This book takes a fascinating look at the development of modern understandings of the family, examining the ideas on marriage of Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Emile Durkheim, John Stuart Mill, Marx, Freud, Simone de Beauvoir, John Paul II, and others. In each chapter, Scott Yenor writes partially from the philosophical perspective of the thinker under consideration, while also offering critiques. In presenting this history, Yenor also builds an argument, through which he “seeks to lay bare the poetry of liberalism as it relates to the family so we can move from opinions about the family to the reality of it” (ix).
Although various themes emerge in this book, Yenor in his opening chapter identifies issues surrounding nature and the family, since in these one finds “each thinker's vision of human thriving and its relationship to marriage and family life” (15). Modern attitudes to nature seem to be under consideration in some way throughout the book, even when not explicitly so. Yenor begins his survey of other thinkers with Locke, for whom nature “appears as a set of constraints of which family life takes account” (14). Marriage is thus constructed (and can be modified) to respond to the constraints of nature seen in maternity: “that children are long dependent on mothers and that mothers have long, somewhat debilitating gestation periods” (23). Later, John Stuart Mill goes further in embracing choice over nature, leading to “his willingness to allow individuals to define marriage's ends for themselves” (127), without reference to natural differences between men and women. Yenor also identifies the loss of a sense of nature as good even in apparent defenders of marriage, for example, Rousseau, Hegel, and certain social scientists. More typically, however, this loss opens the way to partial or complete rejections of marriage, as Yenor shows in the philosophies of Marx, Engels, and Beauvoir. This flight from nature is particularly explicit in Yenor's discussion of transcendence and immanence in Beauvoir's feminism. “Transcendence, for Beauvoir, is the freedom to ‘engage in freely chosen projects.’ … Not satisfied with the givens of nature or culture, transcendent beings aspire to be sovereign over life” (177). Immanence, on the other hand, which is less properly human, is disposed to accept nature and what flows from nature.
With respect to a positive response to issues concerning nature in relation to marriage, Yenor's chapters on Hegel and John Paul II are of particular interest. Building on a strong sense of natural sexual differences resulting in a clear sexual division of labor, Hegel defends marriage as a union in which the two become one in ethical love. This involves a surrender of the self in which nothing is held back, and it is in this gift “that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person, who in turn gains recognition in me” (69). However, Yenor sees problems undermining this vision of marriage. Though nature as seen in sexual difference seems to underlie his vision of marriage, Hegel ultimately opposes nature in favor of History, and thus “appears open to successive remakings of family life” (65). Yenor also notes that marriage is completely subordinated to the political in Hegel, in that the family remains a means, existing so that members of the family can properly live out their higher dignity and duty as “members of the state” (84).
Even in Hegel, then, one can see the continuing rejection of marriage as humanly good in itself, in favor of marriage as useful for a chosen end outside itself. Yenor therefore gives particular attention in the thought of John Paul II to the pope's resistance to a fundamentally technological attitude toward all nature—including ourselves—as an object for use. “John Paul II sees a civilization of technology embodying individualist and utilitarian attitudes towards nature obscuring a civilization of love” (230). This technologization of nature involves a culture in which, specifically, the body is separated from and made an object of use for the spirit. This culture leads, in the words of John Paul, “to human sexuality being regarded as an area for manipulation and exploitation rather than as the basis … of primordial wonder” (230). Thus, when John Paul II insists that the person must not be an object of use, this is a person not understood as first separated from nature, other human beings, the body, or, in particular, from masculinity and femininity. Yenor recognizes this understanding of the human person as lying at the heart of John Paul II's strong defense of marital unity and his insistence on the necessary relation of sex and procreation.
Yenor's own view in his concluding chapter shares much ground with both Hegel and John Paul II, though clearly differing from both. Yenor envisions marriage not merely as a means to some set of social ends apart from itself, but as ordered to responsibility and love lived through marriage. His vision of marital love therefore calls for thinking of freedom as always affected by nature, and more generally by what is other than the self and not first chosen by humanity. Thus, “a form of human dependence on unmade things is part of human life and … we cannot recognize human freedom apart from the existence of these unmade things” (266). Here and in his book as a whole, Yenor makes a compelling and eloquent argument that marriage cannot be understood without transcending the terms of liberalism. One might still doubt whether Yenor fully grapples with the extent to which the conditions set by liberalism contradict the nature of marriage. Notably, Yenor does not believe that the family necessarily calls for “a traditional sexual division of labor” (263), and instead appears open to, if not supportive of, “a society that adopts a public stance of gender neutrality” (262). One need not adopt an overly rigid account of a sexual division of labor in order to doubt whether Yenor's view here can be reconciled with an adequate account of different masculine and feminine ways of working, as reflected even in this book. In Yenor's analyses of various thinkers, he shows that foundational issues regarding nature and marriage repeatedly emerge in the recognition or rejection of such sexual difference in modes of activity, not only within the family, but also through the family in the political and economic order. Is it even possible for the public order to be truly neutral on such a point? The attempt at such public neutrality may already contain its own unintended attack on marriage, if the difference within the unity of man and woman, as expressed in different masculine and feminine ways of working, is truly fundamental not only to marriage and the family in themselves, but through these realities to our understanding of human nature as a whole and the foundations of human community.
Such questions, while important, should not detract from an important and thought-provoking work. Indeed, that such questions can be raised at all concerning Yenor's work indicates that he offers here a timely and insightful look at the philosophical development of recent political thought on the family, in a book that should be of great interest to all those concerned with the place of marriage in relation to liberalism and modernity.
