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Concepts are a functional kind
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 June 2010
Abstract
This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that “concept” ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.
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References
Kim, J. (1992) Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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The novelty of Machery's proposal in Doing without Concepts (Machery Reference Machery2009) is the claim that the term “concept” ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology, because it fails to denote a natural kind. I will not dispute the claim that concepts are not a natural kind. There is a growing consensus among psychologists that the structure of concepts may vary along many dimensions, depending on expertise, domain of objects categorized, and conceptual task involved. Much of this evidence is reviewed by Machery himself, as well as in other recent studies in the philosophy of psychology (Piccinini & Scott Reference Piccinini and Scott2006; Weiskopf Reference Weiskopf2009b). My point here is that, on philosophical grounds, this evidence is perfectly compatible with the much less revisionary claim that concepts are a functional kind. Something is a concept by virtue of the function it performs within a cognitive system, and something is the concept of a certain category C (at least partially) by virtue of the further specific function of representing it. It is a further question whether or not the functional kind “concept” is realized by natural kinds (Weiskopf Reference Weiskopf2009b). Functional kinds can be individuated and described independently of their realizers. This, however, does not deprive them of a central role in experimental psychology.
1. Concepts are a functional kind
It is disputable that a full characterization of the psychological usage of “concepts” is: “those bodies of knowledge that are used by default in the processes underlying the higher cognitive competences” (Machery Reference Machery2009, p. 7). Concepts are also normatively characterized as those bodies of knowledge that can perform a double function – namely, abstraction and projection of knowledge – and that are able to be recombined almost freely in order to form more complex concepts and thoughts. Let us focus on the first two functions, as the third one is arguably not specific to concepts only. Abstraction is the “bottom-up” process of extracting information from a single encounter with an object or property-instance, and generalizing such information to all encounters with that object or property. The experience of tasting rhubarb once and finding it bitter would be of no use if I could not store it as information about rhubarb independently of the specific episode of tasting it, by means of a general representation – a concept (Bloom Reference Bloom2000). Category induction is the complementary “top-down” process of projecting such knowledge to new encounters. When you tell me you like rhubarb pie, I form the expectation that you will also like other bitter-tasting foods. This is an application of my concept of rhubarb. Thus, the function of a concept is that of a “mental glue,” which connects one's past experience with the present (Millikan Reference Millikan1998; Murphy Reference Murphy2002). It is because they perform this complex function that concepts are used by default in our higher cognitive capacities, and not vice versa. Psychologists are interested in discovering how such function is performed – by what structures and mechanisms. The functional properties of concepts provide constraints on what may count as an adequate concept-realizer. This is the first sense in which concepts as functional kinds are not dispensable in psychology.
2. Concepts as a functional kind are multiply realizable in a broad sense
Vehicles and food are familiar non-mental functional kinds. Traditionally, the essence of a mental functional kind is to bring about some outcome, or to exercise some capacity (Kim Reference Kim1992; Putnam Reference Putnam, Capitan and Merrill1967). With “broad sense” here, I mean that they are realizable by items characterized by different structural properties. Assuming that abstraction and category induction are the fundamental capacity characterizing the functional kind “concept,” there are plausibly many ways in which a human mind can organize itself in order to exercise them. Capacities may well be individuated by their ends, not just by their means (Millikan Reference Millikan1998). So, for example, a chemist's capacity to abstract and project information about water may involve means that I do not possess. But so long as we are both able to abstract, accumulate, and project information about water, we share the same capacity, that is, we both possess a concept of water. The variability of structure of the functional kind “concept” is just as compatible with the empirical evidence discussed by Machery, as his own proposal is. It has the advantage of leaving it open whether prototypes, exemplars, and theories exhaust the possible concept-realizers or, more plausibly, not.
3. Concepts as kinds are multiply realizable in a narrow sense
The narrow sense is the traditional sense associated with the phrase “multiple realizability” in philosophy of mind. It is the idea that a token (mental) functional kind can be realized by different physical substances. The classical example is a state of pain, multiply realized by silicon chips or C-fibers. To deny that concepts are multiply realizable in this narrow sense is very demanding. It requires a commitment to a strong form of physicalism. Contemporary neurophysiological research on concepts aims at individuating which areas of the human brain are involved in specifically conceptual tasks and explaining how this is done. It is not committed, however, to the further metaphysical claim that no other kind of matter, appropriately organized, could bring about the same capacities. If neurophysiology is not, surely psychology need not be committed to a robust reductionist agenda. That is, there is no reason why psychology should dispense with the functional kind “concept” qua multiply realizable. The neurophysiological evidence quoted by Machery on the variability of concepts is compatible with the anti-eliminativist functional view.
4. The functional kind “concept” has a role in psychology
Machery claims that there are pragmatic reasons for the elimination of “concept,” if intended as a natural kind term. This is not so if it is taken as a functional kind term. Consider the task of accounting for the fact that one's general representation of a category – say, dogs – changes over time. Initially it is constituted by a bunch of exemplars, then it develops into a summary prototypical representation, and later it becomes a theory. In order to describe the three structures as stages of a diachronic process of change, one needs to make reference to what is common to them, namely, realizing the capacity of representing dogs generally, or being instances of the functional kind “concept of dogs.” This intrapersonal explanation properly belongs to the psychologist's agenda, and so do interpersonal accounts of variability.