An intellectual biography seems only right for a figure of such formidable intellect driven so steadily by ideas and ideals. Of Burke's intellect even the great Samuel Johnson stood in awe. Johnson, whose conversational abilities intimidated nearly everyone, felt he needed his full strength to match Burke. According to James Boswell, “once, when Johnson was ill, and unable to exert himself as much as usual without fatigue, Mr. Burke having been mentioned, he said, ‘That fellow calls forth all my powers. Were I to see Burke now, it would kill me.’” His summary judgment: “Yes; Burke is an extraordinary man. His stream of mind is perpetual” (Life of Johnson, 21 March 1776).
For Bromwich, Burke's stream of mind perpetually ran to ideas—”He was indeed a man of ideas. If he was not, no politician ever was” (21)—and beyond mere empiricism: “the portrait of Burke as an anti-theoretical critic of modern politics, a ‘pragmatic’ adapter to local needs, has always been overdrawn. The truth is that he cherished certain abstract ideals unconditionally” (11).
This first of two volumes traces Burke's writings from the early, anonymous, and uneasily ironic A Vindication of Natural Society (1756) into the early 1780s. (A second volume is to cover the period of Burke's writings on India and France, 1783–97.) Following his discussion of the Vindication and Burke's early intellectual formation, Bromwich, whose home field is English Romanticism, turns to an unusually subtle analysis of Burke's Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. This work of 1757 (revised in 1759) sometimes receives scant treatment in works on Burke as a political thinker; for Bromwich, however, Burke's political thinking derives first from his insight as a “psychologist” (16), and his psychological theorizing began in the realm of aesthetics. Burke turned what had traditionally been a heavily rhetorical field of speculation about the devices and management of sublime language toward introspective psychology: “in dispensing with all guidelines for the sublime and beautiful, Burke's aesthetic treatise offers not so much a survey of its subject as a psychological analysis of the priority of feeling to thought” (89).
This apprenticeship would seem to be the foundation for the quality of Burke's thought that most interests Bromwich, his “deep insight into the psychology of tyranny” (155), and for his cumulative achievement, a “lifelong enquiry into the origins of tyranny” (443). For Burke is not simply a psychologist but a “moral psychologist.” Bromwich draws the distinction helpfully:
“If a psychologist addresses the workings of the individual mind, a moral psychologist is concerned at once with the individual and society. He interprets actions and motives that contain an element of coerciveness that is absent in relationships of smaller groups” (16).
Bromwich rejects the “commonplace that Burke was the father of modern conservatism,” claiming (perhaps prematurely?) that “no serious historian” still believes it. Sometimes arguing from a deeper “radicalism” than he may have “fully understood” (83), Bromwich's Burke is “not only a consistent critic of state violence, he was an antiwar writer through and through” (432). Bromwich does not preach the parallels, but his Burke emerges as moral psychologist for a post-2001 world, alert to the moral hazard at home of an unwise war abroad, fearing, at the outset of war with America, that a “domineering spirit will eventually infect English society, from the habituation of soldiers to the work of oppressors, and the complicity of the people in their own oppression” (293).
Burke understood that the civic diminishments of elective war go beyond hastily formulated repressive laws. Perhaps his most eloquent account of the national danger resides in these few sentences from A Letter to Sheriffs of Bristol (1777): “Whilst manners remain entire, they will correct the vices of law, and soften it at length to their own temper. But we have to lament, that in most of the late proceedings we see very few traces of that generosity, humanity, and dignity of mind which formerly characterized this nation. War suspends the rules of moral obligation; and what is long suspended is in danger of being totally abrogated” (302).
Commenting on the Letter, Bromwich achieves a political eloquence of his own. Burke, he argues, “means to reproach more particularly those ministers of state who lack the imagination to know the effects of war—how it warps and specializes the civil respect for authority, and coarsens the natural feelings of equity and justice. The men he speaks of were those who started the cry for war: they evangelized for it; they enacted patriotic laws to choke dissent and wear down the enemy; and now they have been proved defective in knowledge and imagination alike” (303). Always skeptical of military enthusiasm (a trait he shares with Jonathan Swift), Burke “sees that war is an evil in itself; any argument for the necessity of war is an argument for the lesser evil; and in the nature of state power (and its quest for aggrandizement), the case for a given war must be regarded prima facie with suspicion. The same holds true for those conquests that states by diplomatic euphemism classify as something other than open war” (432).
Bromwich has been writing as a political analyst in recent years about the domestic effects of American international ventures, in what is an arguably Burkean tradition. A January 8th piece in the London Review of Books on the CIA torture report, for example, begins and ends with the New York police killing of Eric Garner. Comparing torture to (temporary) slavery, Bromwich argues that the “evil consists in the ability to dominate other persons without check, the ability to do with them what you will, armed with assurance of impunity. Such a custom of acquittal or habit of non-accountability may have broad consequences in the treatment by the state of its own people—the treatment, for example, of a large black man on the streets of New York by a huddle of police who are determined to subdue him. The suspect becomes a rightless subject and not a person who bears the inalienable rights of a citizen” (16).
Bromwich, to his credit, does not obtrude the parallels I have been suggesting. However one regards his own political writing, it is clear that a serious political intellectual has undertaken Burke's intellectual biography, as well equipped a scholar as I can think of to discern and describe Burke's stream of mind.
