In this new book by Ali Mirsepassi, one of the leading scholars of Iranian intellectual history, two basic ideas are put forward. The first is that Islamist politics is informed less by antiquated religious sources and traditions than by Western counter-Enlightenment critiques of modernity, chief among them Martin Heidegger's philosophy and in particular his ontological conception of authenticity. The second is that there is a link between progressive politics in non-Western societies, notably in India, and a new democratic narrative of modernity inspired by the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, a framework that offers an alternative to both the vulgar secularism of modernist intellectuals and the essentialism of Islamist politics.
Mirsepassi develops these two themes through a distinction that he makes between the philosophies of hope and despair. The politics of despair stands on the desire to abolish the existing order in order to create a new society with “absolute beginnings” based on “absolute values” (pp. 22–23). The “narratives of hope” entail the possibility of transforming rather than completely negating what exists and represent “a more sociological [rather than philosophical and conceptual] approach . . . with particular emphasis on the here and now, the category of the everyday life, the framework of pragmatic ethics, and a guiding commitment to the democratic possibility of modernity” (p. 25). Within this overarching classification Mirsepassi situates both Islamist and secularist politics in the category of despair: they have lost hope in the possibility of negotiating a meaningful life through the transformation of what actually exists. They both create a “vision of reality based on fantasies of nostalgia, and their vision thereby becomes utopian, impractical, and unconcerned with the practical or ethical implications of the ideas produced” (p. 22). Whereas political Islam justifies its project with a romantic reference to an authentic past, “West-centric” modernists, influenced primarily by the French Revolution, promise a utopian future based on a twisted logic that the “premodern” past deserves to be “scrapped on the road to a ‘great tomorrow’” (p. 201). Mirsepassi's analytic framework of hope and despair is thought provoking, but one has difficultly imagining revolutionary and emancipatory acts as constituting a politics of despair. Revolutionary movements have often led to the emergence of totalitarian systems not because they represent a politics of despair but rather because their ideologies represent great hopes.
In Chapter 1, “Intellectuals and the Politics of Despair,” Mirsepassi argues that almost all tragic social projects of the 20th century were influenced by calls for the “absolute overhaul of all existing social and historical realities” (pp. 22–23). In the Iranian context, he discusses two competing currents, one represented by Marxists and Western-oriented secularists and the other by Islamists. However, much of his analysis is devoted to Islamist ideology, the central figure of which, according to Mirsepassi, is Ahmad Fardid (1909–94). A Heideggerian philosopher, Fardid famously called for the rejection of the West “as both an ontology and a way of life” (p. 31).
Fardid's conception of gharbzadegī (Westoxication) had a paradigmatic significance in Iran, Mirsepassi argues, and shifted the earlier debates on Enlightenment discourses of progress (most notably during the Constitutional Revolution) to an ontological critique of the West as a uniform totality. Not only did “Fardidism” reject the premises of modernity as inauthentic and decadent, Mirsepassi argues, but it also gave rise to a generation of “elitist intellectuals” whose language had to remain inaccessible to common folk. These intellectuals shrouded their critique of modernity in a meta-philosophical discourse mixed with Islamic theology and Sufi obscurantism in order to make issues of everyday life irrelevant and pedantic.
In many instances Mirsepassi's assertions about Fardid are either based on secondary readings of his work or largely unsubstantiated. For example, he lambasts Fardid for his “harsh and intolerant attitudes” toward those who disagreed with his views, his “self-promoting claims,” and his “flawed character” (p. 31) without offering any references to support these claims. He also gives “Fardidism” a constitutive significance in relation to Jalal Al-e Ahmad's and ʿAli Shariʿati's political discourses. Many intellectuals of various ideological affinities adopted the concept of Westoxication in Iran as an expression of either anticolonial politics or philosophical contemplation. Writers and social critics such as Samad Behrangi and Gholamhossein Saʿedi, as well as leftist militant activists such as the main ideologues of the Fedayin-i Khalq, all used Westoxication as one of the bases for their social and political struggles. It seems imprudent to consider all these to be instances of “Fardidism.” For example, although Al-e Ahmad pays tribute to Fardid, he uses gharbzadegī to address the predicament of colonialism and dependency rather than to underscore essential differences between the East and the West. Similarly, Shariʿati questioned those who called for the rejection of Western modernity without being critical of the “self,” the return to which they advocated.
Of the six chapters of the book, one is devoted to a discussion of Heidegger's philosophy and his influence on three influential Iranian intellectuals (Chap. 4) and another to a reevaluation of Dewey's contribution to radical pluralism and democratic possibilities of modernity as well as his influence on Indian struggles against British colonialism (Chap. 5). Mirsepassi's discussion of Heidegger relies heavily on Richard Wolin's one-sided interpretation that regards Heidegger's Nazi association as the inevitable manifestation of his grand philosophical project. Mirsepassi's Heidegger is “the leading philosopher of the National Socialist movement in the early 1930s” (p. 85). He indicts those inspired by Heidegger in Iran through an exercise of guilt by association. Mirsepassi identifies “the radical intellectuals of Iranian authenticity . . . as being among ‘Heidegger's children’” (p. 121) without a thorough investigation of their ideas. In this forty-three-page chapter titled “Heidegger and Iran,” Mirsepassi devotes more than thirty pages to an unoriginal reading of Heidegger and spends two to three pages on each Iranian intellectual, demonstrating the Heidegerrian foundation of their critique of modernity. The problem with such an assessment is that Heidegger had too many “children” with radically divergent views. The fact that a number of Iranian intellectuals read, translated, cited, or spoke sympathetically of Heidegger and his conception of authenticity and alienation does not mean that they represented an exclusivist antidemocratic politics. Those who became politically and culturally influential in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Al-e Ahmad and Shariʿati, were more inspired by anticolonial struggles than by Heideggerian anxieties of authenticity in the European context. Contrary to what Mirsepassi claims, neither Shariʿati nor Al-e Ahmad followed a Heideggerian style in their discourse. Indeed, they both wrote and spoke in plain and unambiguous language, with some exceptions in their literary works, to the extent that Shariʿati was later accused of emptying religion of all its mysteries in order to create an accessible political and ideological language for the masses.
Mirsepassi's introduction of Dewey's radical pluralism (Chap. 5) is a welcome addition to the debate over the expansion of postcolonial democratic politics. However, one needs to read Dewey's influence in shaping the constitutional frame of postindependence India more cautiously and without exaggeration. We need to recognize that what non-European intellectuals read and how they understood those readings have always been primarily conditioned by their experience of colonialism. They do not freely choose from a repertoire of philosophical treatises in order to envision change in their own societies.
This book joins a number of good studies that situate Islamist politics within the general critiques of Western modernity and Enlightenment rationality. I wish Mirsepassi had engaged rather than mainly sidestepped this substantive literature. There is much that is interesting in the book, but in the end it reads as if it was too hasty, both in production and in engagement with its main characters. For example, in the footnotes, one comes across editorial marks such as “please provide note text” (pp. 211, 213, 216). For those interested in reading about Iranian intellectuals, I recommend Mirsepassi's earlier book, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), which remains one of the best in the field.
