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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2004
This book is a good idea—a recent economic history of America, without footnotes but with in-text references and a good bibliography. The length of 312 pages is manageable for thoughtful, but nonprofessional readers. And the format, with chronological sections of chapters by topic, makes sense. However, the book lacks any quantitative data in the form of either charts or tables—an intolerable inadequacy for a book on economic history. And the choice of subjects is imbalanced. There are several chapters on labor relations, the author's own specialty, but none on economic regulation or deregulation or other microeconomic phenomenon of interest, such as defense, education, health care, social entitlements (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security), the structure of fiscal deficits and debt, or the structure of America's balance of payments.
Organized in 12 chapters, the book deals primarily with macroeconomic history and labor relations. After an introductory chapter on mobilization, Samuel Rosenberg organizes his narrative in three parts: the making of an institutional framework (1945–1960), development strains (1960–1971), and the unmaking and remaking of a new institutional framework (1971–2000). Within each section, the author deals with macroeconomic policy and growth, with labor relations, and with exchange-rate conditions and international competitiveness. A departure, chapter 7, deals with race, gender, and income inequality.
The macroeconomics is adequate and clear, but hardly masterly. Keynesian economics is explained briefly, but never developed in depth. There is no discussion of income multiplier, of the gap between real and potential output, of total factor productivity, of real interest rates or real exchange rates. Likewise, the coverage of supply shocks—especially the two oil shocks in 1973–1974 and 1978–1980, has too little substance or descriptive color to give the reader an adequate sense of the shocks' effects on America. The same applies to the effects of Reaganomics on the dollar, the budget, and the government's debt.
The book's strongest chapters cover labor relations—chapters 3, 6, and parts of 1, 10, and 11. This is where the author bases his text on a strong background of research. So one learns of the empowerment of labor under Taft Hartley, and its subsequent growth. Then one reads of a standoff, between labor and business during the 1960s, the slow decline during the 1970s and its relations to wage-price controls, and the sharp fall in institutional power and size during the1980s.
The author intensely dislikes the Reagan era and is extremely critical of the Reagan administration's effects on the budget, taxes and inequality, labor and international competitiveness. After characterizing the Reagan Revolution as a market-based, conservative strategy, the author concludes that it “did not lead to a more well-functioning economy. The rate of economic growth did not accelerate and an investment boom did not materialize. What supply-side economics lead to was growing economic inequality and growing economic deprivation”(p. 235). This is not a glowing endorsement. He concludes that “Clinton did what Reagan espoused” (p. 304).
An egregious failure of the book is its failure to develop the phenomenon of economic deregulation after the mid-1970s. After all, huge segments of American economic life—banking and securities, airlines, railroads and trucking, petroleum, natural gas and electricity, and telecommunications were deregulation during this period. There were a series of causes why the old regulated systems began to fail, and a whole analysis of the consequences of deregulation, which contributed substantially to America's macroeconomic performance. Of this, however, there is little mention.
The book would have been vastly improved had the author utilized some simple quantitative data, in tabular or clear graphic form. GDP growth rates, inflation, unemployment, balance of payments, productivity and budgetary data could all be presented clearly and simply, vastly enhancing the readability and understandability of the text.
Professor Rosenberg concludes with a nice section on the budgetary reforms of the Clinton administration, and on the powerful “new economy” at the end of the twentieth century. In a parting shot, though, he warns against smugness, noting that Japan, which looked unstoppable in 1989, appeared pathetic just a decade later. The same, he suggests, could happen to America. Indeed, one wonders what the author would say three years later (July 2003), at the time of this review?