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Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2010

William Seager
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

Modern physicalists frequently offer the generous concession that although dualism is false, it is not a metaphysical impossibility. And it appears that the proper formulation of physicalism allows for this concessionary position. It would be expected that dualists also could accept that while physicalism is false, it too is a metaphysical possibility. I will argue that a careful analysis of physicalism and dualism shows that in fact these concessionary positions cannot be maintained. In particular, the nature of the metaphysical determination relation which holds between matter and mind on both physicalist and dualist views precludes either from allowing that the other is a metaphysical possibility.

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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2010