Academics, like politicians, enjoy celebrating silver and golden jubilees, centennials, and other ceremonial occasions. While the latter use these occasions to boost their legitimacy and elevate their prestige, the former tend to search for some meaningful, authoritative narrative that will hopefully endure until at least the next celebration—the discovery of which perhaps leads to a different kind of prestige. The Golden Jubilee of the Suez Affair in the summer of 2006 prompted the organization of several conferences in the West and the Arab world. The volume under review is the first to emerge from these conferences (and there are more to come). It is the product of an international conference held at the University of Hull; Simon Smith gathered some seventeen academics to collaborate on a book about the 1956 Suez Crisis that included in its title promising terms such as “reassessing” and “new perspectives.” Some articles follow through on the use of such terms, but the volume in general does not offer a meaningful rethinking of the event.
A look at the volume's table of contents reveals two problematic issues: first, no structural logic dictated the ordering of the articles; second, of the fifteen pieces, twelve were dedicated to issues related to the superpowers (Britain, the United States, and France) and the United Nations. Only three articles deal with regional actors—and of those, one focuses on Turkey, which by all accounts was a minor actor in the drama. The result is a strong bias toward a description of the roles of superpowers—particularly Britain (to which eight pieces are dedicated)—with a relative neglect of the role of Egypt, Israel, and the other Arab states. It is also noted that some of the chapters rely heavily on material published in the authors’ previous books and articles. Moreover, even with an evident international–regional imbalance, a serious analysis of the French role is sorely lacking. Zach Levey's interesting article on French–Israeli relations notwithstanding, there is no study on French behavior on the basis of recently declassified French documents. The same can be said with regard to the Soviet role in the affair.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the book is the fact that it does not offer, in the introduction or elsewhere, a fresh look at the “big picture” in any of three possible ways. First, the book could have presented some of the major historiographical debates surrounding the 1956 affair on its fiftieth anniversary and assessed the stages in the evolution of these debates. True, this is a formidable task given the magnitude of the academic literature published on the subject, but the outcome may have been rewarding for two audiences: the general academic reader who is unfamiliar with the details and intricacies of the affair and future generations of scholars who will be able to discern what has changed in the historiography prior to the occasion of the Suez centennial. Instead, the book tends to emphasize the “little picture”—that is, episodes, states, and individuals that were only indirectly related to the episode but now are “revealed” to play some role, even if a secondary one.
Second, in his too short but otherwise interesting conclusion, Scott Lucas quotes a British historian who claims that what is needed “is a global history of Suez.” My impression is that Keith Kyle's epic book on Suez (Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991]) falls within that definition. What is missing in this volume, to my mind, is an article that does not necessarily follow the historical method by relying on archival material (most articles in this volume do the job) but rather analyzes the behavior of the actors from an international-affairs perspective—in other words, an article that analyzes the Suez War within the dynamics of the global system during the Cold War years. Such an analysis would go beyond the heavy reliance on the role of the individual decision maker, which is so prevalent in this volume. (In addition to the many references to Anthony Eden, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, Harold Macmillan, David Ben-Gurion, and Gamal Abdel Nasser [see index], three articles deal with “neglected” personalities such as Winston Churchill, Julian Amery, and Anthony Nutting.)
Third, the volume lacks an analysis of the perceptions and images of the Suez Affair, particularly in the Middle East in the Golden Jubilee year. Without diminishing the importance of investigating what “really happened” on the basis of decent archival work, it is necessary to examine how people in the Middle East personally and collectively “remember” the episode. Such a focus will reveal that there are serious differences in the ways Arabs, Israelis, and the British remember the occasion and that these differences may be highly relevant to contemporary affairs. The fact that the anniversary of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company coincided with the 2006 Lebanese war led to parallels in Arab discourse between Egypt's “victory” in 1956 and Hizballah's “victory” over Israel in 2006. Even the etymological resemblance between Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hassan Nasrallah was evoked as a kind of metaphor. An analysis of discourse in the media, history textbooks, and historiography may reveal how the actors remember the episode.
The volume's overreliance on the global system leads to some stereotypical descriptions of local actors. This is particularly true of the description of Nasser, who is portrayed according to a Western negative image reflected in the documents of the time. This stands in contrast to the more recent approach in Middle Eastern historiography, which sees Nasser as an Arab and Egyptian nationalist, far from a Hitler or Mussolini type, who was defending serious and justified Egyptian interests in the decolonization period. In his astute reading of the global scene, Nasser was playing East against West; in such a way, he could clandestinely coordinate the formation of the United Arab Republic with the United States (in contrast to the prevailing premise that the United States objected to its formation) and at the same time receive arms from the Soviet Union. It seems that Laura James’ contribution, drawing on Arabic sources and interviews, has a good understanding of Nasser's enigmatic personality. Yet her attempt to decipher when and how he made his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company leads to no satisfactory answers; perhaps a comparative analysis of Nasser's “big” decisions (the Czech arms deal, the formation of the United Arab Republic, the Yemen episode, and the 1967 war) could have demonstrated his reckless pattern of decision making.
In sum, the various articles in this volume broaden our understanding of some of the forces in operation during the Suez Crisis, but on the whole they do not offer a serious reassessment or new perspectives on the affair.
