Redhead's admirable book addresses the questions, What cultural, religious, and other baggage do we bring with us to our political interactions with others, and how does it affect those interactions? I am grateful both for the way in which he has opened up those questions and for his generally accurate and always generous treatment of my views. If he has in some ways misunderstood them, this is the result only of an error of omission. For he has neglected to take adequate note both of my account of the distinctive characteristics of most political interactions in the liberal democracies of advanced modernity (except, oddly and briefly, in his footnote 208) and of the importance that I attach to the Thomistic conception of common goods. Yet, without reference to these, some of my central claims about what we bring to political conversations are apt to be misunderstood.
“Voters in liberal democracies,” I have argued, “are in some sense free to vote for whom and what they choose, but their votes will not be effective unless they are cast for one of those alternatives defined for them by the political elites. Conventional politics sets limits to practical possibility, limits that are characteristically presupposed by the modes of discourse, rather than explicitly articulated.”Footnote 1 The political “societies of advanced Western modernity are oligarchies masquerading as liberal democracies. The large majority of those who inhabit them are excluded from membership in the elites,”Footnote 2 and this is especially true of the economically deprived. For money plays a crucial role in sustaining political parties and their candidates for office and those able to contribute large sums have influence denied to the rest of us. Hence the empirically supported findings of a recent study by Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page that in the United States, “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.”Footnote 3 So the initial problem for the excluded and especially the deprived is that of how to break into the political conversation and change the subject radically.
They also face another difficulty. The modes of argument which currently inform deliberation both in politics and in corporate life are of a distinctive kind. Deliberation characteristically takes the form of “the negotiated aggregation of costs and benefits” where everything turns on what it is that is to be weighed and measured and “what weight is to be assigned to different types of factor in assessing either costs or benefits, particularly when there are available radically different ways of commensurating them, none of them incontestable.”Footnote 4 In “the arenas where policy is made,” whether in government or in private corporations, the answers to those questions “are constructed through a process of negotiation,” so that which of the rival and alternative answers are selected is determined by the power and influence that each party brings to the bargaining table.Footnote 5 What then are those to do who lack power and influence? Characteristically their political actions take the form of resistance to the established order in some local situation in which there is a need to organize, so as to raise low wages or remedy inadequate housing or secure decent schooling or reestablish law and order, when these have broken down. What kinds of argument should they deploy? Why do they need arguments? What kinds of argument do they in fact deploy?
It is here that Thomistic Aristotelian theory becomes relevant, and this in three ways. First it provides one essential part of the explanation of why political reasoning and decision-making became what they now are: the loss in the dominant forms of thought of modernity of any adequate shared conception of human goods and of how they are to be ordered. When all conceptions of human flourishing have become contestable, the liberal state assumes a neutral stance, so that in policymaking what is to count as a good on particular occasions becomes open to negotiation. Some of the consequences of this, including the impoverishment of morality, I discussed in “The Privatization of Good.”Footnote 6 What Aristotle and Aquinas provide is an account of why, without such a shared conception of human goods, genuinely rational shared deliberation becomes impossible. But they take us further than that.
In the situations in which the presently excluded and deprived make their claims, what is at stake is always some set of goods such that, if they are not achieved, the common goods of that particular local society will not be achieved. Common goods, as Thomistic Aristotelians understand them, are the goods of families, of schools, of workplaces, of political societies, goods that we cannot achieve as individuals qua individuals, but only qua members of families or households, qua students or teachers, qua workers in this particular enterprise, qua members of this particular political society.Footnote 7 What the achievement of such common goods requires always includes justice, justice within the family, within the school, within the workplace, within the political society, and so, when the excluded and deprived struggle against this or that particular set of injustices, they give reason to the rest of us to be concerned with those injustices, since it is our common good as well as theirs that is at stake. But it is not only that we have the strongest interest in achieving justice, since we are each of us only able to achieve our individual goods, if we achieve such common goods. It is also that we can only achieve such common goods through acting justly.
Everyday awareness that there are such things as common goods and of the importance of achieving them may initially take several different forms. Often it is a recognition that something is badly amiss with our shared lives in the family, say, or the workplace or the school, and, as we try to identify what has gone wrong, we find ourselves defining a common good, although we may not use anything like that form of words in doing so. Sometimes, when cooperating with others, the need may arise to define what our shared goal is more clearly and once again some conception of a common good is brought to bear on our activities. That there are such things as common goods is a presupposition of much of our everyday discourse, not always of course recognized as such, and it is in the course of our everyday activities that many of us learn that such goods can only be attained when our relationships with others are informed by an acknowledgment of the authority of certain norms. I already noted that we need to act justly. We also need to act truthfully, scrupulously, courageously, temperately, and, above all, prudently. We learn this when acting for the sake of common goods and that is to say that we learn to act as the precepts of the natural law dictate.
When I say “we” and “us,” whom do I mean? I mean the larger portion of humankind, all of us when we have not been the victims of some cultural distortion. The Thomistic Aristotelian claim is that rational agents inhabiting numerous very different cultures in their everyday political conversations and interactions understand themselves and others in terms of conceptions of common goods and of the norms of the natural law, although how they articulate this understanding varies with their cultural resources. The claim does not concern what we ought to believe, but what we do in fact believe, if our self-understanding is not obscured by cultural distortions. What each of us brings with us to our political conversations and interactions is not only baggage derived from our own particular cultural tradition, but thoughts, attitudes, and dispositions that are ours as rational agents, whatever our tradition, and these include forms of appeal to common goods and forms of acknowledgment of the natural law. Insofar as we do so, we find ourselves at odds with the modes of political reasoning of the established political order. Insofar as we do so, we find ourselves committed to just that conception of justice to which the deprived and excluded appeal.
There is therefore a crucial difference between the arenas in which rival theoretical standpoints contend and those in which political conflict results from systematic attempts by those deprived and excluded to break into and transform the political conversation. Redhead expounds and criticizes my views of the former fully and fairly, but, I have suggested, takes insufficient note of what I have written about the latter. To this he might well reply that often enough these two different kinds of quarrel are not as distinct as I now seem to be suggesting, and that theoretical disagreements are apt to infect and inform local political conflicts, so that his characterization of the former also holds, at least to a significant degree, of the latter. But what then are the consequences of radical disagreements resulting from the different cultural baggage that we bring to such political encounters? Consider, for example, different and incompatible attitudes to and conceptions of truthfulness, rooted in different cultural and moral traditions: the moral rigorism of a certain kind of Christian piety, whether Lutheran or Jansenist, that excludes any kind of lie, a rigorism inculcated by Kant's parents; the subtle and humane distinctions of Talmudic enquiry; the secular utilitarianism to which Mill appeals; and the very different concerns that Foucault brought to the discussion of truthfulness. All of these may and do underlie some everyday moral and political disagreements, something of which the participants in those quarrels may be less than fully aware. How do and should those participants react, when they identify such disagreements?
I have already suggested that those who find themselves engaged in political struggle to achieve some common good often, perhaps over considerable time, learn to resolve such disagreements. They find good reason to value trustworthiness, reliability, and openness in others, both in those with whom they are cooperating and in those from whom they hope to win concessions. They find themselves held accountable by others for lying, for intentionally misleading, for not sharing relevant facts. The agreements at which they arrive with those against whom they have been contending have to be treated as binding and they have to be honest with those others about their future intentions. So in those contexts of practice in which common goods are at stake, moral agreement is forged in ways that confirm Thomistic Aristotelian theses. That this is so has implications for theoretical disagreements, but those implications have to be spelled out in terms of dilemmas peculiar to the cultures of advanced modernity, including our own.
In my second Tanner Lecture, “Truthfulness and Lies: What Is the Problem and What Can We Learn from Mill?,”Footnote 8 I argued that dilemmas concerning which lies, if any, are to be taken as justified are pervasive in present-day cultures because their inhabitants tend to oscillate in their allegiance between rival sets of principles. I also argued in both Tanner Lectures that systematic consideration of the positions advanced by Kant and by Mill and of the issues that divide them enable us to identify both what it is about lying that makes it almost always a great evil and why there are rare occasions on which we are required to lie. What this particular theoretical encounter between otherwise rival traditions reveals is that there may always be unsuspected common ground, that it is in this instance possible to arrive at shared conclusions, while starting from very different premises. Yet the recent history of moral philosophy shows that such discovery of common ground is often ruled out from the start as a result of assumptions which the representatives of different views bring to debate between rival theoretical standpoints and hence of course the multiplicity of views of truth telling and lying wherever activity is not informed by some shared conception of common goods. But, if what I said earlier is correct, this outcome is just what we should expect.
To have discovered what is involved in commitments to common goods is also to have discovered that one can no longer be at home in a moral culture in which debate between rival standpoints among theorists is matched by the changing weight that different types of consideration—appeals to utility, appeals to rights, appeals to preferences, appeals to what is taken to be reasonable—are accorded in different areas of practice. It is of course just this culture that finds its political and economic expression in “the negotiated aggregation of costs and benefits” that characterizes so much public deliberation. So the cultural baggage that one brings to political conversation, if one has made these discoveries, excludes one from many of the conversations of conventional politics. Happily it is the same baggage that allows one to converse constructively with those excluded from and marginalized by that politics.
What difference would it have made to Redhead's characterization and evaluation of my views, if he had taken note of these aspects of my thought? That is for him to say.
