Introduction
Since the 1970s the anti-globalization movement has provided a network for social movements critical of the policies of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This has enabled them to link together to exchange criticisms as well as strategies on how to counteract the development programmes of these institutions. These movements initially emerged during the period of dictatorships in Asia when international financial institutions were perceived to provide the rationale for state-led, capitalist, authoritarian regimes. Despite the downfall of these dictatorships in the 1980s and 1990s, the policies of international financial institutions, which stress free enterprise, privatization, and a market economy, prevailed. The intensification of these policies under the auspices of neo-liberalism further fuelled the anti-globalization movement. Asia emerged as one of the important sites of interaction among those involved in these movements as international financial institution development models emerged in the newly industrialized countries, for example, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea in the 1970s and the new Asian Tigers of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the 1980s. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, which witnessed the collapse of the economies of the newly industrializing countries and the new Asian Tigers, gave further impetus to the anti-globalization movements as they criticized the development policies and programmes of these institutions. The crisis led to a further criticism of the international financial institutions: the absence of good governance, that is, their lack of transparency and accountability. As noted, the Asian financial crisis was also largely blamed on the corruption of the affected countries.
The increasing role of the Asian Development BankFootnote 1 in the region provided further fuel for the anti-globalization movement. Since the 1980s, anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns have brought together social movements from various countries in the region which link and network with one another not only locally and regionally but also globally. By the late 1990s the Asian financial crisis had thrust the Asian Development Bank into the spotlight as it played a major role in ‘rescuing’ the collapsed Asian economies.
This paper, therefore, discusses the political opportunity structures, both stable and unstable, which have allowed for the creation of sites of interaction and protest against the Asian Development Bank. The first part of the paper highlights the issues these structures have with neo-liberalism, while the second part discusses the political opportunity structures which facilitated the creation of local and global sites of interaction for these anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. The third part of the paper elucidates the strategies of these campaigns in enhancing their sites of engagement and confrontation with the Bank, and the fourth part examines the mobilization of resources by these campaigners. How the anti-globalization movements exchanged ideas in their sites of interaction are discussed in the fifth part, and the sixth and seventh parts elucidate the increments gained by the anti-globalization movement from their sites of interaction and the challenges they confront, respectively.
Localizing and globalizing criticisms of neo-liberalism
The incipient seeds of the anti-globalization movement were sown in the Southeast Asian region during the emergence of the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s. The development policies that were carried out were mainly those which focused on liberalization and an export-oriented market economy. Such was the thrust of state-led capitalist authoritarian states. This was the development paradigm expounded by the international financial institutions, led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. A major critique of this paradigm was that it rendered national economies vulnerable to the world market and that it produced socio-economic inequalities. The solution to these problems, however, lay mainly in removing the corrupt dictators of the respective authoritarian regimes. What emerged was the anti-dictatorship struggle which brought together the social movements in the region. Solidarity networks were formed, particularly along class lines, among workers and peasant movements. These networks were also based on issues such as human rights and the peace movement, with a focus on removing the military bases which exemplified American imperialism in the region. The United States was perceived by social movements as a staunch ally of Asian dictators. The criticisms against the economic policies of international financial institutions, supported by authoritarian regimes, played second fiddle to the anti-dictatorship movement.
It is quite understandable, therefore, that the downfall of these authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and the 1990s led to the pursuit of similar economic policies—this time under a capitalist ‘democracy’. Together with anti-dictatorship movements, international financial institutions argued that socio-economic inequalities were a result of corrupt dictators. Thus, the emphasis was not only on economic liberalization but also on privatization and market forces. That is, by leaving economic competition to the market, the playing field would become level. This was not to be the case as the rich became richer and the poor became poorer, both within society and among nations. What also continued to emerge was the subjection of countries to harsh loan conditions, such as lay-offs and no wage increases, imposed by international financial institutions. Questions were also posed regarding the ‘moral issues’ raised by these loan conditions which also demanded the privatization of basic social services such as schools and hospitals and basic commodities such as water and energy. A concern that emerged in the 1970s, and which was reiterated in the 1990s, was environmental degradation, generally regarded as a trade-off of development. Intensive liberalization also saw the continuing external vulnerability of nations, as attested to by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This was seen especially in Thailand whose economy collapsed in July 1997, triggering a domino effect in the whole Asian region. This time, however, social movements could focus their attention on economic rather than political circumstances, although these are closely intertwined.
An added dimension, which brought about the rise of anti-globalization movements, was the growing role not only of international financial institutions but also of international trade organizations (like the World Trade Organization) and multinational banks which have increasingly exerted their dominance in the economies of countries all over the world, with Asian countries proving no exception. Thus, the concerns that emerged were to do with both local and global governance. As pointed out, ‘unrepresentative decisions on global issues can run counter to democratization within a state and undermine a people's commitment to it’.Footnote 2 This view is shared by Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and Nobel Peace Prize winner for economics, who stressed ‘the importance of grassroots level participation which enhances the effectiveness of development projects’.Footnote 3 The other issue is that of transparency, accountability, and corruption. Democratization at the global level suggests that ‘global institutions must be more transparent, more accountable to citizens and more open to varying forms of citizen access and participation. . .’.Footnote 4
Localizing and globalizing criticisms of neo-liberalism were seen during the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in Thailand during the 33rd Asian Development Bank Annual Governor's Meeting (hereafter referred to as the Annual Governor's Meeting) in Chiang Mai from 6 to 8 May 2000. The protest actions generally criticized the way in which multilateral agencies such as the Asian Development Bank had been mishandling development in their countries. The Thai social movements, in particular, were against what they called ‘anti-poor policies’ such as the Bank's plans ‘to cut back on social welfare, through the establishment of autonomous hospitals’ and ‘to impose a water tax on the irrigation system which Thai farmers claimed would make water unaffordable’.Footnote 5 A particular Asian Development Bank project that was heavily criticized was the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project which was approved by the Chuan government in 1995. This US$605 million project was partly funded by an Asian Development Bank loan of US$320 million, with additional funding of US$70 million provided by Japan's Overseas Environmental Cooperation Fund (now referred to as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation), and Bt750 million from Thailand's Environment Fund and the National Budget Bureau.Footnote 6 It was located on a 1,903-raiFootnote 7 seaside area in Bang Po district, Samut Prakarn on the southern part of Sukhumvit Road. In 2000, the construction was nearly half complete.Footnote 8 Construction and pre-operation of the project was due to be completed within six years. The Pollution Control DepartmentFootnote 9 of the Department of Science, Technology and Environment Ministry commissioned the NVPSKG Joint Venture and North West Water International to undertake the construction on a ‘turnkey basis’.Footnote 10 The aim of the project was to ‘improve environmental sanitation and water quality in the densely settled areas of Samut Prakarn and to establish sustainable institutional arrangements for wastewater management and pollution control’.Footnote 11
A major issue in opposing the construction was the absence of popular participation in the conceptualization as well as implementation of the project. Issues of corruption were also raised: ‘This was precipitated when the Pollution Control Department failed to convince the Klong Dan villagers for its reasons for changing the project site from Bang Pla Kod and Bang Poo Mai to their area in Klong Dan.’Footnote 12 The villagers also argued that the Project went against the Asian Development Bank's tenet of reducing poverty because ‘[when] the plant begins to operate, it will pollute the Klong Dan coastal area’ and that this ‘will endanger not only a rich source of marine food but also the livelihoods and an important source of Klong Dan's 14 villages’.Footnote 13 Moreover, an argument put forward by the Klong Dan villagers was that no environmental impact assessment had been undertaken before the implementation of the project, which is required by Thai law.Footnote 14
Political opportunities for developing local and global sites of interaction
The effectiveness of the campaigns against the Asian Development Bank policies in Thailand in particular and in the region in general depended on the capability of anti-globalization movements to develop sites of interaction where ideas could be exchanged, debated, and reformulated. This relied to a certain extent on the political opportunities for advocacies that were open at the local and global levels and which could be taken advantage of and/or created by social movements.Footnote 15 The political process model provides a framework by which such opportunities can be examined. It emphasizes how a specific political environment may determine the outcome of a particular social movement. Changes in political opportunity structures are monitored as these may either encourage or discourage social movements, and dictate when or how struggles would lead to actual reforms. These are generally referred to as ‘stable political opportunity structures’. Unstable political opportunity structures include opening up access to power, shifts in ruling alignments brought about by cleavages within and among elites, and the availability of influential allies.Footnote 16 This links the political process theory to the resource mobilization theory, which emphasizes the importance of resources to enable a movement to mobilize and succeed. It takes into consideration that ‘actors and their allies and targets differ in terms of [the] resources they command, their preparedness to make resources available and their ability to use these resource effectively’.Footnote 17
The democratization process
For the anti-globalization movements in Southeast Asia, the democratization process in their respective countries allowed for the development of sites of interaction. The process ‘almost always begins with liberalization, the opening of political spaces and the extension of certain rights to individuals and groups’, which affords the social movements the opportunity to shape the direction of the democratizing process and the structures and processes of the emerging democratic regimes.Footnote 18 This was seen in the anti-Asian Development Bank protest actions in the region, the biggest of which took place during the Annual Governors’ Meeting in Chiang Mai. This would not have been possible without the democratization process taking place in Thailand which began with the middle class uprising against the Thai dictatorship in May 1992. This allowed both local and foreign media to cover the Asian Development Bank Annual Governors’ Meeting. By not suppressing such expressions of dissent, Thailand, as host government, was able to show the world that it was a ‘democracy’. Thus, the major concern of the Thai government was ‘to maintain the good image of Thailand as a good host to the event’.Footnote 19
The democratization process, therefore, allowed for the opening of a local site of interaction where views and opinions against the Asian Development Bank could be shared. Because of globalization, however, such a site of interaction is not limited to the local arena. The anti-Asian Development Bank demonstrations in Chiang Mai not only attracted foreigners in the region but also those from Europe and the United States. Thus, the Thai officials’ major concern was to prevent violence from their own people as well as from foreign delegates who could not bar be barred from coming to Thailand for fear of accusations of ‘undemocratic’ practices. In particular, the Thai government did not want the ‘anti-globalization activists to foster violence, as happened when American activist Robert Naiman threw a pie into the face of former International Monetary Fund Chief Michel Camdessus at the February 1999 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Bangkok’.Footnote 20
The development of local sites of interaction for the anti-globalization movement is also dependent on a political environment that allows for this to happen and also on the ability of civil society movements to take advantage of such an environment. Its effect is felt both locally and globally as these movements involved in the anti-globalization movement take advantage of the opening of local sites of interaction to engage and confront international financial institutions and their host governments. The anti-Asian Development Bank demonstrations in Chiang Mai were attended by foreign activists from all over the world.Footnote 21 Thus, for these movements, the political opportunity for policy intervention has been brought about by the democratization process at the local level. Based on this experience, democratization at the global level, therefore, is dependent to a great degree on the democratization process at the local level. This is where there is a need to strengthen social movements as well as civil society in shaping national politics since, together with national economic policy, these remain in the hands of national governments.Footnote 22
There are three categories of global civil society movement players that benefited from this. First are those players who questioned the ideological development paradigm of international financial institutions. An example of this is FOCUS on the Global South, a regional NGO based in Bangkok, Thailand. It recognizes:
that structural adjustment reforms and other neoliberal economic policies have had a devastating effect on countries throughout the southern hemisphere, increasing economic inequality, corruption and environmental degradation. FOCUS argues that these policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank have crippled the state as an agent of development and protector of the community. They therefore advocate the creation of links between local, community-based, national, regional and global ‘paradigms’ of change. The main focus of the organization is Asia, but they coordinate their research with organizations based elsewhere.Footnote 23
The second are those who are concerned with the lack of ‘good governance’ practice among the international financial institutions. In particular, they are interested in the issues of transparency and accountability in the implementation of development projects by these institutions. An example is the Bank for Information Center, an international NGO based in Washington D.C. The Center is ‘part of the transnational network which grew as a US-based advocacy network. It formed alliances with local NGOs, unions, rural associations and community organizations to protect livelihood and land from the effects of projects such as major dams, slum clearance and power plants.’Footnote 24
The third kind are those concerned with particular issues such as the environment. An example is Greenpeace International, which is ‘renowned for its militant actions to defend the environment against free trade and corporate devastation’.Footnote 25 Other global civil society environmental players are the Center for International Environmental Law, Probe International, and the International Rivers Network.Footnote 26 They are part of a network of American-based environmental NGOs which launched an effort in 1983 to address environmental problems associated with World Bank lending. The campaign began with a series of critiques of specific dam or road construction projects, usually involving the forced resettlement of communities.Footnote 27 Much of the campaign now centres on involuntary resettlement of communities for dam projects, the protection of indigenous people's lands, and accountability and transparency at the World Bank.Footnote 28
Along with the emergence of democratization at a regional level in Asia, there has also emerged a regional network of social movements and NGOs challenging international financial institutions, particularly the Asian Development Bank. This was seen in 1988,
when there was a concerted effort among NGOs in the region, among which was the Asian NGO Coalition on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC), that Asian Development Bank projects were systematically questioned. Together with the Environmental Policy Institute (now Friends of the Earth-US/FoE-US), ANGOC criticized what they perceived was the Asian Development Bank's badly-designed and destructive projects. They also noted the absence of dialogue on policy reforms and the need for greater transparency and public accountability. The NGOs also called for greater public awareness and debate on [the] social and environmental impact of Bank lending on local communities.
Pressure from the NGOs led to a more systematic and open dialogue with the Bank and member-governments. NGOs were invited to attend the Asian Development Bank Annual Board of Governors Meetings whereby they engaged in major lobbying activities which challenged the Bank's over-all development priorities based on a centralized economic growth model and to open up greater public accountability, transparency and participation in the Bank's processes.Footnote 29
The democratization process in Thailand in particular enabled these global civil society movement players as well as regional NGOs to join together with the local Thai social movements which now found the space to organize against Asian Development Bank activities in their country. Thus, they formed alliances which also questioned Bank programmes and projects.
The lead Thai NGO in the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in the country is the NGO Coordinating Committee for Development which has 200 organizations under its network umbrella. Among the leading anti-Asian Development Bank NGOs in this network are Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance, and the Project for Economic Recovery.Footnote 30 At the grassroots level, on the other hand, there emerged the People's Network comprising 38 organizations, which also questions the Asian Development Bank projects and programmes, particularly in North and Northeast Thailand.Footnote 31 The Assembly of the Poor is one of the leading grassroots movements in the People's Network. It ‘operates on a network basis with the core people consisting of representatives from local communities in problem areas. A group of advisers, for example, NGO workers and academics, assists it on technical and related matters. Its strength is said to lie in the political synergy of the different groups which work together. It has no hierarchical structure.’Footnote 32
Other political opportunities complementing the democratization process
The Asian financial crisis could be considered as a volatile political structure that furthered the democratization process in the region. It not only witnessed the collapse of the longest dictatorship in the region—namely the Suharto regime in Indonesia—but has made people in countries like Thailand more vocal in their criticisms of their country's policies. This was one of the reasons given for the massive demonstration against the Asian Development Bank in Chiang Mai and the sympathy it generated among the Thai public. As pointed out by Kasian Tejapira of Thammasat University, ‘the demonstration in the North promoted an anti-external force sentiment’. He adds that what emerged in the anti-Asian Development Bank campaign was a strengthening of the sense of nationalism in the face of International Monetary Fund conditionalities following the Asian economic crisis.Footnote 33
Global institutions and the democratization process. The Asian financial crisis also impacted on international financial institutions because of the acknowledgment that their policies had failed. This is important because the democratization process at the global level is also crucial in opening windows of opportunities for social movements to intervene in international policy-making. In general, global institutions are said to have an influential role as they have a marked effect on the activists’ political strategies and opportunities. They also play an important role in shaping the ways in which social movement actors relate to one another.Footnote 34 The campaigns against the Asian Development Bank are made possible by the Bank's annual conferences which provide opportunities for engagement and confrontation. The protest actions during the Annual Governor's Meeting were no exception. Thus, international political forums held by inter-governmental organizations such as the Asian Development Bank actually provide occasions for anti-globalization movements to mobilize their members at the local and international levels and build coalitions around global issues as well as provide common targets for political actions.Footnote 35 These annual conferences, however, are also witness to active engagement between international financial institution officials and NGOs, social movements, and other members of civil society. In the case of the Annual Governor's Meeting, members of civil society were given accreditation to participate in seminars where they could actively engage with Bank officials. This is also one way in which international financial institutions could say that they are ‘democratizing’ their processes.
Formation of alliances.Footnote 36 The windows for democratization at the local and global levels have also enabled the creation as well as reinforcement of alliances at the transnational, regional, and local levels. Such alliances have been made possible with the opening up of democracy at the local and global levels. The anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns are part of the rise of transnational networks, alliances, and coalition of diverse socio-political groups which are chiefly dedicated to the contestation of ‘globalization’ in its various guises.Footnote 37 Their campaigns are supported by international social movements which have independent links that cut across state boundaries.Footnote 38 Therefore, the local and transnational networks that were formed during the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns are vital since ‘networks play a crucial role in building and reinforcing the identities of individuals and provide them with a political consciousness that allows them to get ideologically closer to a given political issues’ and ‘Social ties are one of the major channels through which potential activities are connected with an opportunity for participation.’Footnote 39
Thus, the campaign against the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project incorporated international social movements such as Greenpeace International and the International Rivers Network. These groups supported the Thai social movements and Klong Dan villagers in their continuing protest actions against the Project. Global civil society movements also organized meetings in Japan between Klong Dan villager Dawan Chantarhassadi and Japanese decision-makers in the Ministry of Finance, the Japan Bank for International Conference, and officials from other Japanese agencies to discuss the plight of the villagers. They also pressured the Asian Development Bank by writing to the respective executive directors on the Asian Development Bank board to activate the inspection function to investigate the alleged anomalies in the Project.Footnote 40
Strategies for the creation of sites of interaction
Despite the democratization process, however, undemocratic practices continue. These prevent social movements from being heard by their respective governments. Under an authoritarian government, the social movements resort to the transnational arena as the site for interaction. There are two models which illustrate this: the ‘boomerang’ pattern and the ‘spiral’ model. Both models suggest that blockages in domestic society, often due to repression by authorities, send domestic social movement actors into the transnational arena. Thus, the combination of a closed domestic opportunity structure and an open international opportunity structure initiates the boomerang and the spiral models.Footnote 41 These models, however, are not only used in analyzing social movements actions in periods of dictatorship but also when the government does not act on particular issues. The boomerang model in particular suggests that ‘repression may simultaneously move actors into international arenas to pursue their activities’.Footnote 42 For example, when the Pollution Control Department refused to listen to the Klong Dan villagers’ complaints, they brought this to the attention of the Asian Development Bank officials during the Bank's 30th Annual Governor's Meeting in Chiang Mai. One of the major aims of the demonstrators was to move their campaign to the international arena with the end goal of further liberalizing and opening up domestic regimes.Footnote 43
Using international financial institution conferences and parallel conferences as sites of interaction. Anti-globalization movements have also used international financial institution conferences and parallel conferences as opportunities for sites of interaction to engage and confront these institutions. Holding parallel summits is looked upon as ‘a permanent fixture of global agenda-setting conferences of intergovernmental institutions since the 1970s when streams of activism monitored meetings of the United Nations on environment, development, women, and human rights’.Footnote 44 During the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in Chiang Mai, the anti-globalization movements held a People's Forum three days before the Annual Governor's Meeting ‘to highlight how the projects and policies of the Asian Development Bank are exacerbating poverty, destroying the environment and undermining the rights, livelihoods and food security of local communities throughout the region’.Footnote 45 The People's Forum also provided the anti-Asian Development Bank movement with an opportunity to personally present their demands and concerns about the Bank's policies and programmes to Bank officials, for example, Myoung-Ho Shin, Asian Development Bank vice-president (for Region West).Footnote 46 The occasion also provided the People's Forum conference organizers with an opportunity to arrange a meeting between Thai and international participants and Rintaro Tamaki of the International Finance Bureau of the Japan's Finance Ministry to discuss their problems with the Bank. Furthermore, a special meeting was also arranged between the Klong Dan villagers and the Bank's board of directors and officials from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. The villagers took the opportunity to complain about the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project, particularly about the absence of an environmental impact assessment which was against the Bank's policy of good governance and poverty reduction.Footnote 47
International financial institution conferences such as the Annual Governor's Meeting thus provided for the coming together of local and global social movements that shared similar concerns, namely their critique of the development policies of international financial institutions, and particular issues such as transparency, accountability, corruption, and the environment. Their coming together before and during the meetings of international financial institutions has become part of the anti-globalization campaigns and the Asian Development Bank meeting in Chiang Mai was no exception. This has been a general practice of NGOs which have used unofficial parallel conferences, such as the NGO gatherings held at the time of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund annual meetings, to network and publicize their causes. In general, Annual Governor's Meetings provide global civil society movements that have issues with the Bank—which range from those who do not agree with its neo-liberal ideology policies to those who are concerned with issues of good governance—to use these meetings as a chance not to only raise their concerns but also to link up with the local social movements where the Annual Governor's Meetings are being held. Together they are able to come up with activities to highlight their protest against the Bank.
Such activity is part of the strategy of social movement networks to make use of the ‘international arena as a stage or mirror to hold state and international organization behavior up to a global judgment about appropriateness. . . they attempt to display or publicize norm-breaking behavior to embarrass public authority. . . Human rights activists have called this action the “mobilization of shame”.’Footnote 48 This explains the phenomenon of parallel conferences to international financial institution meetings. Aside from providing sites of interaction, these major global conferences have contributed to the expansion of transnational social movements, particularly in the 1990s.Footnote 49 They have also given birth to the emergence of campaigns to target specific international financial institution projects such as the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project advocacy. The latter was pursued at the 34th Annual Governor's Meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii, where a ‘people's tribunal’ was set up to bring their case against the Project.
Resource mobilization in creating sites of interaction
An important aspect in creating sites of interaction are the resources that can be mobilized by anti-globalization movements. One important resource is the ability of these transnational organizations and coalitions, with branches in several countries, to act as channels for the spread of similar goals, tactics, and ideas. This can be viewed as a positive effect of globalization as it provides for coherence among social movements across countries because it has helped to create transnational opportunities as well as formal structural affinities in different countries. Moreover, these transnational linkages, which are found in the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in Thailand, facilitate the diffusion process.Footnote 50 Another important resource of these global civil society movements is that their transnational linkages have ‘acquired a degree of institutional grounding within global organizations which allow them to become actors on the “official” world political stage’.Footnote 51 These transnational social movements, which include Greenpeace International, Friends of the Earth, and the International Rivers Network among others, have constantly engaged the Asian Development Bank within and outside the conference arena with regard to its environmental policies. The status accorded to them by international financial institutions is a recognition that they are international social movements capable of mobilizing a specific constituency or membership across state boundaries.Footnote 52 This was seen in the manner in which they mobilized people in Thailand and in other parts of the world to support the Klong Dan villagers against the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project. Some of these transnational social movements focus on particular regions. An example of this is the Asian NGO Coalition on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development. The bargaining leverage of these transnational alliances, however, are greatly dependent on their ability to link up with local NGOs which are also espousing their cause. In the case of the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project this was seen, for example, when the Bank for Information Center linked up with Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance and Project for Economic Recovery in Thailand which also shared their concerns for good governance in international financial institutions.
Getting ideas across the sites of interaction
As important as creating sites of interaction is how to get the ideas of the anti-globalization movement to their target, such as the Thai government and the Asian Development Bank, as well as to the victims of the Asian Development Bank projects.
Scale-shift process
In the case of the complaints of the Klong Dan villagers, they were able to locate their complaints against the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project within the context of the anti-globalization struggle. Local and global social movements were able to relate such a campaign to the issues of transparency and accountability around the implementation of the project. This is referred to as the ‘scale-shift process’ whereby the anti-globalization movement was able ‘to navigate a transition from the international realm to an indigenous setting by translating far-reaching transnational advocacies into domestic claims and demands and anchoring these to a local target’.Footnote 53
The framing issue
Related to the scale-shift process is the manner in which the issues are framed so that ideas are communicated to the target communities. Framing is another important reason for forging alliances between local and transnational social movements. The political opportunity structures and the mobilizing structures impact on ‘the forms of collective action that activists engage in, how they frame their issues for public consumption and the targets and goals they address emerge from the intersection of structures and meanings, both within and outside movement’.Footnote 54 All these form part of the social movements’ strategizing, which is ‘the process of interpreting political opportunities, cultural acceptability of goals, and the tactics likely to promote change’.Footnote 55 This is also true for the movement's interaction with external contexts whereby ‘both movements and state construct discourses, collective identity and representation and movement, institutions and the state incorporate and reformulate each others’ meaning’.Footnote 56 The anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in Chiang Mai raised issues which were framed within the context of a critique of the neo-liberal paradigm. These included the privatization of social services, for example, hospitals and schools; the adverse effects of the Bank's structural adjustment programme, for example, the laying off of government workers; and the water tax. Their concerns, which were framed within the context of good governance, were the issues of transparency and accountability with regard to the conceptualizing and implementation of the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project. This framing process not only facilitated the forging of links between global civil society movements and the local social movements but also raising the consciousness of the Thai and global public.
Combining engagement and confrontation
Anti-globalization movements have generally combined their strategies for intervention through a combination of engagement and confrontation. One tactic is the use of demonstrations, inspired by the Battle of Seattle in 1999 against the World Trade Organization. However, this is not often used as the meetings are generally organized by the UN, where ‘relations among social movements and intergovernmental organizers have been largely accommodating’.Footnote 57 In contrast, Seattle points to a more contentious relationship stemming from the World Trade Organization's undemocratic, nontransparent decision-making and deliberate exclusion of civil society in the trade body's working.Footnote 58 The anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns have often been more of an engagement rather than a confrontation, which is why the massive demonstration during the 33rd Annual Governor's Meeting took the Bank's officials by surprise. A reason for this is that, unlike their other activist counterparts, for example, the Filipinos, the Thai social movements did not have a working relationship with the Asian Development Bank. Moreover, their relationship with the Thai government was not good. Thus, protest actions seemed to be the only recourse for them. In addition, the parallel conference participants initially refused to engage with the Bank's officials. Strategies of engagement and confrontation have also been used to denounce specific projects such as the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project. Such actions are identified with the first generation of lobbying of NGOs and confrontation over specific projects was ‘identified more with strategies to gain the attention of the international financial institution and its major shareholders. This included confrontation over specific projects and collaboration in project implementation and dialogue over issues such as participation.’Footnote 59 The anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in Chiang Mai could, therefore, be said to be part of the same strategy to draw attention to specific projects.
Increments gained in the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns
An achievement gained through the development of these sites of interaction has been the political socialization of global activities. The anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns brought about a situation whereby anti-globalization movements were able to link not only with Thai social movements but also with the Klong Dan villagers. Thus, the anti-globalization movements are given a platform whereby they are able to ‘encourage the political socialization of global activities which is crucial for the evolution of democratic skills and norms in a global arena that lacks formal institutions for democratic participation such as political participation and electoral institutions’.Footnote 60
What enabled this is that the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in general, and the anti-Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project campaign in particular, have allowed social movements to adopt a universal ideology that has seemed to inspire and connect similar movements across the world, enabling them to coordinate international solidarity with their cause.Footnote 61
The development of local sites of interaction, as seen through the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns, have also helped widen the democratization process at the domestic level. It allowed, for example, global civil society and Thai social movements to help the Klong Dan villagers. With their assistance, the villagers wrote to the Thai king asking his assistance, requested the support of the Thai senators for their cause, and staged protest actions. All of these are part of the social movements’ efforts to push for greater democratization.
This, therefore, links to the third factor, as the sites of interaction are also used as venues to internationalize domestic policies. Local social movements, in general, play an important role in ‘internationalising domestic policy decisions’, which has been viewed as the ‘internationalisation of government’, particularly in complying with international norms set forth in the international institutions of which they are part.Footnote 62 Such action is important because, despite the internationalization of social movements in advancing their agendas, ‘participation in national policies requires that significant response, initiative and real choice in national economic policy remain in the hands of national governments’. Thus what is needed is the continual development of a strong civil society which is able to shape national policy.Footnote 63 What is important, though, for the effectiveness of international social movements and their transnational networking, is that the main groups involved, that is, the Klong Dan villagers and local social movements, are nationally legitimate, even though the issues raised are framed differently within transnational exchanges.Footnote 64 For example, for the Klong Dan villagers, the end goal was to stop the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project, but for the global civil society movement, the end goal is to reform the Asian Development Bank or, for others, to abolish it altogether. These processes are made possible when local and transnational social movements come together in a common site of interaction, in this case, the site of the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in general and the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project campaign in particular.
The sites of interaction have also contributed to highlighting the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns against the neo-liberal development paradigm. An advocacy that has emerged was for international financial institutions to focus on the equity issue. Throughout these years, which witnessed a shift in Bank-wide lending priorities that focus more on growth with equity than on uplifting the conditions of the poor in the region, NGOs felt that they were making headway regarding the Asian Development Bank. Secondly, the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns helped to maintain the pressure on the international financial institutions to reconsider structural adjustment programmes, particularly in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis.Footnote 65 Finally, the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project campaign brought forth the demand by local and global social movements for international financial institutions to undertake environmental impact assessments. The message of the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns is that there should only be growth if there is equity and sustainability, and that quality of life should be maintained. In relation to this, anti-Asian Development Bank movements have never stopped urging the Bank to increase its social and environmental staff expertise.
Challenges confronting the sites of interaction
Debates have also ensued among the anti-globalization campaigners with regard to the sites they have chosen as points for engaging or confronting the Asian Development Bank. There are those, for example, who perceive participating in the Annual Governor's Meetings as the highlight of the network's advocacy work. However, there are also those who believe that ‘the NGOs should no longer “legitimize” the institution by taking part in its processes, especially the Asian Development Bank Annual Meeting’.Footnote 66 Furthermore, some believe that the resources of the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns could be better allocated to the production of popular education materials rather than attending events like the 34th Annual Governor's Meeting in Hawaii. According to activist Roy Laifungbam, it is more important to publicize the strategic debates of the NGO Forum on the Asian Development Bank so that more NGOs will come to know about its battles with the Bank.Footnote 67 It was, however, pointed out that the Annual Governor's Meetings continue to serve as an important site of interaction because they bring together those from NGOs who have issues they want to raise with the Bank. As noted, during the 2002 Annual Governor's Meeting in Shanghai, China, the participation of a large number of NGOs was important for networking and expanding the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns network. Furthermore, the Annual Governor's Meetings provide a venue for the network to develop an overall strategy on their campaigns. Another argument put forward is that ‘participation in Asian Development Bank AGMs is also looked upon as a means to sharpen public debate and understanding of the basic issues related to the Asian Development Bank’.Footnote 68 There were those who argued that the Asian Development Bank Annual Governor's Meeting in Shanghai, for example, enabled the NGO Forum on the Asian Development Bank to attain the following:
1) To convey to the Asian Development Bank Management/Executive Directors/Governors regarding adverse effects of Asian Development Bank policies, projects/programmes/actions on local communities; 2) to inform the public of the negative effects through media/press, and other educational materials. An ‘Asian Development Bank Briefing Kit’ was provided in both English and Chinese. Part of the efforts was also in reaching out to the press in Shanghai; 3) to inform/network with local Chinese NGOs/groups on the other side of Asian Development Bank lending; and, 4) to act as a de facto secretariat for the FORUM-NGO delegation in Shanghai that will actively liaise with the Bank's NGO Center regarding NGO objectives in Shanghai.Footnote 69
The anti-Asian Development Bank movement is also aware of the challenges they still have to confront with regard to reforming the Bank. This was very much reflected on two occasions during the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in Chiang Mai. The first one was the People's Forum. There were members of the anti-Asian Development Bank coalition who believed that this parallel conference should be used to engage Bank officials. Then there were those who believed that the Bank was beyond reform and thus there was no point in engaging with it. The second occasion was the anti-Asian Development Bank protest actions. There were non-Thai anti-Asian Development Bank activists, like the Filipinos, who were present at the discussion and who were already ‘seasoned’ international financial institution conference participants, who did not fully appreciate the need of the Thai social movements to protest. There were, thus, two very different views as to what the major site of interaction should be: engaging Bank officials at the Annual Governor's Meeting conference or confronting Bank officials in the streets. The impact of the anti-Asian Development Bank demonstrations proved the Filipino activists wrong. The realization was that:
such a shift in the strategy of social movements from mobilization to interest representation sees the concentration of their energy and resources towards the obtaining of their goals within institutional arenas. This has also led to the neglect of their typical means, e.g., street demonstrations and campaign. A disadvantage of this is that these social movements lose public visibility and the potential to recruit new members who produce them with the legitimacy and negotiating power to be used in collaborative interaction with the state. A worst scenario is that this will lead them to be cut off from their social support.Footnote 70
Because a faction of the Thai social movements opted to wage a three-day demonstration during the 33rd Annual Governor's Meeting, they managed to gain media mileage that was more of an exception than the rule regarding media coverage of Annual Governor's Meetings. One of the reasons for this is because they managed to produce the biggest anti-Asian Development Bank protest action. Attention given by the media, and consequently the public, to the demonstrations was also of the result of the issues raised by the protesters, for example, corruption and the environment, two issues that were in the forefront of the consciousness of the Thai public because of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. At the same time, the Thai social movements were also determined that the demonstration would be a peaceful one and not replicate the violent protest actions against other international financial institutions, for example the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. The Thai social movements wanted to get the attention of the Thai middle class or the Bangkokians, who abhor violence.Footnote 71 This Thai experience was quite unique, as attested to by their Filipino anti-Asian Development Bank activist counterparts who have a difficult time drawing media and public attention to their own protest actions against the Bank's policies on energy and water privatization.
Confronting police states
Another challenge confronted by anti-Asian Development Bank demonstrations is the holding of Annual Governor's Meetings in ‘police states’. This is also a problem for the anti-globalization movements in general. This was clearly seen at the 2002 Annual Governor's Meeting held in Shanghai, China, which is a police state that does not allow demonstrations. In contrast, in Thailand, the government could do nothing but tolerate the demonstrations and respect the new constitution which allows for such actions against the state. This seems to differ from the general trend whereby the form, content, and eventual outcomes of gatherings like the parallel conferences are ‘heavily circumscribed by the interest of states’.Footnote 72 Holding international financial institution conferences in ‘police states’, thus ensuring that there will be no demonstrations, was also seen in international financial institution meetings held in Doha and Singapore.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the manner in which the anti-globalization movement—through the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns—created sites of interaction that allowed them to critique the policies and programmes of international financial institution in general and those of the Asian Development Bank in particular. They were mainly concerned with the failure of neo-liberalism to bring about growth without equity as well as creating economies that are vulnerable to the external market, as exemplified by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Questions were also raised regarding the policy of privatization of social services and environmental degradation as a trade-off for development. For the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns, important sites of interaction were the Annual Governor's Meetings, as seen in the 33rd Annual Governor's Meeting held in Chiang Mai, and a particular Asian Development Bank project—the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project—which was characterized by a lack of participation, corruption, and the absence of an environmental impact assessment.
Other important aspects of the creation of sites of interaction, which allowed for an exchange of ideas, were the political opportunities presented as well as created by the anti-Asian Development Bank movement. This included the democratization process in Thailand which allowed for engaging with the Bank and protest actions during the 33rd Annual Governor's Meeting. This also enabled anti-globalization activists from abroad to come to Thailand and both local and foreign media to cover the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. All these strengthened civil society movements in their anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. A volatile political opportunity structure was the Asian financial crisis which made the Thai public sensitive to corruption and the negative role played by the international financial institutions. This in turn made the Thais more sympathetic towards and supportive of the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. The crisis also made international financial institutions more open to intervention from civil society players. Thus, the democratization process undergone by the international financial institutions, which is mainly due to pressure exerted by social movements, has been concretized by these institutions making use of their official conferences (like the Annual Governor's Meetings) to engage with civil society. At the same time, these events have also allowed the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigners a site for interaction. The democratization process has also facilitated the emergence and expansion of alliances through the external political environment that has witnessed the expansion of transnational alliances that challenge globalization. They gave the necessary support to the Thai social movements in general and the Klong Dan villagers in particular in the campaign against the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project.
In terms of the strategies used, the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns made use of the ‘boomerang’ pattern and ‘spiral’ model, which shifted the sites of interaction from the local to the global in response to repression at the local level. Thus, when the Thai government refused to listen to the complaints of the Klong Dan villagers they were able to bring their complaints into the global arena, with the help of local and global social movements. Another strategy was holding unofficial parallel summits to international financial institution conferences as sites of interaction. Conferences like this bring together local and global movements involved with the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. They also help to expand the transnational networks which have advocacy campaigns concerning the Bank's projects. Moreover, events like this enabled the anti-Asian Development Bank movement to invite Bank officials to their own conferences and to present their demands to them. They also gave birth to specific campaigns such as the anti-Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project which was pursued after the 33rd Annual Governor's Meeting protest actions.
The effectiveness in taking advantage of the sites of interaction lies in the ability of the social movements to mobilize resources. Getting ideas through the sites of interaction was done through scale-shifting whereby the demands of the anti-globalization movement, for example against neo-liberalism, are localized in issues such as the privatization of social services. Related to the framing process is the relevance of the issues presented. In this case, the focus was placed on the need for transparency and accountability, and the problem of environmental degradation. These are issues which the middle class in Thailand can identify with, resulting in sympathy and outright support for the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns in general and anti-Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project in particular.
The strategies used in the sites of interaction have also brought about a debate on whether the anti-globalization movement should use them for engagement or for confrontation. More often than not, when people are locked out of the decision-making process—and this was how the Thais felt regarding the Asian Development Bank and the Thai government—they resort to confrontation such as demonstrations. Engagement also brings up the issue of visibility: when the anti-globalization activists deal with Bank officials inside conference halls, they are not seen by the public or media, unlike demonstrations which receive media coverage and bring their issues to the attention of the world.
In terms of the increments gained, the creation of sites of interaction at the local and global levels have facilitated the political socialization of anti-globalization activities as well as the evolution of democratic skills and norms. As important is the exchange of ideas that has taken place here and during the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. There is a universal ideology that has seemed to inspire and connect similar movements across the world, enabling them to coordinate international solidarity for their cause. Moreover, the process has also helped to widen the democratization process at the domestic level as well as bring domestic policies to international attention. The Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project as a site of interaction has also provided global civil society with a case-study to show that the Asian Development Bank was lacking in good governance when it became involved in the Project. It also highlighted the issues of the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns against the neo-liberal development paradigm.
Challenges, however, confront the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns with regard to the utility of the sites of interaction. A question posed, for example, is whether resources should continue to be used at the Annual Governor's Meetings or whether these should be expended on the production of popular educational materials. There is also a concern that social movements’ participation in the Annual Governor's Meetings is a means of legitimizing the Asian Development Bank. At the same time, however, the Annual Governor's Meetings provide media mileage and an opportunity to expand the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. The other issue is the Annual Governor's Meetings that take place in police states, which do not allow protest actions to take place. What happens here is that social movement players have to contend with engaging the Bank at the official conferences. The anti-globalization movement, therefore, has certainly succeeded in creating sites of interaction with regard to the anti-Asian Development Bank campaigns. But, as has been pointed out, what are also important are the effectiveness of the strategies and the resources they utilize in creating as well as sustaining such sites of interaction as well as the manner in which they are able to frame their advocacies to get support from the public and needed response on the part of the Asian Development Bank.
