Less than ever before is it possible to write about Syria in a scholarly and “detached” manner. This ten-chapter narrative tells the story of Syria's first five war years between 2011 and mid 2016, relying primarily on mainstream western media sources, western think tanks, western government discourse and interviews with western officials and Syrian opposition figures residing outside of the country. Analysing the role of “foreign hands” in the context of Syria's ongoing conflict is certainly valuable and in fact essential.
Yet this is not a satisfying account. The focus here is placed too heavily on empirical inquiry, retelling one thing after another while failing to differentiate between primary, secondary, and distracting tertiary factors. There is unwillingness on the part of the author to engage with theoretical perspectives that might explain U.S. behaviour in the Middle East. In particular, the relationship between the United States, Israel, Turkey, the Arab Gulf regimes, and other regional U.S. client states is never explained in any detail. One looks in vain for a single mention of the Eisenhower Doctrine or any other structural reason behind U.S. policies vis-à-vis Syria.
A second directly related problem is the author's narrow time frame, which further limits the scope of analysis. Post-Cold War efforts by U.S. politicians to remove all remaining Arab opponent regimes in the Middle East and the long-standing strategizing of neoconservatives, organically linking U.S. and Israeli foreign policy circles in efforts to break up Syria and Iraq, are not discussed. Indeed, Israel as one of the significant “foreign hands” in the Syrian conflict is noticeable in this book only by its near absence. One needs to turn to page 173 to find less than two pages of inquiry about why Israel might be keen to destroy Syrian statehood closing on page 175 with the mention of a so-called “Israeli Golan,” which appears to be the term of choice of the publisher's copy editor for what is the “occupied Syrian Golan.”
Such issues aside, Phillips is keen to present foreign interventionism in Syria as primarily driven by regional actors. One finds many details on the assumed reasoning of Turkish, Saudi, and other Arab Gulf governing circles for their funding of Islamist extremist groups, while the role of the U.S. and the CIA in organizing the delivery of weapons to the Syrian insurgents – from at least as early as 2012 – and in establishing military command rooms in Turkey and Jordan to coordinate attacks on the Syrian army, state, and society are consistently downplayed.
The statements that “the most important players were Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey” and that “in 2011 western intelligence services had little experience of Syria and did not know who the rebel fighters were, meaning that they had to build relationships from scratch” (134 and 142–3, respectively) are misleading. In fact, the second claim is only referenced as “interview with US official” and one must wonder why Phillips fails to critically engage with such proclamations of U.S. confusion. Later sections directly contradict this earlier statement – namely the notorious 2012 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, briefly quoted on page 203, that foresaw the rise of a “Salafist principality in eastern Syria… exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want.” Aside from forecasting the rise of ISIS, the same intelligence report suggested that the Assad government was ultimately likely to prevail, which certainly contradicted the official line of the U.S. administration at that point in time.
Moreover, crucial U.S. covert actions, which slowly escalated the fighting on the ground but stayed short of “tip[ping] the power balance in the war” (182), are also downplayed. Nevertheless, the section evaluating U.S. President Obama's key role in the context of U.S. strategic debates and institutional infighting is perhaps the most illuminating section of the book (178–188). Here, the author underlines the (relative) success of Obama in utilizing proxy forces such as the PYD-Kurds to gain veto power in Syria, without any large-scale insertion of U.S. troops.
In conclusion, this account of foreign interventionism in Syria is overall too respectful of western government assertions to fully clarify root causes of the Syrian conflict in the regional and global context.
