Conquest, a revision of Rembold's Cambridge dissertation, asserts that “the Christianization of Saxony has yet to be studied in toto . . . ” and “This book attempts to fill this lacuna through a systematic study of politics, society and Christianization in Carolingian Saxony” (3). The Introduction identifies the narrative sources, mostly Annales, but the discussion of their biases is not sufficient. Most startling is the failure even to mention material evidence. The main part of the study is composed of two sections each of two chapters. Part 1, “Politics of Conquest” treats “The Saxon Wars” and “The Stellinga.” Part 2, “Conversion and Christianization” treats “Founders and Patrons” and “Religion and Society.” There is a short conclusion, a useful but limited bibliography, and poor index. While the starting date of 772 is obvious, the terminal date for the study, 888, is not explained, much less defended.

Rembold's “Saxon Wars” are pretty much a scissors and paste account of what is found in the various Annales, which are treated largely as plain text. For a history of war(s), a modern author is obligated to discuss matters such as the natural and human geography of the region of conflict, population estimates, political structure, economy, and military institutions. Additionally, the assets mobilized by the conqueror require examination. Why Charlemagne chose to conquer the Saxon region is not discussed. A treatment of either the Carolingian or Saxon strategy or tactics is lacking. The Carolingian Annales often try to explain that the length of the war was due to Saxon “perfidy.” Without discussion, Rembold suggests that “perfidy may appear to the modern observer as a rational observance of risk-benefit analysis” (61).

The second chapter, “The Stellinga,” has much to recommend it. Rembold gives last rites both to the Marxist view of a “peasant” uprising and its presumed effort to reestablish paganism in the region. Rather, she argues convincingly that the Stellinga were “guildsmen” in the sense used by Oexle. These men were well-armed and trained local levies that played a role in Carolingian military organization and in local judicial institutions. Unfortunately, at this point under the influence of Matthew Innis's scholarship, Rembold becomes involved in an ill-advised discussions of “peasants,” who are not and cannot be defined adequately. Rembold does not explain how, or if, the Stellinga, presumably living throughout the Saxon region, were unified into a single force under some sort of leadership. However, she comes close to explaining why Lothar recruited them when she hints (124) that these “rebels” were the local levies living in areas where the leading royal fideles sided with Louis the German. Rembold's efforts to identify a Nachleben for the Stellinga; her refusal to accept the evidence for early social stratification; and of the nature of the Marklo assembly are all based in speculation.

In chapter 3, Rembold sees the development of the church in the Saxon region as a local matter executed by Saxons. She claims that “bishoprics were shaped by reactive pragmatism rather than by conscious policy” (145). Rembold argues that Charlemagne's government was unable to institute a conscious policy because, she speculates, royal fiscal resources in the region were exhausted by the grant of beneficia to loyal Saxon fideles. The few surviving charters do not support Rembold's speculations. Indeed, the treatment of fiscal sources in Saxon by specialists, particularly those who draw upon the enormous volume of material information developed through excavations, which point to the extensive fiscal assets throughout the Saxon region, many of which were maintain in the royal fisc up through the Ottonian period. A localist ethnic argument must be based upon an exhaustive prosopography and a study of names. Charlemagne did have a policy for the financing of the Saxon church beginning with chapter 17 of the “First Saxon Capitulary,” which describes tithes and the exploitation of the vast mineral resources of the Harz Mountains. Charlemagne's policy of central direction is misunderstood by Rembold (167–171) but is illustrated by the Vita Sturmi. Finally, when the word boves is used to describe draft animals, it refers to oxen, not “cows” (154).

Chapter 4 aims to show that “Saxony became Christian during the reign of Charlemagne (188).” Thus, she disputes whatever “evidence” scholars have mobilized to argue for “pagan” survival. As a result, Rembold is forced to treat archaeological information despite her failure to address the methodological problems inherent in dealing with material sources. Thus, she accepts specious arguments proposed by Guy Halsall (193) that burials were not a religious matter and finds little value in arguments made from the great mass of excavated material. Rembold downgrades written “evidence” for paganism by claiming that the phenomenon in hagiographical sources are topoi to enhance the glory of successful churchmen. She asserts that Charlemagne had outdated information when he issued his capitulary regarding Saxon paganism. Rembold recognizes, however, that Charlemagne is credited in Saxon texts with the victory of Christianity.

Although chapter 4 also treats both the well-known German translations of scripture and the prevalence of nunneries, Conquest is not a “systematic study of politics, society and Christianization in Carolingian Saxony,” much less a study of the church in toto. Rembold's assumption that Saxony was under populated and economically underdeveloped leads her in unfortunate directions. The flourishing population and great wealth of the region under Otto I (r. 936–973) makes clear that he inherited a flourishing region that could not have been “developed” in the course of a century. Some parts of Conquest may be of interest to specialists that know the field.