One of the commonest clichés in the study of ancient and modern democracy is the claim that the former is ‘direct’, the latter ‘representative’. A few scholars have recently explored areas in which the Classical Athenian democracy had representative features, particularly the magistracies.Footnote 1 These studies continue, however, to understand ‘political representation’ according to the definition proposed by the political scientist Hanna Pitkin, that is, as ‘acting [on the part of the political representative] in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’.Footnote 2 In this paper I introduce the insights of the recent ‘constructivist turn’ in studies of political representation to the analysis of Athenian politics in the hope of suggesting, in what will necessarily be a brief and incomplete exercise, how productive this exciting new paradigm can be for understanding the dynamics of ancient democracy. I first lay out the basic tenets of constructivist representation, particularly the notion of the ‘representative claim’ as developed by the political theorist Michael Saward, and argue for their suitability for studying ancient Greek history and political thought. Next, I adapt the model of the representative claim to two episodes of Athenian democratic deliberation, showing how it illuminates processes of demotic will- and identity-formation. I conclude by briefly underscoring how approaching Athenian politics in terms of constructivist notions of representation restores an aesthetic dimension to ancient democratic debate, one that allows us to compare more productively the ‘demos’ of symbouleutic oratory with its counterparts in poetry, sculpture, and other media, namely as a represented object fashioned for creative and rhetorical purposes.
I: The Constructivist Turn, Representative Claims, and Ancient Greek Democracy
As mentioned above, political scientists have tended to understand the concept of ‘representation’ in terms of the election and scrutiny of political leaders by voters. Modern democratic republics are ‘representative’ in the sense that it is elected officials who legislate, on behalf of their constituents, rather than ‘the people themselves’. Indeed, as James Madison pointed out in Federalist 63, the difference between ancient and modern republics lies in the ‘total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity, from any share of the latter’.Footnote 3 In contrast with ancient Greek polities, modern democracies have no ekklêsia or ‘assembly’ of the civic body, in which citizens vote directly on proposals by show of hands.Footnote 4 A focus on voters and their elected officials in the literature on modern democracy thus makes sense––but, as theorists of the constructivist turn point out, this should not exhaust our understanding of political ‘representation’. After all, the opposite of ‘direct’ is, strictly speaking, not ‘representative’ but ‘indirect’, and there is thus the possibility that acts of political representation occur in modern democracies outside of the electoral realm.
This last point is what proponents of a constructivist approach to the concept of political representation emphasize.Footnote 5 For these theorists, the concept is not to be thought of as a status or fact, along the lines of: ‘a certain selection process results in an agent (a “representative”) who represents the interests of a given constituency (the “represented”), which charges the agent with appointed tasks’. Instead, constructivists view representation as a process or ongoing series of acts, in which political actors lodge representative claims before critical audiences. On the constructivist account, representation is dynamic, performative, and—crucially—partially constitutive of the very groups that populate the political landscape. The most concise and influential constructivist formulation is that of Saward, who has defined a ‘representative claim’ as involving the following: ‘A maker of representations (“M”) puts forward a subject (“S”) which stands for an object (“O”) that is related to a referent (“R”) and is offered to an audience (“A”)’.Footnote 6 Several features distinguish Saward's model of political representation from Pitkin's account and exemplify its ‘constructivist’ nature. First, much emphasis is placed on the maker of the representation, who is often but not necessarily always identical with the subject. In other words, Saward's model highlights the importance of the initial creative, authorial voice of a representative claim. Second, there is the distinction between the object and the referent. To take a contemporary example, a populist politician might claim to stand for ‘the people’ as against ‘the establishment’.Footnote 7 ‘The people’ is the object for which the subject (the politician) stands. The referent, however, is the actual population of people whom the politician wishes to make identical with her ‘people’ (an act which she might fail in the event to accomplish). Included in the politician's vision of ‘the people’ might be a particular set of characteristics: ‘ordinary’, ‘hard-working’, ‘God-fearing’, and so on. The people who constitute the referent may not actually match those characteristics or may not have viewed themselves to this point as matching them, but they may come to embrace the politician's vision of them. Alternatively, they may reject or modify the vision. The essential point in the ‘representative claim’ model is that this process of identity-formation is open-ended and features agency on the part of both political actor and potential constituency. Finally, there is the distinction between the referent and the audience. While the two may in some instances overlap, much of the time the political actor puts forth a subject in the presence of a particular audience that is not coextensive with the referent. At other times the two are entirely distinct. Who the audience is may have a significant effect on the representative claim offered.
The suitability of Saward's model to the workings of the Athenian assembly should, I think, be apparent. In fact, there is a near exactness of fit. In a meeting of the ekklêsia, a ‘speaker’ or rhêtôr is the maker (M).Footnote 8 He puts forth himself as an ‘advisor’ or sumboulos, who offers his advice in a symbouleutic address, which constitutes the subject (S).Footnote 9 The advisor's advice about what to do in the here and now stands for something: it is inevitably to sumpheron, that is, what the speaker contends is that which is ‘in the interests’ of the demos. Here we must add a twist to the standard representative claims model. Normally the subject stands for a single object. Here what the subject represents encompasses two entities, to sumpheron and ho dêmos (‘the people’). However, the advantage or benefit of the demos ultimately relies on the nature of the demos itself. What the demos is like and what it wants and needs determines what course of action will be beneficial for it. Thus the more important part of the speaker's claim is its vision of what the Athenian demos is like. The demos can therefore justifiably be called the primary object (O) for which the subject stands.Footnote 10 The referent (R) here is the actual Athenian demos, which had a physical and legal reality: it was the group of ca. 30,000 adult men who were legitimate citizens of Athens. In terms of Saward's model, we see that this group is not necessarily the same as the vision of it (O) contained in the speaker's claim (S). Finally, the audience (A) is the particular group of men, numbering ca. 8–13,000 in the fourth century, gathered during a given meeting of the ekklêsia. This group was never co-extensive with (R), the entire demos, since the latter could not fit on the Pnyx.Footnote 11
I would like to address quickly two points about the model by way of assuaging potential concern. First, we might worry that the representative claims model leaves open that a maker would simply ‘make up’ an object out of thin air, in a completely arbitrary fashion with no connection to reality. A maker is, in fact, free to do this––but they are unlikely to meet with success using such an approach. That is because representative claims are ideally (and in the Athenian democracy were in reality) embedded within long-standing discourses. To offer an audience something totally alien would be to invite disaster: in Athens, getting heckled off the bêma, the ‘speaker's platform’. Therefore speakers and audiences utilize and judge among, respectively, a spectrum of claims each comprising a combination of more-or-less familiar components.Footnote 12 Second, in no way is the representative claims model meant to replace rhetoric as it is traditionally understood. The speaker cannot (usually) get his way simply by talking about the Athenian demos in a certain manner: he must still employ all of the tricks of the trade as outlined by rhetorical handbooks.Footnote 13 What the representative claims model picks out is the seemingly unavoidable need for speakers to fashion a vision of their political community and its interests; it is the part of persuasion that offers a political identity which it hopes will make the proposal more palatable.Footnote 14 In fact, I believe the representative claims model highlights something that is often overlooked in studies of Athenian symbouleutic rhetoric: namely, that, in addition to claiming that his proposal will garner the Athenian demos the greatest possible advantage, the orator stages a kind of contest, in competition with other speakers’ claims, concerning what kind of community the Athenian demos is. This aspect of dêmêgoria is the most specifically democratic in that it asks the audience (A) to assent to a vision of itself qua demos (R). In this respect the present model complements Ober's picture of the relationship between mass and elite: whereas Ober highlighted the terms on which orators approached the people, a sort of ideological grammar of Athenian oratory (the demos is usually correct but can be deceived, the elite orator must serve his community, and so on), the representative claims model offers a way of approaching the substance of competing claims only one of which is ultimately chosen, claims that entail potentially very different and impactful outcomes.Footnote 15
The proof of the pudding with any theoretical model, of course, is in the eating, and I will provide two case studies that show the model in action momentarily. For the present, however, I want to dwell on two important conceptual issues highlighted by the framing of the situation in Saward's terms. The first point is that Saward's model throws into sharper relief the fact that, strictly speaking, the Athenian demos qua (R), the totality of the male citizen body of Athens, rarely if ever actually did anything collectively. There may have been some festivals when almost every citizen was participating, and so ‘the’ demos could legitimately be said to be ‘celebrating the festival’. Most of the time, however, this collective agent never actualized its potential. In some sense this point is banal: scholars have long acknowledged that speakers’ equation of present assembly audiences with the entire demos, when in fact crowds gathered on the Pnyx were a selective and constantly changing portion of the total ‘people’, is a fiction; likewise the claim that those audiences were also the judges sitting in judgment in dikastêria (‘people's courts’).Footnote 16 Where things get more interesting, and where the constructivist turn in representation and related theories might be useful, is in dealing with purported ‘acts of the demos’ that lie outside the assembly and courts. For example: by the time the author of the Aristotelian Athênaiôn Politeia was writing in the later fourth century BCE, he could represent (nota bene) the demos as having besieged Cleomenes and Isagoras on the Acropolis in the revolution of 508/7 BCE.Footnote 17 If we examine the matter honestly, however, we have to admit it is highly unlikely that the entire citizen male population of Attica participated in the revolution. Some may have traveled to the astu (‘city center’) over the course of three days and swelled the numbers, but still it is likely that only a minority participated. Nevertheless, that group was remembered as the demos.Footnote 18
In making sense of this social memory, we might think of the event, using the terminology of the political theorist Jason Frank, as a ‘constituent moment’ in the ongoing process of conceptualizing ‘the people’ of Athens. In Frank's account, which relates to the politics of the post-revolutionary United States, a ‘constituent moment’ is one in which un- or under-authorized agents claim, whether implicitly or explicitly, the role of constituent power, a claim that can be validated only in retrospect, based on whether it was politically felicitous in the moment. In other words, ‘the people’ is seen to have acted—even if the group that carried out the particular action did not fit the legal definition of ‘the people’—as the result of a process of demotic claims-making and claims-judging.Footnote 19 We do not know the exact words spoken over the course of those violent days in 508/7. It is possible that no one actually attempted to rally ‘the demos’ or proclaim its sovereignty. Nonetheless, the act was certainly viewed by later authors, both Herodotus and the author of the Athênaiôn Politeia, as a collective act on the part of the ascendant demos. The hundreds or thousands of everyday male citizens (and perhaps many women and non-citizens besides) who participated in the siege of the Acropolis were transformed post eventum into the demos, and this identification was accepted by many. The events of 508/7 became one of the many ‘sorts of thing the demos does’ (in this case, struggle on behalf of its freedom).Footnote 20 A potential avenue for research might be to examine further extra-institutional circumstances after which ‘the demos’ was remembered as having acted; by the same token, we might look for situations where a group attempted to claim the mantle of the demos but failed, or was remembered by another name. The return of the men of Phyle to the city in 403 is one obvious instance of success ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 41.1), but we could look outside of Athens and the Classical period as well.
My first point, then, was about questions Saward's model raises concerning who gets remembered as the demos and in what circumstances. A second and arguably more important conceptual point has to do with the formation and execution of a demotic will. For on the terms of the ‘representative claims’ schema, the ‘will of the people’ is not something that exists ex ante but instead emerges from the opposed speeches of rhêtores contending for the majority's approval. Whatever won this approval ipso facto earned the title, following formal passage of a proposal, of ‘what the people decided’. In the Athenian democracy, uox populi uox dei, but in order for the first element to exist, an individual, the successful politician, had to make it happen. The preferences of ‘the demos’ could not straightforwardly be known: in order for them to be spoken of in a coherent way, there had to be at least one spokesperson of the demos who tried, however imperfectly, to articulate its supposed interests.
Coincidentally, a version of this insight has already appeared, albeit without any debt to the constructivist turn, in discussions of late Roman Republican politics. In his influential account of mass oratory in the late Republic, Morstein-Marx has pointed out that the popular will in Rome was ‘created in the process of being articulated’ by senatorial elites in the contio, or ‘public meeting’.Footnote 21 Morstein-Marx, and to a lesser extent Yakobson, have outlined all the ways whereby the rhetorical dynamics in the contio represented a one-way street in which elite politicians had considerable room to shape public discourse and manipulate their audiences. Both of them contrast this institutional setup with the Greek democratic ekklêsia, in which proposals might come from the floor and anyone who wanted might speak.Footnote 22 But this is to obscure somewhat the difference between will-formation and isêgoria (‘equality of speech’). The latter indeed allowed a simple shoemaker to address the assembly––but such an act in no way constituted a direct expression of the majority's will. A shoemaker might be ‘a voice from the people’, but he was not necessarily ‘the voice of the people’. The majority still had to decide between competing claims––usually by elite rhêtores––in order for the will of the people to materialize. This is certainly not to claim that Greek democracies and the Roman Republic were the same—merely that, in situations of mass oratory where widespread sustained deliberation within a crowd is impossible, specialist speakers are practically inevitable. What might differ is the relative control the mass had over the elite and, relatedly, the more or less ‘populist’ substance of the legislation that resulted.Footnote 23 But, crucially, in both cases Saward's ‘makers’ had to proffer their claims if the audience was going to authorize a representation of the people and its will.
If we have missed this aspect of demotic will-formation, namely the lack of a preexisting general will the ‘discovery’ of which was the task of the politician, it is perhaps because the ancient sources would have us believe, as Hanink also discusses in this volume, in a unified collective individual called the demos.Footnote 24 More than that––and this is where class position becomes relevant––our elite sources tended to think of that demos as the undifferentiated mass of the poor, whose lack of education ensured that they all similarly desired the same (wrong) things, and so could be thought of at scale as a single individual with a single set of (bad and incoherent) preferences. Thus we have Aristotle's famous description in the Politics of the demos as tyrant in the fourth and final (degraded) stage of democracy. In this form, he explains, ‘the majority (to plêthos) is authoritative and not the law (ho nomos)’. ‘The demos’, he goes on, ‘becomes a monarch, a single individual composed of many; for the many (hoi polloi) are authoritative (kurioi) not each in his singular capacity but all together’. In this political climate,
Just as a monarch…becomes despotic, with the result that flatterers are held in positions of honor, so here too such a demos is comparable to a tyranny among monarchies. Thus their character is the same, and both are despotic towards the better class, and the decrees (psêphismata) [in a democracy] are like the commands there [in a tyranny], and the demagogue and the flatterer are the same and analogous. Both of these gain strength most in these respective situations, flatterers in cases of tyrants, and demagogues in cases of people (dêmoi) of this type.
(Arist. Pol. 4.4, 1292a12–23)Footnote 25For our purposes, however, the most apt description of discovering ‘the’ demotic will comes from Plato's Gorgias. Socrates describes himself and his interlocutor Callicles as mature ‘lovers’ (erastai) pursuing their ‘beloveds’ (erômenoi). ‘I’, says Socrates, ‘am desirous of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and philosophy, and you [are desirous] of two, both the Athenian people (dêmos) and Demos, the son of Pyrilampes [a prominent member of the elite]’ (481d). Callicles, Socrates says, will take any position in order to gain their affection: ‘In the assembly, if, when you are speaking, the demos of Athens says it is not of that opinion, changing your tune you say what that man (ekeinos [= the demos]) wishes’ (481e).Footnote 26 Presumably by ‘the demos…says’ Socrates means the ‘hubbub’ (thorubos) that could erupt in the assembly and law-courts when the speaker said something unpopular with a portion of the audience. The relevant audience members would attempt to shout down the speaker, who sometimes slunk off the platform in embarrassment if he failed to alter his course satisfactorily.Footnote 27 Although thorubos was by no means practiced univocally by the assembled audience as a whole, Plato has Socrates conceive of the situation that way, in the process reducing the heterogeneous thoughts of the ekklêsiastai to a single demotic will: whatever ‘it wishes’ (bouletai), that is what Callicles and speakers like him seek to parrot.
The problem with this picture, aside from its inherent (I would say) implausibility, is that some ancient sources themselves point to a more complicated reality. Consider, for example, the infamous trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae in 406 BCE, thought by many to be the ne plus ultra of democratic extremism. In an illegal act, six of the ten generals were tried collectively and put to death. The democracy had become the ‘tyranny of the majority’ in which popular sovereignty overrode the rule of law. Modern scholars have been quick to label the episode as such, and moreover to follow some ancient sources in assigning blame to ‘the demos’ as a whole. Thus, Yunis describes the trial as an incident of ‘mob terrorism’, in which ‘the dêmos got entirely out of hand…in a fit of fury the dêmos illegally “tried” and condemned to death the generals of the fleet en bloc’.Footnote 28 The difficulty with this view and others like it, however, is that our most detailed ancient source for this episode, Xenophon, tells us considerably more than most accounts let on. A full reading of the relevant passage reveals the following: ‘Of the demos, some people praised these measures [proposals against trying the generals collectively], but the majority (to plêthos) shouted that it was a terrible thing if someone would not allow the demos to do what it wanted’ (1.7.12, emphasis added). In Xenophon's account, the demos (i.e., the people present in the assembly that day) was divided. There can be no doubt, based on the Greek construction, that the two groups, ‘some people’ and ‘the majority’, are factions of the broader ‘demos’ mentioned at the beginning. Thus, by logical necessity, what the majority claims—that the collective trial is ‘what the demos wants’—is not true. ‘The demos’ has no unified position in this case. Some members of the demos favor trying the generals individually, but the majority are able to overpower those voices and establish themselves as ‘the demos’’ position. Modern scholars, when they take this claim as reality, perpetuate (consciously or not) the untrue claim of the majority faction. They ascribe what had been a partial position to the entire demos and treat the latter as an undivided collective agent. In other words, what we see here is modern historians’ acceptance of the majority faction's ‘representative claim’ to embody the demos. The situation was and remains a ‘constituent moment’ as outlined above, in which a group merely claiming to act in the name of the people is validated, retrospectively, as having in fact done so. The language of Xenophon, however, reveals a more complex reality, where one cannot take the will of ‘the demos’ as straightforwardly given.
II: Representative Claims in Democratic Practice at Athens: Demosthenes and Cleon
The following two examples come in reverse chronological order and are, it should be noted, both instances of rhetorical failure.Footnote 29 In 349/8, Demosthenes delivered his Third Olynthiac, urging the Athenians to follow through with their earlier decision to aid the Chalcidice, under attack by Philip II of Macedon. From the outset (3.3), he frames the situation as one in which, while the other speakers seek simply ‘to gratify the people’ (pros charin dêmêgorein), he will dare ‘to tell them hard truths’ (meta parrhêsias), a familiar rhetorical strategy.Footnote 30 After proposing changes to the theoric fund, Demosthenes turns to another tried and true method, namely contrasting the Athenians’ dismal present with their glorious past.Footnote 31 He contrasts the leadership of Aristides, Nicias, and others with contemporary rhêtores who simply ask the assembly, ‘What do you want? What should I draft?’, thus depicting the situation as essentially that of Plato's Socrates in the Gorgias cited above, in which demagogues act as stenographers to ‘what the demos wishes’. Demosthenes then cuts to the heart of the issue:
What then is the cause of all these matters, and why in the world were all things in good order then, but awry now? It is because then the demos itself was willing to act and go on campaign, and it was master (despotês) of the politicians (politeuomenoi) and in charge (kurios) of all rewards.
(3.30)Footnote 32During Athens’ golden age, he claims, the demos was the protagonist of the city's actions. It was also the overlord of the class of rhêtores, in language redolent of the master/enslaved relationship (see further below, on Aristophanes’ Knights). ‘But now’, Demosthenes goes on, ‘the opposite is the case: the politicians are in charge of rewards, and all matters are administered by these men, and you, the demos, have been hamstrung (ekneneurismenoi) and, stripped of money and allies, have sunk to the station of attendant (hupêretês) and appendage (prosthêkê)’ (3.31).
Demosthenes’ form of address is striking and constitutes part of the reason this particular example was selected. The apposition ‘you, the demos’ is rare in surviving Attic oratory and highlights and intensifies a relationship that is usually taken for granted in addresses to the assembled citizens.Footnote 33 This, then, is Demosthenes’ representative claim, and a negative one: he (M) is asking his audience (A) to assent to the idea (O) that they have been cheated of their rightful dominance and reduced to weakness by manipulative politicians, but that by accepting Demosthenes’ advice (S) the demos of Athens (R) will thereby reassert its ‘nerve’. In the event, Demosthenes’ claim was rejected. We do not necessarily know why––some listeners may have disputed Demosthenes’ charge that the demos was no longer despotês and kurios; others may have considered the present situation problematic but not worth ‘rectifying’ by recourse to war with Philip. It is not an implausible stretch of the imagination to suppose that Demosthenes’ rhetorical opponents on the occasion presented the Pnyx crowd with an alternative, more desirable claim about the nature of the demos’ present character. That is a central aspect of Attic oratory, one worth phrasing in terms of the present discussion: audiences of forensic and symbouleutic rhetoric were constantly bombarded with competing claims about the nature of the Athenian demos, issued in real time by rival speakers.Footnote 34 It was in the audience's power to approve of and thus (at least temporarily) to adopt one such claim rather than others, but it was ultimately a verbal construct, a convention, dependent upon a maker––and yet it had political and practical force and was freely and (as the Athenians understood it) democratically chosen.
My second example is Cleon's (in)famous contribution to the Mytilenean Debate of 427 as depicted by Thucydides (3.37–40). Having seen his proposal to kill all Mytilenean men carried on the previous day, Cleon must now deal with the Athenians’ guilt-induced openness to changing their minds (3.36). His brutal but complex speech has been studied many times; if, however, we analyze it in terms of the representative claim, new aspects emerge. For Cleon (M) is certainly engaged in painting (S) a picture (O) of the demos (R) that he hopes will increase the likelihood of acceptance of his proposal among his audience (A). What is that picture? Like Demosthenes, Cleon depicts the Athenians as decadent because they are denying their proper nature: they must realize that ‘ignorance’ (amathia) combined with ‘prudence’ (sôphrosunê) is more beneficial than ‘cleverness’ (dexiotês) combined with ‘lack of restraint’ (akolasia). That is because the ‘commoner’ (phauloteroi) sort of men, such as, by implication, the audience members are, administer cities better than the ‘cleverer’ sort (xunetôteroi) (3.37.3). Being ‘on the ignorant side’ (amathesteroi), the mass of Athenians (that is, the demos) should distrust their own (rather limited) ‘intelligence’ (xunesis) and be content to judge speeches, not participate in them (37.4). With their addiction to speeches (38.4–7), the Athenians neglect their own interests by delaying their punishment of the Mytileneans, since ‘the victim is proceeding against the culprit with a rather dulled sense of anger (orgê), but requiting oneself, when the act follows as closely as possible upon having suffered, is a worthy opponent to the crime and best exacts punishment’ (38.1). After explaining why the Mytileneans deserve no pity, he concludes: ‘So do not be traitors to yourselves, but putting yourself in a state closest to how you felt when you suffered, and [considering] how you valued above all subduing them, now pay them back’ (3.40.7).Footnote 35
Scholars have noted several devious aspects of Cleon's rhetoric: for example, he shuns the spirit of reasoned argument espoused by Pericles (Thuc. 2.40.2f.) and attempts to persuade the Athenians that the decree of his they passed on the previous day should enjoy the respect of long-standing law.Footnote 36 I assume myself that everything Cleon says in the speech is in the service of convincing the Athenians to abide by his earlier proposal. Where I differ from previous commentators is in highlighting Cleon's portrait of the demos in its ‘idealized’ state: according to him, it is rather simple, unlearned, common-sensical, and quick to anger, and by relying on these characteristics it serves itself best in deliberation. Of course, as mentioned already, the Athenians ultimately rejected this representative claim. Nevertheless, what I find fascinating is that Cleon's composite description of the demos recapitulates, almost point by point, the traits of another ‘depicted’ demos, none other than the personified ‘Demos Pyknites’ of Aristophanes’ Knights of 424.Footnote 37 In this play, the city of Athens is metaphorically figured as the household of ‘Mr. Demos’, whose newly purchased slave, the Paphlagonian, manipulates Demos through flattery and bluster until an even more disgusting demagogue, the Sausage-Seller, dethrones him. The drama opens with two demoralized household slaves deploring the rise of the Paphlagonian. As one of them explains during the exposition of the plot: ‘Our master is rustic (agroikos) in character, a bean-chewer, quick to anger (akrocholos)…an unpleasant (duskolos), half-deaf little old man’ (Kn. 40–3). Not only does Cleon's demos resemble Aristophanes’ Demos, but Aristophanes is describing the demos/Demos precisely at the moment when it/he is most in thrall to Cleon/the Paphlagonian. In other words, part of Cleon's strategy in the debate, at least as portrayed by Thucydides, is to convince the Athenians to think of themselves in terms which, in Aristophanes’ view, encourage the demos’ subservience to none other than Cleon himself.Footnote 38 In fact, seeing that Thucydides continued to write (and presumably revise) beyond the ‘earlier’ Mytilenean Debate of 427, I strongly suspect that his eventual presentation of that event was influenced by Aristophanes’ Knights of 424. Thus, we should read Thucydides in the light of Aristophanes, and not vice versa, since the former is, technically speaking, a ‘fourth-century historian’.Footnote 39 This approach does not require that we consider Thucydides’ portrayal a fiction dependent entirely on Aristophanes, merely influenced by him. What is more, if Thucydides’ depiction of Cleon is relatively true to life, then Cleon's (historical) speech from 427 may itself have left its traces in Aristophanes’ picture in Knights; there is potentially a lot of interdependence going on here. What Saward's model illuminates is the presence in oratory of a carefully crafted performance, the representative claim, not far different from depictions of the demos in other media such as comedy and historiography.
III: Conclusion: Claim as Creation: Representations of the Demos
We are now in a position to observe, briefly and in closing, that Demosthenes and Cleon, no less than Aristophanes, are engaged in prosôpopoiia according to its original, ancient definition, that of the creation of a personified character.Footnote 40 We can see, according to the terms of the constructivist turn, that orators’ descriptions of the demos are themselves artistic creations that re-present their subject, in the sense of making present something that is absent, without ever actually being or even describing the subject in an accurate or universally agreed-upon way (since, as we have seen, the audience [A] that approves a picture [O] of itself as demos is not the actual demos [R] stricto sensu, which rarely if ever does or approves of anything). In this regard, the constructivist turn restores the ‘aesthetic dimension’ inherent in all acts of political representation, to use the words of the political theorist Frank Ankersmit.Footnote 41 If this is true, however, then there is no reason not to bring representative claims into dialogue with personifications of the demos in other artistic media, such as painting and sculpture. For the portrait of the demos in Demosthenes’ Third Olynthiac attempts to represent the demos of Athens and, moreover, to spur the recipients of these representations to certain kinds of action—just as do the seated Demos relief of the Eucrates stele, the standing Demos relief of the Euphron stele, the painted Demoi of Euphranor, Parrhasius, and Aristolaus, and the Demos statue of Leochares.Footnote 42 Of course, an artist's intention might be confounded by the audience's reception, which depends upon the audience member's own context and set of beliefs, among other things.Footnote 43 As Alastair Blanshard has written, ‘what one must inevitably do on encountering a depiction of the Demos…[is to] take a political position…Whether you think the depiction of the People is too old, too young, too rich, too poor, too plain or too good-looking, too kind or too cruel––you have implicated yourself in a political view.’Footnote 44 As I hope to have shown, orators’ representative claims subjected themselves to just such a reception, in a manner that not only ‘represented’ but genuinely instantiated the Athenian democracy in action.
