]). While we occasionally wish a “holiday from moderation” (45), that, too, is to be indulged in moderation. Character tells, even in love.
What, however, of the deep criticisms of reasonable morals? Clor takes on many if not all comers. To begin with, contemporary cultural relativists ignore the cross-cultural commonness of duties to family and friends—this, despite their own cross-cultural agenda of openness and toleration. Besides, they do not prove that scruples are all constructed. Nietzsche, who does try to prove this, defends a limited, closed horizon: “perspectivism.” But cannot one with reason judge some horizons better than others, such as those with some predominance of law? It can be admitted, as Rousseau contends, that civilizing reason can inflame passions and wants. But reasoning can also remove foolish illusions and hopes. Yes, the Bible lays down absolute rules for corrupted innocence. But it also shows an Abraham exercising judgment superior to that of innocent Adam and superior even to the Lord's overweening anger at Sodom and Gomorrah. True, terror of death can overwhelm us, as Hobbes alleged. But such terror can be moderated, in part by sound character. And as for belonging to oneself, on which Montaigne dwells: that is to forget one's dependence on friends, country, and other social connections.
Clor's little book cannot do full justice to these deeper thinkers, as he himself acknowledges. Moderation touches Machiavelli's critique of morals, but does not plumb it, and it does not touch Machiavelli's argument for political extremism. Also, the precise relation of Clor's argument to actual classical doctrines remains somewhat obscure. How does his comprehensive moderation relate to Plato's priority of wisdom to moderation, or to Plato's philosophic extremism (“divine madness”), or to Aristotle's distinction of separate moral virtues (including temperance) under the guidance of prudence? Still, what Moderation intends, it does wonderfully well. It clarifies comprehensively the reasonableness of reasonable conduct. For this we owe Harry Clor our close reading and our appreciative gratitude.
