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Aristotle's Politics on Greeks and Non-Greeks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2021

Thornton Lockwood
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Abstract

Scholars of race in antiquity commonly claim that Aristotle holds protoracist views about barbaroi or non-Greeks. But a careful examination of Aristotle's remarks in his Politics about slavery, non-Greek political institutions, and Greek and non-Greek natural qualities calls into question such claims. No doubt, Aristotle held views at odds with modern liberalism, such as his views about gender subordination and the exploitation of slave and nonslave labor. But claims that Aristotle holds protoracist views are regularly but erroneously asserted without careful consideration of relevant textual evidence. I argue that Aristotle neither categorically distinguishes Greeks and non-Greeks nor does he endorse the claim that Greeks are categorically superior to non-Greeks. Indeed, Aristotle regularly draws upon non-Greek political institutions in his own formulation of the best constitution and he praises the non-Greek constitution of Carthage as superior to that of Greek constitutions such as Sparta and Crete.

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Type
Research Article
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The Review of Politics , Volume 83 , Issue 4 , Fall 2021, pp. 465 - 485
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of University of Notre Dame

In the last few decades, scholars have laudably reexamined the beliefs of canonical figures in the history of political thought concerning the subject of race. Figures such as Plato, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill have been reevaluated, both positively and negatively, in light of their views about race and racism.Footnote 1 Less laudable, though, is the often repeated claim that Aristotle viewed all barbaroi or non-Greeks as inherently inferior to Greeks and thus were “slaves by nature” on racial grounds.Footnote 2 Two recent studies of race in antiquity take such a view as needing no further argument: Denise Eileen McCoskey asserts that Aristotle “proposed that barbarians, as opposed to Greeks, were inherently servile,” and Erik Jensen claims that Aristotle “defined all barbarians as natural slaves fit to be ruled over by Greeks.”Footnote 3 Such comments imply that Aristotle believes both that Greeks and non-Greeks are categorically distinct and that Greeks are categorically superior to non-Greeks. Characterizing those claims in terms of race is complicated: although modern notions of race are based on purported laws of hereditary descent and biologically distinct groups, scholars in antiquity usually based group characteristics on climate or geography.Footnote 4 Nonetheless, many modern scholars follow Benjamin Isaac and claim that Aristotle's views can be characterized as “protoracist” on the grounds that “climate and geography rather than genetics are said to determine group characteristics.”Footnote 5 My article will follow Isaac's locution and examine whether Aristotle held “protoracist” views, namely, categorical claims about groups within humankind and their inherent inferiority or superiority.

At the core of Isaac's account of protoracism is the claim that “individuality is ignored. . . . Large groups of peoples, indeed entire nations, are believed to have common characteristics determined by factors outside themselves, which are, by implication, unchangeable” (74). Mariska Leunissen and Malcolm Heath present the most exegetically sophisticated version of this view in the case of Aristotle's writing. Although both correctly assert that Aristotle espouses an environmental rather than a biological account of group characteristics, Heath implies that non-Greeks who are not natural slaves would be an exception to a general rule and Leunissen claims that the only hope for a young non-Greek male to avoid becoming a natural slave is to change his address and undergo a lot of extra ethical conditioning.Footnote 6 But Aristotle's theory of the slave by nature actually is a doctrine about individual rather than group characteristics; whatever its faults, Aristotle's theory of the slave by nature has no basis in a theory of group traits. The views of Leunissen and Heath also conflict with the variability Aristotle ascribes to the differences between Greeks and non-Greeks and the praise he offers of non-Greek political institutions, especially the constitution of Carthage, which the Politics praises as superior to the Greek constitutions of Sparta and Crete.

Scholars who ascribe protoracist views to Aristotle also neglect the work of scholars who have called into question the “porousness” of his distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks. Most prominently, Julia Ward, Jill Frank, and Mary Dietz have argued that Aristotle, a Macedonian by birth who bridges aspects of Greek and non-Greek identity, rejects such categorical distinctions in his accounts of non-Greeks.Footnote 7 Numerous Aristotle scholars have also raised questions about the extent to which his account of the slave by nature in the first book of the Politics undermines fourth-century conventional slavery in Greek city states such as Athens, which in practice predominantly enslaved non-Greeks.Footnote 8 Nonetheless, many scholars who write about Aristotle's Politics have neglected his account of environmental group effects.Footnote 9 The reading of Aristotle as protoracist is misguided but understandable because many of Aristotle's defenders, such as Frank and Dietz, fail to acknowledge adequately the environmental factors emphasized by Leunissen, even if Leunissen herself ultimately exaggerates the effect of these factors.Footnote 10

I argue that a careful examination of Aristotle's discussions of slavery, autocratic government, non-Greek natural characteristics, and non-Greek political institutions undermines the claim that Aristotle held protoracist views.Footnote 11 What emerges from this article is a much more nuanced view of Aristotle's distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks, as it is articulated throughout all discussions of the distinction in the Politics.Footnote 12 On the one hand, Aristotle explicitly characterizes some (but not all) Greek and non-Greek societies as slavish or politically “primitive.” On the other hand, Aristotle also characterizes the political institutions of some (but not all) non-Greek societies, especially those of Carthage, as superlatively good. But such a nuanced view is incompatible with the claim that Aristotle holds protoracist views about all Greeks and non-Greeks.

In order to refute the claim that Aristotle holds protoracist views about all Greeks and non-Greeks, I first examine those passages that scholars have identified that allegedly ground such a distinction. Thus, in the first part of the article I examine Politics 1.2.1252a30–b9, where Aristotle claims that non-Greeks lack a naturally ruling element. In the second part, I examine Politics 3.14.1285a16–27, where Aristotle discusses “non-Greek kingship” and claims that some non-Greeks are more slavish than Greeks. In the third part, I examine Politics 7.7.1327b20–33, where Aristotle discusses the natural characteristics of Greeks, Asians, and Europeans. Together, the first three parts of the article undermine the claim that Aristotle embraces a clear, categorical distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks. In the fourth and final part, I examine Aristotle's praise of non-Greek political institutions, especially those of fourth-century Carthage. Such praise seems difficult to reconcile with the claim that Aristotle embraces any sort of protoracism.

1. Non-Greeks and Aristotle's Notion of Slavery

The claim that Aristotle holds protoracist views is usually based, in the first place, on remarks he makes about slavery in his Politics. The first book of the Politics discusses slavery both in the analysis of the constituent parts of the polis that exists by nature (Pol. 1.2) and as an aspect of household management and property acquisition (Pol. 1.4–6); both discussions make reference to non-Greeks and so many commentators presume that Aristotle's account of the slave by nature—a form of slavery that he claims is just and beneficial (Pol. 1.5.1255a2–4)—is designed to justify the slavery of non-Greeks. The first part of this article undermines that presumption. Indeed, it is striking that Aristotle says almost nothing about non-Greeks in his discussion of the slave by nature and his sole mention of non-Greeks in that argument arises in a dialectical argument that presents opposing views, including several that Aristotle rejects. But even more problematic is that Aristotle's theory of the slave by nature concerns individual rather than group characteristics. The claim that Aristotle's theory of the slave by nature is the basis for his protoracist views shows a serious misunderstanding of Aristotle's theory, regardless of its obvious moral failings.

In his account of the constituent communities of the polis in Politics 1.2, Aristotle distinguishes spousal rule from despotic rule as part of an extended argument against those who claim that ruling over a slave is qualitatively the same as ruling over a city.Footnote 13 Within that context, he claims that just as the female and the male cannot exist without each other and come together for the sake of procreation,

a ruler by nature and what is ruled by nature come together for the sake of survival. For if something is capable of rational foresight [tē(i) dianoia(i) prooran], it is a ruler by nature and master, whereas whatever can use its body to labor is ruled and is a slave by nature. That is why the same thing is beneficial for both master and slave. There is a natural distinction, of course, between what is female and what is slavish. . . . Among non-Greeks, however, the female and the slavish occupy the same status. The reason is that they do not have anything that rules by nature; rather their community consists of a male slave and a female slave. This is why our poets say “it is proper for Greeks to rule non-Greeks,” implying that the non-Greek and the slavish are by nature the same. (Pol. 1.2.1252a30–b1, b5–9)Footnote 14

This passage looks like the “smoking gun” that proves that Aristotle embraces protoracism. The claim that non-Greeks (both males and females), in contrast to Greeks, lack something that “rules by nature” appears to entail that they are incapable of “rational foresight” and thus are natural slaves.Footnote 15

It is wrong to ground a categorical distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks on this passage for a number of reasons. First, the text theorizes different forms of rule rather than supplies an argument about natural slavery and it is not immediately clear that the account of despotic rule in Politics 1.2 maps on to the account of natural slavery that Aristotle provides in Politics 1.4–6.Footnote 16 On the one hand, whereas Politics 1.2 characterizes the slave by nature in terms of a cognitive deficiency (the incapacity of foresight) and the absence of differentiation of the female and the slavish, the definition of the slave by nature characterizes such a being in terms of parts and wholes.Footnote 17 On the other hand, Aristotle's definition of a slave by nature (Pol. 1.4) makes no reference to the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks. Aristotle's discussion of the slave by nature makes use of a number of apparently categorical binary distinctions between that which rules and that which is ruled, such as the distinction between the soul and body, between human and nonhuman animals, and between the male and the female (Pol. 1.5.1254b2–25). If Aristotle held protoracist views about Greeks and non-Greeks, it is very odd that he fails to mention them in his discussion of the slave by nature.Footnote 18

Secondly, Aristotle's claim about non-Greek households is found within the context of an origins story that Politics 1.2 offers about the naturalness of the polis. The quasi-mythical account of the primordial communities of which the polis is composed is far too complicated to unpack in this context, but insofar as the account provides a quasi-historical depiction of primitive society (namely, of households and villages prior to the development of poleis), Aristotle's characterization of “non-Greek” may describe a form of primitivism rather than an ethnic or protoracial grouping. Indeed, Aristotle regularly uses the adjective barbarikos to indicate practices or institutions that lack sophistication or development, unrelated to different groups of people.Footnote 19 For instance, in his criticisms of Hippodamus's constitution, Aristotle claims “the laws or customs of the distant past were exceedingly simple and barbaric [haplous . . . kai barbarikous]. Indeed, the Greeks used to carry weapons and buy their brides from one another” (Pol. 2.8.1268b39–41). If Aristotle characterizes Greeks as having “non-Greek” laws or customs, then the term “non-Greek” cannot have protoracist content. Aristotle recognizes a broad range of levels of sophistication among non-Greek societies and it seems difficult to support the claim that he aims to characterize all of them within his theoretical analysis of community and rule in his quasi-mythical account of the primordial communities that comprise a polis.

Finally, although my first passage concludes with Aristotle's apparent reference to Euripides's line that “it is proper for Greeks to rule non-Greeks,” he fails to endorse or agree with the content of the poetic assertion and there are good reasons for thinking that Aristotle would not endorse the view of Iphigenia in Euripides's Iphigenia in Aulis.Footnote 20 The passage only shows that poets claim that it is fitting for Greeks to rule non-Greeks; it does not claim that poets are right. Aside from the Euripides citation, the Politics never characterizes non-Greeks as deserving to be ruled by Greeks, although it regularly discusses hunting slaves in just war.Footnote 21 Once again: if Aristotle held protoracist views about Greeks and non-Greeks, it is very odd that he fails to mention them in his discussion of the just procurement of slaves by war. No doubt, Aristotle's doctrines of the slave by nature and the just war of hunting slaves are repellent and wrong, but there is no textual basis to suggest that they were grounded in a protoracist distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks.

Aristotle's second discussion of slavery that refers to non-Greeks falls within his dialectical examination of different views about whether slavery is conventional or natural. Commentators who take the discussion to indicate that Aristotle thinks that non-Greeks are natural slaves fail to notice that Aristotle's dialectical argument includes positions that he himself clearly rejects.Footnote 22 To wit, he describes “conventional slavery,” proponents of which claim that

enslavement in war is just. But at the same time they imply that it is not just. For it is possible for wars to be started unjustly, and no one would say that someone is a slave if he did not deserve to be one; otherwise, those regarded as the best born would be slaves or the children of slaves, if any of them were taken captive and sold. That is why indeed they [i.e., the proponents of conventional slavery] are not willing to describe the best-born, but only non-Greeks, as slaves. (Pol. 1.6.1255a28–30)

Proponents of conventional slavery think that enslavement by warfare is just but deny that it is just to enslave well-born Greeks (such as themselves) by warfare; rather, Aristotle thinks that what they really mean is that the enslavement of non-Greeks by warfare is just.Footnote 23 But Aristotle clearly calls into question the justice of conventional fourth-century slavery. Whatever problems one finds with Aristotle's account of the slave by nature (and there are many), its description identifies individuals, rather than categories of persons, who meet its criteria. Recall that Isaac's justification for classifying Aristotle's account of non-Greeks as “protoracist” was that within Aristotle's account, “individuality is ignored” (74). But to claim that Aristotle's doctrine of the slave by nature ignores individuality is a complete misunderstanding of the doctrine. Whereas the view of fourth-century conventional slavery that Aristotle criticizes claims that everyone from a conquered polis or ethnic group was legitimately a slave, Aristotle's account presupposes the application of criteria to individuals rather than groups (including any ethnic groups). Indeed, it is likely that Aristotle's theory of natural slavery would justify the enslavement of some (perhaps many) individual Greeks and the emancipation of many non-Greeks unjustly enslaved through warfare.Footnote 24

One final passage underscores the claim that Aristotle's account of slavery is not grounded in protoracist beliefs. In his account of the best constitution in Politics 7 and 8, Aristotle is quite clear that although commerce, artesian-work, and agriculture are necessary for a polis, such servile work is inappropriate for citizen-soldiers who organize their lives around the proper use of leisure (Pol. 7.9.1328b34–1329a2, 7.10.1329b36–38, 7.15.1334a11–15). Although Aristotle recommends a non-Greek underclass for the agricultural labor force in his best constitution, that is actually his “second choice”; he first recommends that the labor force be filled by nonspirited and heterogeneous Greeks (Pol. 7.10.1330a25–30). From a modern perspective, such exploitation is unjust and even cruel, insofar as Aristotle identifies members of the labor force on the basis of their propensity to subordination and vulnerability. But the claim that people of the “Greek kind” may be unspirited in nature undermines the claim that all Greeks share the same characteristics. The claim that people of the “Greek kind” may be better slaves than non-Greeks undermines the claim that all Greeks are superior to non-Greeks.Footnote 25 Thus, although Aristotle disparages (some) individual non-Greeks in his account of slavery, his account is independent from claims of protoracism based on the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks.

2. Non-Greek Kingship and Autocracy

The claim that Aristotle holds protoracist views about Greeks and non-Greeks is often based, in the second place, on his discussion of a form of constitutional monarchy that he likens to the “kingships of the non-Greeks.” But as I will now make clear, Aristotle fails to attribute such a form of kingship either to all non-Greeks or even exclusively to non-Greeks. He describes such a kingship as follows:

There is another kind of monarchy besides [the Spartan one], which is like kingships that exist among some [par’ eniois] non-Greeks. The powers all these have are very like those tyrants have, but they are based on law and heredity. Because non-Greeks are by nature more slavish in their character than Greeks, those in Asia being more so than those in Europe, they tolerate rule by a master without any complaint. So for this sort of reason these kingships are tyrannical, but they are stable because hereditary and based on law. Their bodyguards are kingly and not tyrannical for the same reasons. For the citizens guard their kings with their weapons, whereas a foreign contingent guards tyrants. (Pol. 3.14.1285a16–27)

Aristotle's claim that Asians (i.e., Persians) tolerate autocratic political rule because of their slavish character appears to be protoracist, insofar as it categorizes Asian non-Greeks as more slavish than both Greeks and European non-Greeks.

Although clearly Politics 3.14 invokes the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks, the “porousness” of Aristotle's distinction is more problematic. The “kingship of the non-Greeks” blurs two distinctions within Aristotle's taxonomy of monarchy. First, Aristotle usually distinguishes kingship from tyranny (and royal rule from despotic rule) on the basis of the consent of the ruled (Pol. 4.10.1295a16–18, 23–25). But the non-Greek king exercises a form of “despotic” rule over subjects and yet his or her subjects consent to such rule and are willing to guard and protect such a ruler (unlike the tyrant, who has to rely upon foreign mercenaries to populate his guard). Secondly, Aristotle distinguishes kingship from tyranny on the basis of the stability and rule of law that characterize monarchy (Pol. 4.10.1295a14–16). But in the case of non-Greek kingship, a king exercises autocracy based on hereditary but clearly defined rules of succession (not unlike modern constitutional monarchies), consistent with the rule of law.

These background details undermine the claim that Aristotle holds protoracist views because non-Greek kingship is actually quite similar to forms of autocracy practiced among Greeks. Aristotle notes that historically Greeks themselves have often lived under so-called “heroic” kingships and elective tyrannies, both of which appear quite similar to the “kingship of the non-Greeks.” So, for instance, Aristotle characterizes non-Greek kingship as hereditary, law-based, tyrannical rule with kingly (rather than tyrannical) bodyguards (Pol. 3.14.1285a17–28) and heroic kingship as hereditary, law-based rule over willing subjects (Pol. 3.14.1285b4–8). Both elective tyranny and heroic kingships are kingly because they rule over voluntary subjects, just like non-Greek kingship (3.14.1285b2–5). Indeed, Aristotle explicitly claims that non-Greek kingship and elective tyranny are “kingly in as much as they were based on law and involved monarchical rule over willing subjects; but both were tyrannical, in as much as they ruled like masters in accordance with their own judgment” (4.10.1295a15–17). In the case of “heroic” kingship, Aristotle has in mind a Greek king such as Agamemnon (3.14.1285a10–14); in the case of elective dictatorship, it is a Greek autocrat such as Pittacus, the early sixth-century elected tyrant of Mytilene (3.14.1284a35). But if the kingship of the non-Greeks, heroic kingship, and elective tyranny are all forms of consensual, law-based autocracy, the fact that one is practiced toward non-Greeks and the others toward Greeks undermines the protoracist claim that only non-Greeks are ruled autocratically owing to their “slavishness.” Historically, Greeks have been ruled in a salutary, nontyrannical, autocratic form, just like non-Greeks.Footnote 26 Characterizing this form of autocracy as “non-Greek” obscures its similarities to “Greek” autocracy, which is to say that the protoracist distinction between non-Greek and Greek forms of political institutions is porous.

Aristotle's account of non-Greek kingship also suggests that his distinction between non-Greeks and Greeks is too porous and complicated to ground any sort of robust notion of protoracism. First, Aristotle's account of non-Greek kingship states that the category of “non-Greek” includes both Asians and Europeans. But as I discuss in the next part of the article, Asians and Europeans are very different kinds of peoples, largely owing to environmental and climatological influences. Their major differences undermine the claim that non-Greeks form a monolithic class of slaves by nature. Second, Aristotle explicitly limits the attribution of slavishness to only some (par’ eniois) non-Greeks. But if only some non-Greeks are slavish, then it is fallacious to assert that all non-Greeks are slavish. If the category of “non-Greek” includes numerous kinds of different peoples, then it is fundamentally unhelpful to generalize across that category in contrast with Greeks. Indeed, the porousness of the concept of non-Greek for Aristotle may be the fundamental reason that he makes such limited use of the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks in his Politics.

3. Greek and Non-Greek Natural Qualities

Aristotle's discussion of the natural qualities of Europeans, Asians, and Greeks is a third place that purportedly shows that he holds protoracist views with respect to Greeks and non-Greeks. I argue, first, that Aristotle fails to distinguish categorically between Greeks and non-Greeks and, second, that such natural qualities play a very weak role in Aristotle's program for the best constitution. In Politics 7.4–12 Aristotle identifies what he calls the “suitable material” of his best constitution, and such matter includes not only the determination of the city's population and territory, but even issues like its climate, street lay-out, and location of markets and temples. Within such a context, Politics 7.7 seeks to identify the best “natural qualities” of the colonists who will form the first generation of settlers in this city. Aristotle claims that one can identify what natural qualities the initial colonists in his best constitution should have

by looking at those Greek city-states that have a good reputation and at the way the entire inhabited world is divided into nations.Footnote 27 The nations [ethnē] in cold regions, particularly Europe, are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and craft knowledge. That is precisely why they remain comparatively free, but are apolitical and incapable of ruling their neighbors. Those in Asia, on the other hand, have souls endowed with intelligence and craft knowledge, but they lack spirit. That is precisely why they are ruled and enslaved. The Greek kind [to tōn Hellēnōn genos], however, occupy an intermediate position geographically, and so share in both sets of qualities.Footnote 28 For it is both spirited and intelligent. That is precisely why it remains free, governed in the best way, and capable, if it chances upon a single constitution, of ruling all the others. (Pol. 7.7.1327b20–33)

Aristotle's discussion of natural qualities has received significant scrutiny and it seems relatively uncontroversial to assert that this passage describes human qualities, prior to habituation, that are the result of environmental causes such as excessive climatic heat or cold.Footnote 29 Thus, the word “natural” is slightly paradoxical: such qualities are hardly immutable or natural essences transmitted through genes.Footnote 30 Rather, the “natural qualities” are the effects of environmental causes rather than some sort of “primordial” natural matter.

Aristotle seeks to identify natural qualities that “should be present in the nature of people if they are to be easily guided to virtue by the legislator” (Pol. 7.7.1327b36–37); he identifies the Greek kind of people as a preeminent example of such qualities because they possess the proper blend of spirit and intelligence.Footnote 31 Although the lack of intelligence and craft knowledge impedes the ability of European peoples to coordinate their actions or act “politically” (either for self-organization or intertribal organization), the crucial term in the discussion is spiritedness (thumos), the presence of which grounds the freedom of the Europeans and the absence of which is the cause of Asian subordination.Footnote 32 “Ruling and being free invariably derive from this capacity,” Aristotle says, “for spirit is both imperious and indomitable” (Pol. 7.7.1328a6–7). As other texts show, Aristotle thinks that the quality of spiritedness is closely allied to the development of courage, the desire for self-assertion and self-government, and even the basis for forming friendship.Footnote 33 Such a capacity reacts with anger to insults or domination and Aristotle attributes the lack of such a quality to those who live under despotic rule without complaint.Footnote 34

Although the significance of Aristotle's blend is clear, there are three reasons why this passage fails to show that he held protoracist views. First, although Aristotle privileges the Greek people over Asians and Europeans, he immediately adds that “Greek nations also differ from one another in these ways. For some have a nature that is one-sided, whereas in others both of these capacities are well blended” (Pol. 7.7.1327b34–36). The blend of spirit and intelligence that Aristotle seeks can go wrong in at least two very different ways (namely, the target population could possess too little spiritedness or too little intelligence), and Greek peoples exhibit one-sided mixes just like the non-Greeks. Both Greeks and non-Greeks are slavish or have one-sided natures. If Aristotle embraces the doctrine of environmental determinism, clearly it is a “soft” version of the doctrine: the same environmental causes do not uniformly produce the same effects. Climatic causation fails to establish a categorical distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks or even uniformity among the Greeks.Footnote 35 Aristotle clearly characterizes the natural characteristics of both some non-Greek and some Greek peoples as one-sided or inferior for the cultivation of ethical virtue. Such a nuanced view is incompatible with the claim that Aristotle holds protoracist views with respect to the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks.

Secondly, as David Lefebvre and Julia Ward have shown, Politics 7.7 eschews a binary opposition between Greeks and non-Greeks. According to Lefebvre, repeatedly in Aristotle's treatment of the “natural given” of the best constitution, he specifies conditions that embody a mean. Thus, the population size of the best constitution is neither too many nor too few citizens and the ideal polis size is neither too large nor too small (Pol. 7.4.1326b1–6, 7.5.1326b29–31). But, Lefebvre adds, Aristotle fails to oppose Greeks and non-Greeks, but instead locates Greeks as a kind of mean between Europeans and Asians.Footnote 36 As Ward notes, although Aristotle occasionally employs the Greek/non-Greek opposition, he does not make it fundamental to his theory: “he relies,” Ward claims, “upon another pair of terms instead, shifting the weight from Greek-barbarian to a pair that emphasizes a political contrast. . . . He often uses the term ethnos in opposition to polis to signal the contrast between a group of people living together who possess laws and a common political end, and those who live in social arrangements without law and purpose.”Footnote 37 And sure enough, Politics 7.7 characterizes Europeans as ethnos-dwellers (1327b23, 34) more frequently than it characterizes them as non-Greeks. Taken together, Lefebvre and Ward undermine the claim that Politics 7.7 supports a protoracist interpretation.

The relative insignificance of natural characteristics is a third reason to call into question the view that Aristotle held protoracist views. Politics 7.7 articulates the “matter,” as it were, of the best constitution; but Aristotle thinks that the “form,” or institutional structure, of the best constitution and its inculcation through education is far more significant and serious than its matter for at least two reasons. First, as noted previously, Aristotle's account of the best constitution specifies what he calls the “suitable material” of the polis of our prayers. But he concludes his discussion of “suitable matter” somewhat poetically, noting that such details “are not hard to think out [noēsai], just hard to do [poiēsai]. Speaking about them is a task for prayer [euchēs]; bringing them about is a task for luck [tuchēs]” (7.12.1331b19–21; cf. 7.13.1332a28–32).Footnote 38 Identifying superlatively good natural qualities is a matter of wishful thinking rather than the object of political science or determinate policy.

In the second case, Aristotle's account of inculcating virtue in his best constitution explicitly downplays the role of natural qualities. After identifying the best natural qualities and concluding his discussion of the underlying material of his best constitution, he writes that

people become excellent because of three things, nature, habit, and reason [phusis ethos logos]. For first one must possess a certain nature from birth, namely, that of a human and not that of some other animal. . . . But in the case of some of those qualities, there is no benefit in just being born with them, because they are altered by our habits. For some qualities are naturally capable of being developed by habit either in a better direction or a worse one. The other animals mostly live under the guidance of nature alone, although some are guided a little by habit. But human beings live under the guidance of reason as well, since they alone have reason. Consequently, all three factors need to be harmonized with one another. For people often act contrary to their habits and their nature because of reason, if they happen to be persuaded that some other course of action is better. (Pol. 7.13.1332a39–b8)

Although Aristotle once again recognizes the relevance of natural qualities for the making of excellent citizens, quite clearly nature plays a subordinate role to the causes of habituation and reason. Whatever views Aristotle holds about the natural qualities of Europeans, Asians, and Greeks, those natural qualities are weakly and inconsistently determined by environmental causes, they are largely the object of chance rather than political science, and they can be refashioned by Aristotle's notion of civic education, which harnesses what he clearly thinks are the far more influential forces of habituation and reason.Footnote 39

4. Aristotle's Political Science and Non-Greek Political Institutions

Careful examination of Aristotle's accounts of slavery, autocratic government, and natural qualities calls into question the claim that he holds protoracist views. The concept of non-Greek peoples plays almost no role in Aristotle's account of natural slavery and his accounts of autocratic government and natural (i.e., environmental) qualities fail to support the claim that Aristotle categorically distinguished between Greeks and non-Greeks in a protoracist fashion. But scholars who claim that Aristotle held protoracist views also fail to recognize that his Politics includes extensive praise for non-Greek political institutions. Such praise, especially in the case of the Carthaginian constitution, further undermines the claim that Aristotle categorically dismisses non-Greeks as inferior to Greeks. Admittedly, the connection between non-Greeks and their institutions may be indirect. One can imagine a protoracist praising the cultural institutions (e.g., music) of a people while at the same time thinking that groups of people are fundamentally different and inferior. But the fit is tighter with respect to political institutions. As we have already examined, that a society's political institutions are autocratic suggests that they have failed to develop robust habits of self-government. But praising non-Greek political institutions to a Greek audience is inconsistent with protoracist views. Praising non-Greek political institutions alongside Greek political institutions underscores their commonality, namely, that they are human political institutions, laudable to both non-Greek and Greek humans.

One captures a glimpse of such a “universal” or “human” political science in one of Aristotle's somewhat rare reflections on the scope and methods of his political science. He writes that

those who philosophize about constitutions, whether nowadays or in recent times, seem not to be the only ones to recognize that a polis should be divided into separate classes and that the military class should be different from the class of farmers. For it is still this way even today in Egypt and Crete, Sesostris having made such a law for Egypt, so it is said, and Minos for Crete. Messes also seem to be an ancient organization; they arose in Crete during the reign of Minos, but those in Italy are much older. . . . The separation of the political multitude into classes, on the other hand, originated in Egypt, for the kingship of Sesostris is much earlier than that of Minos. (Pol. 7.10.1329a40–b8, b23–25)

The communal messes that feature so prominently in the Spartan and Cretan constitutions are ultimately Italian (i.e., European) in origin; the partite division of political community by functional task is ultimately Egyptian (i.e., Asian or Libyan) in origin. Aristotle's incorporation of both features into his account of the best constitution clearly suggests that Greek students of political science can learn from non-Greek political institutions (Pol. 7.10.1330a2–9, 7.8.1328b2–24). The scope and methods of Aristotle's political science embrace the excellent institutions and practices of all peoples, regardless of whether the peoples who have produced those institutions are Greek or non-Greek. It is hard to reconcile such scope of inquiry with the claim that Aristotle viewed non-Greek people as categorically slavish and inferior to Greeks.

An especially rich example of such non-Greek political wisdom is Aristotle's inclusion of the constitution of Carthage in his analysis of the best constitutions in Politics 2. Fourth-century Carthage was a northern African commercial empire that was founded by and retained the cultural and linguistic practices of Phoenicia, a decidedly non-Greek nation that Cyrus the Great incorporated into the Persian Empire in the sixth century BCE.Footnote 40 Aristotle reports that

the Carthaginians also are thought to be well governed, and in many respects in an extraordinary way compared to others. . . . Many of their arrangements work well for them, and it is an indication that their constitution is well organized that the people willingly stick with the way the constitution is organized, and that no faction even worth talking about has arisen among them, and no tyrant. (Pol. 2.11.1272b24–33)

Aristotle examines Carthage within his consideration of existing constitutions reputed to be well-governed, namely, alongside Sparta and Crete, both of which share structural similarities with Carthage.

Although Sparta, Crete, and Carthage all incorporate communal meals into their political communities, Aristotle argues that the Spartan system, which lacks public support, is inferior to the publicly funded communal meals found in Crete and Carthage.Footnote 41 Sparta, Crete, and Carthage all share analogous political offices, namely, an executive oversight board (the overseers in Sparta, the order keepers in Crete, or the Hundred and Four in Carthage), a senate, and kings; Aristotle judges Carthage as having the best organization of each office in all three cases.Footnote 42 Aristotle faults all three constitutions for neglecting or leaving to chance, rather than legislative design, key institutions. The Spartan legislator neglects women's education, the Cretan legislator relies upon its location as an island to avoid faction, and Carthage mitigates faction through “sending some part of the people out to other cities to get rich,” namely, through commerce and trade.Footnote 43 But such a situation seems less precarious than Spartan “shortage of citizens” (Pol. 2.9.1270a36) and Cretan dynastic succession and suspension of rule of law (Pol. 2.10.1272b8–10). Clearly, Carthage is Aristotle's best non-Greek constitution; but it also appears to be his best “existing constitution,” eclipsing the merits of Sparta and Crete.

Aristotle's depiction of Carthage consistently embodies the opposite of the protoracist characteristics that Aristotle allegedly ascribes to non-Greeks.Footnote 44 For instance, in light of the claim that Aristotle thinks that non-Greeks fail to recognize rulers by nature, it is worth underscoring that he characterizes Carthage as a polis in which both the people and the wealthy consent to a dual or hybrid criterion for rule, namely, a mix of excellence and wealth. Aristotle writes that their constitution specifies

that rulers should be chosen not solely on the basis of their merit, but also on the basis of their wealth, since poor people cannot afford the leisure necessary to rule well. Hence, if indeed it is oligarchic to choose rulers on the basis of their wealth, and aristocratic to choose them on the basis of their merit, then this organization, according to which the Carthaginians have organized matters related to the constitution, will be a third sort. For they elect to office with an eye to both qualities, especially in the case of the most important officials, the kings and the generals. (Pol. 2.11.1273a21–30)

To be clear, Aristotle thinks that such a principle of election is mistaken and deviates from the purely aristocratic principle that rule be apportioned by merit (Pol. 2.11.1273a31–35; cf. 4.7.1293b7–18). The mistake of the Carthaginian legislator consists in thinking that the distribution of leisure to those who rule approximates the distribution of wealth and that those who succeed in commerce are best suited to rule a political community. But such a principle seems profoundly unlike those which appear to guide the slave by nature, who is incapable of self-rule much less commercial innovation and economic imperialism.

In light of the claim that Aristotle thinks that non-Greeks willingly endure and live under autocracy, it is worth underscoring that Carthage is, in Aristotle's account, a vibrant participatory political community (indeed, one that is ultimately too democratic for Aristotle's tastes). Although the Carthaginian constitution is oligarchic, the people willingly support it because of the popular participation it insures. In cases in which the kings and senators lack unanimity, “the people have authority over these matters. Moreover, when they make proposals, the people not only are allowed to hear the officials’ resolutions, but have the authority to decide them; and anyone who wishes may speak against the proposals being made. This does not exist in the other constitutions” (Pol. 2.11.1273a7–12). Although Carthage is clearly a non-Greek community, Aristotle clearly thinks that its dēmos is fundamentally “democratic” and insistent upon participation. The Carthaginian people seem to be the antithesis of those non-Greeks who willingly live under non-Greek monarchy.

In light of the claim that Aristotle thinks that non-Greeks lack thumos as a natural characteristic, it is worth underscoring that Aristotle commends Carthage's martial virtue and documents their empire.Footnote 45 Fourth-century Carthage established a commercial empire that stretched throughout the western Mediterranean, but they were hardly only traders. The Aristotelian On Marvelous Things Heard reports that

in the sea outside the Pillars of Hercules they say that an island was discovered by the Carthaginians desolate, having wood of every kind and navigable rivers, and admirable for its fruits besides, but distant several days’ voyage from them. But, when the Carthaginians often came to this island because of its fertility, and some even dwelt here, the magistrates of the Carthaginians gave notice that they would punish with death those who should sail to it, and destroyed all the inhabitants, lest they should spread a report about it, or a large number might gather together to the island in their time, get possession of the authority, and destroy the prosperity of the Carthaginians. (836b30–837a6)

The Aristotelian treatise reports similar domination of the island of Sardinia (838b13–29). Even if such stories are entirely fanciful, they are proof that Carthage possessed a reputation for being a ruthless and dominant power within the Mediterranean region. But whereas fourth-century Sparta and Crete fell into the trap of organizing their constitutions around the principles of domination and territorial accumulation, Carthage's emphasis upon commercial wealth suggests a very different view, namely, that of “conquering” the Mediterranean region through trade rather than through arms (although with arms at ready).Footnote 46 But it seems very difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile Aristotle's remarks about spiritless non-Greeks with his own testimony about Carthaginian expansion and empire.

Although Aristotle occasionally identifies natural qualities as non-Greek, his discussion of legislative or institutional proposals eschews such distinctions and is instead profoundly inclusive. He makes the point most clearly in his claim that the storehouse of human history includes both Greek and non-Greek exemplars. Since that history is ultimately cyclical, all potential institutional arrangements have at some point in time been actual. It is the political scientist's responsibility to be familiar with such institutional histories (which of course Aristotle's school documented prodigiously in their research on constitutions, including non-Greek constitutions). Aristotle includes in that storehouse of institutional arrangements reflection on the political and social practices of Greece, but also those of Asia, Libya, Egypt, and Europe. Aristotle is a firm believer in the value of non-Greek knowledge and his Politics is a vehicle for its circulation. Such an inclusive political science seems hard to reconcile with the claim that Aristotle held protoracist views about all non-Greeks.

Conclusion

Aristotle's Politics has drawn the admiration of thinkers as diverse as Dante and Marsilius of Padua, Sepúlvade and Las Casas, Jefferson and Adams, Arendt and Maritain, and Rawls and Nussbaum. The work is deeply embedded in the inclusive polis institutions of the classical Greek world and yet it anticipates the monarchies of the Hellenistic world. The work identifies and defends a form of slavery and yet it seriously critiques all conventional slavery of its time. Its account of the household characterizes women as cognitively inferior to men and yet affords women authority, virtues, and even an approximation of equality between husbands and wives—far more than was practiced in classical Greece. The Politics reaches back in time to Archaic and non-Greek theories of kingship and communal messes and yet (arguably) reaches forward to modern notions of human rights and the social welfare state.

Clearly, Aristotle's Politics carries some of the intellectual baggage of its time and presents numerous arguments in favor of nonegalitarian, aristocratic/supremacist political institutions. But I have argued that a careful reading of Aristotle's discussion of the distinction between Greeks and non-Greeks fails to support the claim that Aristotle held protoracist views. That Aristotle's readers come from all subsequent eras of thought, numerous forms of religious belief and organization (including secular humanism and naturalism), and all varieties of the political spectrum—from monarchists to anarchists—speaks to the universality of his work. There are many views in Aristotle's Politics that are repugnant to the views of our own age, but systematic protoracism is not one of them.

Footnotes

I am grateful to audiences at the Université de Montréal, the Institut d’études scientifiques de Cargèse, and the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy for feedback on earlier versions of this article. I am especially grateful for the constructive criticism of three anonymous referees from the Review of Politics and its editor, Ruth Abbey.

1 See, for instance, Rebecca LeMoine, Plato's Caves: The Liberating Sting of Cultural Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Thomas Hill and Bernard Boxill, “Kant and Race,” in Race and Racism, ed. B. Boxill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 448–71; and Tunick, Mark, “Tolerant Imperialism: John Stuart Mill's Defense of British Rule in India,” Review of Politics 68, no. 4 (2006): 586–611.

2 Such a view already finds its proponents in antiquity: Plutarch, in On the Fortune of Alexander (1.6), reports that Aristotle counseled his student Alexander to rule Greeks in the fashion of a ruler (hēgemonikōs), but non-Greeks in the fashion of a master (despotikōs). The Greek term barbaros (and the cognate term barbarikos) is contested both in Aristotle's time and in our own; I will translate the term throughout my article as “non-Greek.” See further Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Erich S. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); and most recently Harrison, Thomas, “Reinventing the Barbarian,” Classical Philology 115, no. 2 (2020): 139–63.

3 Denise Eileen McCoskey, Race: Antiquity and Its Legacy (New York: Tauris, 2012), 24; Erik Jensen, Barbarians in the Greek and Roman World (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2018), 69. Non-Aristotle specialists echo the view. For instance, Jonathan Wolff, in his recent Introduction to Moral Philosophy (New York: Norton, 2018), claims that Aristotle believes that “non-Greeks have lower powers of deliberative rationality than Greeks, and they are more likely to be ruled by their bodily appetites. Non-Greeks are therefore not suited to the same level of freedom and should become slaves of Greeks” (228). Other scholars who claim that Aristotle categorically distinguishes Greeks and non-Greeks include Rosivach, Vincent, “Enslaving ‘Barbaroi’ and the Athenian Ideology of Slavery,” Historia 48, no. 2 (1999): 129–57; Teisserenc, Fulcran, “La question barbare: Platon ou Aristote?,” Revue de philosophie ancienne 32, no. 1 (2014): 87–128; and Fritsche, Johannes, “Aristotle's Biological Justification of Slavery in Politics I,” Rhizomata 7, no. 1 (2019): 63–96.

4 McCoskey, Race, 23–34, surveys the difficulties of ascribing a nonbiological concept of race to Greek and Roman authors. Although Fritsche ascribes to Aristotle a biological notion of race (“Biological Justification,” 73–75), the scholarly consensus is that such a claim is mistaken. See, for instance, Isaac, Invention of Racism, 70–73; Julia Ward, “Ethnos in the Politics: Aristotle and Race,” in Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, ed. Julia Ward and Tommy Lott (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2007), 20–23; and Mariska Leunissen, From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5n6.

5 Isaac, Invention of Racism, 74. Although one may distinguish racialism, the doctrine that there are biologically distinct groups, and racism, the doctrine that biologically distinct groups can be evaluated as inferior and superior, I will use the terms “protoracist” and “protoracism” to include both claims (see further Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014], 271–75).

6 Malcolm Heath, “Aristotle on Natural Slavery,” Phronesis 53, no. 3 (2008): 245n6 and Leunissen, From Natural Character, 53–54.

7 Ward, “Ethnos in the Politics”; Jill Frank, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle on the Work of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 26–32; Dietz, Mary G., “Between Polis and Empire: Aristotle's Politics,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 283–85.

8 See Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery,” Political Theory 15, no. 3 (1987): 390–410; Frank, Democracy of Distinction, 30–31; Dietz, “Between Polis and Empire,” 284–85; Cherry, Kevin M., “Does Aristotle Believe Greeks Should Rule Barbarians?,” History of Political Thought 35, no. 4 (2014): 632–55; and Nah, D., “Aristotle as Realist Critic of Slavery,” History of Political Thought 39, no. 3 (2018): 399–421. Cherry, “Does Aristotle Believe,” 632–33, catalogs the views of the previous generation of Aristotle scholars on this question.

9 Exceptions to this claim include Ward, “Ethnos in the Politics,” 20–23; Leunissen, From Natural Character, 45–48; D. Lefebvre, “La puissance du thumos en Politiques VII, 7,” in Politique d'Aristote: Famille, régimes, éducation, ed. Emmanuel Bermon, Valéry Laurand, and Jean Terrel (Pessac: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2011), 105–38; and Monteils-Laeng, Laetitia, “Aristote croit-il au déterminisme environnemental ? Les Grecs, les esclaves et les barbares (Pol.. VII, 7),” Polis 36, no. 1 (2019): 40–56. P.-A. Rodriguez, “L'impérialisme institutionnel et la question de la race chez Aristote,” European Review of History, no. 23 (2016): 761, takes this point to be fatal to Isaac's interpretation of Aristotle as “protoracist.”

10 I am quite grateful to an anonymous referee for the Review of Politics for helping me articulate these patterns in scholarship on Aristotle's Politics.

11 Aristotle also recognizes non-Greek intellectual achievements, such as the Egyptian invention of mathematics (Metaphysics 1.1.981b13–25) and Babylonian achievements in astronomy (De caelo 2.12.292a7–9; cf. 1.3.270b6–10), that undermine the claim that he views non-Greeks as uniformly primitive. In several places Aristotle recommends “periegetic literature,” namely, that of travelers who can attest to non-Greek customs (e.g., Rhetoric 1.4.1360a30–8; Pol. 2.3.1262a18–21). The Vita Menagiana reports that Aristotle authored a single volume on nomima barbarika (Rose 18/Gigon 26). See further Mor Segev, “Aristotle on the Intellectual Achievements of Foreign Civilizations” (unpublished).

12 Although I arrive at conclusions similar to Cherry, “Does Aristotle Believe,” and Ward, “Ethnos in the Politics,” my article goes beyond their more localized claims. Cherry focuses primarily on Aristotle's treatment of Euripides's Iphigenia in Aulis and Ward is ultimately concerned with Aristotle's contrast between the terms ethnos and polis. Neither article examines in detail all of Aristotle's references to non-Greeks in the Politics nor his discussion of non-Greek political institutions.

13 M. Schofield, “Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle's Theory of Slavery,” in Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms (New York: Routledge, 1999), 101–24, and M. Deslauriers, “The Argument of Aristotle's Politics 1,” Phoenix 60, no. 1/2 (2006): 48–69, decisively show that Politics 1.1–7 is devoted to refuting the Socratic claim (found in Plato's Statesman [258e–261a] and Xenophon's Memorabilia [3.4.12, 3.6.14]) that rule is not qualitatively differentiated, namely, that ruling a polis is qualitatively the same as ruling a slave (Pol. 1.1.1252a7–18, 1.3.1253b18–19, 1.7.1255b16–20).

14 Translations are my own, based on William D. Ross, Aristotelis Politica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), but informed by C. D. C. Reeve, Aristotle Politics (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998).

15 For instance, Fritsche, “Aristotle's Biological Justification,” 64, argues that Aristotle's account of the non-Greek household contains “in a nutshell” the theory of natural slave articulated in Politics 1.4–6, even though Politics 1.4–6 makes very limited reference to non-Greeks. Teisserenc, “La question barbare,” 122–24, also suggests that Politics 1.2 assimilates non-Greeks and the slave by nature, although he recognizes that the claim cannot be exhaustive for all non-Greeks.

16 Kamtekar, Rachana, “Studying Ancient Political Thought through Ancient Philosophers: The Case of Aristotle and Natural Slavery,” Polis 33, no. 1 (2016): 150–71, notes that the dialectical context of Aristotle's account of natural slavery is twofold, namely, it engages both the question of the unity of rule and the question whether slavery is conventional or natural (158). Arguably, Politics 1.2 speaks to the first question and Politics 1.4–6 speaks to the second one.

17 Pol. 1.4.1254a9–11, 13–17. Nonetheless, Pol. 1.5 does characterize the natural slave in terms of “sharing in reason to the extent of perceiving it” but not having it (1.5.1254b22–23; cf. 1.13.1260a12–14). Heath, “Natural Slavery,” persuasively argues that the natural slave's incapacity consists in an impairment of practical deliberation about global matters that detaches “an individual's conception of intrinsic value from executive control of his behavior” (253).

18 Karbowski, Joseph, “Aristotle's Scientific Inquiry into Natural Slavery,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51, no. 3 (2013): 331–53, implicitly makes my explicit point: the most detailed recent analysis of the argument for natural slavery in Politics 1.4–6 makes almost no mention of non-Greeks (except for Pol. 1.6.1255a28–30, which I discuss next).

19 See, for instance, Aristotle's discussion of barter, which he reports many non-Greeks still use (Pol. 1.9.1257a22–27); cf. Ward “Ethnos in the Politics,” 19–20.

20 I am in agreement with a number of other scholars who claim that careful examination of Aristotle's quotation calls into question whether he (or Euripides) agreed with the words put into Iphigenia's mouth (see IA 1400–1401). See further Frank, Democracy of Distinction, 30–31, Dietz, “Between Polis and Empire,” 284–85, Nah, “Aristotle as Realist Critic,” 418–19, and most recently (and exhaustively) Cherry, “Does Aristotle Believe.” Fritsche, “Aristotle's Biological Justification,” 73, claims that Aristotle concurs with the poets.

21 Pol. 1.7.1255b36–38, 1.8.1256b23–26, 7.2.1324b37–39, 7.14.1333b38–1334a1.

22 See, for instance, Fritsche, “Aristotle's Biological Justification,” 85–88.

23 Millett, Paul, “Aristotle and Slavery in Athens,” Greece & Rome 54, no. 2 (2007): 178–209, notes that based on the evidence of social history, Athenian slaves were overwhelmingly non-Greek. If so, Aristotle's rejection of conventional slavery is a direct attack on the social practices of his adopted polis.

24 Ambler, “Aristotle on Nature and Politics”; Peter L. P. Simpson, A Philosophical Commentary on the “Politics” of Aristotle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 42; Dietz, “Between Polis and Empire,” 284; and Nah, “Aristotle as Realist Critic,” 413–19, offer variants of the claim that Aristotle is undermining rather than endorsing the position of “conventional slavery,” i.e., slavery justified by defeat in inter-poleis warfare (Pol. 1.6.1255a4–6, 23–32). Rosivach, “Enslaving ‘Barbaroi,’” argues that by conventional slavery Aristotle means instead the fourth-century Macedonian practice of enslaving Greeks (e.g., as in the case of the destruction of Thebes in 335 BCE), which Aristotle allegedly objected to on the grounds that Greeks (or at least Macedonians) were enslaving Greeks (144–45). The key problem for Rosivach's argument is Aristotle's claim that the proponents of conventional slavery think it applies only to non-Greeks, a view that Aristotle rejects as false (Pol. 1.6.1255a28–29). Were Rosivach right, Aristotle should be criticizing the very practice of enslaving Greeks, which he never does.

25 E. Holberg raised the question whether Aristotle may hold inconsistent racist views, not unlike contemporaries who view a category of individuals as inferior, but exempt members of that category because of personal acquaintance (i.e., “I do not hold racist views because I am friends with Smith, who is a member of a different race”). I do not see that evidence from the Politics supports such an interpretation for his views on non-Greeks. For instance, Aristotle does not qualify his remarks about Macedonia (e.g, that it is a long-lasting kingship based in territorial expansion [5.10.1310b39–40, 5.11.1313a24, 7.2.1324b15] or that Philip II was assassinated owing to his arrogance [5.11.1311b2]) in terms of race, even though many Greeks viewed Macedonia as a non-Greek kingdom.

26 Aristotle's account of absolute kingship (pambasileia) also appears to be a superlative constitution for both Greeks and non-Greeks, although its interpretation is contested (Pol. 3.13.1284a3–17, 1284b25–34; 3.15.1285b29–33; 3.16.1287a10–b35; 3.17.1288a14–17). But if it is best for at least some Greeks to be ruled by an absolute king, then there is no categorical distinction between Greek and non-Greek kingship.

27 What polis with a “good reputation” might Aristotle have in mind? At the conclusion of his analysis of Carthage, Aristotle claims that Sparta, Crete, and Carthage “are justly held in high esteem” (Pol. 2.11.1273b26; cf. 2.1.1260b32), but his criticisms of Sparta and Crete are merciless and he commences his analysis of the best constitutions by pointing out that “the currently available constitutions are not in a good condition” (Pol. 2.1.1260b34–35).

28 Aristotle refers to the Greeks as both a genos and as organized into ta ethnē (Pol. 7.7.1327b29, 33–34). Translators have expressed genos as “race,” “family,” and “stock”; and ethnos as “tribe,” “people,” and “nation.” Somewhat unusually, Fritsche, “Aristotle's Biological Justification,” 73–75, argues that Aristotle believed that Europeans, Asians, and Greeks represented three different genē that practiced race purity (eschewing intermarriage). I render genos here as “kind” in the way that one might identify a “kind” of plant (but without implying a rigid scheme of genera and species).

29 See, for instance, Isaac, Invention of Racism, 70–73; Heath, “Natural Slavery,” 253–58; Ward, “Ethnos in the Politics,” 20–23; Lefebvre, “La puissance du thumos,” 105–38; and Monteils-Laeng, “Aristote croit-il au déterminisme environnemental?,” 47–50. By contrast, Fritsche, “Aristotle's Biological Justification,” 75n10, rejects the model of climatic causation and argues for a biological cause of race. Leunissen, From Natural Character, 45–48, provides an account of the material causation underlying Aristotle's blend based in large part on Aristotle's analysis of the qualities of nonhuman animals in the Historia Animalium.

30 Thus, although Frank, Democracy of Distinction, 31, is correct to claim that there is no “immutable feature about the Asian soul,” Aristotle's climatic model of causation seems to imply that any human being raised in “Asian” heat will develop persistent “Asian” qualities.

31 Aristotle contrasts Asians and Europeans with respect to “craft knowledge,” but fails to ascribe it explicitly to Greeks (who are said to possess “both” [1328b30]). Presumably technē is incorporated into intelligence.

32 Although Politics 7.7 clearly privileges spirit and intelligence, Aristotle says very little about intelligence and instead uses the remainder of the text to discuss spirit (through a critique of Plato's characterization of spirited guardians in the Republic). Within Aristotle's psychological taxonomy, spiritedness is one of three forms of desire and appears to be especially connected to anger or the response one has to being slighted. See further Lefebvre, “La puissance du thumos,” 128–34.

33 Nicomachean Ethics 3.8.1116b30–32 ; Pol. 7.7.1328a6–7, 1327b40–41. See further Heath, “Natural Slavery,” 255–58; Leunissen, From Natural Character, 48–51.

34 See, for instance, Pol. 5.10.1312b25–33, 5.11.1315a27–31.

35 Monteils-Laeng, “Aristote croit-il au déterminisme environnemental?,” claims, I think correctly, that “Aristotle's justification of ‘environmental determinism’ does not . . . entail the support of a form of environmental providentialism” (42). P. Pellegrin, L'Excellence menacée: Sur la philosophie politique d'Aristote (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2017), 151–52, and Lefebvre, “La puissance du thumos,” 120, by contrast, appear to embrace an element of providentialism in their accounts of Politics 7.7.

36 Lefebvre, “La puissance du thumos,” 111–12.

37 Ward, “Ethnos in the Politics,” 18.

38 Cherry, “Does Aristotle Believe,” 651–55, also argues that natural qualities are insufficiently important in the development of complete virtue.

39 By contrast, Leunissen, From Natural Character, claims that “environmental factors have quite dramatic impacts on the individual natural character of people and thereby on their political and moral lives. Living a happy or virtuous life constitutes the perfection of human nature, but, evidently, realizing this kind of perfection is easier for some than for others, and easiest for those—typically, Greek—men who are by nature already disposed to courage and intelligence” (53).

40 Josephine Quinn, “Phoenicians and Carthaginians in Greco-Roman Literature,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Phoenician and Punic Mediterranean, ed. Carolina López-Ruiz and Brian Doak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 671–83, surveys textual evidence about the nature of Carthage during Aristotle's time. Isaac, Invention of Racism, 324–51, and Gruen, Rethinking the Other, 115–22, survey Greek stereotypes about Phoenicia and Carthage, although Isaac overstates the case that the most persistent stereotypes attached to Phoenicians and Carthaginians are those of “guile, unreliability, and treacherousness” (328). Gruen is a good corrective, reminding us that Herodotus depicts Phoenicia as loyal to its colonists at Carthage and Carthaginians as fair and honest traders (Hdt. 3.19, 4.196). Barceló, Pedro, “The Perception of Carthage in Classical Greek Historiography,” Acta Classica 37 (1994): 1–14, in general supports Gruen, showing that Greek historiography on Carthage was generally positive prior to Rome's engagement with Carthage. The Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters, and Places unfortunately possesses a textual lacuna where its author discussed the conditions of the Egyptians and Libyans (AWP 13).

41 See Pol. 2.9.1271a26–36, 2.10.1272a13–22, 2.11.1272b33–34.

42 Aristotle judges the Spartan overseers as superior to the Cretan order keepers, and the Carthaginian Hundred and Four as superior to the overseers (Pol. 2.10.1272a27–35, 2.11.1272b34–36); he makes extended criticisms of the Spartan and Cretan senates, but his criticisms of Carthage's senate are minor and ultimately he praises it as aristocratic (Pol. 2.9.1270b36–71a8, 2.10.1272a35–39, 2.11.1273a13–18); and he judges the Carthaginian office of king better than that of the Spartan office (2.11.1272b37–1273a1).

43 See Pol. 2.9.1269b12–19, 2.10.1272b15–17, and 2.11.1273b18–23; cf. 6.5.1320b4–7.

44 The next three paragraphs draw upon material from my unpublished manuscript “Carthage: Aristotle's Best (Non-Greek) Constitution?”

45 See, for instance, Pol. 2.9.1271a41–b9, 7.2.1324b3–15, 7.14.1333b6–33.

46 Carthage was hardly immune from exercising dominion by force. The Poetics reports that the battle at Himera (between Carthage and the Sicilian army of Gelon) coincided with (and perhaps was coordinated with) the Persian defeat at Salamis in 480 BCE (1459a26). Aristotle appears to be alluding to a tradition, written by the historian Ephorus and preserved in Diodorus Siculus (11.1.4), which claimed that Xerxes sought to open a “second front” in his war on Greece and proposed to Carthage an alliance that would coordinate their attacks on both the Greek mainland and Greek western colonies.