The Patron's Payoff is a useful marriage of an economic model borrowed from game theory and a well-known phenomenon belonging to art history: the many examples of Renaissance patrons expending extravagant sums on art and architecture. Faced with the problem of the proliferation of private chapels in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Italy, sold off by the respective churches to patrons who might spend a fortune on them yet rarely put them to use, the economist Richard J. Zeckhauser and the art historian Jonathan K. Nelson developed a model to explain conspicuous consumption during the Renaissance based on the economics of information. They use three basic concepts: signaling, signposting, and stretching. Through their application they hoped to describe the benefits accruing to patrons from such commissions that cannot be readily put in monetary terms, where, in fact, the patron's expenditures often don't make much financial sense.
Signaling is primarily related to the Renaissance concept of magnificence, and refers to the efforts by patrons to use their art commissions to signal their social status to their contemporaries and to posterity. Signaling involves a cost differential that implicitly separates the status of the patron who can afford such displays of magnificence from lesser contemporaries. Signposting refers to the manner in which commissioned works of art represent features that typically show the patron to the best advantage while leaving out elements that, even if closer to the truth, would detract from the patron's prestige. Stretching occurs when the patron/agent create works of art that magnify qualities belonging to the patron, but in a manner that remains acceptable to the patron's contemporaries. The latter two behaviors might be said to contribute to what Stephan Greenblatt has famously termed “Renaissance self-fashioning.”
The authors demonstrate through numerous examples drawn from three centuries of Italian art and architecture how patrons negotiated their claims to status within an ever-changing equation in which patrons measured projected benefits against anticipated costs and achieved their commissions within a variety of material and cultural constraints. In the second half of The Patron's Payoff, with the help of several art historians, they offer further examples of extravagant patronage. Nelson and Zeckhauser contribute an essay on Renaissance chapel commissions, which was the seed idea for the book; Thomas Loughman writes on the Alberti family's activities as patrons in fourteenth-century Florence; Kelley Di Dio describes how the artist Leone Leoni effectively assumed the role of art patron in the sixteenth century in order to enhance his social status; Molly Bourne discusses how a commission for the Italian artist Andrea Mantegna served the political interests and reputation of the Gonzaga family, and finally, Larry Silver offers a broad collection of examples from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century in which extravagant commissions could be shown to embody behaviors which illustrate signaling, signposting, and stretching. The respective authors make convincing cases that all three forms of behavior (signaling, signposting, and stretching) are in play.
I hope that The Patron's Payoff represents just the beginning of the authors' investigations of conspicuous patronage and that they will further develop their methodology. As is, Nelson and Zeckhauser's model of consumptive behavior is useful, but still limited. Excluding their essay on chapel expenditures, the book's examples rarely shed new light on major problems in patronage studies nor open up new questions for further research. Perhaps it is because there are no tables, no measurements, and the evidence is primarily anecdotal, familiar to any student of Renaissance art history, that The Patron's Payoff does not rise much above the simplest application of game theory. Most importantly, the artist's share in the commission game is barely touched upon, and consequently how extravagant commissions might encourage artistic innovation is one of the least developed aspects of the book's arguments.
Even so, The Patron's Payoff is a welcome and important addition to the considerable literature on art patronage. Art history has long resisted quantitative and market approaches. And art historians have tended to treat each patron and each behavior they encounter as essentially unique and rarely look for patterns of behavior that exist inside and outside the boundaries of art and over time. By bringing patronage studies in line with recent work on the economics of information, The Patron's Payoff offers an approach considerably more rigorous than found in most existing patronage studies. Yet it also offers humanists the reassurance that consumption indeed has broader social dimensions than can be measured by prices. Accessible yet grounded in systematic generalizations, should The Patron's Payoff be widely read and imitated by art historians, perhaps it will encourage future scholarship to look for behavioral patterns and so to realize the still largely untapped benefits of quantitative and economic approaches for art history.
As the economist Michael Spence notes in his forward, Nelson and Zechhauser have not directly explained the relationship between extravagant art commissions and the remarkable burst of artistic innovation that defines fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italian art. However, The Patron's Payoff provides an important conceptual springboard for a new understanding of Renaissance artistic innovation within the context of economic expansion, increased possibilities for social and economic upward mobility, and a developing equilibrium between the commercial sector, the state, and the church in Renaissance Italy.
