The papers gathered here emerge from a workshop held at the Danish Institute in Rome in January 2013. The workshop investigated how the Roman triumph evolved during a period when the Romans were preoccupied more than ever with war. Although I question the editors’ premise that the uniquely Roman ritual of the triumph indicates that the Romans suffered from a ‘victory disease’ to an exceptional degree within the Mediterranean system they inhabited (the comparison with Classical Athens and Sparta (9) is beside the point; better would be a comparison with Rome's contemporaries, the constantly warring Hellenistic states and kingdoms), they have compiled an interesting, thought-provoking suite of papers.

The first section of the book, ‘Triumphal Conventions’, examines the evidence for the ‘rules’ surrounding the triumph. Not surprisingly, as with most matters involving the aristocratic pursuit of gloria during the Republic, it seems the triumph was governed less by ius than by mos (though the authors are curiously reluctant to use this term; see below). Christoph Lundgreen's paper (titles may be found at http://www.edizioniquasar.it/sku.php?id_libro=2041) on Valerius Maximus’ ius triumphandi (2.8) divides Valerius’ alleged iures into unbreakable ‘rules’ and more flexible ‘principles’. Richard Westall's paper approaches the problem from a literary perspective, arguing that the triumph not only provided closure for the Roman military process, but also for Greek and Roman historical narratives, particularly in their religious aspects. Co-editor Vervaet's first essay in the collection, co-written with Christopher Dart, defends the basic meaning behind Valerius’ statement that triumphs could only be granted to those commanders whose victories extended Roman territory rather than simply recovered that which had once been Roman. The authors argue that Valerius’ term ius is too inflexible a term to apply to the set of rules governing a triumph, but was a ‘principle’ established over time as the nature of the Roman imperium evolved and the Senate in response determined the grounds upon which to grant or deny triumphs, which then became ‘precedents’.

The next section on ‘The Middle Republic’ contains a pair of papers, one by co-editor Lange and the other by Matteo Cadario. The former argues that originally ‘the Alban Mount triumph was a form of protest against the Senate's decision to decline a triumph’ (68), but was transformed by Octavian into a legitimate, official triumph after Julius Caesar's and his own (jointly with Antony) Alban Mount triumphs (which lacked actual military victories to celebrate) in 40 and 44 b.c., respectively. Cadario's paper concerns the afterlife of plundered Greek artworks, arguing that victorious Roman commanders displayed ‘connoisseurship’ in their choice of, and decisions concerning, plundered artefacts. Some they plundered for display in triumphs and eventual display in Rome and other Italian cities; others they returned to their original owners to avert resentment; still others they sent to allied Greek cities; while anathemata (dedications, votive offerings) were typically left in situ and reinscribed with the victorious commander's name to display his piety.

The next set of papers on ‘The Late Republic’ begins with Jesper Carlsen's close study of Ahenobarbus’ (cos. 122) triumph of 120 b.c. de Galleis Arverneis. Jesper Majbom Madsen in the following chapter discovers that the three generals who celebrated triumphs over Mithridates VI without vanquishing the king (Sulla, Murena and Lucullus) could do so because of political manipulations rather than rigid rules and conventions. Vervaet's second paper in the volume argues that Pompey's triumphs are yet another locus of the great general's overall subversion of Republican norms, which provided dangerous precedents for the breakdown of consensus that ultimately doomed the free Roman state. Rounding out this section is Josiah Osgood's paper, which follows on nicely from Vervaet's, in that it shows how Caesar's frustrated request for a triumph in 60 b.c., despite his doing everything necessary for gaining one — and then some — during his Spanish proconsulship of 61, determined his behaviour in the years leading up to the civil war. He would not be deprived of his triumph a second time.

The awkwardness of celebrating victories over fellow-citizens is discussed in the final section, ‘Civil War and Triumph’. Wolfgang Haevener argues that Sulla, Pompey, Caesar and Octavian used different, innovative strategies to downplay the fact that their triumphs were, partly, over fellow-citizens while at the same time sending a message that order had been restored, that they were the victors who achieved this, and that their victories justified and consolidated their power. Ida Östenberg, by contrast, believes that the taboo of celebrating Roman victories over other Romans was never overcome; one could not parade Romans as defeated enemies, and so ‘reality [Romans defeating other Romans] and representation [triumphs continued to celebrate Romans beating foreign others] simply did not match’ (188). The Romans, therefore, developed two alternatives: the memorial monument (which was ultimately unsuccessful) and the calendar (which was very successful).

The final stand-alone chapter, ‘the capstone and grand finale of [the] volume’ (13), is esteemed scholar John Rich's exploration of the evolution of the triumph during the Republic, and its fluctuations in response to senatorial decision-making and military requirements. Rich provides a most valuable reconstruction and discussion of the triumphal list across 500 years of Republican history — a ktēma es aiei if there ever was one.

The editors have assembled a thought-provoking and persuasively argued set of papers. At the risk of essentializing, however, I wish the authors and editors could have torn themselves more fully away from the Anglo-Germanic legalistic scholarly traditions surrounding such socially- and culturally-specific Roman rituals as the triumph. They all seem to accept, rightly in my view, that ius is too inflexible a concept to apply to the Roman triumph, preferring such terms as ‘conventions’, ‘regulations’, ‘criteria’, ‘norms’, ‘conditions’, ‘qualifications’, ‘rules’, ‘principles’, ‘prerequisites’, and even ‘customary law’ (136 n. 25, 144), but most eschew the terms the Romans themselves would have used. Mos governed whether a triumph was granted; when the conditions under which it was granted changed, for whatever circumstantial (mostly political) reason(s), mos maiorum was updated to reflect this, as the sources amply attest (cf. Livy 31.20.3 (exemplum a maioribus), 5 (mos maiorum … exemplum), 49.10 (maiores); 39.29.5 (exemplum … mos maiorum); Dio 36.25.3 (νενομισμένον); 37.22.4 (ἔξω τῶν πατρίων)). Some authors’ failure to recognize this invariably leads to terminological confusion, as well as hair-splitting and special pleading. So, for example, despite Lundgreen's assertion that his division of Valerius Maximus’ iures triumphandi into unbreakable ‘rules’ and more flexible ‘principles’ is a ‘heuristic instrument [that] allows us to account for all sources combined’, a glance at his table on the same page (24) shows the ‘rules’ were anything but: one was gone by 326, another by 200, and the third by 81 b.c. The last case, Pompey's famous request for a triumph without actually having held command as a magistrate, Lundgreen insists ‘is no counter-argument’ (23) since he is the exception that proves the rule. But mos maiorum was built upon such exceptions; they are indeed its very essence.

The volume itself is well-presented with relatively few typos and few slips (‘Perseus’ for ‘Philip V’ (58), ‘Massalia’ for ‘Massilia’ (106, 112), ‘Black [sc. Sea]’ (120), ‘homus novus’ (126), ‘veni, vidi, vinci’ (129)), though the folio format makes it a bit unwieldy and difficult to read (especially on public transport), and the lack of a consolidated bibliography seems an odd editorial decision.