The historian David E. Kyvig improves our understanding of the impeachment power by drawing our attention to what he argues is a new constitutional culture of impeachment. Whereas impeachment was, up until 1960, a forgotten power, it is now “an extension of the ordinary contest for control of the reins of government” (312). To support this conclusion, Kyvig devotes a whole chapter to the impeachments or attempted impeachments of Earl Warren, Abe Fortas, William O. Douglas, Spiro Agnew, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Alcee Hastings, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, as well as a combined chapter on Harry Claiborne and Walter Nixon. No longer a “rusted blunderbuss,” impeachment efforts in this period resulted in the removal or resignation of eight executive or judicial officers.
If a constitutional culture requires a founding, Kyvig would have us look to Robert Welch and Gerald Ford as the fathers of the modern culture of impeachment. Welch hitched his organizational efforts for the John Birch Society to the cause of impeaching Chief Justice Earl Warren. Although this effort never succeeded—and was even mocked by conservatives such as William F. Buckley—the billboards and attention “brought back into the public consciousness the existence of a constitutional device for removing unsatisfactory public officials” (59). More significant, perhaps, were the House minority leader's speeches for the impeachment of Justice Douglas. Ford argued that an impeachable offense need not be an indictable offense; it need only be “whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers [it] to be at a given moment in history” (96). Like Warren, Douglas survived the attempt, but what was once fringe had become mainstream. The politicians responsible in the failed efforts to remove Warren and Douglas and in the successful removal (by resignation) of Fortas were able to employ their newly developed skills in the cases of Agnew and Richard Nixon. In turn, the events leading up to Nixon's resignation offered a playbook for those involved on each side in the cases of Reagan, Clinton, and Bush.
Kyvig seems to suggest, though he does not directly state, that the culture still retains the right-wing inclinations of its fathers and thus constitutes a departure from the intent of the Founders of 1787. Kyvig implies that Clinton's offenses were not impeachable but those of Reagan and George W. Bush were. Even though there were calls for the impeachment of Reagan and Bush, the impeachment talk never materialized into impeachment proceedings because Democrats lacked the will of Republicans and had more “respect for the strict terms of the Constitution” (257, 379). In passages like these, Kyvig loses what he needs most—precision in his presentation of the founders and impeachment to show what is so new about the new culture of impeachment. This situation is somewhat puzzling; his examination of the original understanding of impeachment in the book's opening pages (23) is both nuanced and clear. It includes a point that showed me, for the first time, the connection between the impeachment power and the compromise between large and small states (16).
But this quibble should not distract readers from the strengths of Kyvig's elaboration of a new culture of impeachment. First, it allows students and scholars to see impeachment not as isolated legal or political events (Presidents Nixon and Clinton) but rather as a series of impeachments not only supported by a culture but also interconnected by particular politicians, arguments, and strategies. Second, for his argument that impeachment became “routine” (187–96), Kyvig succinctly lays out seven laws that might be seen as institutionalized impeachment: War Powers Act, Budget and Impoundment Control Act, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, Freedom of Information Act, Presidential Recording and Materials Preservation and Presidential Records Act, Ethics in Government Act, and Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. This section most supports his thesis, and its clarity will make it a handy reference for students of conflicts between Congress and the president. Third, and conversely, Kyvig helps extend the imperial presidency thesis: because the new culture revealed that members of the House are reluctant to impeach a president regarding interdepartmental fights or foreign policy, it has paradoxically contributed to presidential power (169, 177).
More broadly, even though Kyvig regards the new culture of impeachment as a departure from original intent, his examination will lead readers to wonder whether the older understanding of impeachment is even workable. Just as scholars such as Jeffrey Tulis and Keith Whittington have elaborated the political (as opposed to legal) understanding of the scope of impeachment, Kyvig's classification of impeachments reveals how fundamental political judgment is in the determination of a “high crime and misdemeanor.” Is tax evasion such a crime? Or lying about tax evasion? Lying about violations of campaign finance? Can a president be impeached for the actions or inactions of his advisors? For resisting a subpoena? A judge, for addiction to painkillers? For incendiary opinions? Such questions are not new, but they suggest that there is some force in Gerald Ford's blunt understanding of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Kyvig's account will raise further questions for political scientists interested in American political development. To what extent was the John Birch Society's effort to impeach Warren not a founding moment but rather a continuation of the debate brought about by FDR's plan to invigorate the Supreme Court with new and modern judges? Or, somewhat differently, was the episode affected at all by Eisenhower's prior emphasis on merit and integrity as a reaction to Truman's cronyism in judicial appointments? In addition, Kyvig offers the provocative claim that impeachment disappeared as an attractive option because it was replaced by an efficient party system. If this is true, then is it also true that the new culture of impeachment is related to what political scientists have described as either the end or the transformation of the party system? In short, Kyvig's important presentation of a new constitutional culture offers more material for political scientists who seek to understand this particular constitutional order.
