“Tell me one last thing,” said Harry [Potter to the dream-image of Albus Dumbledore]. “Is this real? Or has this been happening inside my head?”
Dumbledore[’s] . . . voice sounded loud and strong in Harry's ears even though the bright mist was descending again, obscuring his figure.
“Of course it is happening inside your head, Harry, but why on earth should that mean that it is not real?”
J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows
Several years ago I reviewed an article manuscript from a young scholar who announced that the approach he was taking in his paper “forces us to reconceptualize notions of identity, place, and representation, which foster, in turn, a rethinking of culture and location and the relationship between the two.” Go back and read that again, as I did, and pause to think. Could this really be? Would reading this work actually force me to rethink such fundamental concepts? Moreover, can we really do this exhausting work every time we read something new? Why not engage deeply with existing scholarship about identity and place and representation and culture and location (or whatever the topic might be), with a new set of case studies, perhaps offering one or two new insights?
This kind of unintentional hubris suffuses many first books and manuscripts coming out of dissertations. It is easy to presume that because our thinking about a topic is inspired by revolutionary thinkers—Foucault, say, or Butler, or de Certeau—our work might be revolutionary in turn. And it is apparently easy for colleagues and reviewers to let such claims slide, because the mention of such names and the declaration that one is going to address Big Issues is code for having succeeded in taking on the concerns of our masters and knowing how to cite scripture appropriately. This way of deploying cultural capital seems to be encouraged even when the invocation of great names is merely a declaration of identity rather than an invitation to the ancestors to do any sustained work that helps us solve the problem at hand.
Dreams that Matter follows this pattern of promising more conceptually than it delivers. Focusing largely on one category of Egyptian dreams, the ruʾya or dream-vision in which the dead, saints, and prophets appear to the dreamer, the book argues that these are dreams that matter “in the sense of having significance in people's lives and, more literally, in the sense of having an impact on the visible, material world. . . . They place the dreamer in relation to the Divine, offer guidance, and . . . continually remind believers of their embeddedness in larger orders” (pp. 2–3). But the book has higher ambitions as well. In addition to describing the way dream-visions remind people of their manifold social relationships, such dreams matter,
because they complicate the notion of a monolithic Islam, and they matter because they destabilize conventional understandings of the “real”. . . . Instead of reading this renewed interest in dreams as an escapism triggered by the nightmare that waking life has become, I suggest that . . . dream-stories can open up critical spaces and possibilities. The kinds of dreams that I retell. . . . enable a mode of being in the world that disrupts the illusion of the autonomous self-possessed subject, calling attention to in-betweenness and interrelationality instead (pp. 2–3).
Any of these goals is laudable, but we have certainly seen them articulated and addressed many times before. Mittermaier wants to promote an “understanding of the imagination (al-khayāl) that is not anchored in the individual subject but instead refers to an intermediary realm between the spiritual and the material, the Divine and the human” (p. 3), an understanding in which imagination produces not fantasy but vision, not hallucinatory wish fulfillment but moral truth, not illusion but glimpses of reality. She encourages the reader to “rethink the imagination in and through anthropology” (p. 29), pointing out that “psychologizing and materialist explanations [of dreams] offer only two out of multiple interpretive frameworks and that they obscure, if not violently erase, many others. . . . I want to call into question the presumption that all dreams are inherently linked to the psyche,” originating inside the dreamer rather than in a broader reality (p. 15). Stressing dialogic encounters, she offers the Muslim concept of the barzakh (an in-between space where the living and the dead can meet) as both an ethnographic object “and . . . an analytical tool [that] can offer us insight into modes of being in the world that might not easily be intelligible from within rationalist, secular vocabularies” (p. 4).
The concept of barzakh is not really given the chance to work in this book, and that is disappointing. Instead of allowing herself to develop the idea in a novel and systematic way, Mittermaier repeatedly sets up “rationalist, secular vocabularies” (e.g., a psychoanalytic regime described as narrow, hegemonic, imperializing, and self-enclosed [pp. 12, 29]) primarily as targets of dismissal rather than parties to a dialogue. Not dreams this time, but “the self-contained self” (p. 171) is identified right off the mark as an illusion. Ironically, it is an illusion that has been decentered not primarily by the Egyptian dream stories told here but by decades of contemporary critical theory emerging from the rationalist, secular academy and perhaps even by Freud himself, although this element of his work is mentioned only briefly (p. 14) and then forgotten. Even the theorists—whether Bakhtin or Benjamin—whose work might be most useful in thinking across epistemological worlds are more often treated as names to be checked off a tally sheet of quotations than as interlocutors who could, if engaged seriously, help bridge the experiences of Egyptian and “Western” dream interpretation.
Now, one mediates a dialogue poorly by denouncing one set of partners ahead of time as partisans of an illusion. In ignoring the broad and varied body of anthropological theorizing about dreams, Mittermaier misses what is perhaps a more productive way of understanding the barzakh's space of possibility. Instead of imagining the barzakh as some sort of undefined medium between the self and the world of the spirits, or as a metaphor for human encounter, we might more profitably remember how social theory has long provided us with ways to talk about abstract realities that are nevertheless material ones. We can take other life worlds seriously not only by considering their visions as possibilities, as the author does here, but also by remembering that both the self and the heavens, however they are constituted, are visions provided to us through the mediation of an existential social reality, an elsewhere that is simultaneously immanent and transcendent. This middle range of existence between the mind and the cosmos is almost entirely absent in Mittermaier's formulation of the issues.
Few readers may care about these qualms. One of the things about good anthropology is that sometimes, even when a book comes wrapped in a theoretical framework that is muddled or unnecessary, good ethnography can make it well worth the effort to read. Dreams that Matter teaches us a great deal about Egypt, if not so much about dreams in general. In the long space between its introduction and conclusion, Mittermaier provides a rich portrait of the social organization of dreaming in the form of a collection of interesting dream lore and a perceptive ethnography of how burgeoning Sufi and quasi-Sufi practices in contemporary Egypt intersect with mass media, state institutions, psychological science, Islamic texts, and everyday relationships among the living and the dead. She describes a number of men whom we might think of as entrepreneurs of dreaming, from Shaykh Nabil, an ordinary man ordered by Imam ʿAli's daughter al-Sayyida Ruqayya to open a shrine to Ibn Sirin (d. 728), one of the most famous Muslim dream interpreters; to Shaykh al-Qusi, a charismatic poet and dream visionary whose followers brought him their own dreams about his interactions with Khidr and the Prophet Muhammad, to be recorded in a great Book of Visions; to Saudi television talk shows in which psychologists negotiate publicly the different realities of dreams.
Dreams that Matter is well written, sensitive, and often insightful. It offers engaging and detailed outlines of the interpretive strategies Egyptians use in discussing dreams of various kinds, the local history of psychoanalytic thought, and the ways in which Egyptians combine insights from religious literature and psychology. It shows how they draw metaphors from media and perceptual vocabulary, past and present, as well as technology and family life to describe the nature of visions. Discussions about the significance of these dreams suffuse the emotional and political life of Egyptians from every walk of life, and Mittermaier is a very fine guide to these Egyptian landscapes of imagination even if she does not take us very far beyond them.
