I

By the early seventeenth century, allegiance to the monarch had become tied to religious conformity, and the swearing of oaths was the priviledged method of demonstrating that loyalty. James I's oaths of allegiance made this connection between political and religious loyalty explicit.Footnote ⁶ The purpose of oaths of allegiance in the early seventeenth century was to bind subjects to the monarch (both in person and office) in secular and religious terms. Yet even as loyalty tests were institutionalized, their reliability was questioned. Casuists debated the possibilities of equivocation or mental reservation, which could result in partial or conditional swearing, and offered instruction on reconciling conscience with the taking, refusing, and sometimes modification of oaths. The possibility of attesting to qualified or insincere allegiance generated anxiety among government officials and swearers alike.Footnote ⁷ Thus, while allegiance was closely tied to oath-taking, contemporaries nevertheless recognized that oaths were imperfect gauges of loyalty.

This disconnection grew after 1638 in Scotland and 1641 in England and Ireland, when those who came to support war against Charles I argued that the king himself posed a threat to the religious, social, and political order. The Scottish National Covenant, for example, served as the foundation for resistance to Charles I's religious and political policies. Opposition to the king, regardless of prior oaths of allegiance taken in his name, was justified by Charles's attacks upon the presbyterian Kirk, which breached Scotland's religious Covenant with God.Footnote ⁸ Separating the person of the king from the office of kingship allowed subjects to hold that loyalty could be withdrawn from individual monarchs while remaining with the institution of monarchy.Footnote ⁹ In laying out the grounds for war, new loyalty oaths, such as the Confederate oath of association, the Scottish National Covenant and Solemn League and Covenant, and the English parliament's Protestation, proliferated in the three kingdoms. Successive loyalty oaths raised the prospect of conflicting allegiances. For many contemporaries, like the parliamentarian William Jessop, reconciling competing oaths was essential for the establishment of congruency and the satisfaction of conscience. When Jessop and other subscribers took the Solemn League and Covenant, even as they opposed Charles I's actions they pledged their commitment to monarchy. Jessop subsequently wrestled with swearing the Engagement to the English republic. Because he had opposed the regicide and abolition of monarchy, Jessop satisfied himself that taking the oath to uphold the current government as constituted would not violate his previous vow of monarchical allegiance.Footnote ¹⁰ The attempt to reconcile loyalties, however, was not always successful. For example, the Catholic marquis of Antrim was torn between his loyalty to the king and Irish Confederacy. Antrim found himself compelled to choose, and he chose against the king. In addition to protection of his own self-interest, he became convinced that the goals of the Confederacy were incompatible with royalism.Footnote ¹¹

What, then, did it mean to be a royalist in the mid-seventeenth century? Much existing scholarship focuses upon political theory, highlighting the ways in which contemporaries understood the nature and extent of royal authority. The distinction between ‘absolutists’ or ‘ultra-royalists’, on the one hand, and ‘constitutionalists’ or ‘moderates’, on the other, has been particularly influential.Footnote ¹² Numerous studies have focused upon the formation of absolutist and constitutionalist factions after 1641 and the role these factional alignments played in royalist political and military affairs.Footnote ¹³ Defining royalism primarily using such theoretical terms as absolutism and constitutionalism, however, has several drawbacks. First, it assumes that these were clearly identifiable, stable positions that reliably guided the thoughts and actions of their subscribers. The distinction between absolutist and constitutionalist royalists, however, is not always readily apparent, and consequently the utility of this model recently has been questioned.Footnote ¹⁴ Nor were rivalries and factional divisions necessarily based on political or ideological differences. Rather, individuals could move in and out of factional alliances – which themselves often were fluid and ill-defined – for strategic and tactical reasons, out of personal enmities or pragmatism, or in response to changing political and military circumstances.Footnote ¹⁵ Moreover, not all royalists were drawn to support the king out of coherent, rational political or constitutional views of the nature of royal authority and the proper relationship between king, subject, and institutions of government. Espousal of royalism also could stem from such factors as the conditions of war, military or community pressure, anxiety over parliamentary radicalism, and commitment to the Church of England.Footnote ¹⁶

Loyalty to the king thus was not necessarily theoretically or philosophically based. Indeed, Barbara Donegan recently has argued that for some, allegiance was natural and purely instinctive; this form of intrinsic loyalty was, according to Donegan, a peculiarly royalist phenomenon.Footnote ¹⁷ For Rachel Weil, however, any attempt to uncover ‘true allegiance’ in the seventeenth century is anachronistic. Loyalty was not tied to internal conviction but to external conditions together with the narrative conventions used to explain individual circumstances and actions.Footnote ¹⁸ The distinction between internal loyalty and external circumstances in part may be attributable to the nature of the sources under consideration. Weil's sources, for example, are petitions to the parliamentary committee for compounding from royalists seeking, at least officially, to reconcile themselves to parliament in order to recover their estates. In contrast, royalist correspondence regularly brims with effusive professions of allegiance to the king, members of the royal family, and the Stuart cause. While external actions or services, such as military or financial support, certainly were crucial means of establishing allegiance to the king, so were declarations of personal fidelity. To take one example, the Scottish royalist James Graham, marquis of Montrose informed the prince of Wales in 1648, ‘as I never desyred, to live bot for ther Maiestys service, so shall I never shun, to dye, for y^res’.Footnote ¹⁹ A reputation for loyalty, based on both disposition and action, was highly valued by royalists. After the regicide, for instance, lists of known or potential royalists in England were compiled and arranged according to region, religion, individual skills and capabilities, well-affectedness, reliability, and likely degree of allegiance.Footnote ²⁰

Nevertheless, as Weil suggests, it is virtually impossible to verify the inner loyalties of most seventeenth-century men and women. Protestations of deep, immutable, internal allegiance to the king and his cause were as much a part of the conventions of royalist writing as descriptions of external circumstances were to those appealing to the committee for compounding. Any expectations of unwavering internal loyalty are belied by the not uncommon changing of sides during the civil war period. For example, Murrough O'Brien, Lord Inchiquin, president of Munster and commander of the Munster forces, moved from royalist to parliamentarian to royalist in the 1640s.Footnote ²¹ Marchamont Nedham, parliamentary propagandist and supporter of every republican and Protectorate regime of the 1650s, briefly turned to royalism in the late 1640s.Footnote ²² For the king, the most important element – even more important than religion or ethnicity – was the present (and ideally future) condition of loyalty. Those who continued in rebellion could not be forgiven, but returning to allegiance could provoke leniency and readmission into royalist circles. Former parliamentarians were potentially valuable assets for the royalist cause and could be welcome additions to the fold.Footnote ²³

Royalists thus were a diverse group with different motivations and backgrounds. What held them together? One definition holds that royalism was ‘the loose affiliation of those who supported the King and who condemned his enemies’, and who were ‘first and foremost monarchists’.Footnote ²⁴ This model, however, is problematic, especially when applied beyond England. Though the Scottish Kirk and parliament and Irish Confederacy were monarchist in general, they were decidedly reluctant to offer active allegiance to Charles I and Charles II in particular. If monarchism is taken to define royalism, then Scottish Covenanters and many Irish Catholics would appear to be royalists – a designation they (not to mention members of the king's party) would have rejected categorically. More useful is the definition offered by McElligott and Smith: a royalist was one who self-identified and was accepted as such by other royalists. What royalists had in common was the desire for the restoration of royal power on the king's terms or under conditions which were as advantageous as possible to the king.Footnote ²⁵ Accordingly, though many Scottish Covenanters and Irish Catholics could support the institution of monarchy and accept Charles II as king, they were not necessarily royalists.

Indeed, one of the principal challenges facing the king and his supporters during the 1650s was that the loyalty of many Scottish and Irish subjects to Charles II and his cause was conditional. This was not an entirely new development, as more than a decade of civil wars had shown. Yet while Charles I struggled to recapture the loyalty of his existing subjects, Charles II struggled to gain and maintain the loyalty of the kingdoms he claimed from exile. Irish Confederates and Scottish Covenanters allied with the king only after he or his authorized agents agreed to their conditions and signed treaties guaranteeing their political, religious, and constitutional demands. Yet even signed treaties did not ensure steadfast allegiance. With their loyalty gained by treaty, Covenanters and many Irish Catholics believed themselves justified in withdrawing their support if and when they perceived the king or his agents to be violating its terms, or if they believed its execution had become untenable. Scottish Covenanters and Irish Catholics also were apt to see each other as more dangerous than the English republican government, which rendered an alliance of royalists, Covenanters, and Catholics inherently volatile and ultimately unsustainable. Lastly, the modification, or even revocation, of loyalty often was a pragmatic response to shifting circumstances or the actions of military and political leaders. Understanding allegiance thus involves examining the ways in which political, religious, economic, and military pressures could affect its proclamation and implementation over time.

II

In early 1649, an alliance of British and Irish subjects loyal to the king and serving his cause seemed possible. To Charles II and many of his courtiers, agents, and advisers, the prospects for the recovery of Ireland initially appeared bright. In January, after years of civil discord and the resistance of the Catholic Confederacy, royalists and Irish Catholics formally reconciled in the Second Ormond Peace.Footnote ²⁶ This treaty offered considerable concessions to Catholics, including the protection of property, freedom of religious worship, and the ability to hold military and political offices.Footnote ²⁷ The result was the union of royalist forces with the Irish Catholic armies of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught; this coalition was augmented in the fall of 1649 by the long-sought alliance with the Catholic general Owen Roe O'Neill, commander of the Ulster forces. In February 1649 the Ulster presbytery condemned the English parliament and its act of regicide, and in the spring the Ulster British forces also joined the royalist war effort.Footnote ²⁸ For a time this broad coalition, under the leadership of Charles II's lord lieutenant, the marquis of Ormond, inspired hope and confidence for royalists in Ireland.

This sense of optimism reached the exiled court as well. In the wake of Charles I's execution, the Peace was a welcome symbol of progress and offered new direction and purpose. News of the treaty reached the king at The Hague only in late February, while he and his court were still reeling from the shock of the regicide. The Peace was a ‘great comfort to us in the midst of many and great misfortunes’, according to the exiled secretary of state Robert Long, and for the Irish courtier George Radcliffe it gave ‘great reputation to the King’.Footnote ²⁹ In the following months positive reports of Irish affairs continued. In June 1649, for example, Ormond informed the king of the ‘hopeful condition’ of royalist fortunes. Most of Ireland was in royalist hands, he wrote, and many Ulster Scots were joining with the presbyterian general George Monro to increase the troop levels.Footnote ³⁰ Other favourable accounts followed. For example, Edward Nicholas, later secretary of state in exile, received word that ‘it is now a very busy and hopefull tyme with us, the Rebells have little left them in the whole kingdom’.Footnote ³¹

For royalist leaders in Ireland, capitalizing on this momentum was crucial. Ormond requested additional military support and regular intelligence from the exiled courts. Keeping the forces occupied was another goal: it would allow no ‘tyme heere which may minister occasions of division and new quarrels betwixt those that are but newly freinds [sic]’.Footnote ³² Hope for the success of the new alliances could not mask their fragility. The diversity of the coalition, comprised of British and Irish Protestants and Catholics, was at once a great strength and a great weakness. Religious faultlines ran deep and jeopardized the Peace almost from the outset. Other factors contributed to the instability of allegiance. One was the position of exile, which removed Charles II from his subjects, enabled the advancement of rival loyalties and interests, hampered communication, and weakened his ability to command. Those he relied upon to manage affairs in his absence, notably Ormond, increasingly found themselves the objects of hostility and resistance.

Irish Catholics were divided over the degree of loyalty owed to the king and the royalist cause. Many former Confederates, particularly clergy, who had opposed the first treaty with Ormond in the mid-1640s, remained uneasy with the second Peace in 1649.Footnote ³³ Agreeing to the Peace did not make this ‘clerical party’ royalists; they were prepared to support the king as long as they were serving their own interests in the process. Complaints to Ormond of the harassment of Catholics and violations of the terms of the Peace highlighted the contractual nature of their support.Footnote ³⁴ Catholic bishops and clergy distrusted, not without reason (as discussed below), the commitment of Ormond and the royalist leadership in Ireland to preserving the protections granted in the Peace.

Ormond and other royalist commanders viewed the clerical party and their supporters as unreliable and potentially disloyal subjects. Ormond also believed they were apt to exploit the king's need for aid by demanding greater indulgences for Catholics, which in turn risked alienating Protestants. Ormond warned the king against granting ‘such further new concessions to them as may loose [sic] the hearts of the Protestants without whom your Mat^ies worke heere much less in England and Scottland is not to be done’.Footnote ³⁵ The king shared these concerns, but he also was reluctant to jeopardize the support of the clerical party. Charles subsequently instructed Ormond to try to keep any additional Catholic demands from public circulation and refer the petitioners to the next parliament in Ireland. If immediate concessions proved necessary they should be restricted to civil matters. In short, the king directed Ormond to ‘content them with as little as you can’.Footnote ³⁶

Irish Catholics, however, were not a cohesive group and many firmly believed that their best interests lay with the king and his lord lieutenant in Ireland. Indeed, some of the most prominent Irish Catholic royalists, including the marquis of Clanricarde, the earl of Castlehaven, Lord Taaffe, and Lord Muskerry, were close associates of Ormond. The marquis of Clanricarde, for example, who had joined with Ormond rather than the Confederacy earlier in the 1640s, again distanced himself from the bishops and their supporters. ‘I decline the defence of that w^ch they terme the Catholike Faith’, he declared, ‘w^ch according to my breeding & instruction had no relation to rebellous [sic] principles’.Footnote ³⁷ From this perspective opposition to Ormond meant disloyalty to the king, and it also weakened resistance and left Ireland as a whole vulnerable to conquest.Footnote ³⁸ Loyalty to the king was bound together, not potentially at odds, with national interest. Accordingly, Clanricarde urged the assembly of prelates at Limerick to put aside their complaints and punish those who resisted royal authority. Securing Ireland required the unity of all subjects, including Protestants and Catholics, British and Irish, prelates and laity, nobles and commoners.Footnote ³⁹ The royalist cause could encompass each of these groups and rise above their differences. Trying to disentangle and choose among these interests was not only misguided, it could be disastrous: weakening the whole threatened the component parts as well.

Yet as royalist strongholds and garrisons fell to the English army from the autumn of 1649, distrust grew among various parties in Ireland, particularly between royalists and former Confederates and their sympathizers. Religious and ethnic tensions escalated, and Ormond found himself the object of increasing hostility. As the Irish Catholic Lord Muskerry, Ormond's brother-in-law and supporter of the first Peace in the mid-1640s,Footnote ⁴⁰ informed the lord lieutenant in the autumn of 1649, zealous Catholics were complaining that ‘protestants and Inglish doe share yo^r favo^rs amongst them’. Obedience, Muskerry reminded Ormond, could not be taken for granted: Irish Catholics who felt excluded and marginalized under the current system were unlikely to fight for its preservation, especially since royalist fortunes had begun to decline. The key to securing their allegiance, Muskerry counselled, was to allow Irish Catholics a greater stake in the defence of the nation. What was needed was ‘an Army of the natives’, including Irish Catholic officers and commanders, who would grant ‘this nation theyre owne rights as fully, as the Inglish would expect if the Irishe were to serve with them in Inglande’.Footnote ⁴¹ Reports of the discontent among Irish Catholics reached the exiled courts and royalist agents abroad. Muskerry's recommendations found support at the highest levels. The Catholic bishop of Clogher, for example, was appointed to command the Ulster forces, and Ormond was directed to collaborate with Catholics in the management of Irish affairs.Footnote ⁴²

Such measures, however, proved ineffective, and the clerical party increasingly withdrew obedience. In March 1650 the Catholic bishops met at Limerick to register their grievances and propose solutions. To renew Irish Catholic commitment to the king's cause, the bishops' recommendation to Ormond was ‘to free the kingdome of those of the English Nacon in the Army, that the feares and jellosies held of them and of yo^r Excell^cie for them, might thereby bee removed’.Footnote ⁴³ The bishops reminded Ormond that in the English republic both the king and Irish Catholics shared a common enemy, one ‘who aymes at nothing soe much as the disthroaning of our now gracious King Charles the Second, and the finall extirpation of our Natives’.Footnote ⁴⁴ For Catholics to unite wholeheartedly behind the king he must be seen to represent and protect their interests as well as his own. Such a convergence would serve the ‘advancemen^t of his Mat^ies interest and the good of the Kingdom generally’. By remedying their grievances, the bishops stated, Ormond would aid in the ‘pacifing [sic] of discontented mynds, and put us in a waye here to labour further in soe good a cause’.Footnote ⁴⁵

Protestants in Ireland also wrestled with multiple allegiances. Conflict between presbyterians and royalists, particularly regarding loyalty to Charles II, divided the Ulster British forces. These divisions were influenced by developments in Scotland, which highlight the British dimension of debates over allegiance to the king. Scottish political and ecclesiastical leaders took care to distance themselves from open association with ‘papists’, and in July 1649 the Kirk condemned the Second Ormond Peace as granting Catholics ‘the full liberty of Popery’.Footnote ⁴⁶ Like the Scottish Kirk and parliament, the Ulster presbytery refused to fight on behalf of an uncovenanted king. Following the Kirk, the presbytery of Ulster denounced the Peace, leading to widespread desertions.Footnote ⁴⁷ As long as the principal objective was to serve the cause of the Covenant, the presbytery was prepared to work in conjunction with royalists and to countenance joint attacks against English strongholds and troops. The Covenanting movement had spread rapidly through Ulster and beyond from 1644, and by 1649 many of the soldiers in the Irish Protestant armies were primarily concerned with upholding the cause of the Covenant rather than that of the king.Footnote ⁴⁸ Royalist commanders, on the other hand, placed their principal loyalty with Charles II and his cause. The Ulster Scottish royalist Lord Montgomery, for example, made his allegiance to the king at the expense of the Covenant increasingly evident.Footnote ⁴⁹ To the Ulster presbytery and its supporters, Montgomery's loyalties were disordered and his willingness to ally with the Irish Catholics in the king's cause signalled his abandonment of the Covenant. The presbytery condemned Montgomery in July 1649, and much of his army deserted.Footnote ⁵⁰

Tensions increased the following month. On 2 August, Ormond's army was defeated by English forces at Rathmines. This show of English strength moved the Catholic general Owen Roe O'Neill to treat with Ormond, though O'Neill died shortly thereafter. Emer McMahon, the Catholic bishop of Clogher, succeeded O'Neill as general of the Irish Army in Ulster, thereby subordinating the Ulster presbyterian general George Monro, commander of the Enniskillen garrison, to the bishop's command. Maintaining loyalty both to religion and the Stuart cause could be a difficult balance for British Protestants. In April 1650 George Monro at length resolved to leave the bishop of Clogher's army and treat with the English republican forces. In addition to insufficient means to maintain his troops, Monro cited the hostility of Catholics to Ormond and their reluctance to work in conjunction with Protestants to defend both the king's cause and the nation as a whole. Monro explained that the English army, though the enemy, was better disposed to protect the Protestants under his command than the ‘barbarous’ Irish rebels.Footnote ⁵¹

Monro announced he could no longer ‘put my people in their trust whose hands be yet embrued with our blood’ and was bound to come to terms with the English forces. As he stated, ‘I will rather submit to Gods plasure and leave them in the hands of those, who profess themselves children of the same mother, though they have theire owne faults and great ones.’Footnote ⁵² Nevertheless, Monro was careful to state that his actions did not imply disloyalty to Charles II. Rather, Monro maintained that he could not serve the king effectively without the support of Irish subjects. In fact, he argued, the treachery of Irish Catholics meant that relying on them actually worked against the king's, as well as Protestant, interests. Monro accordingly proclaimed his continued loyalty to Charles II and offered to serve the king elsewhere or in another capacity.Footnote ⁵³

Religious concerns, which often were influenced by developments across Britain as well as abroad, thus could present significant obstacles to allegiance to the crown. Individuals could feel forced to choose among competing loyalties, and in this struggle royalism did not always emerge triumphant. Religious divisions were far from clear-cut, however, as Irish Catholics were disunited and presbyterians like George Monro remained committed to the king months after the Ulster presbytery's condemnation of the Peace. Further complicating matters, and placing additional strains upon the bonds of allegiance, was the exile of Charles II and the Stuart courts.

III

As the exiled king and his advisers considered strategies for recovering the thrones, one main issue was whether efforts should focus upon Ireland or Scotland. Ireland was favoured by a number of advisers, including Edward Hyde and Edward Nicholas, as well as by Charles II himself.Footnote ⁵⁴ Promises of aid to Ireland were swift and earnest. As Robert Long informed Ormond, the king resolved to send whatever he could ‘upon the first intimation from your Lo^pp of the necessity of it’. Indeed, early in 1649 Long related, the king was so determined to see success that even the distress over his father's death could not keep Ireland from his thoughts.Footnote ⁵⁵ The position of exile, however, was a significant obstacle, and advisers believed that Charles II's presence would enhance royalist efforts in his kingdoms. In exile, the king was at a geographic distance, his court was impermanent, and his absence underscored his political displacement. His presence, conversely, would be a source of inspiration, a sign of solidarity with his subjects, and a focal point for allegiance. The king's presence was, as George Radcliffe put it, much-needed ammunition for the royalist cause in Ireland.Footnote ⁵⁶ Charles II agreed and anticipated he would join his Irish subjects. Robert Long informed Ormond that Charles II was en route and had reached St Germain.Footnote ⁵⁷ Edward Nicholas relayed the court's satisfaction with progress of Irish affairs and also assured Ormond of the king's intention to go to Ireland, though he advised Ormond that Charles would be able to bring little money with him, if any.Footnote ⁵⁸ In expectation of his impending arrival, the king granted Ormond great latitude and authority in determining courses of action. ‘It is impossible for us at this distance’, Charles II acknowledged, ‘to iudge what may be proper for the present affections & inclinations of persons and parties there now what particular directions the state of our own affaires may require.’Footnote ⁵⁹

Since Charles II was an exiled king with limited resources, he needed to maximize domestic and international support. Appealing to both Protestants and Catholics required a delicate balance. In March 1649 Charles II sought international aid, including from the states general, to support his cause in Ireland. Reassuring the United Provinces that his alliance with Irish Catholics did not compromise his commitment to Protestantism, Charles II pledged to use ‘all wayes and meanes w^ch may tend to the advancem^t and propagation of the Protestant Religion’.Footnote ⁶⁰ On the other hand, to secure the allegiance of Catholics, Charles II aimed to show that his rule would be far more beneficial than that of the English Commonwealth. The king directed royal officials in Ireland to assure Catholics ‘that they may and ought to expect all fitting favours from us, and much greater then they can reasonably expect or hope for, from the Rebells of England’. Any promises, pledges, or guarantees which the English republic might issue could not be trusted: its members and supporters already had proven themselves ‘false and faithlesse Traitors’.Footnote ⁶¹ Irish Catholic commanders, including Colonels Philip O'Reilly and Bryan O'Burn, were reminded of the king's efforts to defend their ‘Religion and Nation’ from English invasion.Footnote ⁶² At the same time, Charles II recognized that links to Catholics could jeopardize support from British Protestants. Fearing the withdrawal of presbyterians, circumspection and caution in enforcing the Peace in Ulster was advised. For example, Ormond instructed George Monro to consult with presbyterians and carefully assess ‘when & how farr to press those people & the forces of those partes to declare their submission to the peace’.Footnote ⁶³ The king also ordered that any further negotiation with Catholics, including the possibility of Spanish aid, ‘be kept secret’.Footnote ⁶⁴

Conflicting interests endangered long-term stability and eroded the loyalty of the king's subjects. As the precarious alliance of royalists, British Protestants, and Irish Catholics began to fracture, allegiance to the king's cause increasingly was tested. Loyalty to the crown was tied to royalist fortunes in Ireland. From the late summer of 1649 the royalist tide began to ebb. The successes of Cromwell's forces, the defeat of Ormond's army at Rathmines in August, and the massacres at Drogheda and Wexford in September sapped morale.Footnote ⁶⁵ Plague and disease were spreading, and money and supplies were short.Footnote ⁶⁶ Fear of the English armies and the desire for self-preservation caused a rise in desertions.Footnote ⁶⁷ To Ormond and other commanders, these developments portended the loss of the kingdom. On 15 September, Inchiquin informed Ormond that the situation was fast approaching critical. Provisions were badly needed, Inchiquin noted, and a commitment to the defence of the realm on the part of all Irish subjects was essential. Otherwise, ‘the kingdom will be lost to the most tyrannicall Rebells in the world, against whom it may be easily defended if the kingdom apply themselves as they may doe to their owne preservation’.Footnote ⁶⁸

It took some time for word of the deteriorating condition of Ireland to spread. Royalists on the continent, including Edward Nicholas, periodically complained about the shortage of reports from Ireland.Footnote ⁶⁹ Moreover, news often contained conflicting information. As one London newsletter declared in August 1649, ‘Here are such various reports of y^e affaires of Ireland, y^t a man cannot tell what to write, or what to beleive [sic] of what he hears’.Footnote ⁷⁰ Alongside accounts of troubles in the state of royalist affairs, for example, rumours circulated that Charles II himself was to arrive in Ireland with an additional 6,000 foot and 4,000 horse to confront Cromwell's army.Footnote ⁷¹ Even royalist officials offered differing assessments. While many commanders were reporting increasing unrest, in November 1649 the governor of Kinsale downplayed the growing instability. Desertions were ‘as yet inconsiderable’, the governor claimed, and he projected that the alliance with O'Neill's forces would rejuvenate the war effort. He also (wrongly) announced that royalist troops were gaining the upper hand: ‘what we heare of certain is, that our Enemyes are ruined; soe I hope our King shall shortly have this Kingdom totally at command’.Footnote ⁷²

Ormond himself appeared torn over what, and how, to tell the king and his councillors about the state of Irish affairs. The war was not going well and Ormond required more men and money to continue its prosecution, but at the same time he wanted to persuade Charles II and the exiled courts that Ireland was worth supporting. Ormond illustrated this uncertainty in two letters dispatched on 30 November 1649, the first of which was a rather positive account while the second painted a much gloomier picture. In the first letter, Ormond placed the number of loyal troops at a robust 22,000 foot and horse, a figure which he expected to see enlarged upon the receipt of additional provisions. George Monro's forces were in the field and Owen Roe O'Neill's troops, despite the death of their commander, were ‘cheerefull in the service’. At the same time, Cromwell's forces were depleted and his ability to fight reduced unless joined by more recruits from England. Ormond also tried to put positive spin on instances of disloyalty and defection: ‘I should not esteeme his Mat^ies party much weakened by the drawing of[f] of men that weare only to be kept by good successe.’ Ormond concluded that ‘his Mat^ie can want noe numbers of good men in this Kingdom either for his service heere or elswhere’.Footnote ⁷³

In the second letter, headed ‘For his Mat^ies cleerer satisfaction in the state of his affaires’, Ormond emended a number of points made in the previous account. It was a more sober and reflective report, and one which openly and repeatedly stressed the need for the king's assistance and intervention. At the heart of the challenges he faced was faltering allegiance. The situation in Ireland was grim, Ormond related: ‘Our wants having occasioned disorder, that disorder the spoyle of the country, and that spoyle the flight of the country from us as from an enemy.’ Ormond revised the appraisal of his military resources downward. The number of troops which could actually take to the field was 18,000 at the outside, and it was questionable whether even this number could remain intact for long. While it was a boon to conclude the treaty with Owen Roe O'Neill, the long-term results were as yet unclear. Ormond cautioned that the Ulster army's resolve and commitment to the king's cause was uncertain: ‘I cannot assure his Mat^ie any perfect obedience from it longer then it suite with their interest to all under his authority.’ In short, Ormond informed the king, it was imperative to raise more forces at home and abroad. He also needed more financial support for the troops. Without it, Ormond warned, ‘uppon [sic] want they will disperse’. If it came down to a choice between loyalty to the king and to survival, the former stood to lose. Not even Charles II's presence could compensate for lack of funds, and accordingly Ormond reluctantly advised that unless and until the king could sustain himself, his court, and the army ‘for some tyme’, it would be unwise to sail for Ireland.Footnote ⁷⁴

As fortunes in Ireland declined, the exiled courts were conscious of the significance of the king's support, on both material and psychological levels, to royalists in his kingdom. Ormond held Charles II's exile partly responsible for inhibiting obedience to royal authority. Should the king recover his English crown, he could easily subdue rebellious Irish subjects. If, on the other hand, Charles II remained in exile ‘he must hope for little here’.Footnote ⁷⁵ Ormond was assured of Charles II's continuing desire to join him in Ireland; money was the only barrier to the king's departure.Footnote ⁷⁶ The king apprised Ormond of ongoing efforts to secure aid from Spain,Footnote ⁷⁷ which Lord Byron hoped ‘may in some measure cheere up the drooping spiritts of the people there, and not make them thinck themselves alltogether abandoned’.Footnote ⁷⁸ For Ormond, however, potential aid from Spain was more a cause for alarm than reassurance since it could potentially alienate Protestants in the kingdoms.Footnote ⁷⁹ Moreover, despite assurances from the exiled courts, Ormond maintained that the lack of direction and support from the king was a major impediment to the cause in Ireland. For much of the winter of 1649–50, little news from the exiled courts and royalist agents abroad reached Ireland. As a result, Ormond informed Henry Jermyn, exiled royalist at the court of the queen mother Henrietta Maria, that many in Ireland felt deserted:

Ormond hypothesized that the dearth of correspondence could be due to miscarriage of the post. Yet he also wondered whether triumphant accounts of the victories of Cromwell's army in the English press, ‘wherein doubtlesse they have perfected the conquest of the Kingdome’, had persuaded the king and exiled courts ‘that it is held lost labour to send to or inquire after us’.Footnote ⁸¹ On a practical level the reason behind the lack of communication mattered little. Soldiers and subjects were suffering defeat, disease, and hardship, and many were feeling the tug of competing loyalties. That the king was in exile on the continent was already a challenge; the fear that Charles II had given up hope and channelled his energies elsewhere could be crushing. This sense of abandonment by royalist leadership was shared by others in Ireland. The mayor of Waterford, John Lynett, lamented that requests for relief had gone unmet, and this ‘neglect had of us’ left little option but surrender. Lest the responsibility for submission be attributed to a collapse of loyalty among inhabitants or the failure of Waterford itself to marshal the necessary manpower and resources, the mayor advised he would make public the lack of support from royalist officials and ‘manifest to the world how wee came to be made the Enemies prey after our soe long resistance to the losse of all our estates and inhabitants’.Footnote ⁸²

IV

Maintaining the loyalty of Irish subjects to an exiled king, especially when regular communication from the royal courts was lacking, was a daunting task. In the king's absence the leadership and management of Irish affairs fell to Ormond, who found that the authority granted by royal commission was an unreliable instrument to command allegiance. Ormond and other Irish royalists, including Inchiquin, laid the responsibility for the crisis of confidence in the royalist war effort and the withdrawal of allegiance to the king primarily at the feet of the clergy and their supporters. As Ormond recounted, the clergy ‘by evill practises, & under false pretences had gained credditt enough with the well meaneinge people to mistrust us’.Footnote ⁸³ Micheál Ó Siochrú has argued that by this time Ormond was becoming so wrapped up in self-pity he neglected to pursue strategies, such as granting greater authority to Catholic commanders who were acceptable to the clergy, that might have resurrected royalist fortunes. Ormond's paralysis, Ó Siochrú concludes, contributed to the collapse of the war effort.Footnote ⁸⁴ Yet Ormond may have been less paralysed than unwilling to compromise. Though he wanted to defeat the English ‘rebels’, he did not want to do so at any cost. Ormond's understanding of his duty to Charles II and his responsibilities as lord lieutenant drove him to ensure royalist control over Irish affairs and to insist on principal allegiance to the king.

These concerns had guided Ormond's policies and actions before the regicide as well. Ormond viewed Catholics, particularly the clergy, as both unreliable subjects and as threatening to Protestant interests. Ormond's distrust and hostility had long ago soured his relations with many Irish Catholics.Footnote ⁸⁵ He had been reluctant to concede to the clergy's demands during negotiations for the first Peace in 1645–6. Indeed, Ormond insisted upon the inclusion of articles which he knew the clergy would not accept, thereby tainting the peace process.Footnote ⁸⁶ Furthermore, after the negotiations with the Confederates for the first Peace already had begun, Ormond undertook parallel talks with Ulster Protestants in an effort to weaken the Catholic bargaining position or perhaps to circumvent the Confederate treaty entirely.Footnote ⁸⁷ Ormond, along with other royalist agents during the protracted talks for the first Peace, was adamant that any agreement acknowledge the king's sovereignty and maintain his royal prerogative.Footnote ⁸⁸ The greater concessions to Catholics granted in the second Peace of 1649 to a great extent were prompted by the growing sense of crisis in 1648 as wars ravaged the Confederacy and the prospect of a large-scale English invasion loomed.Footnote ⁸⁹ Ormond, however, was never comfortable with these terms of the second treaty and feared that Catholics would use them as the foundation for greater demands. So abhorrent was unfaithfulness on the part of those who officially embraced the cause that Ormond wondered which would be worse: defeat by Cromwell or victory won by disobedient subjects.Footnote ⁹⁰

As fissures widened, Ormond found it increasingly difficult to secure allegiance and to prosecute the king's cause. With opposition to his own leadership overriding loyalty to Charles II, in the spring of 1650 Ormond began to wonder if his departure from Ireland would be the best way to heal the rifts.Footnote ⁹¹ Inchiquin, however, was not persuaded that replacing Ormond would enhance royal authority in Ireland. The only way to secure the co-operation of the disobedient, Inchiquin concluded, would be to agree to their demands.Footnote ⁹² Similarly Daniel O'Neill, the Protestant nephew of the late Owen Roe, informed Ormond that ‘yo^r Ex^cie will never have any obedience from them or those they can governe further then is consistent w^th their interest, w^ch (truly) iff I am not deceaved is neyther his Mat^ie nor yo^r Ex^cie’.Footnote ⁹³ Some doubted that reconciliation would be possible at all. For example, Sir Nicholas Plunkett, royalist agent in Brussels and one of the moderate Confederates who had supported Ormond in the 1640s,Footnote ⁹⁴ declared ‘Soe farr hath the spirit of ambition & disention invaded the hearts of some of that nation, that they will sooner pull God out of his Throne or throw themselves hedlong unto the sea then [sic] become loyall to the Crowne of England’.Footnote ⁹⁵

Problems of allegiance grew with successive royalist losses, particularly after the defeat of the bishop of Clogher's Ulster forces in late June 1650. Once again the main source of discontent, according to Ormond, was the ‘ever disloyall party of the Irish Clergie and their adhearants’ who tenaciously worked to undermine his authority.Footnote ⁹⁶ Towns and garrisons rejected his command and resisted his arrival with reinforcements.Footnote ⁹⁷ Moreover, royalist Catholics, like the marquis of Clanricarde, were ‘under almost as much distrust & discountenance’.Footnote ⁹⁸ While the clergy received much of the blame, Ormond and other commanders also identified other agents of unrest including nobles, gentry, and officers who pursued their own interests at the kingdom's expense. As Clanricarde recounted, his horses and oxen were stolen, the gentry were prepared to treat with the rebels, and the soldiers were acting as undisciplined brigands.Footnote ⁹⁹

These ‘affronts put uppon the Kings authority’, Ormond reflected in the summer of 1650, prompted him to re-evaluate the possibility that his departure would encourage greater unity among royalists and Irish Catholics.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Reports of strained relations between Ormond and the clergy were causing concern among royalist agents abroad.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Charles II granted Ormond permission to resign if and when he deemed it necessary for the good of the cause. Ormond conceded he may have passed the point at which reconciliation was possible: ‘I have lost the meanes of Ballanceing the partys, or of bridging them to reason.’Footnote ¹⁰² For the next few months, however, Ormond remained in his position, informing the king he would stay in Ireland for as long as there remained ‘any glowing of lite left in yo^r busines’.Footnote ¹⁰³ It is also possible that Ormond wanted to stay in order to protect his reputation from the assaults of the clergy.Footnote ¹⁰⁴

As the weeks and months passed, it became increasingly clear that the situation was untenable. In August, the Catholic clergy assembled at Jamestown denounced Ormond's leadership and declared that Catholic subjects were no longer in his obedience.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ In the summer of 1650 Charles II finally reached an agreement with the Scottish Kirk and parliament, and one of the conditions was the king's denunciation of the Peace. Though in October Charles privately assured Ormond that this rejection was not permanently binding,Footnote ¹⁰⁶ the king's disavowal of the treaty, and hence the repudiation of the protections granted to Irish Catholics, was difficult to overcome. As the English republic's conquest of Ireland continued to wax, Ormond's effectiveness waned, and at length he determined he had no option but to lay down his command. True allegiance to the king, Ormond concluded, was lost. Only superficial respect for Charles II remained, and that too was in danger so long as Ormond stayed in Ireland.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ In December 1650 Ormond went into exile, leaving Clanricarde in his place. As Ormond summed up his decision in January 1651, he had waged a war on two fronts – against the rebels and the Irish people – only to lose both.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

V

As in Ireland, Charles II faced problems of allegiance in Scotland. The Scottish Kirk and parliament, like the Irish Confederacy, insisted upon the successful conclusion of a treaty with the king as a prerequisite for active loyalty. Upon the execution of Charles I, the Scottish Kirk and parliament proclaimed his son Charles II king. From the outset, however, Scottish political and ecclesiastical leaders distinguished between the institution of monarchy and the person of the king, and made it clear that their obedience to Charles II was conditional: it was not something automatically granted by virtue of birthright and position, but could be granted, withdrawn, or circumscribed by subjects. The Kirk and parliament held it to be the king's responsibility to bring himself and his actions in line with Scottish political and religious systems, institutions, and traditions, and to demonstrate his commitment to godliness. Negotiations between the king and Scottish parliamentary and Kirk commissioners to reach agreement began in the spring of 1649. Talks faltered by June, and no resolution was reached until the summer of 1650.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

The Scottish proclamation of Charles II as king both restricted his authority and outlined the terms according to which he was eligible to receive the active loyalty of his Scottish subjects. The conditions included provisions to sustain both the National and Solemn League and Covenants, uphold the presbyterian Kirk in Scotland, and establish presbyterianism in England and Ireland.Footnote ¹¹⁰ In requiring subscription to these articles, the Scottish parliamentary and Kirk commissioners dispatched to treat with Charles II repeatedly emphasized that these were not new demands to be imposed upon a new king and signalled no new limitations on obedience. Rather, the terms marked the continuation of existing Scottish political and religious commitments and required the king to agree to espouse Covenants, institutions, and practices already in effect.Footnote ¹¹¹ Charles II was expected to acknowledge pre-existing limitations on his authority, based on both divine and secular law: ‘His Majestie is bound by the Law of god, and Fundamentall Lawes of this Kingdome to rule in Righteousnesse and Equity for the Honor of god, the good of Religion, and the Wealth of his people.’Footnote ¹¹² The Kirk and parliament thus recognized multiple allegiances: to the institution of monarchy, to the person of Charles II, to the presbyterian Kirk, to the Scottish nation and its parliament, to the National and Solemn League and Covenants – loyalties which could diverge and could be difficult to reconcile.

Faced with these conflicts, Scottish Covenanters resisted compromise and maintained that the path to resolution was the king's to travel. Until he made it possible for his subjects to enter into allegiance, the uncrowned monarch would have no kingdom to rule. Scottish political and ecclesiastical leaders monitored Charles II's words and actions, pointed out inadequacies, and outlined means for their correction. In a letter to the king in February 1649, the general assembly of the Kirk counselled the king to ‘avoid all the tentations [sic] and snares that accompanie youth’, which could involve a reluctance to heed wise counsel. Indeed, the Kirk warned, ‘we were faithfull and free with your Royall Father; wold [sic] God he had hearkened to our humble advise!’Footnote ¹¹³ The king was not only accountable for his own actions, but more broadly those of his courtiers and agents as well as those of the House of Stuart. Charles I's guilt, which Charles II inherited along with his father's kingdoms, required contrition. The commissioners sent to treat with the king in the spring of 1649 accordingly were directed to insist that Charles II repent of ‘the sins of his house’, paying particular attention to his mother's Catholicism ‘as a maine cause of the evills both of sin and of punishment, that have afflicted these Kingdomes’.Footnote ¹¹⁴

Yet alongside the distrust of the king lay a desire to reach accommodation (albeit on Scottish terms). Persuading the king and royalists of the Scottish devotion to monarchy was at once vital and challenging; after all, Scotland was the first kingdom to raise arms against Charles I in the civil wars. The commissioners knew that many royalists held presbyterianism and monarchical government to be fundamentally incompatible. The Anglican royalist John Bramhall, exiled bishop of Derry, argued this position at length in his 1649 treatise A fair warning, to take heed of the Scottish discipline, published as the negotiations were getting underway. Presbyterians, Bramhall declared, intend to impose their form of worship ‘not onely upon their fellow-Subjects, but upon their Sovereign himself, contrary to the dictates of his own conscience, contrary to all Laws of God and Man, yea to compel forreign Churches to dance after their pipe’.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Denunciations of the Kirk often emphasized the presbyterian drive to spread this ecclesiastical system: as one royalist declared, ‘I beleeve if you speake with any zealous Presbyterian & he his minde to you, he will tell you he not onelie wisheth but is bound in conscience to endevour y^e setting up his religion & republike over all y^e world.’Footnote ¹¹⁶

Royalist advisers and officials, including Edward Hyde, Edward Nicholas, and the marquis of Ormond, made no secret of their scepticism that Scottish presbyterians could be counted as loyal subjects. Regardless of any subsequent action on behalf of the Stuart monarchs, many royalists blamed Scottish presbyterians for precipitating the events leading to the execution of Charles I and the dispossession of Charles II from his thrones. Charles himself let the Scottish commissioners know he had not forgotten Scotland's role in the ‘late troubles’.Footnote ¹¹⁷ For this reason, the English republican newsbook Mercurius Politicus contended, Charles II would never be able to reconcile completely with his Scottish subjects, and consequently they would fare much better if they put themselves in the hands of the English Commonwealth.Footnote ¹¹⁸

Whether and to what extent Charles II should consent to Scottish demands was a source of discord in the exiled courts. Was the crown of Scotland worth such substantial constraints upon royal authority, and would agreement with Scotland jeopardize Irish affairs? One view, espoused by the Queen Mother Henrietta Maria, Robert Long, Henry Jermyn, and Sir John Berkeley among others, held that securing the Scottish throne was in fact worth the king's concessions.Footnote ¹¹⁹ In March 1649 Long observed that Scottish officials likely would insist upon ‘such reservation and restrictions, as shall keepe him from any exercise of power as long as they please’. Nevertheless, Long maintained that reaching a settlement with Scotland need not undermine the royalist cause in the long term.Footnote ¹²⁰ For Berkeley, compromise with Scottish officials was imperative. Holding out for optimal conditions was self-defeating, he informed Hyde, and allowed significant royalist opportunities to slip away. Successful restoration depended upon the support of Scottish as well as Irish subjects, and thus the king had to secure Scottish co-operation.Footnote ¹²¹ Other courtiers and advisers, including Nicholas, Hyde, and Ormond, viewed Scottish demands as an assault upon royal prerogative and a clear demonstration of disloyalty. From this perspective, a focus on Ireland was preferable to accepting Scottish limitations on royal power.Footnote ¹²² As one royalist report argued, the Kirk was attempting to take advantage of a weakened and exiled king. If Scottish support was conditional upon these demands it should be rejected. A king with little power could, in fact, threaten the welfare of his subjects: ‘He wilbe lesse a Monarch, & so lesse able to protect them.’Footnote ¹²³

Establishing the compatibility of presbyterianism and monarchy, the Scottish commissioners believed, would add weight to professions of loyalty. The commissioners restated ‘the affection of the Kirk of Scotland vnto Monarchie, and to the continuance of the same’. One of their number, Robert Baillie, published a lengthy refutation of Bramhall's treatise which demonstrated that presbyterians could in fact be faithful subjects.Footnote ¹²⁴ Despite these protestations, Charles II balked at the prospect of accepting limitations on his authority. A proclamation of kingship that prevented his assumption of the throne was, from his perspective, tantamount to an act of defiance. In negotiating with the commissioners the king declared, ‘I shall expect that obedience and duty from them in the exercise of my Royall power as is due to me by their allegiance.’Footnote ¹²⁵ Another point of contention included the Kirk's insistence that the king repudiate the Second Ormond Peace, a measure which he was disinclined to take. Additional Scottish demands centred upon Charles II's courtiers and advisers: the Kirk wanted to curtail the access of the uncovenanted or royalist ‘malignants’, such as Edward Walker and the marquis of Montrose, to the king.Footnote ¹²⁶ Charles II resented these encroachments on his prerogative, but he also was reluctant to jeopardize the negotiations. Much of his early communication accordingly tended to be noncommittal, asking for further information or expressing hope for a satisfactory agreement ‘to which we shall contribute all that can be reasonably expected from us’.Footnote ¹²⁷

As the talks broke down, the issue of allegiance proved to be one of the main stumbling blocks. For Scottish Covenanters, the king had to earn their loyalty and obedience. Charles II, however, maintained that by virtue of his office his subjects owed him allegiance. The commissioners were dissatisfied with the king's stalling and publicly aired their frustrations. Copies of the negotiations were sent to press, and the preface and text of the documents reveal annoyance and disappointment with Charles's conduct. The commissioners complained that the king seemed prepared ‘to obstruct all agreement, and to cause and increase jealousies and differences betwixt his Majestie and us’.Footnote ¹²⁸ Though the commissioners protested their ‘affection and Loyalty’ to Charles II, they also warned him of ‘the great danger and disadvantage, which would inevitably ensue upon his delaying, or refusing, to give the satisfaction desired by this Kingdom’.Footnote ¹²⁹ On a more positive note, the commissioners informed the king, subscribing to these ‘just and necessary’ articles,

Mere submission to the king was not enough, the commissioners explained. At least as important as ‘outward obedience’ was ‘inward affection to your Royall Person, Authority, and Government’.Footnote ¹³¹

In his response, Charles II acknowledged the difference between active and passive loyalty and demanded both of his subjects. ‘I expect and require from all my Subjects of Scotland’, he announced, ‘such obedience as is due to me their King, by the Laws of God, of nature, and of that Kingdom.’Footnote ¹³² Protestations of loyalty meant little if unaccompanied by action, or even concrete plans for action. Following the commissioners' vague pledges to assist in punishing those responsible for the regicide, for example, the king requested detailed proposals. Promises were simply lip-service; it was necessary to put words into practice. Regarding the nature and extent of royal prerogative, Charles II acknowledged his power already was circumscribed. As king, his duty was to ‘Almighty god’, and the exercise of his authority was for the benefit not of himself but of his subjects.Footnote ¹³³ Indeed, the king used the restrictions on his prerogative to his advantage in negotiations with the commissioners. Notably, the king observed that implementing presbyterianism in England and Ireland exceeded his authority and required the assent of the parliaments of the kingdoms.Footnote ¹³⁴ In any case, once his authority was established the king, as sovereign, would be free to reinterpret or reject his former pledges, particularly those which he had no choice but to offer. A number of Scottish royalists in fact believed that the king's concessions need not be permanently binding. The marquis of Montrose and the earls of Lanark and Callender, for example, urged Charles II to take the Covenants upon the understanding that once he had assumed his full power he could alter the constitution of his kingdom.Footnote ¹³⁵

VI

As long as hope, however slim, remained for royalist success in Ireland, the king was loath to accept Scottish offers of conditional loyalty and limitations on his authority. Inability to reach an agreement caused the negotiations to stall for the next few months, but as the situation in Ireland deteriorated the king returned his attention to Scotland. In January 1650 Charles II informed the general assembly of the Kirk of his willingness to concede to ‘just and reasonable demands, for the settling of a right understanding’. The king expressed hope that ‘wee shall find the spirit of meeknes [sic] and moderation in you’, and proof of their commitment to his cause. Greater demonstrations of loyalty this time around, Charles II informed the commissioners, would increase his confidence in the integrity of the process.Footnote ¹³⁶ In resuming discussions, however, the king found that the Scottish position had not changed. Unless he accepted Scottish conditions, including denunciation of the Second Ormond Peace in Ireland, the Kirk declared ‘there can be small or no hopes of a blessing vpon any means that shall be assayed for the establishment of your Majestie vpon the throne of these Kingdoms’.Footnote ¹³⁷

In the face of intransigence, the king hoped to bypass the Kirk and parliament and tap directly into a fount of popular royalism in Scotland. Popular pressure, Charles II believed, could persuade Scottish political and ecclesiastical leaders to mitigate their demands. Hoping that a show of force would cause the Covenanters to soften their position, Charles commissioned the marquis of Montrose to raise royalist forces in Scotland.Footnote ¹³⁸ Military action, however, was to be a last resort. As the king informed Montrose in January 1650, it was preferable to ‘reduce Our Subjects of that Kingdome to their due obedience to Us, by Our just & honourable Condiscentions, & by all endeavours of kindnes [sic] & favour on Our part, rather then by warre and hostility’.Footnote ¹³⁹ Hyde also believed that Montrose's show of strength would ignite popular royalism, swelling the ranks of the king's party and leaving the Kirk party isolated.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ The principal goal was to secure coronation in Scotland, which would enable the king to assume his royal authority. It would also signal the support of the Scottish people. Finally, it would increase Charles's international stature and lend greater weight to his conduct of foreign affairs.Footnote ¹⁴¹

Unfortunately for royalists, Montrose's rising failed and the marquis himself was captured and executed. These developments prompted the king to reconsider his position, and on 30 April 1650 Charles agreed to renounce Anglicanism and subscribe to the National and Solemn League and Covenants. The article requiring the establishment of national presbyterian churches in England and Ireland was modified to reflect the king's pledge to assent to acts of parliament passed in these two kingdoms. Wholesale acceptance of Scottish terms, however, proved unpalatable. Charles II refused to comply with all the demands, including the condemnation of the Second Ormond Peace as well as his father's sins and his mother's ‘idolatry’.Footnote ¹⁴² These omissions notwithstanding, the king was invited to Scotland and arrived in June 1650.

This invitation, however, did not remove the barriers to allegiance. If Charles believed his presence would sway the Kirk to admit him to his full authority he was mistaken; even after he arrived his ability to command was circumscribed. In response to his refusal to give full compliance, on 13 August the general assembly asserted that the king's presence in Scotland should not be taken to mean he was admitted into his full power. This ‘Kirk and Kingdome’, the general assembly declared, ‘doe not own nor espouse any Malignant partie or quarrell or interest, but that they fight meerly vpon their former grounds and principles … as they have done these 12 yeares past’. This statement was accompanied by an even clearer refusal of obedience to the king for as long as he maintained his current stance:

Similar concerns were raised by Scottish military officers, who publicly distanced themselves from the king's cause. The presence of royalists or ‘scandalous and malignant persons’ in the kingdom and about the king tainted Scotland's political and religious missions. The officers called for the purging of royalists from the royal court and army, so that ‘God be no more provoked, by countenancing or sparing of them, least the Lord should desert us’. For as long as the status quo remained, the officers maintained that they would take up arms not on behalf of Charles II, but only for the ‘defence of the Cause, Covenant, and Kingdome’.Footnote ¹⁴⁴

Yet Charles II still hoped that appeals to allegiance would gain traction. To try to persuade the general assembly to adjust their requirements, the king invoked familial loyalty. Censuring a father was an unseemly and disloyal act on the part of a son, he objected, and asked that the Kirk allow him to respect his father's memory.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ Though the Kirk expressed sympathy for the king's plight, his request was denied. It would not reflect ill upon the king, the Kirk assured, but would give ‘glorie to God before the world, and an evidence of the sinceritie of your repentance, and of your reall abandoning of that opposition to the worke of God that hath been the cause of so many calamities to your familie and to your Kingdomes’.Footnote ¹⁴⁶ Charles's appeal to omit the condemnation of his mother and her Catholic faith similarly was refused.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ It was imperative, the Kirk informed the king, to ‘appeare in all your actions, that yow love and honour Jesus Christ more then [sic] father or mother’.Footnote ¹⁴⁸ Charles's hopes to retain his loyal courtiers and councillors also were dashed. The Kirk and parliament wanted oversight over the king's advisers and courtiers, stipulating that all royalists were to be removed. If they were not, ‘this Kingdom will give them noe protection, but will seize upon their persons & dispose of them as they shall thinke fit’.Footnote ¹⁴⁹

Such pressure from ecclesiastical, political, and military quarters ultimately forced the king to accept negotiated loyalty. With little choice but to submit, Charles II finally issued a declaration conceding to all of the Scottish demands.Footnote ¹⁵⁰ In turn, to fulfil ‘their part of the said Treaty’ the Scottish parliament admitted the king to the full exercise of his authority.Footnote ¹⁵¹ Though to some extent an act of allegiance, it also clearly was a contract, one which both parties were bound to fulfil. Indeed, the Kirk upheld its end of the bargain only reluctantly. The general assembly expressed reservations over the king's sincerity in his subscriptions, believing that he did so as a matter of expediency rather than as a result of genuine commitment. For example, despite his pledges Charles remained unwilling to distance himself from royalists or ‘malignants’. Equally importantly, the commissioners themselves were culpable for their willingness to accept half-hearted promises: ‘sundry of our statesmen’, the general assembly protested, acted in a ‘crooked way’ in treating with the king.Footnote ¹⁵² Too many in Scotland, the Kirk complained, were willing to put obedience to the king above ‘Religion and the liberties and safeties of the Kingdomes’.Footnote ¹⁵³

Debates over the nature and degree of allegiance owed to the king escalated in the fall of 1650. After Oliver Cromwell's army roundly defeated Scottish forces at Dunbar in September, Charles increasingly became a polarizing figure and acceptance of his authority was re-evaluated.Footnote ¹⁵⁴ In October 1650, The humble remonstrance of the gentlemen, officers, and ministers attending the western forces held the treaty with the king largely responsible for Scottish defeat. The Remonstrants argued that allegiance to Charles II was justified only ‘so farre as he ownes and prosecutes the Cause’.Footnote ¹⁵⁵ The king, however, was insincerely Covenanted: he capitulated due to pressure, and as a result ‘it was in a kynd extorted from him’.Footnote ¹⁵⁶ Instead of renouncing royalists, Charles remained in contact with the ‘enemies of the Reformation and Covenant’ at home and abroad.Footnote ¹⁵⁷ As such, the Remonstrants stated, ‘the King is not prosecuting the Cause of God, and walking in subordination to God, but rather in opposition to the worke of God and to the Covenant, and cleaving to the enemies thereof’. For these reasons, the Remonstrants concluded, ‘we cannot owne him nor his interest’.Footnote ¹⁵⁸ The Remonstrants, who laid the foundation for the Protester movement which emerged in 1651, thus disavowed allegiance to the king and rejected his royal authority. The Remonstrants/Protestors also vehemently opposed allowing uncovenanted royalists to join the military or hold political office.Footnote ¹⁵⁹

On the other hand, after Dunbar many believed that the only way to defend Scotland from English conquest was to enlarge army ranks, which would require the readmission of purged royalists. The Kirk's Public resolutions of December 1650 removed the prohibition on royalists serving in the Scottish forces, and the repeal of the Acts of Classes of 1646 and 1649 similarly lifted the restrictions upon public offices. The Resolutioners, who came to form the majority in the Kirk, remained more or less reconciled to Charles II, who they pointed out was now a Covenanted king.Footnote ¹⁶⁰ As the general assembly maintained, Scotland needed the king to defend against the invasion of English ‘sectaries’ who sought the destruction of religion and nation.Footnote ¹⁶¹ The Kirk declared that military exigency mandated a more ‘general calling’ for soldiers. All but the excommunicated, the ‘notoriously profane’, and hardened enemies of Covenant would be admitted to the army.Footnote ¹⁶²

Much of this support for Charles was ambivalent, borne of the need for defence and a king around whom subjects could rally. For those who believed that the king was insincerely Covenanted, support for his cause was difficult to accept. The Public resolutions garnered protests from a number of synods and presbyteries, including Stirling and Glasgow.Footnote ¹⁶³ Alexander Jaffray, one of the commissioners to Charles II in 1650, reflected that the king was forced to subscribe to the Covenants against his inclinations.Footnote ¹⁶⁴ According to Jaffray, the commissioners and Charles both were at fault: the king, ‘finding that upon these terms only, he could be admitted to rule over us, (all other means having then failed him,) he sinfully complied with what we most sinfully pressed upon him’. Indeed, the commissioners may have borne even greater responsibility since they suspected the king had consented to Scottish demands ‘against his heart’ but allowed him to proceed anyway. The devastation wrought in Scotland was thus divine castigation of the nation for its sins.Footnote ¹⁶⁵ Such a position seemed to find ample confirmation on the first anniversary of Dunbar, a date which did not escape the notice of contemporaries. On 3 September 1651, the defeat of the combined Scottish and royalist forces at Worcester shattered the king's army and forced him into exile once again.Footnote ¹⁶⁶

Charles's departure threw into relief the difficulty of commanding obedience from the position of exile. It also underscored the reality that a substantial proportion of those who pledged allegiance by treaty were not really royalists. The war effort in Scotland never fully recovered after Worcester and the discord among Scottish subjects persisted. For example, in October 1651 royalist commanders, including John Middleton, declared their intention to keep fighting, ‘but to the grief of our hearts we find in place of union the breach proving wider, & that not only in Church & State, but likewise in that Remnant of our Army’.Footnote ¹⁶⁷ Management of royalist affairs in Scotland was left to General Middleton who, like Ormond, found the divisions too great to bridge.Footnote ¹⁶⁸ In February 1654, Charles II informed Middleton that conflicts over allegiance posed a far greater danger to the royalist cause in Scotland than did the Cromwellian army. Accordingly, the king named reconciling the competing factions a priority.Footnote ¹⁶⁹ Middleton agreed, and believed that Charles's presence was the best means to rally Scottish support.Footnote ¹⁷⁰ When royalist risings were planned in Scotland and England in the winter of 1655, the king was eager to remove from exile and join his subjects; to his chagrin, however, the risings were unsuccessful and he remained on the continent.Footnote ¹⁷¹ Middleton partly attributed the failure of the Scottish rising to the lack of domestic and foreign support. Yet it also fundamentally was a failure of loyalty: supporters deserted the cause, and others offered nothing but antipathy to Charles II. As Middleton lamented, many in Scotland opposed the king as much as they did the English government.Footnote ¹⁷²

VII

In Charles II's attempts to recover his thrones, the allegiance of his subjects played a pivotal role. Proclaimed king of Ireland and Scotland while in exile, Charles spent most of the next eleven years as an itinerant monarch. Plans for restoration were devised, debated, and disputed among advisers, officials, and members of the royal family in the exiled courts. Diplomats and agents were dispatched to drum up support from continental powers, including the papacy; these efforts generally proved unsuccessful, to a great extent owing to the reluctance of international leaders to devote valuable resources to an exiled king. Exile engendered and perpetuated geographic, political, financial, and diplomatic instability. It also weakened the bonds of allegiance. Subjects were expected to give their loyalty to a remote king who claimed but did not possess his thrones and who was cut off from his kingdoms' traditional legal, economic, and political institutions. Royalist officials, advisers, and agents recognized the king's presence would help bolster commitment to the cause and provide a tangible focus for allegiance; indeed, for these same reasons Scottish political and ecclesiastical leaders were reluctant to allow Charles II to take up residence in Scotland until the summer of 1650. Governing from exile required the king to delegate administration and authority to his officials in Ireland and Scotland who were better positioned to assess and respond to current conditions and new developments. Yet weeks and months could pass with little or no communication between the exiled courts and the kingdoms, leaving each side bereft of clear information, direction, and intelligence. Moreover, Charles II's commanders found that their commissions were unreliable mechanisms for securing obedience.

The experiences of the civil wars and regicide gave Irish and Scottish subjects leverage to reshape their relations to the king. Irish Confederates joined forces with royalists only after concluding a treaty granting religious, political, and social concessions to Catholics, and the Scottish Kirk and parliament refused to admit Charles II to his full authority until he came to accept their religious, political, and constitutional demands. These formal agreements, along with the willingness of Irish and Scottish subjects to withdraw their support when they perceived the king was not following through with his commitments, threw the contingent nature of loyalty into sharp relief. As well, Charles II was not the only focus of allegiance for his Irish and Scottish subjects. Religious, ethnic, and national interests competed with the king – and with each other – for primacy. Catholics in Ireland disagreed amongst themselves over the extent of obedience to be given to the king, and presbyterians in Scotland similarly were divided. Recovery of the kingdoms depended upon the support of Irish Catholics and Scottish presbyterians alike, yet presbyterians in Scotland and Ireland balked at the king's alliance with Catholics, and many Irish Catholics suspected that Charles II's courting of, and eventual treaty with, the presbyterian Scots would cost them the religious and political gains they had won under the Peace. This climate of distrust within and across the kingdoms further inhibited obedience to Charles II and prompted many in Ireland and Scotland to define and prioritize their interests at the expense of the king's. To understand the failure of restoration efforts in the 1650s, then, we must look not only at the attempts of the king, his agents, and the exiled courts to recover the thrones, but also at the willingness and capacity of subjects to obey.