Meyer has written an exquisite book. Easy to read and very clear in the exposition of the ideas defended, The Nature of Time can be considered as both an introduction to the classical topics in philosophy of time for advanced students and a profound analysis that offers a novel solution of some of the controversies and problems developed in contemporary debates on time.
To provide “a satisfactory account of the nature of time” (vii) is the main aim of the book. To do so, Meyer promotes a modal theory of time. The idea behind this thesis is to treat instants of time as possible worlds and not as places. Based on classical positions advanced by A.N. Prior, Meyer’s view “spells out temporal distinctions in terms of conceptually primitive tense operators” (vii). Nonetheless, this tense primitivism diverges in two important aspects from Priorian accounts. First, it constructs instants of time as linguistic entities (ersatz, in Lewisian terminology). Second, instead of accepting a privileged present, it “favour[s] a very weak system that impose[s] no structural constraints on the time series” (viii). This is to say, Meyer’s tense primitivism rejects presentism (because is not a substantial thesis) and defends an eternalist view that treats every instant of time as equal in order to construct a minimal theory that reconciles the metaphysical and physical contingent characteristics of time.
The book’s core is the premise that “pretending that times are like places is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. It can be done, but feels rather forced” (37). To answer the question, ‘What are instants of time?,’ which is the crucial question for Meyer, the book argues that we should only emphasize usual aspects of our ordinary language. This is, Meyer’s points out that instead of pretending that they fit in spatial metaphors, instants of time are possible because we commit ourselves to a particular instant when predicating properties of objects. In other words, since our verbs are tensed, we should take tense seriously. Since spatial approaches of time advocate for a standard first-order logic, Meyer’s view accounts for times using modal views to expand intensional tense operators.
Meyer gives a modal logic of basic level with sentence letters A, B, C, and D with and without numerals to construct a model that assigns truth-values to every sentence. Since it is possible to think of different models of this propositional logic as different ways the world might be and the previous logic can only make claims about the actual world, Meyer introduces the classical operators for possibility and necessity to express the reference to ‘sometimes’ and ‘always,’ respectively, and reserves the reference to the actual world to express only ‘the present.’ The result is an elegant interpretation of the classical modal system S5 as a tense logic. (This system is described in Chapters 4-8).
The applicability of Meyer’s system is impressive. Since the author guarantees the system’s theorems as depending on the very weak tense logic Z (43-48), Meyer’s is a minimalist theory of time that requires a priori knowledge of instants of time. In the same fashion as classical accounts, simple tense logic Z treats important questions as simultaneity, symmetry, and quantity of instants of time as non-empirical questions. This grants that our knowledge of time is analytic a priori. The difference between Meyer’s position and other interpretations is that, in Meyer’s primitivism, these are questions about the nature of time itself and not about what is going on within time.
Instead of sentences, Meyer’s system accepts propositions as the bearers of truths. Although Meyer is not as enthusiastic about propositions as expected, “since abstract objects do not take up any space” (50), he does not decide between eternal and temporal propositions. Meyer accepts both because his tense primitivism, he says, is not committed to either one or another, even though he explicitly claims an eternalist view and that “modal theories of time are committed to the existence of temporal propositions, which change their truth values over time, while spatial theories require eternal propositions, whose truth values are always the same” (49). This could be the germ for contradiction. Nonetheless, since Meyer rejects the truth-maker principle and accepts times as sets of sentences, he “preserves the ontological frugality of tense primitivism… [and] provides the needed referents for dates without incurring commitment to temporal propositions, temporal parts, metaphysically basic time points, or any other recognizable temporal entities” (66).
Since instants of time are sets of sentences, the structure of time is not a contingent matter. It will depend on the expressive resources of our natural language. So, Meyer gives an approach to duration in terms of “appropriate measurement procedures” (72) that compare one time to another. This can be easily accomplished by adopting “a language that can describe the relevant features of the measurement procedures and scientific theories on which our temporal coordinate system is based… determin[ing] the temporal distance between them” (77). The result is that temporal distances between ersatz times are defined as internal and objective relations.
Given the necessity that a tense logic accounts for the interaction of tense operator with quantifiers and identity, Meyer expands his tense logic Z in order to construct different model to quantified tense logic “that yield the same ersatz time” (86). Meyer introduces a primitive existence predicate (E!) that allows him to make claims about existence at a particular time. And since he understands the existential quantifier under an untensed interpretation, Meyer argues, “the range of quantification always comprises all objects that exist at some time or other” (81).
The first three chapters, besides serving as an introductory overview to the topic, survey and reject a number of previous approaches to time. Temporal relationism defends that temporal relations supervene on events or objects. According to Meyer, this position is “ontologically extravagant” (23) because it treats instants like places and compares poorly with modal accounts. Temporal substantivalism avoids the previous issue by taking times as metaphysically basic entities but, Meyer says, it should be rejected because it is condemned to immobility “unless temporal substantivalism could produce an argument that shows that there are necessarily as many times as places” (36).
The remaining Chapters 9-12 are devoted to analyzing different questions regarding (the nature of) presentism, the flow of time, the problem of motion and change, and relativity. Meyer’s purpose here is to reconcile and converge his tense primitivism with contemporary scientific views of time.
The Nature of Time is an excellent book. It provides an interesting and novel perspective on time and a synopsis of alternative theories. Even though further developments are required, Meyer’s system gives us a breath of fresh air regarding treatments of time. If you are interested in the topic of time, you should not miss this book.
Acknowledgements:
This review is partially founded by the research project “Points of View and Temporal Structures” (FFI2011-24549), Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad.
