Introduction
The scholarly discourse surrounding the role of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya in South Asian history revolves largely around negative responses to the movement since the creation of Pakistan. In these regards, Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya is most often associated with its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) and his messianic claims. Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya maintains that these claims disclose Ghulam Ahmad's elevated spiritual status, which incorporates a strand of prophethood subservient to the prophethood of Muhammad. This belief is considered by the mainstream to present a challenge to Islamic orthodoxy by questioning the finality of Muhammad's prophethood. Ghulam Ahmad's prophetic status in particular, amongst other Ahmadi beliefs, including Jesus’ natural death in Kashmir and the rejection of violent jihad, has perhaps generated the most controversy. As such, the shootings at two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore on 28 May 2010, which killed 86 people and injured scores more, illustrate the intensity of the Ahmadi controversy and the magnitude of its repercussions in recent times.Footnote 1
The persistence of the opposition towards Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya as well as the public's overall familiarity with the debate has made the Ahmadi controversy an accepted feature of political discussions in contemporary Pakistan. Scholars typically contextualize the evolution of the controversy by highlighting key events in Pakistani history, such as the Punjab disturbances of 1953, which led to the first implementation of martial law in the country,Footnote 2 Pakistan's constitutional changes of 1974, which officially categorized Ahmadis as part of the non-Muslim minority,Footnote 3 and the introduction of the blasphemy ordinance of 1984, which effectively made integral aspects of religious life in Pakistan for Ahmadis into a criminal offence.Footnote 4 Since 1984, religious convictions found to be in violation of the penal code are legally punishable by the state, making the expression of one's belief in Ahmadi Islam a culpable act which is subject to fines or imprisonment.
Although these events accurately reflect the overall resistance towards Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya in Pakistan since India's partition, they do not provide an adequate explanation of how the religious worldviews of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya became intertwined in the mainstream political discourse of modern South Asia. In contrast, perhaps one might be inclined to think that mainstream politicians ought to have allowed Ghulam Ahmad's inner spiritual experiences and his hypothetical abstractions of prophecy to remain confined to the theological debates of the ‘ulamā. However, it is quite clear that by the time of the Punjab disturbances in 1953, Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya had already become a firmly established feature of the mainstream political discourse of Muslim South Asia, which to some extent made such widespread disturbances possible. This suggests that Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's initial thrust into the mainstream political arena must have taken place prior to 1953. Interestingly, this period has comparatively drawn less scholarly attention from historians interested in the impact of the Ahmadi controversy. It therefore seems reasonable to assert that studying the political involvement of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya prior to partition is better suited for providing richer explanations of the political significance of the Ahmadi controversy after partition. As shown below, developing a better understanding of the historical context of the pre-partition era will illuminate aspects of contemporary South Asian politics, including the ongoing fallout of the Ahmadi controversy since partition.
Despite the wealth of literature on the movement, scholarly accounts of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya are limited. The most influential account of the movement is arguably Yohanan Friedmann's Prophecy Continuous, which focuses on some of the most important theological differences of Ghulam Ahmad's interpretation of prophethood and its medieval background.Footnote 5 Other works, such as those by Antonio Gualtieri and most recently by Simon Ross Valentine, focus on contemporary issues confronting the movement, which again revolve around the aftermath of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's involvement in South Asian politics, rather than its origins.Footnote 6 So the prevailing assumption implicit in previous studies of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya is that the egregiousness of Ahmadi religious interpretations has somehow justified the political response against them, and that religion itself has dragged Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya into the mainstream political arena.
In challenging this view, this paper will attempt to demonstrate that Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya was not simply a religious movement in the way that is has thus far been conceived. By focusing on the Kashmir crisis of the 1930s, we shall see how Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya was heavily involved in South Asian political controversies prior to partition. Although Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's political involvement has varied over the course of Ahmadi history, including a number of attempts at political mobilization, I argue that the brunt of this involvement has stemmed from the movement's initial success in using the Kashmir riots of 1931 to launch itself into the political framework of South Asia. In this manner, the Kashmir crisis became the basis for Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's political platform, which, as we shall see below, has no connection whatsoever to the controversial aspects of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's religious platform or to Ghulam Ahmad's prophethood.
Considering the overall lack of scholarly accounts of Ahmadi history in general, accounts of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's initial involvement in Kashmir are limited. The most extensive accounts of Ahmadi involvement in the Kashmir crisis have been provided by Spencer Lavan, in his book, The Ahmadiyah Movement.Footnote 7 In addition, Ian Copland has presented a detailed account of the rivalry between Ahmadis and the Ahrar during the crisis.Footnote 8 Most recently, Ayesha Jalal surveyed aspects of the Kashmir crisis in her Self and Sovereignty, in which she connects Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's role in the crisis to broader themes of Muslim political movements in early twentieth century South Asia.Footnote 9 Jalal's ability to contextualize Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's involvement in Kashmir is the most pertinent resource for the argument advanced by this paper. She provides multiple examples of how the practice of ‘mixing religion with politics’ helped define platforms for political parties of the time,Footnote 10 including, as detailed below, Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya. Jalal also notes that Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's organizational structure successfully combines the ‘spiritual and material worlds’ in a more efficient manner than other Punjabi Muslim organizations prior to India's partition.Footnote 11 This point will be expanded below in order to demonstrate how the mixture of religion and politics contributed towards Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's initial success in Kashmir, as well as to its eventual political failure in South Asia.
As mentioned above, a comprehensive account of the formation of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's political platform has thus far been missing from the scholarly literature. This void has made it difficult to assess the subsequent role of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya in South Asian politics and its consequences. Unlike previous studies of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya, this study incorporates the Urdu accounts of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's commissioned historian, Dost Muhammad Shahid (d. 2009), which often highlight the official Ahmadi position during the crisis. These accounts provide unique insights into Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's political interests, while clarifying how the Kashmir crisis since 1931 has served as a political platform for Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya, which, as discussed below, ultimately facilitated the entrance of the Ahmadi controversy into the mainstream political discourse of South Asia.
Prelude to the riots
Muslim rule in Jammu and Kashmir extends back before the Mughal period. Accordingly, a Muslim majority population has dominated the Kashmir valley for several centuries underneath various forms of government. There was a brief interlude of Sikh rule during the Ranjit Singh era, which lasted nearly three decades, but ended soon after his death in 1839. At this point, the British consolidation of India led to the signing of successive treaties in March 1846, first in Lahore and then in Amritsar, which resulted in the transfer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the loyalist Dogra chieftain, Gulab Singh, in exchange for a relatively nominal sum.Footnote 12 This enabled the British to avoid the logistical formalities of rule while maintaining an active influence in the region through a reduced role of ‘firm supervision’.Footnote 13 Since the new Dogra Maharaja and his successive heirs were Hindu, Kashmiri Muslims developed the tendency of looking to their co-religionists from the Punjab for support, as political tensions occasionally swelled. Likewise, Punjabi Muslims had taken an interest in contrasting their own state of affairs under the British with the state of Kashmiri Muslims on the other side of the border.Footnote 14 In 1911, Punjabi Muslims held the inaugural All-India Kashmiri Muslim Conference in Lahore in conjunction with the growing popularity of the independence movement.Footnote 15 However, the inception of the organization was in actuality more of a symbolic gesture than a radical call to action. As such, it took nearly 20 years of almost complete dormancy before the committee was revived with widespread recognition and mass publicity.
By the early 1930s the Dogra Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, had developed a reputation for highhanded treatment of his Muslim majority subjects. Moreover, growing dissent in Muslim areas coincided with a severe international depression, whose effects Kashmir could not escape.Footnote 16 Heavy taxation resulting from the government's false appraisal of agricultural production had left many families in hardship.Footnote 17 In addition, many qualified Kashmiris were increasingly finding themselves without suitable work, which only added to the popular perception of Muslim victimization. Opportunities for Kashmiri Muslims were diminishing on many levels, and half-hearted attempts to remedy the situation were failing. Only recently, in 1927, a state-sponsored scholarship committee, consisting entirely of Hindu members, determined that 11 out of 12 possible awards were to be given to Hindu students, leaving only one scholarship for a Muslim candidate. The selection was defended by the government as being based entirely on ‘merit’, which fuelled the prevalent sense of inequality amongst Muslims.Footnote 18 This led many to believe that the government was committed to truncating opportunities for Muslims before they entered the workforce. Still, Kashmiri Muslims bore their plight with ‘remarkably little organized resistance’ until the summer of 1931, when things began to change.Footnote 19
Panic on the streets of Srinagar: the Kashmir riots
The underlying tensions, which had been building steadily for decades, reached their boiling point on 5 June 1931 when a Hindu head constable of police had reportedly ordered a subordinate Muslim constable to stop reading the Qur'an. After allegedly calling the recitation nonsense (bakwās), the head constable proceeded to snatch the Qur'an from the hands of the subordinate officer and throw it away in the trash.Footnote 20 These rumours themselves were enough to provide the Punjabi press with ample material for its readers, which helped to provoke an international controversy.Footnote 21 Newspapers with colourful accounts of the event served as a catalyst for Muslim political mobilization. In this respect, the socio-political climate facilitated the notion of widespread Hindu favouritism, which polarized the population and eased the reception of articles depicting Muslims as the ‘downtrodden slaves’ of Dogra rule.Footnote 22 Advocates of India's Muslim population were livid, and a barrage of Punjabi protesters streamed across the border as the demonstrations began.
Towards the end of June 1931 a ‘European's cook’ named ‘Abd al-Qadīr was arrested for making a seditious speech at Srinagar's khānaqāh mu'allā.Footnote 23 His radicalized intonation involved inciting listeners to violence by directing them ‘to kill Hindus and burn their temples’.Footnote 24 The government tried to control the hype surrounding the trial by conducting the proceedings in secret within the Srinagar jail where ‘Abd al-Qadīr was being detained. The Darbār believed that the privacy of a swift, closed trial would prevent public excitement and counter precisely what India's newspapers had claimed was taking place. However, when whisperings of a secret trial leaked out the night before the arraignment, disaster became unavoidable. Thousands of demonstrators arrived at the Srinagar jail on 13 July 1931 to protest about the proceedings inside.
In retrospect, it is understandable why so many people believed that the secrecy of the trial was simply another Dogra conspiracy to continue oppressing Muslims. The police were summoned in the early morning hours, but did not arrive until the afternoon. The ill-preparedness of the police was later attributed to their failure to appreciate the magnitude of the situation and the overall lackadaisical attitude of the officers.Footnote 25 As the protests intensified, the audacity of the crowd apparently turned into belligerence. Irascible protestors surrounded the prison and began hurling stones and bricks at the guards. They proceeded to shake the telephone lines furiously, until they were finally cut off. The guards intermittently fired warning shots with ephemeral effect, but the crowd responded by trying to set fire to the prison. The guards opened fire killing ten immediately, as they successfully dispersed the protestors away from the prison. Meanwhile, the mob carried the bodies back to the city, shouting slogans and waving banners soaked in the blood of the dead. Upon their arrival, rioters devastated the Maharaj-ganj bazaar, located in the Hindu quarters of Srinagar, and looted a number of shops.Footnote 26
The riots marked the beginning of three long years of strife, disturbances, and political unrest throughout the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In the weeks that followed, Muslim shopkeepers declared a hartāl (strike) by refusing to open for business, bringing much of Srinagar's daily commerce to a standstill. Muslims continued with acts of noncompliance by refusing to take part in the official Riot Enquiry Committee, despite repeated requests from the Darbār. On 23 September 1931, a crowd of 15,000 dissidents armed with staffs and axes amassed at the house of Sa'd al-Din, a local Muslim who had recently risen to prominence for refusing to take part in the Riot Enquiry Committee. This time the local Hindu population was fortunate, since the rioters apparently had ‘no quarrel with Hindus, but [rather] ha[d] declared Jehad against His Highness’ government’.Footnote 27
An ordinance was passed the following evening, which gave ordinary members of the military and police extraordinary powers to control ‘turbulent persons’ by making arrests and seizing property without warrant.Footnote 28 Additionally, the ordinance incorporated a clause, which made ‘dissuading’ others from military enlistment a prosecutable offence, punishable by one year in prison, flogging, or both.Footnote 29 Angered responses led to retaliation from both sides. On 25 September, following the Friday prayers in the town of Shopian (south of Srinagar), a mob of Muslims attacked a sub-inspector and eight constables, who had been ‘watching the prayers’, resulting in the death of one head constable. When the requested military reinforcements arrived and opened fire, another person was killed and at least seven more were injured.Footnote 30 Meanwhile, with the threat of the new ordinance looming, the British Resident of Kashmir was led to believe that a ‘rapid improvement’ of troop morale was taking place. However, his misjudgement only lasted until local ‘Europeans’ began complaining that Hindus were abusing their newly acquired powers. Apparently, some Hindu officers had interpreted the ordinance to justify thrashing any Muslim who failed to say, ‘Mahārājā sāhib kī jay! [victory to the Maharaja]’ whenever passing a member of the military or police. Indeed, this behaviour was corrected as soon as possible, but some Muslims in Srinagar had already been ‘severely’ beaten.Footnote 31
From 1931 to 1934 communal disturbances in Kashmir had displaced diplomacy as the preferred means of expressing political dissent.Footnote 32 The instability produced by the circumstances enabled a new Muslim leadership to emerge out of the broader movement for independence. Leaders identified the symbolism of India's Islamic cause in Kashmir, making the crisis a paradigm for Muslim independence. From a certain perspective, the Kashmir crisis exemplified both the tyrannical subjugation of Muslims, as well as an idealized spiritual resistance that bordered on outright jihad. The new political leadership emerging from the centre was eager to utilize the crisis as a means to substantiate their political visions in the event of a favourable outcome. In this sense, the mainstream perception of the crisis in Kashmir provided an opportune moment for emerging Muslim leaders to demonstrate how their party's Islam was capable of transforming society in the manner in which they had claimed. Furthermore, the historical context of the Kashmir crisis coincided with a time that was sufficiently removed from the failures of the Khilafat Movement, which enabled India's aspiring leaders to substantiate their claims (once again) through a seemingly new course of action.
Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya and the revival of the All-India Kashmir Committee
Kashmir has always played a significant role in Ahmadi explanations of Jesus’ survival of the crucifixion.Footnote 33 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself wrote a tract in which he argued that both Jesus and Mary had travelled to Kashmir after the crucifixion to escape further persecution.Footnote 34 Subsequently, Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya has produced an extensive amount of literature pertaining to Jesus’ journey to Kashmir and his burial in a particular Sufi shrine in Srinagar, which Ghulam Ahmad has identified as the actual tomb of Jesus Christ.Footnote 35 In addition, Maulvi Hakim Nur al-Din, Ghulam Ahmad's closest companion and first successor (khalīfat al-masīh I), had served as the chief royal physician (shāhī tabīb) to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir for 15 years, under Hari Singh's two predecessors.Footnote 36 Mahmud Ahmad had visited Kashmir on a number of occasions, due to its importance to the community, both before and after his ascension to khilāfat in 1914. Within this context, it is no coincidence that Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya was pursuing an aggressive missionary campaign in Kashmir prior to the outbreak of the riots.
Soon after the riots on 25 July 1931, the Lahore based All-India Kashmiri Muslim Conference held a meeting in Shimla to determine its course of action. Many notable dignitaries were present, including Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Sir Mian Fazl-i Husain, the Nawab of Malerkotla, Sir Muhammad Zulfiqar ‘Ali Khan,Footnote 37 (Shams al-‘Ulamā) Khwaja Hasan Nizami of Delhi, Khan Bahadur Shaykh Rahim Bakhsh, as well as several other Nawabs, a Deobandi professor, and high ranking administrators from both the Siyāsat and Muslim Outlook newspapers. On Iqbal's nomination, the members unanimously chose Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad as president, with his missionary disciple, ‘Abd al-Rahim Dard, as secretary, of what they called the ‘All-India Kashmir Committee’.Footnote 38
The inaugural meeting at Shimla was important for several reasons, considering that the group's motivations for political mobilization were still the same. With this in mind, it is important to note that the circumstances surrounding the Kashmiri Muslim Conference's former period of impotence had not really changed by 1931. The newly founded All-India Kashmir Committee still had no clear grounds for agency, in the sense that there was no official sponsorship from any of the three governments (Kashmiri, Indian, and British) involved. Likewise, there were no definitive goals, no explicit reasons for its existence, and no Kashmiri lobby officially asking for its help. For all intents and purposes, the All-India Kashmir Committee was no different than it had always been during its quieter years throughout the earlier part of the twentieth century. Prior to the meeting at Shimla, the committee was little more than an unorganized group of influential Muslims, predominantly from the Punjab, who were understandably upset about the conditions of their co-religionists in Kashmir. Nonetheless, their sympathies did not translate into practical power on the other side of the border in Kashmir.
Shimla marked the beginning of several significant changes which altered the role of the committee and the Muslim struggle for independence in Kashmir. In light of the fact that the meeting took place in Shimla, instead of somewhere more convenient, such as the committee's previous headquarters in Lahore, the committee had already taken on a more national appearance, which extended beyond the Punjab.Footnote 39 The new members at Shimla, and those who joined soon after, were more representative of an ‘All-India’ organization, which now stretched from the Frontier in the west to Bengal in the east. The augmented geographic boundaries represented a step towards establishing credibility. Now, at the very least, the All-India Kashmir Committee could produce non-Punjabi members who held meetings in one of the nation's capitals.
The emergence of key players in the crisis
A young Kashmiri named Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah was amongst the Muslim activists to emerge following the riots.Footnote 40 At the time, Sheikh Abdullah was an unemployed Master's graduate of Aligarh who was making a name for himself by delivering impassioned protest-speeches. His continued involvement in political activism eventually earned him the laudatory title Sher-i Kashmīr (the Lion of Kashmir) as well as the opportunity to serve as the state's Chief Minister from 1975 until his death in 1982.Footnote 41
The Kashmir crisis also marked the beginning of the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, an organization which was seeking to establish itself in opposition to the Ahmadi-administered All-India Kashmir Committee.Footnote 42 From its inception, the Ahrari defence of Islam was reactionary in nature. It unapologetically incorporated anti-Darbār, anti-British, anti-Sikh, anti-Hindu, and anti-Ahmadi sentiments on a single platform.Footnote 43 The Ahrar's stance was reinforced through a militant enterprise, which involved wielding jathās (gangs) who threatened to infiltrate the Kashmiri border at a moment's notice.Footnote 44 Sir Mian Fazl-i Husain described them as the ‘riff-raffs’ amongst the Muslims.Footnote 45 Although the Ahrar's tactics may have appeared crude in the early days, they nevertheless may have provided suitable opposition for Mahmud Ahmad, who is said to have been ‘running the local administration [in Qadian] on the lines of an Ahmadi mafia’.Footnote 46
Mahmud Ahmad's objectives were to find ‘Ahmadi’ solutions to a set of sophisticated political problems. Leading a successful lobby on behalf of the All-India Kashmir Committee from India was a challenge, but ensuring that it had an impact on the streets of Kashmir was an entirely different matter. Mahmud Ahmad knew that utilizing local Kashmiris would be more beneficial than bringing in outsiders. For this reason, he needed to mobilize Kashmiri Muslims against the Dogra government, while warding off attacks from the Ahrari opposition. Neither were easy tasks. Had the Darbār been willing to respond to civil sentiment, either through the implementation of changes in public policy or perhaps by initiating a plan to bring about these changes in the near future, it is probable that a great deal of social anxiety could have been avoided. However, resolving the problem of reconciliation after the crisis had begun was no longer a viable option, once mainstream members of Kashmiri society had taken to rioting en masse. Several Kashmiri Muslims were weary of the government and unwilling to entertain diplomatic negotiations. Both the severity of the violence and the widespread consent expressed by the masses during the communal disturbances made it difficult to stop the crisis by finding a tempered solution. Furthermore, reconciliation needed to take place in the backdrop of groups like the Ahrar, who specialized in rousing communal hatred.
Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad's strategic response to the crisis
Mahmud Ahmad's methodology in resolving the conflict in Kashmir was to utilize Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's excellent contacts in the region and its institutionalized structure for political leverage. The institutionalized framework itself gave Mahmud Ahmad an advantage over his opposition,Footnote 47 as it was different from any other Muslim group of the time with the exception of the Isma'ilis. Considering that Mahmud Ahmad was personally responsible for setting up the Jama'at's organizational structure, it is not surprising that he was quick to use it to enter into an international crisis. Mahmud Ahmad had always intended that his Jama'at would compete for the dominant leadership of the Muslim world, thereby enabling the Ahmadi khilāfat (which is to say, his own khilāfat) to reign supreme over the umma. This is why Mahmud Ahmad had never fully supported the Khilafat Movement, since doing so would have undermined his own claim to khilāfat.Footnote 48
The All-India Kashmir Committee needed the approval of Kashmiri Muslims in order to have a lasting effect in Kashmir. In addition, Mahmud Ahmad needed to balance the support of the Kashmiri mainstream with the logistics of an international resistance. In response, Mahmud Ahmad established a publicity committee whose only function was to bombard the Indian press with news coverage of the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir. The committee publicized issues throughout the subcontinent amongst Muslims who were either unaware of the internal developments in Kashmir or of the All-India Kashmir Committee's response to the crisis.Footnote 49 Then, Mahmud Ahmad ordered the establishment of Kashmiri Independence Offices (otherwise known as Reading Rooms) throughout Jammu and Kashmir, but shrewdly forbade his Ahmadi disciples from holding positions of leadership within them.Footnote 50 This further created the impression of an organized resistance taking shape internally, with Muslims coming together from within the state's borders. His strategy was intended to beguile onlookers who were attempting to assess the threat of Kashmiri Muslims by showing them the borrowed framework of an organized institution that was already in place. In doing so, Mahmud Ahmad hoped that government officials would be thoroughly dismayed by the utterly unified network of Reading Rooms that were simply non-existent in the weeks prior to the riots, but now seemed to be popping up throughout the state. From the government's perspective, this ought to have been impossible without previous warning signs. Clearly, no one had anticipated that the leaders of the agitations would be capable of organizing themselves with such competence as rapidly as they had done in Kashmir.
The unfolding situation presented the Darbār with a disgruntled Muslim population conflating into a collective resistance with unthinkable efficiency. Realistically, however, the underlying structure of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya had taken nearly 40 years to establish itself in this fashion. Nonetheless, Dogra officials were left wondering how such a highly organized network of Muslims had materialized virtually overnight. Mahmud Ahmad was keenly aware that the mere threat of organized resistance pervading the state had damaging consequences for officials who now appeared isolated from their Muslim subjects. From the government's perspective, its inability to anticipate this type of resistance amounted to multiple failures on various levels. This should have involved the repeated disregard of indicators that would have been pointing towards the potential unravelling of their own state.
Sheikh Abdullah's pact with the Khalīfa
With the infrastructure of resistance beginning to take shape, Mahmud Ahmad began searching for a Kashmiri spokesperson to be advanced for the cause. He summoned roughly 15 to 20 candidates to Qadian for personal interviews in order to get a better idea of whom he would be working with in the future.Footnote 51 Once the meetings were complete, Mahmud Ahmad asked the Kashmiri delegation if they knew of any other potential leaders who had not joined them in Qadian. The entourage concurred that there was a Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah of Srinagar who could not risk leaving Kashmir in fear that the Darbār would not permit his re-entry into the state. This response was provocative enough to pique Mahmud Ahmad's interest, so he made arrangements to meet Sheikh Abdullah at the border town Garhi Habibullah. In a truly Bollywood style masquerade, ‘Abd al-Rahim Dard smuggled Sheikh Abdullah, who was hiding under a blanket in the backseat of a carriage, across the Indian border into Garhi Habibullah to meet the All-India Kashmir Committee's new president. When the meeting with Mirza Mahmud Ahmad was over, Sheikh Abdullah was smuggled back into Kashmir in the same manner in which he had arrived.Footnote 52
The scheme was a success and the agreement was simple. Sheikh Abdullah was to set up an office in Srinagar from which he could devote his full-time attention to the independence movement. He was entrusted to establish a periodical to disseminate information and publicize the resistance internally, resulting in the founding of the Islāh newsletter. The Islāh introduced a rare Muslim mouthpiece from within the borders of Kashmir that was created purely for the promotion of the independence movement. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad was aware that it was inappropriate for him to intervene as the khalīfa, since most Muslims in Kashmir were not his Ahmadi disciples. Likewise, at this point, the All-India Kashmir Committee was more of a facade for Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya than an inclusive umbrella, despite its influential membership.
Within this historical context, a newspaper itself was a major organ for communicating ideas throughout the subcontinent. Periodicals were one of the few means by which major leaders of the era could spread ideas beyond their immediate vicinities, which were often limited to the crowds of the local mosques that emerged following Friday prayers.Footnote 53 For this reason, Sheikh Abdullah's easy access to the press instantly made him a major player in the eyes of government observers who were studiously tracking the development of the situation. In fact, the impact of Sheikh Abdullah's ideas circulating throughout the Kashmiri press may have been more influential than Mahmud Ahmad had expected, due to the circumstances surrounding the Kashmiri press at that time.
In the early years of the conflict, Kashmir's reinvigorated press was taking advantage of the Dogra rulers’ recent relaxation in the censorship of Muslim publications, which had been implemented until 1932.Footnote 54 Sheikh Abdullah fulfilled his obligations through the early 1930s by publishing articles that made explicit appeals to the All-India Kashmir Committee, which effectively begged for its intercession. This alone provided Mahmud Ahmad with legitimacy as a political leader and enough leeway to enfranchise his political platform on behalf of the All-India Kashmir Committee from neighbouring India. Now, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad possessed the freedom to pursue matters in Jammu and Kashmir as he saw fit, while acting as the All-India Kashmir Committee's rightful president. In return for internal publicity and public appeals for intervention, Sheikh Abdullah, who did not come from an affluent background and hence lacked personal resources, received the funding necessary to sustain his independence office in Srinagar. The initial amount agreed at Garhi Habibullah was a base allowance of Rs. 238 per month with a potential for increase as needed.Footnote 55 This was indeed a generous figure for the time.
Sheikh Abdullah was so convincing in aligning himself with the All-India Kashmir Committee that he spent the rest of his career facing accusations of being ‘Qadiani’ from opposition parties, who would malign his reputation whenever the opportunity for political advancement arose. This was a problem for Darbār officials who were still trying to identify the key players in the crisis. Consequently, local authorities now had to waste time trying to determine if Sheikh Abdullah really was a ‘Qadiani’. It took months until ‘Abd al-Rahim Dard could clarify the issue on a visit to the Resident of Kashmir.Footnote 56 Even so, doubts remained and periodically re-emerged as a hazard for unassuming Kashmiris who were caught in the fallout of political opportunists exploiting the latest scandal. There are examples of this in Sheikh Abdullah's memoirs:
Unfortunately, the Mirwaiz [Maulvi Yusuf Shah] became embroiled in their [Majlis-i Ahrar's] intrigues. On 30 January 1932, he delivered a sermon at Khanqah-e-Naqshbandia in which he accused me of being a Qadiani. Everyone knew that I was a Sunni, of the Hanafi sect. This event took place in the dead of winter when most Kashmiris do not leave their houses without their kangris [braziers]. During the altercations which followed his allegation, these kangris were freely used as trajectories, injuring a number of people.Footnote 57
Being labelled a Qadiani in the 1930s was equivalent to slander. The allegations of being associated with Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya created difficulties for Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir, even though he clearly benefited from Ahmadi publicity on other occasions. The title Sher-i Kashmīr (the Lion of Kashmir) itself was purportedly coined by Mahmud Ahmad, who incessantly published sensationalized articles about Sheikh Abdullah which referred to him as the Sher-i Kashmīr. As other papers became acquainted with the Sher-i Kashmīr title, and Sheikh Abdullah's contributions to the Kashmiri cause were substantiated over time, Sher-i Kashmīr eventually became synonymous with Sheikh Abdullah.Footnote 58
The affinity between Mirza Mahmud Ahmad and Sheikh Abdullah developed gradually as both remained true to their agreement and honoured their commitments. The details of each specific project varied case by case, but the underlying premise was always the same. On 23 May 1932 Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, this time on behalf of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya, established a new scholarship fund for Muslim students studying in Kashmir. With an additional Rs. 200 per month, Sheikh Abdullah could establish a suitable boarding house with a full-time cook, which enabled 20 promising candidates the opportunity to pursue higher education each year.Footnote 59 Although this may appear to be a small number at first, it was considerably larger than the number of Muslim students included in the government's offer of 1927, which created such a stir and was succeeded by accusations of Hindu favouritism. Nevertheless, the new scholarship fund consisted of enough awards to woo Muslim favour in Kashmir and to increase positive publicity for Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya at a reasonable price.
Pragmatically, increasing revenues was never a problem for Mahmud Ahmad, who had constructed a fund-raising industry that was beginning to perpetuate itself. There was a circular return as finances were being channelled back into the same system from which they emerged. Sheikh Abdullah's frequent displays of approval for the All-India Kashmir Committee's initiatives had loosened the pockets of the committee's wealthier members, which sparked an increase in donations as well as a broader ‘All-Indian’ membership to stretch its roster. Likewise, growing numbers of underprivileged Kashmiris were willing to support a movement that was having a visible impact on the ground, including stipends for the families of the deceased and medical provisions for those injured in the riots.Footnote 60 Consequently, the increased confidence of lower class Kashmiris in the All-India Kashmir Committee was attracting even more donors from above.
Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's devotional support for the All-India Kashmir Committee
Mahmud Ahmad appropriated funds to the Kashmiri cause from every accessible channel, including Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya. As khalīfat al-masīh II, he established the ‘Kashmir Relief Fund’, a mandatory charitable donation (chandā) levied upon each earning Ahmadi within his Jama'at. These Ahmadis were required to give at least one pāī’ (1/192 of a rupee) on every earned rupee per month,Footnote 61 which the Jama'at continued to accrue for decades after the riots.Footnote 62 Still, many Ahmadis likely considered the Kashmir crisis to be a worthy cause and donated to the relief fund openhandedly.
As mentioned above, there were significant numbers of Ahmadis working anonymously behind the scenes, which contributed towards the hidden labour force of the independence movement under various banners, such as the All-India Kashmir Committee and the numerous Reading Rooms. However, unskilled labourers were not the only Ahmadis compelled by their khalīfa to volunteer their time and effort for the Kashmiri cause. In addition, Mahmud Ahmad instructed skilled Ahmadis to contribute professional services to Kashmiris as well. Throughout the stormiest years following the riots, major cities like Srinagar were occasionally subjected to bouts of martial law. Accordingly, the communal tensions and revolutionary threats had raised concerns amongst members of the military and police. The violent implications of the ordinance of 24 September 1931, mentioned above, reflected the heightened state of paranoia regarding national security. Consequently, an inordinate number of Muslims were falsely arrested and detained under pretences that were precariously linked to various offences.
With the internal situation deteriorating, Kashmir did not have an independent judicial system in place to determine whether those incarcerated were being held on legitimate charges. In addition, the Darbār had been using the ordinance to justify the acquisition of property from those indicted, since the ordinance permitted action to be taken based solely on suspicion.Footnote 63 As a result, when such cases went to trial, they invariably reduced to one individual's word against the word of another. The All-India Kashmir Committee sent teams of attorneys to Kashmir in order to assess the situation and to defend those who had been wrongfully detained or whose property had been wrongfully confiscated. Although there were also several cases where wealthy Kashmiris had their property or businesses seized, the majority of cases appear to have involved lower class Kashmiris with no recourse to legal counsel.Footnote 64
The lawyers went to major cities in Jammu and Kashmir at their own expense as volunteers of the All-India Kashmir Committee. Naturally, this involved several prominent Ahmadis who were primarily responding to their khalīfa's instructions. The All-India Kashmir Committee's legal team included Shaykh Bashir Ahmad (who later became a High Court Justice in Lahore), Chaudhry Muhammad Yusuf Khan, Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad Mazhar (who authored numerous lexicons pertaining to Ghulam Ahmad's linguistic theory),Footnote 65 Chaudhry Asadullah Khan (the younger brother of Zafrulla Khan), and several others. Remarkably, Dost Muhammad Shahid has recorded the details of hundreds of such cases that were acquitted or overturned due to the efforts of the All-India Kashmir Committee's legal team throughout the early 1930s.Footnote 66
Some of the All-India Kashmir Committee's internal support and services, such as legal contributions, medical relief, and scholarship funds, were meaningful in the sense that their interface with the Kashmiri public was deeply rooted enough to impact those who presumably were the most affected. However, Mahmud Ahmad had a number of other influential contacts within the All-India Kashmir Committee with whom he was collaborating to support his initiatives. Iqbal's sentimental connection to Kashmir is well known and often attributed to his family's Kashmiri background. His lifelong contributions and poetry about the struggles of the Muslims of Kashmir and the wider subcontinent have been well documented.Footnote 67 Similarly, it is known that Mian Fazl-i Husain's influence played an important role in stabilizing support for the All-India Kashmir Committee.Footnote 68 As with Iqbal, Mian Fazl-i Husain's contributions in the way of the independence movement have been recognized by the historians of South Asia,Footnote 69 although his personal relations and social contacts alongside his professional affiliations are often overlooked. In the Ahmadi-specific context, Mian Fazl-i Husain claimed to have a ‘great regard’ for Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali of the Lahori branch of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya.Footnote 70 Furthermore, he had been mentoring a young Chaudhry Muhammad Zafrulla Khan for some time, a devoted Ahmadi who had entered the movement at the hand of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.
From 1930 to 1932, Zafrulla Khan participated in all three of the Round Table Conferences in London. About five months after the riots, in December 1931, Zafrulla Khan was elected president of the All-India Muslim League. Despite the overt animosity expressed by Ahrari protesters,Footnote 71 Zafrulla Khan remained president of the Muslim League until June 1932 when he resigned from the position to fulfil his next task. Mian Fazl-i Husain had been a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council from 1930 to 1935. However, his declining health forced him to take a four-month leave of absence during the summer of 1932. Upon his recommendation, Zafrulla Khan took Fazl-i Husain's place on the Viceroy's Executive Council throughout the summer,Footnote 72 which was a bold move considering Zafrulla's age, inexperience, and lack of seniority. In his diary, Mian Fazl-i Husain admitted: ‘If it comes off, it will be a startling appointment’.Footnote 73 However, Zafrulla Khan's political aptitude had been developing rather quickly, while his proximity to eminent personalities provided the opportunity to discuss the Kashmir matter personally with the Viceroy in the early 1930s.Footnote 74 Zafrulla Khan represents one of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's most successful political leaders. As such, he was an invaluable asset to Mirza Mahmud Ahmad and the All-India Kashmir Committee during the crisis, and perhaps even more so following partition.
Towards visions of independence
Several factors came together during the crisis in Kashmir in the 1930s, which ultimately amounted to a transnational network of support with vast resources to apply pressure on the relevant governments (Kashmiri, Indian, and British) involved. As a result, the inability to identify the role of key figures in the Muslim leadership frustrated the response of government officials. This enabled Mahmud Ahmad to exercise various levels of control over the perception of the crisis by voicing similar concerns through dissimilar outlets. This, thereby, influenced a broader constituency than would normally have been possible through his own personal reach. His connections with revolutionary demagogues such as Sheikh Abdullah, who represented the Muslim sentiment of a country, to idealized literary icons such as Iqbal, who has come to represent the Muslim sentiment of an era, enabled Mahmud Ahmad to impose his influence throughout the region. Mahmud Ahmad now had the ability to meet with the Viceroy personally and threaten him with various courses of action,Footnote 75 including increased civil disobedience, like the mass boycott of shopkeepers (hartāl) of August 1931.Footnote 76 Mahmud Ahmad recognized the implications of the delicate balance between his action and inaction. In this respect, he also attempted to intimidate government officials by threatening to resign as All-India Kashmir Committee president and requesting his supporters to comply with Ahrari objectives, which would likely have resulted in a more violent conclusion to the crisis.Footnote 77
In his capacity as president of the All-India Kashmir Committee, Mahmud Ahmad exerted whatever pressure was available at his disposal upon the British and Indian governments to intervene in Kashmir, since he was convinced that immediate British intervention was the best political solution to the conflict. Mahmud Ahmad believed that British intervention would displace Dogra rule and eventually give the Muslims of Kashmir the best chance for independence. Although this was an indirect route to Kashmiri independence, it may have been a reasonable strategy considering the enduring violence in Kashmir in recent years. Despite Mahmud Ahmad's attempts, the British were resolved to let Kashmiris settle their own disputes, while they intervened sparingly and only when necessary. This attitude eventually exacerbated the ideological conflict between Mahmud Ahmad and his opponents, including Sheikh Abdullah, who from the beginning had insisted upon the creation of an independent Kashmir.
Weaning the All-India Kashmir Committee from its Ahmadi crutches
In order to sustain the All-India Kashmir Committee beyond the aftermath of the riots, the organizational facade of the committee needed to be solidified by explicitly defining its aims in writing as soon as possible. By 1933, the All-India Kashmir Committee still had no formal constitution, no formal objectives, and no formal procedures for carrying out its implicit goals. Realistically, Mahmud Ahmad had complete control of the All-India Kashmir Committee, much like in his own Jama'at, although it was for very different reasons. Thus there was a sense of validity to Ahrari criticisms that were beginning to resonate throughout the region, which often highlighted the potential for an Ahmadi conspiracy. Many people feared that Mahmud Ahmad was exploiting the situation in Kashmir to expand Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya. The only reasonable course of action for the committee's advocates was to consolidate the committee in a way that would formalize its agenda, which could provide it with longevity as a self-sufficient organization. In some respects, the familiar process involved in the act of institutionalization was Mahmud Ahmad's specialty, since it was exactly what he had done with his own Jama'at following the Lahori-Qadiani split.Footnote 78
Mahmud Ahmad must have been aware that people both inside and outside the All-India Kashmir Committee had problems with his approach. Mahmud Ahmad never denied his high hopes for the Muslims of Kashmir whenever he was questioned about proselytization,Footnote 79 even though he preferred to avoid the issue. His explanations often depicted a romanticized image of Kashmir's Muslims embracing Ahmadiyyat after seeing the tremendous efforts of individual Ahmadis in the way of Islam. However, this vision conflicted with the views of the remaining non-Ahmadi supporters of the All-India Kashmir Committee. Moreover, Mahmud Ahmad's acute awareness of the situation suggests that he feared creating a rift within the committee, which could have damaged his credibility as a leader and potentially tainted his Jama'at's ongoing efforts in Kashmir. Mahmud Ahmad knew that his disciples would follow him, irrespective of outside opinion. However, it was not prudent for him to cut ties with the committee. Once again, labour and funding had never been a problem for Mahmud Ahmad, but he needed the recognition of his fellow non-Ahmadi Muslims in order to achieve his political goals. Likewise, the non-Ahmadi members of the committee relied heavily upon the benefits of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's funding and infrastructure, which intrinsically accompanied Mahmud Ahmad's membership.
In May 1933 at Lahore's Cecil Hotel, the All-India Kashmir Committee decided to remedy the outstanding problems. Mahmud Ahmad resigned as president, largely in response to external pressure, which was beginning to polarize the committee's internal roster.Footnote 80 Following what was described by Dost Muhammad Shahid as a dignified ceremony, the committee selected Iqbal as an interim president to oversee the next election and to initiate the process of writing a constitution.Footnote 81 During this interim period, Iqbal recommended that other Ahmadis be prohibited from presiding as president of the All-India Kashmir Committee, due to the inherent conflict of interest. Iqbal was concerned that another Ahmadi president of the committee would only take orders from the khalīfat al-masīh,Footnote 82 which was a criticism that Mahmud Ahmad did not dispute. Nonetheless, Mahmud Ahmad's resignation was a problem for both sides of the committee's ambivalent members. It was no secret that the majority of Ahmadis who supported the committee were only involved out of obedience to their khalīfa. Had the committee revoked the membership of Ahmadis altogether, it would essentially need to re-establish itself once again without an Ahmadi infrastructure, which was something that its leaders had failed to do during the 20 years prior to 1931. Not only would this adversely affect the committee's source of Ahmadi funding, but it would also diminish its international pool of Ahmadi labourers.
It appears as though the Ahmadi withdrawal from the All-India Kashmir Committee (and its subsequent manifestations under similar names) took several years to become final. Periodically, there were a few half-hearted attempts to keep both factions of the committee working together on the Kashmiri front, but eventually both sides pursued their own interests. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad's resignation and subsequent break with the committee did not prevent his Jama'at from being involved in the ongoing crisis in Kashmir. The sole support of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya itself was enough to provide Mahmud Ahmad with a platform to continue working towards Kashmir's independence without the aid of the committee's more distinguished members. After various phases under different names, the committee settled back into a similar role as prior to the riots, an ineffective body of well-known Muslims without any real power.
This evolved into an unexpectedly awkward situation for Mahmud Ahmad because it forced community leaders, like Iqbal and Sheikh Abdullah, to state their official positions with regard to Ahmadi Islam. Naturally, Mahmud Ahmad's non-Ahmadi collaborators were not members of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya for a reason, which is not to say that they despised Ahmadis, since they were clearly willing to interact with them socially, politically, and religiously on a number of occasions. Nevertheless, they all ultimately disagreed with the Ahmadi interpretation of Islam at some level. Most often this was reduced to the problem of takfīr (accusing one of being a non-believer), which resulted from Mahmud Ahmad's presentation of his father's prophethood. Although Mahmud Ahmad's contacts maintained their relations with him, they were forced to distance themselves publicly from Ahmadi Islam and openly denounce the Ahmadi practice of takfīr. Interestingly, the issue of Ghulam Ahmad's prophethood did not dominate criticisms of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya until much later.Footnote 83 The process of dissociating from Mahmud Ahmad and Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya was centred more on a public display of alienation, rather than by breaking private contacts with individual Ahmadis. It seems as though Iqbal, Fazl-i Husain, and Sheikh Abdullah still met with, sat with, and prayed with Mahmud Ahmad as Muslims who shared common political interests, but maintained conflicting perspectives on Islam. This was different from rival groups like the Ahrar who had fiercely opposed Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya from the onset.Footnote 84
Due to the pressures of pragmatism, many of India's political elite had shown a willingness to cooperate with Mahmud Ahmad in the hope of establishing an image of Muslim unity. However, once the deviations in his theological worldview became politicized, they abandoned him by removing him from the limelight. The fact that Mahmud Ahmad's sectarian outlook sanctioned takfīr, which hence encouraged further divisions in Islam, was problematic for this type of politics, because opposing a particular party in Muslim South Asia could be perceived as opposing Islam.
Mahmud Ahmad could no longer represent the face of Muslim politics in any capacity whatsoever, except as khalīfat al-masīh. It seems as if he understood the implications of his actions and willingly accepted his new role as a follower of Indian politics rather than as its leader. This process was made easier by the political achievements of some of his more prominent disciples. As the Ahmadi controversy continued to erupt with greater frequency in the coming years, Ahmadis like Zafrulla Khan still managed to attain high-level political positions, including (the first) Foreign Minister of Pakistan. This was followed by a successful career in the United Nations, where Zafrulla Khan served as President of the General Assembly and President of the International Court of Justice. Interestingly, Zafrulla Khan's accomplishments in international politics did not enable him to receive public recognition for his religious affiliations, which may have a sense of irony considering Mahmud Ahmad's political aspirations.
Conclusion
As detailed above, the Kashmir crisis provided a testing ground for political parties and Muslim representatives, which facilitated the emergence of a new leadership in Muslim South Asia following partition. The continued strain of communal tensions coupled with the need for socio-economic reform provided a backdrop for Muslim leaders to prove their organization's claims through the implementation of political policies. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad's involvement in communal politics and in the formation of modern South Asia's political machinery added a new political dimension to the Ahmadi identity. As Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya began to move away from the other-worldliness of Ghulam Ahmad's Sufi metaphysics, it abandoned the elitist circles affiliated with the upper classes in favour of a populist approach that offered this-worldly gains for average Indian Muslims.
In this sense, Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya was no different from any other Muslim political party of the time, in that it condoned the notion of an implicit connection between political success and religious authenticity. By attributing socio-political accomplishments to a religious worldview, a Muslim political party substantiated both its political platform and its interpretation of Islam. Correspondingly, this was used to demonstrate its religious superiority to rivals and, in the case of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya, expand its mission. Unfortunately for Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya, the espousal of politics with religion could conversely be used to infer that the reverse was also true. For this reason, the ultimate failure of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya to bring about Kashmiri independence quietly encouraged the general perception of Ahmadi Islam's hollowness.
With this in mind, most academic surveys of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya focus too heavily on questionable aspects of Ahmadi religious thought as the sole antecedent for the Jama'at's subsequent persecution in Pakistan following partition. For example, in Yohanan Friedmann's study, Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's participation in the Kashmir crisis is altogether ignored.Footnote 85 Recent studies on Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya tend to follow this trend and focus wholly on the causal relationship between religious idiosyncrasies and religious persecution.Footnote 86 Although Spencer Lavan did discuss elements of the Kashmir crisis in his study, his historical analysis of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya ended in 1936.Footnote 87 Collectively, this has made it difficult to assess the role of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya in the development of South Asia. Thus, the significance of the Kashmir crisis, in providing an appraisal of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's place within the contemporary discourse on South Asian religion and politics, has been largely overlooked. Furthermore, current literature is unable to contribute towards a broader understanding of this process and, in particular, show how Ahmadi Islam suddenly became so heavily politicized in mainstream South Asia after partition. As we have seen above, factors contributing towards the politicization of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya took place long before partition as part of a gradual process, which was initiated by events, including the Kashmir crisis, that were forged within a mixed religious and political framework.
As individual Ahmadis became more accustomed to civic involvement, self-promoting publicity campaigns, and political activism throughout the various crises in the 1930s and 1940s, Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's role in public affairs became a firmly established feature of South Asian religion and politics. In this sense, the public's familiarity with the Ahmadi presence in South Asian politics contributed to the politicization of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya, which ultimately influenced subsequent events in Pakistan's early history, including (perhaps most notably) the Punjab disturbances of 1953. Although these events are commonly discussed today within the public discourse on Ahmadi Islam, they are rarely contextualized with regard to the two preceding decades of conflict in Kashmir, upon which the Ahmadi political platform was predicated. It is clear that the subsequent presence of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya in South Asian politics following partition cannot be divorced from its lengthy development prior to partition, which relied heavily upon the political platform that was constructed over the course of the crisis in Kashmir, as a means to disseminate Ahmadi Islam in South Asia. The Kashmir crisis therefore facilitated this process and largely marked the entrance of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya into South Asian politics.
