Introduction
In 1898, following China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, Germany used the killing of two missionaries in Caozhou, Shandong, as a pretext to send troops to occupy Qingdao and to force the Qing government to lease Jiaozhou Bay, thereby incorporating Qingdao and surrounding areas into Germany’s sphere of influence. Russia, under the pretext of balancing the influence of Western powers in China, likewise sent troops to occupy Lushun and Dalian and demanded that the Qing government recognize the Liaodong Peninsula as part of its sphere of influence. Shortly thereafter, Russia constructed the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchuria Railway. Subsequently, Britain obtained leasing rights to Weihaiwei, Jiulong, and areas along the Yangtze River; France secured priority leasing rights in Guangzhou Bay and Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan; Japan established influence in Fujian; and Italy requested the lease of Sanmen Bay in Zhejiang. By the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, competition among the great powers to establish spheres of influence in China, together with intensified religious and colonial activity in coastal regions, contributed to the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in North China.
In the spring of 1900, the Boxers entered the Beijing and Tianjin areas, operating under the slogan “support the Qing and destroy the foreigners” and were subsequently utilised by the Qing to conduct xenophobic attacks. War thus broke out involving the Qing army, the Boxers, and the Eight-Nation Alliance. During this period, following requests from the United Kingdom and other powers to dispatch troops, Japan decided at a cabinet meeting on 15 June to send 3,000 soldiers to North China to join the war. From that point until September 1901, when the powers signed the final treaty with the Qing government and declared peace, Japan played a prominent role in both military and political spheres. This conflict was the first war against China in modern history in which Japan fought alongside Western powers. During the war, one Japanese quasi-nongovernmental organization (QNGO)— Tōa Dōbunkai — voluntarily participated, marking the first time that a Japanese QNGO intervened in international politics concerning China.
Tōa Dōbunkai was established in November 1898 through the merger of Tōakai and Dōbunkai and initially comprised sixty members. Its president was Atsumaro Konoe, Speaker of the Japanese House of Lords, who enjoyed considerable trust from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from private foreign-policy activists. One predecessor, Tōakai, was founded in April 1898 by critics associated with the Seikyōkai, members of the Progressive Party, and student groups such as Dōhōkai of Tokyo Imperial University and Dōjinkai of Tokyo Senmon School. Its leading figures included Katsunan Kuga, Tsuyoshi Inukai, and other commentators and politicians. The association aimed to “study East Asian issues, especially the Chinese question, correct the colonial status quo in the region,”Footnote 1 promote political transformation within the Qing state, facilitated the adoption of Western (particularly Japanese) institutions and culture, and ultimately resist European aggression on the basis of the “Japan-China Alliance.”Footnote 2
Another predecessor, Dōbunkai, emerged in June 1898 through the merger of the Association and the Spiritual Society. Its principal members included Ryūhei Shiraiwa, Masaki Nakanishi, Saburō Ide, and other long-term activists in China. Many Dōbunkai members were engaged in economic and commercial activity with China and adopted a comparatively moderate political stance, arguing that Chinese and Japanese actors should “strengthen nongovernmental cooperation as an urgent task.”Footnote 3
After its establishment, Tōa Dōbunkai attached considerably importance to the crisis generated by the scramble for China by Western powers. The organisation founded the magazine Toa Jiron in Tokyo, established branches in Shanghai, Hankou, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou, and published Chinese-language newspapers including Han Bao, Min Bao, Yadong Shibao, and Tong Wen Hu Bao. In pursuit of expanding its sphere of influence and establishing extensive networks across Chinese society, it gathered intelligence across multiple fields, investigated Qing political trends and policies, examined public opinion and commercial practices, and established schools to educate young people and cultivate cultural expertise. In particular, the organization engaged Chinese intellectuals who advocated political reform, encouraging pro-Japanese sentiment, the adoption of modern institutions, and initiatives aimed at transforming systems of governance. Tōa Dōbunkai was nevertheless criticized both domestically and internationally for its radical arguments, including calls for resistance to Russia and criticism of the Qing government.Footnote 4
After 1900, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs adjusted its policy to strengthen oversight of the overseas activities of nongovernmental organizations. Institutions operating in Korea were placed under the jurisdiction of the Japanese embassy there, while organizations active in China were expected to merge with Tōa Dōbunkai. Activities in China were also to be led by Konoe, who maintained close relations with the ministry. As a result, branches, schools, and newspapers of Tōa Dōbunkai in Korea were transferred to embassy supervision, while Tōa Dōbunkai absorbed organizations such as the Korean Association and the Asia Association. Membership soon exceeded 3,000, making it the principal Japanese QNGO with extensive operations in Mainland China and significant China-related expertise and influence. Although the association received an annual subsidy of 40,000 yen from confidential funds of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approximately 20 per cent of such funds at the time, it was not a government agency and therefore faced relatively few formal restrictions on its external activities.Footnote 5
From June, when fighting between the Eight-Nation Alliance and Qing forces intensified, Tōa Dōbunkai anticipated that the occupation of Beijing would lead the great powers to intensify the scramble for China. It therefore sought, utilizing its QNGO status, to promote separatist activity in southern China by persuading and assisting political forces perceived as opposed to the Qing government, with the aim of constructing a federal state under Japanese influence. On the surface, this position differed markedly from that of the Japanese government, which sought careful coordination with Western powers during the crisis.Footnote 6 Notably, Tōa Dōbunkai did not regard federal preservation as the creation of a new state in opposition to the ideas of preserving China; rather, it framed federal preservation as one possible means of achieving that goal. This argument illustrates the conceptual ambiguity and flexibility inherent in the notion of preserving China. Clarifying the ideas and actions of Tōa Dōbunkai, in response to the war therefore sheds light not only on the external orientation of Japanese QNGOs during Japan’s early expansion into China but also on the subtle differences between the roles and functions of QNGOs and the state.
Previous studies of Japan’s response to the Boxer Rebellion have rarely addressed the distinctive activities of QNGOs such as Tōa Dōbunkai. Long-term research on organisation’s activities in China may be broadly grouped into four categories: studies examining its general activities;Footnote 7 analyses of its investigative, research, and educational workFootnote 8 ; scholarship focusing on propaganda activities from the First World War to the 1930s;Footnote 9 and comprehensive assessments of its understanding of China and political influence.Footnote 10 Building on these approaches, this study argues that, as the Alliance, including Japan, invaded North China, Tōa Dōbunkai attempted to exploit the crisis to create a sphere in which Japan could exert influence through cooperation with diverse Chinese forces. The concept of federal preservation was not a clearly defined academic theory, but rather an action plan developed by association members drawing on their knowledge of colonial practice. Broadly, it involved using wartime conditions to establish a sphere of influence, or potentially a colony, under Japanese control or joint control with Britain in parts of China. Furthermore, because federal preservation operated within the association’s broader concept of “protecting China,” examining this strategy reveals the tensions and contradictions within that concept and provides a historical foundation for analysing comparable issues.
From the concept of preserving China to that of federal preservation
In the resolution drafted at the inaugural meeting of Tōa Dōbunkai in 1898, the preservation of China was explicitly defined as the basic principle guiding its activities. This principle functioned both as a response to rapid changes in the Far East international environment and as an interpretation of Japanese government policy in the region. At this time, Japanese foreign policy emphasised coordination between the two rival powers, Britan and Russia, while simultaneously pursuing Japan’s own interests in China. Three events in April 1898 illustrated this approach. First, Vice Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura expressed agreement with Britan’s intention to occupy Weihaiwei following the withdrawal of Japanese forces, with the aim of containing Russia. Second, the Japanese government acquiesced to Russia’s occupation of Lushun and Dalian by signing a Russo-Japanese agreement two days later. Third, the Japanese envoy in Beijing successfully pressed the Qing government to declare that Fujian would not be ceded.Footnote 11
Japanese public opinion, however, increasingly criticised the government for following Britain and Russia and called for more active intervention in mainland China. Two broad positions emerged. One advocated participation in the scramble for China, arguing that since Western powers had already adopted this approach, it was advantageous for Japan to join them promptly;Footnote 12 some even suggested that failure to secure Weihaiwei should justify Zhoushan or parts of Fujian.Footnote 13 The second position emphasised the preservation of Chinese territory, arguing that Western expansion into China would ultimately threaten Japan and that Japan should therefore invoke the preservation of China to counter the great powers.Footnote 14
Tōa Dōbunkai adopted a moderate preservationist position with distinctive features. First, it avoided direct confrontation with Western powers, recognising that Japan’s national strength lagged behind theirs. Preservation was therefore framed as compatible with cooperation, particularly with Britain, whose interests in China overlapped with Japan’s. Atsumaro Konoe consistently argued that Anglo-Japanese cooperation was essential in addressing the Chinese question.Footnote 15 Second, the policy reflected a clear utilitarian objective: preserving China was valued not out of solidarity but because China’s territorial integrity was closely linked to Japan’s development and future. Konoe emphasised that Japan did not seek a formal “offensive and defensive alliance” with China, which he regarded as insufficiently modernized.Footnote 16 Rather, preserving China would prevent Western monopolisation of opportunities and encourage the Japanese government to move beyond its previously cautious stance towards expanding rights and interests in China.Footnote 17 These characteristics help explain Konoe’s shifting positions following the outbreak of the crisis.
The first report concerning the Boxer movement received by Tōa Dōbunkai was sent by Masaki Nakanishi to Konoe in January 1900,Footnote 18 yet the organisation did not respond until early June.Footnote 19 As foreign powers dispatched troops on the grounds that the Qing government had failed to suppress the Boxers, tensions escalated. On 11 June, Akira Sugiyama, secretary of the Japanese legation, was killed by Qing forces under Dong Fuxiang, prompting the Japanese government to view suppression of the uprising as the beginning of expanding international influence and “controlling Chinese hegemony”Footnote 20 and to deploy troops to the Beijing–Tianjin region. On 19 June, the day the Qing court decided to declare on the foreign powers, Tōa Dōbunkai convened its board and drafted a policy resolution. While reaffirming the preservation of China, the resolution proposed that, should the Qing government collapse or prove unable to govern, Japan establish a new regime in South China ahead of other powers. If coastal partition occurred, Japan should secure advantageous territories; if encroachment intensified, Japan should immediately occupy Korea.Footnote 21
The resolution indicated that the organisation sought to stabilize South China through both military and non-military means, including the shaping of public opinion. It also revealed growing disillusionment with the Qing government and concern regarding the intentions of the great powers. Konoe initially maintained a cautious position, criticizing proposals within Japan that the Alliance should occupy provinces such as Zhili, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang as “absurd.”Footnote 22 By late June, however, his position shifted due to changing circumstances. Provincial leaders in southern China adopted a neutral stance towards the conflict, culminating in the Mutual Defence Pact of the Southeastern Provinces led by Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, and Liangguang Li Hongzhang. Members of Tōa Dōbunkai, including Masunosuke Ōdagiri in Shanghai, regarded this development as “advantageous for Japan”Footnote 23 and facilitated contacts between provincial leaders and foreign representatives.Footnote 24
The influence of the Japanese government and military also proved significant. At a meeting on 30 March, political activist Tomofusa Sasa and Secretary-General Tadashi Satō relayed the Japanese government’s favourable assessment of Tōa Dōbunkai’s recent responses to events in China. They also indicated that the army sought closer contact with figures such as Liu Kunyi but lacked appropriate channels and therefore wished to work through the organisation.Footnote 25 Such signals suggest tacit governmental and military support for Tōa Dōbunkai’s expanded activities.
In this context, Konoe and the leaving cadres of Tōa Dōbunkai began to deliberate over China policy. In his diary, Konoe described the discussion, which lasted almost all night, in the following terms: “All kinds of beneficial ideas have been generated.”Footnote 26 This remark suggests that Konoe, who had hitherto consciously pursued a cautious approach to the Boxer Rebellion, had come to align more closely with the views of the organisation’s principal cadres. On 5 July, when he met Qian Xun, Zhang Zhidong’s liaison with Japan and supervisor of Hubei students overseas, Konoe asked him to convey to Zhang Zhidong that “Tōa Dōbunkai would to its utmost to promote an alliance among the southern viceroys.”Footnote 27 This was the first occasion on which Konoe publicly expressed support for the southern viceroys’ management of China’s situation. Yet what, in practice, did this “alliance” entail and towards what end was it directed? Konoe’s phrasing remained vague at the time, but its meaning became clearer after Hajime Nezu, a Tōa Dōbunkai councillor, returned to Tokyo from Shanghai.Footnote 28
In May 1900, Nezu was dispatched to Nanjing as Konoe’s special envoy, taking up the post of President of the Nanjing Dōbun Shoin, which had concurrently been held by Secretary-General Tadashi Satō. After a month and a half, Konoe abruptly recalled Nezu to Tokyo.Footnote 29 Nezu had previously served in the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office and possessed extensive military connections. Moreover, through his involvement in China-related work at the Japan–China Trade Research Institute in Shanghai alongside Sei Arao, he had developed substantial knowledge of China and a strategic vision for Japanese policy there; he was therefore highly trusted by Konoe.Footnote 30 On 10 July, Nezu submitted to Konoe a lengthy policy memorandum entitled The Handling Plan for the Turmoil in China, and on 12 July he met Konoe privately to discuss it. Konoe recorded three points in his diary. First, Nezu’s intelligence and assessment of the situation further strengthened Konoe’s intention to work with the southern viceroys. Second, Konoe rejected the proposal advanced by some Tōa Dōbunkai cadres to pursue southern initiatives jointly with Western powers. Third, in order to secure governmental support, Konoe planned to approach Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi in person,Footnote 31 an indication that his stance had shifted towards more active intervention. In other words, Konoe regarded Nezu’s views regarding both key concepts and specific countermeasures. What, then, was the substance of Nezu’s programme, endorsed by Konoe and intended for presentation to the prime minister?
With regard to Japan’s response to the Boxer Rebellion, Nezu outlined four policy options: (1) preservation of the original status quo; (2) laissez-faire preservation; (3) participation in the scramble for China; and (4) federal preservation. ‘Preservation’ functioned as the conceptual foundation of all four, and Nezu argued that the federal preservation was the most appropriate and timely approach. Before analysing federal preservation, the other three options may be summarized briefly. First, under the policy of preserving the original status quo, Japan would cooperate with the great powers to suppress the Boxers, thereby demonstrating the prestige of the Japanese army to Chinese officials and the public. In relations with the great powers, especially Britain and the United States, Japan should position itself as a leading intermediary between them and China, exerting implicit dominance over the settlement process; it should then demand substantial indemnities and restore conditions to their pre-war state. Second, under laissez-faire preservation, Japan would remain indifferent to developments in China and to the activities of the great powers, focusing solely on protecting its own rights and interests while leaving the Qing court responsible for its survival. Third, the policy of participating in the scramble envisaged Japan, in conjunction with Britain and other powers, dispatching two divisions to occupy the Yangtze River basin and bring Hunan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui under control; subduing Fujian and Zhejiang with the assistance of the Viceroy of Taiwan; and placing these regions under Japanese military administration to form an empire analogous to British rule in India.Footnote 32
These three options were premised on the pursuit of Japan’s objectives through coordination with other powers. By contrast, federal preservation was presented as a plan that Japan could implement largely on its own, with support from powerful actors within China. In Nezu’s view, if the Qing government persisted in war, revolutionary groups across China would inevitably exploit the situation, plunging the country into chaos. Japan should then adopt a strategy of federal preservation: the establishment of an alternative federal government in southern China. Nezu divided this strategy into four stages. First, Japan would align with viceroys such as Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, and Li Hongzhang to establish sub-states within their respective jurisdictions. Second, to secure and protect this sphere of influence, Japan would dispatch troops to take control of Fujian and Zhejiang and appoint a Japanese figure of recognised standing in China as viceroy. Third, Fujian and Zhejiang would be merged with the sub-states of Liu, Zhang, and Li into a large empire under Japanese protection, enabling Japan to govern China through the mobilization of Chinese resources. To advance this programme, Nezu emphasized the need first to reach agreement with Liu, Zhang, and Li on a federal strategy. In the Beijing‒Tianjin theatre, Japan needed only secure the requisite national interests from the great powers while maintaining a minimum threshold of prestige vis-à-vis China.Footnote 33
The core logic of this plan closely resembled a contemporary Japanese governmental approach articulated in The Follow-up Measures of the Northern Qing Incident, drafted by Prime Minister Aritomo Yamagata at around the same time. Yamagata argued that, to avoid provoking suspicion among the great powers in the post-war settlement, Japan should adopt the policy of “guarding the north and advancing the south”, metaphorically, “first chasing one rabbit in the south and then another in the north.” He further observed that the “occupation of Fujian and Zhejiang, despite their commercial and industrial development, was not an urgent objective; nevertheless, if an opportunity arose, it could be pursued.”Footnote 34
This parallel may also be read as evidence of tacit governmental support for Konoe and broad alignment with Nezu’s federal preservation scheme. To assess the feasibility of the Tōa Dōbunkai plan, and because the organisation’s China operations were financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ confidential funds, Konoe solicited views from relevant officials, though no consensus emerged within the ministry. Masunosuke Ōdagiri, acting Consulate-General in Shanghai, signalled Konoe that “if the Japanese government and people secretly assist Liu, Zhang, and Li at this time, there will be many benefits in the future.”Footnote 35 By contrast, Foreign Minister Shūzō Aoki adopted an ambivalent posture, “neither fully endorsing it nor stopping it.”Footnote 36 Given Aoki’s tendency to align with Yamagata on China policy, often in opposition to the more cautious Ito,Footnote 37 this ambiguity may be interpreted as a warning to Tōa Dōbunkai to weigh wider international considerations, avoid alienating the government, and perform its role as a QNGO with care.
Within Tōa Dōbunkai, radical activity in South China generated internal divisions. Secretary-General Tadashi Satō proposed adding the phrase “safeguarding the Qing dynasty” to the organisation’s policies in order to signal prudence in wartime; other secretaries argued that the organisation’s line should not be excessively stabilising.Footnote 38 Although Konoe struggled to discipline the cadres’ thinking, the question of whether to support continued Qing rule was provisionally defused when Tōa Dōbunkai agreed not to adopt an explicit position on China’s political future. At the same time, more radical tendencies became evident among the organisation’s China-based members.
By the summer of 1900, Tōa Dōbunkai’s principal institutions in China consisted of branches in Shanghai, Hankou, Fuzhou, and Guangdong; Tōa Dōbunshoin in Nanjing; and the Chinese-language newspaper Tong Wen Hu Bao. Following the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion, members in China coalesced into two groupings: a ‘central’ group centred on Shanghai and Hankou, and a ‘southern’ group centred on the Guangdong branch. Their principal interlocutors and targets included ‘self-reliance’ associations connected to Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, and Tang Caichang, as well as figures such as Li Hongzhang and Sun Yat-sen.
Within the central group, Kotarō Munakata, head of the Hankou branch, argued that Japan’s fundamental aim in responding to the crisis was to expand national rights and interests. To that end, Japan should secure a leading position in the handling of China’s affairs before other powers could do so and should adopt a “doctrine of power” amid rapid change. Under this doctrine, if the great powers destroyed Qing authority and established a new regime, Japan should enjoy a comparable degree of dominance. Accordingly, after the Eight-Nation Alliance captured the Dagu Forts, a symbol of Qing authority, and especially after the southern viceroys signalled their refusal to follow the Qing court’s war policy, Munakata proposed that “Japan should control viceroys such as Zhang and Liu and occupy useful territory.” When the Alliance entered Beijing in August, he further insisted that “Japan must occupy at least the three provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang,” and treated the federal-state plan as a strategy for regions south of the Yellow River. In a confidential report to Japan’s Naval Ministry, Munakata described a scheme whereby, following the occupation of Beijing, the great powers would judge the Qing court, after the flight of the Emperor and the Empress Dowager, as no longer qualified to govern and would then negotiate with the southern viceroys to establish a federal regime. The area south of the Yellow River would be divided into seven states — 1) Hunan-Hubei; (2) Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou; (3) Guangdong- Guangxi; (4) Jiangsu- Anhui; (5) Shandong- Henan; (6) FujianZhejiang; and (7) Jiangxi — with the federal government located in Wuchang to coordinate and unify these units. Other regions, such as Zhili, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu, would remain temporarily under Manchu jurisdiction and could be incorporated once the southern situation stabilized. Japan would place Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi under Japanese protection.Footnote 39
The central group, however, also contained alternative views. In a discussion with Kang Youwei, for instance, Masaji Inoue of the Shanghai branch proposed a federation that would divide China’s eighteen provinces into eighteen states and form a federation ‘with Japan,’ with Japan positioned as Prussia.Footnote 40 Compared with Munakata’s plan, Inoue’s proposal was distinctive in two respects: it fragmented China into eighteen constituent states and excluded Western powers altogether, envisaging unilateral Japanese implementation.
To consolidate a shared position, Yasunosuke Tanabe (acting dean of Nanjing Dōbun Shoin), and the directors of the Shanghai and Hankou branches, Saburō Ide, Munakata, and Inoue, met on 15 July and agreed on a federation-building programme, adopting the following policies. First, they would maintain contact with the southern viceroys and provided assistance to reform-oriented nongovernmental actors. After the occupation of Beijing, if the Guangxu Emperor remained in power, Japan would support efforts to establish a new government under his authority; if the Empress Dowager Cixi fled to Xi’an, Japan would strive to form a new government without her recognition. Second, if the southern viceroys adopted an equivocal stance, continuing to accommodate Cixi or even attacking foreigners, Japan would support whichever forces were capable of defeating them. These forces included the so-called Chinese Parliament organized by Tang Caichang and other groups advocating Qing reform, as well as armed organisations such as the Gelaohui in the Yangtze River basin. Third, they would urge the Japanese government to resolve the Korean question rapidly while concentrating activities in the Yangtze River basin. The Japanese army and navy would be approached and encouraged to press the Tōa Dōbunkai headquarters to act in accordance with these policies.Footnote 41
Two points merit emphasis. First, insofar as it envisaged assisting southern viceroys in establishing a new regime once Qing rule was destabilised, this policy did not differ substantially from the positions outlined above by Munakata, Inoue, Nezu, and Konoe, and it was not confined to the southern viceroys alone. Moreover, with respect to methods and instruments, it placed far greater reliance than other proposals on non-state actors, including civil forces such as the Chinese Parliament in Shanghai and secret societies in southern China.
Second, in order to realise so radical a political objective, Tōa Dōbunkai’s China-based operatives sought to exert influence not only on the Japanese government and military but also on the organisation’s headquarters. Their aim was to create a fait accompli that would compel senior leaders, who favoured a cautious course for a variety of reasons, to acknowledge and accept it. This tactic was unusual at the time; it later became a recurrent strategy employed by Japanese QNGOs and rōnin in their China-related activities.
Within the southern group, many sympathized with Chinese revolutionaries who sought to overthrow Qing rule by extraordinary means, including Sun Yat-sen. Figures such as Tōten Miyazaki, Ryōhei Uchida, Makoto Fukumoto, Shū Hirayama, Yoshimasa Yamada, Kōshichirō Kyofuji, and Misao Suenaga maintained their respective alliances with Sun and his associates, while the leaders of the Guangdong branch, Ken Takahashi and Kiichi Haraguchi, supported Sun’s activities. After the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, Miyazaki, Hirayama, and others attempted to forge a coalition between Kang Youwei and Liang Quichao, who advocated constitutionalism, and Sun, who favoured a republican system, in opposition to the Qing dynasty. These efforts failed, however, owing to Kang’s refusal to participate. This failure nevertheless prompted Miyazaki and his associated to devote themselves more fully to Sun’s movement. After the Boxer Rebellion, Sun Yat-sen, regarding the crisis as a rare opportunity to launch a revolution, began planning an uprising aimed at establishing a new central government in either Nanjing or Wuhan.Footnote 42 At this time, the Japanese involved in the planning around Sun were members of this network.Footnote 43 In June 1900, Fukumoto and Uchida were appointed commander-in-chief and army supervisor, respectively, of a Japanese Volunteer Army intended to support the uprising.Footnote 44 In mid-June, prompted by rumours that Li Hongzhang intended to negotiate with Sun regarding the independence of Guangdong, Miyazaki, Uchida, and Kyofuji acted as Sun’s representatives in negotiations with Li’s confidant, Liu Xuexun.Footnote 45
Although Miyazaki and Uchida supported Sun’s objective of overthrowing the Qing dynasty, their motivations were not identical. Miyazaki and his associated regarded Sun as “not only the most progressive revolutionary in China but also the most progressive politician in Asia”; accordingly, they committed themselves to his cause in the hope of realizing a more ideal world.Footnote 46 Uchida and his associates, by contrast, supported Sun’s revolution chiefly as a means of containing the European powers and advancing their own ambitions to expand Japan’s sphere of influence in Fujian and Northeast China. Uchida reportedly stated to his followers that they risked their lives to assist Sun because Sun’s rationale aligned with Japan’s interests: the ideal envisaged by Sun and his supporters amounted to Sino-Japanese mutual assistance against Western encroachment and the creation of a Han-dominated China. If Japanese assistance to Sun and other revolutionary forced succeeded, Uchida argued, Japan would be able to take control of Northeast China and Siberia.Footnote 47
Tōa Dōbunkai’s headquarters, however, remained highly wary of the southern group’s involvement in Sun’s revolutionary movement, at times dismissing its members as mere “parasites” who did more harm than good.Footnote 48 From the perspective of the southern group, the headquarters was not only conservative in its thinking but also strikingly ill-informed about conditions in China. Miyazaki, for example, broke with headquarters because of its stance.Footnote 49 Moreover, the Guangdong branch in Guangzhou, often used by Miyazaki and others as a base, actively participated in Sun’s revolutionary activities. One member, Kiichi Haraguchi, jointly published the ten-day periodical Xixiao Bao with associates of the Sun faction. Owing to the periodical’s frequent attacks on the Qing government, the Qing authorities demanded that the Japanese consulate in Guangzhou expel Haraguchi and close the Guangdong branch.Footnote 50 This demand formed the immediate backdrop to the Tōa Dōbunkai board’s resolution of 14 July to dissolve the Guangdong branch and order its members to return to Japan.Footnote 51 This indicates that efforts to assist Sun were not incorporated into federation-building programme pursued by Konoe and his associates.
Attempts to establish a federal state
As noted above, the Tōa Dōbunkai leadership and its China-based branches did not share a uniform understanding of what federation-building entailed. Moreover, the implementation of ‘federal preservation’ proceeded along three partially overlapping tracks, without a single unified chain of command: first, attempts by Tōa Dōbunkai members to persuade the southern viceroys to declare independence; second, assistance provided by China-based members to the uprising of Tang Caichang’s Independent Army; and third, the involvement of some southern-group members in the Huizhou uprising led by Sun Yat-sen.
Persuading the southern viceroys to declare independence
According to relevant passages in the correspondence of Kotarō Munakata and Yasunosuke Tanabe, and in Masaji Inoue’s diary, members of the Shanghai and Hankou branches engaged chiefly in the following efforts at persuasion.
First, in mid-June 1900, Munakata, Inoue, and others, through Wang Kangnian of China Foreign Daily, urged the Viceroy of Huguang, Zhang Zhidong, to receive the Guangxu Emperor in Wuchang and establish a new government.Footnote 52 Wang was a well-known publisher and reform advocate, and had previously served under Zhang. Zhang refused, however, on the grounds that a viceroy’s duty was to govern his jurisdiction in accordance with imperial orders.Footnote 53 Second, in late June, Inoue and his associates asked Tang Caichang to ascertain whether the Viceroy of Liangjiang, Liu Kunyi, had any intention of declaring independence.Footnote 54 Although Liu expressed support for the establishment of a federal government in a letter to Konoe,Footnote 55 his equivocal posture meant that these overtures did not succeed.Footnote 56 Nor did attempts to use Tao Senjia, and acting Jiangsu official, as an intermediary prove effective.Footnote 57 Third, when Li Hongzhang, Viceroy of Liangguang, passed through Shanghai en route to Beijing to participate in the peace negotiations, Inoue and others again relied on Wang Kangnian to probe Li’s intentions and sought access to Li Jingfang (Li Hongzhang’s son and a former ambassador to Japan). Li Jingfang refused outright, stating that the matter concerned national policy and that he would not enter into an agreement. Tōa Dōbunkai also enlisted Zheng Guanying to approach Li Hongzhang, but Li sharply rebuked Zheng, and the attempt likewise failed.Footnote 58
The failure of these efforts was in part related to a shift in the southern viceroy’s stance after mid-July. On July 25, amid mounting criticism, both within China and internationally, of Empress Dowager Cixi’s mismanagement, Zhang Zhidong, after consultation with Liu Kunyi and Li Hongzhang, telegraphed the British Consul-General in Shanghai (a central figure within the Shanghai consular corps). Zhang asserted that recent unrest stemmed from the Kang- Liang faction’s slanders against Cixi; he claimed that she had governed well for more than thirty years and pursued a policy of friendly diplomacy, and warned that failure by foreign powers to show her due respect would provoke resentment among Chinese public opinion.Footnote 59 Concluding from this that the southern viceroys would no longer no longer facilitate the establishment of a federal government, the central group maintained its ties with them but shifted its efforts towards supporting the Chinese Parliament, particularly the constitutional movement led by Tang Caichang.
Supporting Tang Caichang
During the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, Tang Caichang attracted the attention of members of both Tōakai and Dōbunkai because of his advocacy of political reform in China.Footnote 60 Following the coup that ended the reform movement, Tang travelled to Japan to seek assistance and received assurances from Munakata and others that they would support reformist efforts.Footnote 61 After returning to Shanghai in 1899, he contributed to the editorial work of Yadong Shibao, a periodical run by Tōa Dōbunkai.Footnote 62 He also reached an agreement with Kitsuji Tano, a Tōa Dōbunkai member, regarding support for the establishment of schools and newspapers in Hunan; this agreement, however, was not fully implemented because the Japanese actors in Shanghai disagree about the feasibility of assisting Tang.Footnote 63 Tang therefore shifted course and founded the Justice Society on Xinma Road in Shanghai. To support his activities, Tano and others established the Dongwen Translation Agency at the same location as a cover organisation for the Justice Society.Footnote 64
After the Boxer Rebellion and the intensification of the ensuing political disorder, Tang Caichang renamed the Justice Society the Independence Society and accelerated preparations aimed at overthrowing Cixi and establishing a constitutional government in southern China. This development aligned closely with the federal project advanced by the Tōa Dōbunkai central group. According to the testimony of Tang Caichang’s brother, Tang Caizhong, in addition to Kitsuji Tano, those who most actively assisted Tang included Masaji Inoue, Shū Hirayama, and Masunosuke Ōdagiri. Among them, Inoue was the most deeply involved in Tang’s plans and preparations for an uprising.Footnote 65 In July 1900, Tang Caichang, then Secretary-General of the Chinese Parliament, disclosed to Inoue the organisation’s purpose, a matter concealed from ordinary members: “to abolish the old government and establish a new government, to preserve the security of China and of the world, and to enlighten the people.”Footnote 66 This episode underscores the degree of Tang’s confidence in Inoue.
Once the southern viceroys’ opposition to the federal scheme had become clear, and even as Munakata and Ōdagiri grew pessimistic about Tang’s prospects, partly because they underestimated his organisational capacity,Footnote 67 Inoue nevertheless travelled west along the Changjiang River with Tang on August 9. Two days later, Inoue separated from Tang and entered Nanjing, where he sought the support of local gentry and officials, securing their agreement to assist the Chinese Parliament in establishing a federal government should circumstances require it.Footnote 68
Yasushi Kai, a Tōa Dōbunkai member, accompanied Tang Caichang to Hankou, the operational centre of the uprising. Kai was among the few individuals privy to the core secrets of the Independence Army revolt.Footnote 69 On August 21, Kai was arrested at the uprising headquarters, alongside Tang and others, by subordinates of Zhang Zhidong. At the request of the Japanese consulate in Hankou, headed by Asanosusumu Sekawa, Kai was subsequently extradited to Japan.
Following Tang Caichang’s arrest, Tōa Dōbunkai was divided over how to respond. Inoue and Yasunosuke Tanabe, together with the Kang- Liang faction, agreed on a rescue strategy and, simultaneously, published a sympathetic article in Han Bao (Hankou) to express solidarity.Footnote 70 The leadership’s prevailing view of Tang and the Chinese Parliament, however, had been dismissive, emphasising their lack of internal cohesion, describing their program as detached from political realities, and deriding them as “actors who inherited Kang Youwei’s lineage.”Footnote 71 Nonetheless, the leadership did not seek to suppress the central group’s support for Tang as decisively as it had sought to restrain assistance to Sun Yat-sen. Yet when Tōa Dōbunkai secretary Buntaro Kashiwahara urged Konoe to write directly to Zhang Zhidong to request leniency for Tang, Konoe refused. His position remained unchanged even after leading figures, including Shigenobu Ōkuma, Taisuke Itagaki, Gorō Miura, and Tsuyoshi Inukai, signed a telegram calling for Tang’s rescue. Moriyoshi Nagaoka, the association’s vice-president, followed Konoe’s line and likewise declined to sign.Footnote 72 Zhang Zhidong’s firm opposition was a significant factor in shaping the stance adopted by the Tōa Dōbunkai senior cadres.
In the aftermath of the Tang Caichang affair, Zhang suspected that Tōa Dōbunkai members in China had colluded with Tang. He contacted Liu Kunyi and commissioned an inquiry into the activities of Tōa Dōbunkai members in Nanjing.Footnote 73 Once the organization learned of Zhang and Liu’s moves, it was compelled to curtail its rescue efforts. More importantly, by late August, when the Tang Caichang incident unfolded, the centre of gravity of Tōa Dōbunkai’s China activities had already shifted back towards engagement with the southern viceroys, despite their opposition to the federal plan. In effect, a fundamental strategic reorientation was under way: the notion of federal preservation was abandoned, and a ‘northward advance’ policy was established in its place.
Participation in Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement
From July 1900, members of the southern group became more deeply involved in Sun Yat-sen’s preparations for an uprising. In early July, in an effort to rebuild and reestablish the alliance between the Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei factions, Tōten Miyazaki and Kōshichirō Kyofuji travelled to Singapore, where Kang was residing, to pursue negotiations and related activities. Unexpectedly, the Governor of Singapore had them arrested on suspicion of plotting to murder Kang Youwei. The projected cooperation between Sun and Kang consequently collapsed.Footnote 74 On 17 July, at the request of the Governor of Singapore, the Governor of Hong Kong denied Sun and his associates entry to Hong Kong. Sun Yat-sen, Makoto Fukumoto, Kōshichirō Kyofuji, and others therefore discussed plans for an uprising aboard a ship anchored off Hong Kong.Footnote 75 During these discussions, Fukumoto and his associates advocated an immediate landing and a swift seizure of Guangzhou; Sun rejected this proposal as reckless.Footnote 76 The plan was then revised: Sun would travel at once to Taiwan via Japan to enlist support from the Japanese Governor-General, Gentarō Kodama; the operational focus would shift from Guangzhou to HuizhouFootnote 77 ; and a five-person headquarters, including Fukumoto and Shū Hirayama, would be formed to lead the insurgent force.Footnote 78 To secure sufficient manpower, on 22 July Fukumoto persuaded Yoshimasa Yamada, an officer and instructor at the Nanjing DōbunShoin, who was capable of mobilizing students, to join the planning effort.
As noted above, the Tōa Dōbunkai leadership not only disapproved of the southern group’s cooperation with Sun Yat-sen’s faction but also sought actively to prevent such activity. Even within the organization’s China-based membership, views diverged. Masaji Inoue, who remained in regular contact with the southern group, considered Fukumoto’s enterprise unlikely to succeed, yet expressed sympathy for their intentions “as righteous Japanese who wished to reform the old empire” and agreed to provide assistance.Footnote 79 By contrast, Ryūhei Shiraiwa, then head of the Dadong Steamship Company, dismissed the southern group’s activities as worthless adventurism and recommended preventive measures in reports to headquarters. Konoe and others were particularly alarmed to learn that roughly half of the academy’s students had been drawn into radical activity.Footnote 80 Accordingly, on the day Shiraiwa’s report was received, the Tōa Dōbunkai board of directors resolved to appoint Yasunosuke Tanabe, the organisation’s Nanjing secretary, as acting dean of Nanjing DōbunShoin. Pressure from headquarters contributed to a split within the southern group and to efforts to punish severely those “connected to the conspiracy by Makoto Fukumoto and others.”Footnote 81
Under this pressure, Sun Yat-sen and Ryūhei Uchida arrived in Taiwan in late September seeking assistance from the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office for the Huizhou uprising. Shū Hirayama and Yoshimasa Yamada, both dismissed from the Nanjing Dōbun Shoin, also travelled to Taiwan through other channels.Footnote 82 Through Kotarō Hiraoka, a Tōa Dōbunkai member, Sun negotiated with Governor-General Kodama and reached an agreement: the Revolutionary Army would first foment disturbances in Xiamen, thereby providing a pretext for the Taiwan garrison to dispatch troops; in return, the Governor-General’s Office would provide a measure of support to the insurgents.Footnote 83 The situation changed abruptly at the end of September. The Japanese government, once it became aware of Sun’s activities, strictly prohibited assistance, compelling the Taiwan administration to withdraw its commitment to supply Japanese officers and munitions. Sun was, for a time, even barred from entering Xiamen. Hirayama Shū, who was particularly close to Sun, was ultimately persuaded by the governor of Taiwan to leave the island and return to Japan,Footnote 84 while Yoshimasa Yamada, who remained in Taiwan, was later killed by Qing forces after returning to Guangdong to carry out Sun’s orders.Footnote 85
In sum, Tōa Dōbunkai members pursued three partially overlapping routes towards the creation of a federal polity in mainland China. Independent of the Qing: efforts to induce the southern viceroys to embrace independence; support for Tang Caichang’s uprising; and participation by some southern-group members in Sun Yat-sen’s Huizhou revolt. Although the aims and methods of these actors diverged markedly, each sought to exploit the exceptional conditions in southern China during the crisis in order to establish a regime either under Japanese protection or aligned with Japanese interests.
The replacement of federal preservation by Hokushin-ron
The proposal of Hokushin-ron
On 15 August 1900, the day after the Eight-Nation Alliance first occupied Beijing, Tōa Dōbunkai adopted a declaration at an extraordinary general meeting reaffirming the following principle: “Preserving China is our foundation; in view of the present situation we are ever more convinced that of the correctness of this principle, and therefore we swear to implement it.”Footnote 86 This renewed emphasis on “preserving” China signalled that the leadership had abandoned the project of constructing a federal state. From the perspective of Konoe and other senior figures, the requisite conditions for federation-building no longer existed given the southern viceroys’ attitudes. Meanwhile, Russia’s occupation of the three northeastern provinces in July 1900 shifted attention from the south to the north. In other words, once the federal project in southern China became infeasible, the leadership began of contemplate a transition towards participation in the scramble for China, since Russia’s occupation of the northeast constituted an urgent new crisis.
On August 4, Konoe, several councillors and secretaries met to assess Russia’s attack on Hunchun (Jilin), agreeing that it signalled Russia’s intention to occupy the three northeastern provinces and that Japan should be prepared, if necessary, to fight to the end.Footnote 87 To direct the Japanese government’s attention to Russia’s move, Konoe met Prime Minister Aritomo Yamagata on August 31 and urged a firmer policy, arguing that Japan should “concentrate its management in the north” and prioritise forcing Russia to withdraw from the three northeastern provinces.Footnote 88 Yamagata, however, decline to take immediate action. The conflict had not yet concluded, and Japan’s participation in a multilateral operation with the great powers for the first time meant that any unauthorized northward expansion by Japanese forces risked being misinterpreted.Footnote 89 Moreover, as indicated in Yamagata’s contemporaneous memorandum, The Aftermath of the Northern Qing Incident, he regarded northern ‘management’ as the central objective of Japan’s expansion in China and envisaged negotiating a division of spheres of influence in which Korea and the three northeastern provinces would fall, respectively, within Japanese and Russian domains. He therefore adopted a restrained posture in order to avoid provoking Russia prematurely.Footnote 90
Alongside continued efforts to influence decision-makers, Konoe and his associates established the Kokumin Dōmeikai in late September, with Tōa Dōbunkai cadres at its core, in order to shape public opinion in favour of a tougher line against Russia. Indeed, from its inception Tōa Dōbunkai, driven by a commitment to overseas expansion, had viewed Russia as Japan’s principal rival in mainland China and a major threat to Japan’s security. On this reading, Russia’s occupation of the northeast constituted a direct challenge that demanded confrontation. For Konoe, whose overriding concern was to prevent Russia’s southward advance, the twin pillars of the hardline position, demanding withdrawal from the three northeastern provinces and advocating ‘northern management,’ were mutually reinforcing instruments. Both served as forms of political pressure, making Russia’s retreat from the northeast a prerequisite for Japan’s development while also justifying Japan’s expansion of influence in the north as the principal means of preventing further Russian movement southward.Footnote 91 The public opinion campaign launched by Konoe and his allies on this basis foreshadowed subsequent developments, including the Anglo-Japanese Alliance concluded in January 1902. In June 1903, the Gozen Kaigi convened by Prime Minister Tarō Katsura and senior ministers resolved to open formal negotiations with Russia over the withdrawal of Russian forces from Northeast China.Footnote 92
The logic underlying the replacement of federal preservation with the Hokushin-ron policy
In terms of the Tōa Dōbunkai conception of China, the federation-building project associated with ‘federal preservation,’ which envisaged the secession of parts of southern China from the Qing polity, sat uneasily with, and in important respects contradicted, the organisation’s foundational doctrine of ‘preserving China.’ From mid-August, therefore, Tōa Dōbunkai reaffirmed the preservation-of-China thesis and, in parallel, began to advocate the Hokushin-ron policy of resisting Russia’s occupation of Northeastern China.Footnote 93 Konoe offered a rationale for this shift away from the federal-state idea and towards Hokushin-ron.
First, because Western public opinion did not generally endorse the partition of China, Konoe argued that insisting on the preservation-of-China thesis would isolate Russia, whose forces occupied the three northeastern provinces, while simultaneously attracting Chinese popular support. By February 1901, Japan, together with Britain, the United States, and Germany, had questioned Russia’s occupation of the three northeastern provinces and criticised the Qing government for making inappropriate concessions to Russia.Footnote 94 Tōa Dōbunkai also viewed “anti-Russia” action as an opportunity to prevent Chinese opinion from turning decisively against Japan. Having visited China twice, Konoe was acutely aware of China’s material significance for Japan, and he understood that realizing Japan’s objectives was closely bound up with Chinese popular sentiment.Footnote 95 The organization was therefore eager to revive the preservation-of-China thesis in order to dispel distrust generated by the prominent role played by Japanese forces within the Eight-Nation Alliance. At the same time, when some observers interpreted Kokumin Dōmeikai, initiated by Konoe and others to oppose Russia, as an attempt to construct a “yellow alliance” excluding Europeans and Americans, Konoe reiterated his earlier position that Japan had no intention of forming an alliance with China and dismissed such claims as a profound misunderstanding.Footnote 96
Second, Konoe maintained that the preservation-of-China thesis had strategic value for Japan’s expansion in China. In particular, he and his associates argued that the most effective means of addressing the northeastern question was to insist that the three provinces be opened fully to all countries. Since the Qing government could not preserve Northeast China on its own, opening the region would prevent Russia from monopolizing it.Footnote 97 As Hajime Nezu, Tōa Dōbunkai’s secretary-general, explained, the practical purpose of this approach was to invoke the need to prevent Russia’s southward advance in order to keep the three northeastern provinces nominally under Qing sovereignty while placing them effectively under Japanese control.Footnote 98
Conclusions
During the Boxer Rebellion, the Eight-Nation Alliance besieged Beijing and Tianjin, precipitating an unprecedented crisis of territorial partition in modern Chinese history. Tōa Dōbunkai, active in Chinese affairs since the late nineteenth century and committed, at least rhetorically, to the doctrine of preserving China, was subjected to a severe test: it had to reconcile its ideas and practices with rapidly shifting political circumstances, while its claims to uphold ‘preservation’ were open to scrutiny. This study has traced the formation and attempted implementation of “federal preservation” within that political process and has clarified its underlying logic.
In the early phase of the crisis, and in contrast to the Japanese government’s policy of coordinated intervention alongside Western powers, Tōa Dōbunkai anticipated that the war would culminate in a scramble and partition of China. Some members therefore began to plan the creation of an alternative federal polity in southern China alongside the Qing state. Owing to President Konoe’s initially cautious outlook, however, this response remained largely at the level of discussion. As the situation rapidly evolved, Konoe interpreted the southern viceroys’ refusal to comply with the Qing court’s war edict, and their secret negotiations with the Shanghai consular corps over the Mutual Defence Pact of the Southeastern Provinces, as manifestations of political autonomy. He consequently moved towards implementing the federal-state concept advanced by Nezu.
Yet, the ambiguity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and internal divergences within Tōa Dōbunkai led Konoe and other senior figures to refrain from articulating a clear, unified line. Instead, they tacitly tolerated initiatives undertaken by members in China aimed at federation-building. Despite substantial differences among these actors, there was broad agreement over two points: first, that the objective was to construct a federal polity either aligned with Japan or subject to Japanese predominance; and second, that this project was to be framed as consistent with the doctrine of ‘preserving China.’
In practice, efforts to establish a federal polity proceeded along three tracks. However, as the southern viceroys increasingly signalled opposition to independence, and as the uprisings associated with Tang Caichang and Sun Yat-sen failed, federation-building became infeasible. Russia’s occupation of the three northeastern provinces created a new context in which participation in the scramble for China appeared unavoidable. This development ultimately prompted Tōa Dōbunkai to abandon the federal-state project and to adopt the Hokushin-ron policy, presented as consistent with the preservation-of-China doctrine and directed against Russia.
Reflecting on this policy shift, Nezu, who served as Tōa Dōbunkai’s secretary-general for fourteen years, observed that “the preserving China policy had various solutions depending on the time and circumstance.”Footnote 99 In essence, the organisation’s ‘preserving China’ philosophy functioned less as a fixed normative commitment than as a strategic repertoire, repeatedly recalibrated to secure Japan’s diplomatic leverage and rights in its relations with China. In responding to the crisis, both through the attempted construction of a federal polity and through efforts to cultivate anti-Russian sentiment in China and Japan over the northeastern question, Tōa Dōbunkai exploited the spontaneous and covert organisational characteristics of the QNGO. This was particularly evident in its invocation of racial redemption while obscuring expansionist aims, thereby performing a role that the Japanese government could find useful in confronting sudden external contingencies. In this respect, the episode established an important precedent for the interaction between QNGOs and the state in Japan’s modern diplomatic history and in Japan’s early expansion into China.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the editor of the journal and the anonymous reviewer for their valuable opinions and suggestions. The author is responsible for any errors and omissions in the article.
Open access
