Sungmoon Kim's latest book is a contribution to a growing debate: the possibilities for democracy in East Asian societies shaped by a historically undemocratic Confucian tradition. This debate is often framed as a dispute between two positions, democrats and meritocrats. Confucian democrats believe democracy is compatible with, or an extension of, traditional Confucian thought and values. Meritocrats argue that the tradition suggests a political system where authority is based on personal excellence.
What distinguishes Kim's book is his original approach to Confucian democracy, and his concern with contemporary East Asia as a starting point for theory. For example, Kim points out that the democrat-meritocrat dichotomy is an oversimplification (60). Both can endorse some degree of democracy, since meritocrats can use elections for lower-level positions and to legitimize the political system. A more sophisticated account of democracy is thus needed to understand why a society infused with Confucian values would also fully embrace the values and institutions of the democratic process. Furthermore, the debate often assumes that present-day claims about East Asian democracy should be based in traditional Confucian thought; Kim argues, however, that showing that traditional Confucian texts contain ideas that putatively support democracy is insufficient. For example, Confucian thought's commitment to personal cultivation has been used to argue for democracy, insofar as complete virtue is thought to require active political engagement (30); on this view, democracy is instrumentally necessary for Confucian perfectionism. This does not prove its value for modern times, however, since whether personal cultivation truly requires political participation, or whether it is better secured by other means, such as the established Confucian concern with social and familial immersion, is an open question (34). What is needed is direct arguments for the value of democracy, which are relevant to East Asia today and also consistent with core Confucian values.
This is the goal for the first half of the book—the three chapters of part 1. Here, Kim examines three related questions, respectively: why political participation matters, the value of democracy, and how democratic procedure can further perfectionist Confucian goals.
Kim does not seek a justification of democracy by direct appeal to Confucian values and heritage, nor does he appeal to the universal value of democracy per se or to liberal individualism. Instead, Kim argues that democracy is the most appropriate political system for contemporary East Asian societies, given their current political and social realities. Empirical study of these societies reveals increasing diversity and a striving to coordinate decisions across the public realm. The tradition of exemplary rulership by virtuous leader has proven inadequate, and institutionalized participatory democracy has emerged as the best (or least bad) political system. The resulting pragmatic Confucian democracy is “a mode of democracy whose political institutions and social practices, which together make democracy a way of life, are justified on pragmatic grounds under the circumstances of modern politics” (6).
Kim argues that citizens will first accept democratic institutions and procedures for pragmatic reasons, but in time, and recognizing their effectiveness, they will embrace democracy as a way of life. They will come to hold in their own right political values not endemic to the Confucian tradition, such as “popular sovereignty, political equality and the right to political participation” (23). Presumably, we are to understand this as an expansion of the core values of modern Confucian societies to include such political values, and this explains how democracy can flourish outside the individualism of the Western liberal tradition. Indeed, Kim believes that these democratic political values can further certain traditional Confucian values (those emphasizing strict social or gender hierarchies are discarded). Unlike the Western liberal democratic state, neutral between conceptions of the good life, citizens in a Confucian pragmatic democracy cherish goods such as filial piety, respect for the elderly, and ritualized forms of life. Democratic political values are instrumental to their realization, helping to structure public debate and reason.
The theoretical foundations of pragmatic Confucian democracy now established, the second part of the book (chapters 4–6) explores how a Confucian democratic polity might deal with three areas of public policy: punishment, equality, and humanitarian intervention. For each, Kim offers a distinctive Confucian approach; for example, punishment is understood in terms of the repair of relationships and reform of the offender's character (121).
There is much to admire about this book, particularly its extensive use of Western political theory to expand the conceptual possibilities for Confucian social thought. Another strong point is the account's empirical sensitivity. While many have theorized Confucian political modernity in abstraction from the realities of contemporary East Asian societies (62), Kim's account reflects democracies in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea that—to some degree—illustrate the book's case for democracy. In these countries, democracies develop symbiotically with elements of the Confucian good life.
Kim's argument seems to hover close the horns of a dilemma, however. On the one hand, the commitment to democracy originates in the pluralism of contemporary East Asia, as a method to coordinate and order the public realm. At the same time, Kim believes that some core traditional Confucian values will serve as guiding standards for public debate and direct policy decisions. Confucian values, such as filial piety and respect for the elderly, remain central to citizens’ identity and decisions. These two claims seem to be in tension, however. If democracy emerges as a response to disagreement, then it is not clear how there can be a stable core of Confucian values that can guide public debate and shape policy. The resort to deriving decisions through democratic mechanisms suggests a lack of consensus over values in public life. Conversely, if there is indeed a core of traditional Confucian values that command assent among a sufficiently large swath of the population, then it is hard to make sense of the claim of pluralism and the pragmatic need for democracy.
Admittedly, a society committed to Confucian values would presumably still experience disagreement about how best to enact shared goals, such as filial conduct or respect for seniors. Disagreement of this kind, however, might not produce democracy, since a meritocratic system could also feature disagreement over implementation. The disagreement that Kim has in mind seems more substantial than this, and involves accommodating those who reject traditional Confucian values—including those who wish to develop their own conception of the good life. Such deeper conflicts seem representative of increasingly diversified East Asian societies and their encounters with other traditions. Consequently, the democracy that emerges in this book at times feels like one in which citizens committed to democratic process and sympathetic to Confucian values are merely one group among others; but whether this can be called a Confucian democracy is debatable.
Such reservations do not detract too much from the book's achievements, however. Its contributions to questions important to the quest for Confucian democracy make it required reading for those in the field.
