In a globalized world, where economic development, as well as food, water and human security, have become pressing cross-border issues, an understanding of how “Asia” approaches these issues is important. In each clearly presented chapter, the chapter authors, all experts in their fields, focus on policy making to discuss regional governance in Asia. Besides the editors, they include Mike Douglass (on governance and migration), Graeme Hugo (on water governance), Taeho Bark (on trade promotion), William Long (on health cooperation) and Mely Caballero-Anthony (on human rights and trafficking). Broadly speaking, the authors take an institutional perspective to analyse cross-boundary issues, issues that cannot be resolved by national action alone. They pay particular attention to the role of civil society and the media in shaping the policy debates in countries throughout Asia; why and how cross-boundary cooperation becomes institutionalized and affects policy; and why regional cooperation has succeeded or failed on each issue.
Although “Asia,” not China, is the book's focus, because China shares 22,147 kilometres of borders with 14 countries, and is such a powerful actor in Asia, its involvement in regional dialogues and institution building has been crucial in almost all of the cross-boundary issues discussed: disease, water, trade, human trafficking and regional institution-building. It is noteworthy that most of the Asian nations share the Chinese view on these issues, except when their respective national interests differ.
China's engagement with Asia on cross-boundary issues is particularly evident on health issues. China shares information and engages in dialogue on infectious disease surveillance, training healthcare personnel, controlling epidemics and much more. Through its participation in functionally oriented institutions, such as the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance Network and “ASEAN + 3” infectious diseases initiatives, China is building trust with other states that could spill over into other functional issues, including cooperation even on political and security issues.
Another cross-boundary governance issue in which China is a key player is trade. As with health, the “public good” of free trade is greatly enhanced by cooperation with other Asian states: more open economies, with fewer trade barriers, tend to become more prosperous. China's trade liberalization and participation in multiple Free Trade Agreements benefit Asia's economic integration. Moreover, China's investment in its Asian neighbours' infrastructure, by eliminating logistical bottlenecks in land transport and ports, has fuelled regional trade and economic growth within Asia.
China has also joined Asian regional efforts to prevent and punish human trafficking, even though for China this mostly occurs within its own boundaries. With migration, China, like most other Asian states, restricts permanent settlement of foreigners, but (except for North Korean refugees) migrant workers rarely try to enter China. The Chinese differ from most other Asian countries on emigration, with China viewing this not as a “brain drain” but rather as an important link in the chain of building educational, cultural and business bridges with developed nations. Furthermore, the millions of Chinese low-skilled emigrants working throughout the world return tens of billions of dollars in remittances each year to their families in China.
One of the key areas in which China's cooperation with cross-boundary institutions is limited by sensitive national interests is water. China rarely shares data concerning its cross-boundary rivers, such as the Indus, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna and Mekong rivers because of water, food and energy security issues. Often the uppermost riparian for Asian cross-boundary rivers, China does not want to consult with downstream countries about whether it can build dams or limit the water it takes from rivers. So water and dam building do not meet conditions of a “transnational regional public good” since, if China builds a dam, the countries located below China's border may bear the costs – and not receive the river's benefits. Water is an unusual trans-boundary issue, however, as rarely are any Asian states willing to put regional interests above national interests. China's geographical position, allowing it to control the flow of the major rivers originating in the Tibetan plateau, means its decisions about sharing information and building infrastructure affect the national interests of all downstream riparians. Like other states, China is more willing to cooperate if agreements about trans-boundary rivers have limited binding authority and are on a bilateral basis, where deals can be made, and costs and benefits better calculated than in multilateral agreements.
Nevertheless, as several chapter authors point out, China's power to act independently has been increasingly constrained and shaped by the power of NGOs and grassroots groups, and sometimes by international financial institutions. Thanks in particular to the Asian Development Bank's efforts to knit together the entire “Greater Mekong Sub-region” through transportation, communication and trade, China is developing a different calculus of the costs and benefits of its participation in cross-boundary water governance.
In short, the book's authors suggest that if a true “public good” is involved, in which all states “win” by cooperating, and if not cooperating will clearly produce less optimal outcomes (the spread of disease, limited trade and development, and increased human trafficking), participation is likely. But when there are sensitive political and security issues that involve national interests (such as water management), most states, including China, are reluctant to participate. As globalization structurally transforms Asia, the challenge is for states to modify their ideas of sovereignty as territorially based. This well-edited book is valuable for specialists to understand the growth of Asian regional governance, which is eroding the importance of China's territorial borders.
