DIASPORA

Scholars have argued that diaspora communities can be classified as either active or passive actors in international politics (Shain and Barth Reference Shain and Barth2003). Active involvement occurs when diaspora communities organize with the purpose of influencing the foreign policies of their host-state(s), a phenomenon frequently witnessed in powerful liberal-democratic societies (Patterson Reference Patterson2006). Additionally, diaspora can influence their homeland without any direct support from their state of residence. They can send back money (known as remittances), technology (in the case of conflict, often arms), and even recruits (“return” migration, especially to serve in violent activities during armed conflict) to support their homeland broadly or specific actors operating within it (Collier and Hoeffler Reference Collier and Hoeffler2004). Furthermore, diaspora participation in post-conflict political campaigning and peacebuilding can directly contribute to the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Baser and Swain Reference Baser and Swain2008).

However, not all diaspora communities take on active roles in engaging with their homeland. Sheffer (Reference Sheffer1996) and Shain and Barth (Reference Shain and Barth2003) note that “passive” diaspora can reflect an unsolicited political use of their community by their homeland or describe the targeting of diaspora as unsought representatives of their homeland. They provide two valuable examples of passive diaspora. First, they account for the use of Russian diaspora by the Russian Federation to influence “newly independent non-Russian successor states” (Shain and Barth Reference Shain and Barth2003, 453). Second, they discuss when “diasporas cannot control their status as perceived members of a remote homeland, and thus become implicated in the homeland's international affairs” (Shain and Barth Reference Shain and Barth2003, 453). I argue that this component of their passive diaspora definition is critical to explaining variation in anti-Semitic incidents targeting American Jewry within the United States. However, to simply classify American Jewry as a passive diaspora actor, considering its many active characteristics and real connections to Israel, is insufficient.

At the individual level, American Jews (and non-Jews) have acquired the majority of bonds issued by Israel (Ketkar and Ratha Reference Ketkar and Ratha2010), purchasing over $1 billion bonds annually since 2012, which totals over four-fifths of the total bonds sold each year (Israel Bonds 2017) and is more than representative of its diaspora proportion. Prime Minister Netanyahu has called these bonds “a financial instrument and a fraternal instrument, a bond of brotherhood and sisterhood with the Jewish state” (Israel Bonds 2017). American Jews have also used their political relevance in the United States, particularly their political activism (Patterson Reference Patterson2006), electorally important residential concentrations, and financial resources to successfully lobby on behalf of Israel and the betterment of U.S.–Israel relations through organizations such as The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) (e.g., Mearsheimer and Walt Reference Mearsheimer and Walt2006; Bard Reference Bard, Eytan and Efraim2008). One of the most important achievements resulting, at least in part, from pro-Israel-motivated political interests and capital include the sustained economic and military aid as well as security cooperation Israel receives from the U.S. government. Despite its small population of roughly 8 million people and its relative wealth compared to other foreign aid recipients, Israel has received more foreign aid than any other country since the 1950s (Patterson Reference Patterson2006). In fact, “since 1962, Israel has accepted more foreign aid from the United States than all of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa combined (USAID 2002); the combined population of these three areas is well over one billion” (Patterson Reference Patterson2006, 1899). Scholars (e.g., Mearsheimier and Walt Reference Mearsheimer and Walt2006) and politicians on both the right (e.g., Patrick Buchanan) and left (e.g., Ilhan Omar and Rashida Talib) have utilized American aid to Israel as an indictment, claiming American Jewry frequently utilize their political capital and financial resources to serve the interests of Israel at the behest of U.S. interests, foreign and domestic.

It is critical to note that the belief in a pernicious American Jewish influence manipulating American geopolitical positions on Israel and the Middle East is frequently challenged and rejected. In fact, many individuals (e.g., Alan Dershowitz) and organizations (e.g., the ADL) claim that this insinuation of “dual-loyalty” is tantamount to bigotry, utilizing the millennia-old anti-Semitic canard that Jews are a nation within a nation representing their own ingroup above all else. Instead, they point to the shared values of America and Israel as the bedrock for U.S. affinity toward Israel. Additionally, the rise of radical Islamic terrorism combined with Israel's strategic position in the Middle East and their impressive intelligence gathering capabilities, have served to increase Israel's potential in helping the United States seek its regional foreign policy goals.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that administrations, both Democratic and Republican, since Israel's founding, have justified their close relations to Israel through common history, shared economic and security concerns, and as fellow vanguards of democracy. Perhaps this is best articulated by looking at the similarities of speeches between by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama who shared considerably diverging views on foreign policy. In 2008 President George Bush remarked on arriving in Israel, “We've built strong democracies to protect the freedoms given to us by an Almighty God. We've welcomed immigrants, who have helped us thrive. We've built prosperous economies by rewarding innovation and risk-taking and trade. And we've built an enduring alliance to confront terrorists and tyrants.” Five years later in 2013, President Barak Obama noted while speaking to an Israeli audience in Jerusalem, “Together we share a commitment to security for our citizens and the stability of the Middle East and North Africa. Together, we share a focus on advancing economic growth around the globe…Together, we share a stake in Democracy.”

Still others have argued that the American Jewish community's political support for strong U.S.–Israel ties should be viewed not as lobbying to allow Israel to operate in the Middle East carte blanche, but instead as a reaction to the Holocaust and real concern for the safety of their ethnoreligious kin. Haunted by their inability to better influence the United States to actively protect European Jews targeted by the Nazis during the Holocaust, many American Jews believe powerful and effective lobbying on behalf of an embattled Israel is the only way to live up to the rallying cry of “Never Again” (e.g., Cohen Reference Cohen2002).

Regardless, any charge that American Jewry represents a uniform group committed to serving Israeli geopolitical interests is decidedly problematic for a variety of reasons. First, and perhaps most acute, the sheer size of American Jewry (as compared to both Israel and the rest of the Jewish diaspora) and the geopolitical power of the United States have led to charges that Israel acts on behalf of America, not vice-versa. This position has two origins, one rooted in the unrivaled power of the United States to influence global affairs and the other in the unique size of America's Jewish population.

Second, American Jewry is more heterogeneous and complex than other Jewish diaspora communities. While direct connections to Israel are common among American Jewry, comparative surveys of Jewish diaspora suggest American Jews speak Hebrew less frequently, travel to Israel less often, and hold fewer Zionist attachments and attitudes than any other sizeable diaspora community (Pew Research Center 2013). Scholars suggest that these attitudes and behaviors are undoubtedly related to the successful integration of American Jews into the country's unique pluralistic identity (Chanes Reference Berenbaum2008). Additionally, American Jewry, on average, has suffered far less anti-Semitism—whether state-sanctioned, extra-legal, or criminal—than Jewish diaspora communities in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East (Jaher Reference Berenbaum2008). With the largest period of Jewish emigration from Europe and Eastern Europe to the United States occurring between 1881 and 1924 (Library of Congress 2018), most American Jews avoided the worst of the Holocaust, which systematically destroyed 6 million Jews, roughly two thirds of Europe's Jewish population. This reality is also likely to contribute to variations in attitudes regarding the necessity of a homeland between American Jews and other members of the Jewish diaspora comparatively.Footnote ⁵

Third, non-Jewish Americans have, by and large, been supportive of Israel throughout U.S. history, and this support has been particularly robust in recent decades.Footnote ⁶ Although partisan sympathies have become more polarized in recent years, “most Americans (76%) across party lines agree that Israel is a strategic asset to the United States” (Telhami Reference Telhami2016). In fact, the largest pro-Israel organization in the United States is not Jewish but Christian: Christians United for Israel, which boasts over 5 million members (Parke Reference Parke2018). Furthermore, American political leaders, while not always encouraging of specific Israeli behavior, have tended to be extremely sympathetic to its distinctive security concerns. Most U.S. legislation favoring Israel passes in Congress with near unanimity. For example, during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, when Israel was running low on missile interceptors used by the Iron Dome, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution (H.J.Res.76) providing Israel $225 million in funds. This resolution passed the House 395-8 and the Senate unanimously. Israel also enjoys sweeping support from legislators during periods of considerably greater calm. The United States-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2018 (S.2497), which details defense and security assistance provisions from the United States to Israel, was passed by voice vote in both the House and Senate. Consequently, attributing the United States’ unique relationship with Israel to specific pro-Israel policies of American Jews alone hazardously undervalues other reasonable and competing explanations.

Despite numerous reasons to assume Israeli conflict behavior should not be directly or fully attributable to the positions of American Jewry, charges that the American Jewish diaspora are defending Israel from what should be greater American scrutiny remains commonplace. However, regardless of one's stance on diaspora culpability for an extremely close U.S.–Israel relationship, there is never a legal justification for the criminal targeting of Jewish Americans and their institutions.

Perceived accountability for homeland behavior becomes more frequent and salient for American Jewry when Israel is engaged in a violent military conflict. Furthermore, these accusations have, at times, invoked imputations that many consider to be anti-Semitic, particularly when they invoke ideas of disproportionate Jewish power in America and/or across the globe. Relatedly, the possession of more traditional anti-Semitic beliefs can also intensify the strength of the perceived diaspora-homeland connection (Kaplan and Small Reference Kaplan and Small2006) and the nefarious motive associated with that connection. The possession of anti-Semitic attitudes and beliefs are likely a precursor, necessary for determining why certain individuals go beyond protected forms of criticism during Israeli military operation, and instead criminally target American Jews and their institutions.

ANTI-SEMITISM

Political science literature interested in anti-Semitism focuses primarily on anti-Semitic attitudes, specifically their origins and characteristics (e.g., Adorno et al. Reference Adorno, Levinson, Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford1950; Blank and Schmidt Reference Blank and Schmidt2003; Kaplan and Small Reference Kaplan and Small2006; Sheffer Reference Sheffer2012) as part of broader studies on the psychology of intergroup relations. More recently, scholars have attempted to test the effects of anti-Semitic beliefs on behavior (e.g., Kane, Craig, and Wald Reference Kane, Craig and Wald2004; Cohen et al. Reference Cohen, Jussim, Harber and Bhasin2009).

Anti-Semitic beliefs share both unique qualities as well as characteristics common in alternative types of intergroup hatred (Bilewicz et al. Reference Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta and Wójcik2013, 822). Several studies show that “anti-Semitism correlates closely with xenophobia, Islamophobia, homophobia and the like” (Ambrosewicz-Jacob Reference Ambrosewicz-Jacobs2003; Bergmann and Erb Reference Bergmann, Erb, Richard, Schmidt and Wasmer2003; cited in Bergmann Reference Bergmann2008, 345). Anti-Semitism scholarship, focused almost exclusively in Europe, shows that despite these similarities, anti-Semitic beliefs are often based on distinctive Jewish stereotypes.

Jews are charged with lacking sociability (Lin et al. Reference Lin, Kwan, Cheung and Fiske2005, 35; Bergmann Reference Bergmann2008) thus engendering the belief of extreme group cohesion and exclusivity. This belief contributes to accusation of Jewish diaspora dual-loyalty as well as more grandiose conspiracy theories assuming Jewish control of international finance, business and global governance (Cohn Reference Cohn1967). Belief in an international Jewish conspiracy is also associated with attitudes ascribing Jewish behavior as greedy and dishonest (Brym Reference Brym1996; Krichevsky Reference Krichevsky1999; Bergmann Reference Bergmann2008, 349). Bergmann (Reference Bergmann2008, 349) suggests that “international Jewish power” represent the “dominant” anti-Semitic stereotype, at least in Europe. When employing models of stereotype categorization, such as the ethnic hierarchies model (Hagendoorn Reference Hagendoorn1993) and social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto Reference Sidanius and Pratto1999), this belief highlights the uniqueness of anti-Semitism when comparing it to other intergroup animus. Many immigrant minority groups and Roma, for example, do not have the perceived power to dictate influence from the top-down (Bergmann Reference Bergmann2008, 347). The association between Jews and vast power as well as the interrelated charge that Jews lack sociability, can make otherwise predictable and inoffensive diaspora-homeland connections seem far more sinister. These beliefs, especially when activated by a threatening context, can contribute to motivations leading to the criminal targeting of Jews.

A newer research agenda exploring more contemporary forms of anti-Semitism seeks to explain the role Israel plays in the formation and manifestation of explicit anti-Semitic attitudes. Kaplan and Small (Reference Kaplan and Small2006) find that individuals who hold extreme anti-Israel views are more likely to possess anti-Semitic beliefs. Alternatively, Dinnerstein (Reference Dinnerstein2004) argues it is unlikely that Israel represents a truly “new” form of anti-Semitism, and instead represents a new way for pre-existent anti-Semitic narratives to manifest. Cohen et al. (Reference Cohen, Jussim, Harber and Bhasin2009, 292) find that because classical-bigotryFootnote ⁷ in contemporary times has largely been forced underground, the use of Israel, the World's only Jewish state, as a proxy for anti-Semitism may be a more “socially acceptable cover for anti-Semitism because other critics of Israel have motives untainted by such bias.” Regardless of whether Jewish associations with Israel epitomize a novel form of anti-Semitism or simply represent a new context for anti-Semitism to be applied, Israel has become central to diaspora concerns regarding the experience of anti-Semitism.

HATE CRIMES

While the diaspora and anti-Semitism literature is helpful in explaining possible motives for targeting American Jewry for Israel's actions, this literature is of limited use in explaining why perpetrators actually engage in the criminal targeting of Jews. Consequently, this paper turns to the emergent literature focused on the systematic study of hate crime to help elucidate why Jews might be targeted for Israeli conflict activities.

Prejudicial subjugation and violence have, in many ways, been woven into the historic fabric of the United States since its first settlers, ironically, many of whom were escaping similar persecution in Europe. However, state-sponsored or endorsed organized violence including the systematic slaughter of Native Americans, the mass enslavement of Blacks, and Jim Crow laws should not be confused with hate crimes.Footnote ⁸

As a result of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, protecting civil rights and investigating their violations became a task of the federal government, of which the FBI has played a critical role. It would still take several decades for the term hate crime to become popularized in the United States as a result of media coverage surrounding several prominent incidents targeting Blacks, Jews, and Asians in the 1980s (Green et al. Reference Green, McFalls and Smith2001, 480). Following congressional legislation, the FBI began publishing reported hate crime statistics in the 1990s.Footnote ⁹

Theories of hate crime tend to emphasize either an objective or subjective approach to incident motivation and manifestation. For example, several scholars (e.g., Pinderhughes Reference Pinderhughes1993; Tolnay and Beck Reference Tolnay and Beck1995) believe hate crime is driven by a threat(s) posed by an outgroup(s).Footnote ¹⁰ This outgroup threat can take many tangible forms including the competition of resources (e.g., Sherif et al. Reference Sherif1961), political rivalry (e.g., Kopstein and Wittenberg Reference Kopstein and Wittenberg2018), and national and cultural decay (Holz Reference Holz2001). However, scholars interested in studying threat as a motivation for hate crime need to account for the reality that the perception of threat is often the result of demonstrated and experienced (objective) group concerns intertwined with exaggerated or entirely untruthful narratives and propaganda (subjective). In examining motivations for targeting American Jews and their institutions, it is important to merge the objective and subjective elements underscored in both the diaspora and anti-Semitism literature. Specifically, American Jewry's genuine, exaggerated, and fictitious connections to Israel provide the basis for seeing American Jews as threating and blameworthy. Demonstrable links (or the perception of them) to the Jewish homeland when erroneously weaved into related anti-Semitic narratives and tropes that allude to a broad threat posed by Jews to one's ingroup (be it their own ethnic group, nation, or the entire world) results in Israeli behavior evidencing and enhancing this threat. In short, when Israel, the only professed Jewish nation on earth, is engaged in violent military conflict, the salience of objective and subjective explanations of Jewish threat increases, serving to help actualize the perceived threat associated with Jews broadly and American Jews specifically, in potential perpetrators of their criminal targeting. It is Israeli actions that can turn latent anti-Semitic attitudes into criminal, bigoted behavior.

WHY ISRAEL MATTERS

Building largely from the reviewed diaspora, anti-Semitism, and hate crime literature, this paper hypothesizes that violent Israel military operations will result in spikes of reported anti-Semitic hate crime because they activate latent anti-Semitism in individuals through two distinct but not mutually exclusive mechanisms: (1) confirmation of anti-Semitic attitudes and beliefs and (2) perceptions of direct threat, which induce reactive action. These two dynamics closely mirror two of the three factors Pinderhughes (Reference Pinderhughes1993) argues shapes racial violence in New York City, specifically structural conditions and ethnic and racial attitudes. The first mechanism articulated by this paper focuses on how Israeli military operations act as confirmation bias for certain anti-Semitic beliefs, particularly the belief in a nefarious and disproportionate Jewish influence in both the United States and on global events. As a regional power, Israeli military capabilities have been unmatched by their foes during the armed conflicts they have participated in, particularly over the last four decades. Relatedly, this has allowed Israel to induce extremely high costs on their enemies while enjoying drastically less damage to their own critical infrastructure including suffering far fewer casualties than their foes, both military and civilian. Since the start of the second Lebanon War, militants and populations under their control have suffered casualties at a rate of nearly 20-1 to Israel.Footnote ¹¹ This paper contends that this seemingly Israel-favorable casualty ratio is key in contributing to narratives of Jewish power, and helps to activate latent anti-Semitism and confirm pre-existing anti-Semitic beliefs.Footnote ¹²

The second mechanism explains how Israeli military operations and resulting violence can induce a sense of threat within individuals not directly participating in the conflict and how these emotions can make action more likely. Cohen et al. (Reference Cohen, Jussim, Harber and Bhasin2009) find that people who experience stimuli inducing mortality salience are more likely to report anti-Semitic attitudes and are less likely to be supportive of Israel. Images and narratives of extreme violence resulting from Israeli military operations are frequently visible on mainstream news sources as well as on social media during these conflicts. Seeing and reading about death is likely to induce greater mortality salience, thus prompting increases in anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment.

Relatedly, Bradley et al. (Reference Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert and Lang2001), utilizing the defense cascade model (Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert Reference Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert1997), report that pictures of mutilated victims of violence strongly activated a sense of defensive action such as imminent attack within those surveyed. For those susceptible to or already subscribed to narratives of a Jewish-Israeli danger to their individual wellbeing or the security of groups whom they identify with, violence attributed to Israel can move this belief from distant to present, and makes reactive action more likely. This reactive action will directly contribute to the increased targeting of Jews and result in increases of anti-Semitic hate crime.

DATASET SELECTION AND JUSTIFICATION

A major reason behind the paucity of systematic research analyzing hate crimes is concerns surrounding the collection and comparability of hate crime data. Consequently, it is vital to explain the rationale behind choosing the FBI's UCR hate crime data over possible alternatives as well as to explore the limitations of plausible data sources.

Choosing the appropriate data source for analyzing anti-Semitic incidents across the United States for an extended temporal period is currently limited to two major sources: (1) the FBI's UCR hate crime data (UCR) or the collection of the Anti-Defamation League's (ADL) annual audits of anti-Semitism. The UCR dataset provides certain clear advantages over the ADL audits that this paper reviews below.

First, while the UCR data are limited to incidents handled by policing agencies reaching a criminal threshold, the ADL data include both criminal acts and non-criminal acts such as “incidences of written and verbal harassment and intimidation” (ADL 2016). This can be explained by the way data are collected and substantiated by the FBI and ADL. The FBI accepts crime data “from participating law enforcement agencies through the Summary Reporting System or through the National Incident-Based System” (FBI 2019). In order to be considered a hate crime, police investigating a reported crime must arrive at the conclusion it was motivated “in whole or in part, by the offender's bias(es) against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity” (FBI 2019). The FBI then aggregates these reported crimes from both aforementioned systems into yearly reports available through the FBI, with partial summaries of available data published in its Hate Crime Statistics publication. Alternatively, the ADL builds its data from the crimes reported in the UCR as well as from reports of anti-Semitic incidents directly to the ADL, which occur when witnesses or victims contact their local office by telephone or by submitting a report of their incident online through the ADL website. After the complaint is received, the ADL investigates the incidents veracity to verify that the incident indeed had an anti-Semitic motivation. Many of the incidents reported exclusively by the ADL do not reach a criminal threshold, including anti-Semitic messaging online, the bullying of Jewish children at schools, or the use of protected anti-Semitic speech by individuals in the public sphere.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that on average the ADL data annually reported 445 more anti-Semitic incidents than the UCR from 2001 to 2014. This margin peaked in 2005 with the ADL documenting 909 more anti-Semitic incidents than the UCR, the difference actually representing more anti-Semitic incidents than the UCR reported for that entire year. Since 2008 the ADL and UCR data have acquired greater parity, with the ADL reporting only 280 more incidents on average annually. While the UCR data may systematically undercount the total number of anti-Semitic events in the United States, this paper is interested specifically in hate crimes, and the criminal threshold of the UCR data provides this without further disaggregation (Fig. 1).

Figure 1.

Total reported anti-Semitic hate crime by year (comparison of ADL and FBI (UCR) data from 2001 to 2014 (ADL, 2001–2014)).

Also important are concerns of geographic and temporal data quality. This paper's theory and its operationalization require U.S. anti-Semitic incidents be disaggregated at the state level, which is available in both the UCR and ADL data. Temporally, however, the UCR data are vastly superior to the ADL data in that it publicizes the day in which a hate crime incident occurs. The ADL aggregates all incidents that are reported in a state in an annual report, which makes testing certain variables, such as the effect of an Israeli military operation lasting just weeks, particularly challenging. Other control variables, such as the effect of annual Jewish holiday, are simply not testable through the ADL data.

An additional data concern is the level of detail of an anti-Semitic incident description. The ADL provides a total incident count and has disaggregated this count into three categories: (1) “Harassment, Threats, and Events,” (2) “Vandalism,” and (3) assaults. However, in certain years, only the total counts have been reported, while in other years, assaults have not been included in the disaggregation. Alternatively, the UCR data on anti-Semitic incidents have documented over 26 different offense types. The UCR data also have critical descriptive information which often includes the number of victims, type of victim(s), and location details (e.g., bar/nightclub, government/public building, residence/home, etc.). These details can be particularly useful for scholars wishing to analyze more micro-level characteristics of anti-Semitic incidents. Ultimately, due to its temporal flexibility, descriptive capacity, and criminality threshold, my analysis uses the UCR data. In doing so, however, it recognizes some notable shortcomings.

Concerns regarding reporting bias in the UCR data are unavoidable as the participation of law enforcement agencies in reporting hate crime data to the FBI is voluntary. For example, in 2001, non-reporting agencies represented close to 15% of the U.S. population (FBI 2002). Furthermore, certain states such as HI have consistently failed to participate. Other states report zero or close to zero hate crimes in a given year, what some scholars have considered a statistical impossibility (e.g., Ahuja Reference Ahuja2015). Citing the 2015 UCR data, the ADL's current CEO, Jonathan A. Greenblatt, noted, “at least 85 police agencies in cities over 100,000 did not participate in this report--or affirmatively reported that they had zero hate crimes” (ADL 2016). Nonetheless, the number of participating police agencies within a state has not varied considerably across time and is not associated with significant differences in a state's reporting of hate crime.Footnote ¹³ Furthermore, it should be noted that Jonathan Greenblatt, whose criticism of police reporting is evidenced in the aforementioned quote, recently called the UCR “the most important national snapshot of the hate crime problem in America” (ADL 2016). Despite its concerns, the UCR data represent the best available source for scholars interested in systematically studying ethnoreligious-motivated hate crimes, including incidents specifically targeting Jewish individuals.

DATA AND METHODS

FINDINGS

This paper hypothesized that reported anti-Semitic hate crime would increase in weeks during violent Israeli military operations in America. All three models find that these military operations exert more influence in explaining upsurges in reported anti-Semitic hate crime than any other measured variable. These military operations wield the most influence in explaining rises in reported violent-intimidation anti-Semitic hate crime. These findings suggest that significant Israeli military operations fundamentally explain increased insecurity of American Jewry.

Table 1 reports the findings of three fixed-effects negative binomial regression models, each with a different dependent variable. The left column reports how each independent variable affects the total number of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes in a state per week. The center column specifically details anti-Semitic hate crimes classified as vandalism in a state per-week and the right column accounts anti-Semitic hate crimes coded as incidents of violence or intimidation. All models report findings through incident rate ratios (IRR). The top number that is reported across from each variable is the (IRR), while the bottom number in parentheses is the standard error.

Table 1.

Negative binomial regression, fixed effects (U.S. reported anti-Semitic hate crime, 2001–2014)

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

The first model looking at the total number of anti-Semitic hate crimes reported in a state confirms the theoretical expectations of this paper. In weeks when Israel is engaged in a substantial military operation, states are 22.70% more likely to report an anti-Semitic hate crime than weeks when conflict is at a lower intensity. Visits by high-level Israeli leadership to the United States and Israeli casualties in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza resulting from both Israeli military engagements and terror attacks associated with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have no significant effect on reported anti-Semitic hate crime.

The second model looking at anti-Semitic hate crime classified as vandalism finds that Israeli military engagements continue to have a significant effect on reported incidents. In weeks when Israel is engaged in a military conflict, states are 16.35% more likely to report an anti-Semitic hate crime.Footnote ¹⁷ Visits by high-level Israeli leadership to the United States and Israeli casualties in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza resulting from both Israeli military engagements and terror attacks associated with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict continue to have no significant effect on reported anti-Semitic hate crime.

The third model looking at anti-Semitic hate crime classified as violent and intimidation incidents shows that Israeli military engagements have the most robust effects on these types of reported incidents.Footnote ¹⁸ In weeks when Israel is engaged in a military conflict, states are 35.74% more likely to report an anti-Semitic hate crime. Again, visits by high-level Israeli leadership to the United States and Israeli casualties in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza resulting from both Israeli military engagements and terror attacks associated with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have no significant effect on reported anti-Semitic hate crime.

FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION

The significant role Israeli military operations play in increasing the targeting of American Jewry is imperative for scholarship interested in prejudice toward and the security of ethnic minorities, as well as anti-Semitism specifically. This research opens up considerable opportunities for research exploring the current vacuum in the diaspora literature on how homeland behavior and reputation alters diaspora communities, particularly their security, identity, and attitudes.

Future research that is critical to completing our understanding of Israel's role in Jewish diaspora security is empirical analyses accounting for hate crime perpetrator characteristics. However, current data availability makes constructive analysis of an offender's race, ethnicity, and religion extremely challenging, if not infeasible altogether for several reasons. First, while the FBI UCR data do offer space for the official reporting of an offender(s) race, they do not record perpetrator ethnicity or religion. Consequently, any exploration of whether Israeli military operations trigger any specific ethnic, national, or religious populations to target American Jews at higher rates cannot be measured in this paper's models. While several scholars have noted that anti-Zionism, including anti-Israel attitudes that extend into the realm of anti-Semitism, are more frequent among young male Arabs and Muslims in Europe (Wistrich Reference Wistrich2002; Jikeli Reference Jikeli2015a; Reference Jikeli2015b), the UCR data code Middle Eastern and North African offenders as “White” individuals. Additionally, while it is likely that the possession of anti-Semitic attitudes is a necessary precursor for committing an anti-Semitic hate crime, simply possessing anti-Semitic attitudes does not mean an individual will commit a hate crime. Second, roughly 80% of all reported anti-Semitic hate crimes in the United States included in the UCR have no known offender racial data in a given year. This is concerning not only because it prevents analyses that are crucial in advancing the systematic study of hate crime but because it suggests a considerable number of hate crimes go unsolved. This lack of perpetrator characteristics is largely explained by incident type and associated lack of offender certainty. For example, if a synagogue reports that someone spray-painted swastikas on their property, in the absence of any clear videotaped footage or eyewitnesses, there is no way racial, ethnic, or religious identity of the perpetrator can be inferred unless investigations successfully lead to the offender's arrest. Additionally, because crimes of vandalism make up the majority of anti-Semitic hate crimes across the data and these crimes have considerably lower arrest rates, offender data are unsurprisingly limited. Scholars interested in systematically studying perpetrator data associated with minority targeting will likely have to utilize data limited to extremely violent crimes and murders, which have substantially higher arrest rates.

An additional avenue for future scholarship is comparing the effects of Israeli military operations across different diaspora communities, namely those in Europe and North America. Not only do diaspora communities exhibit different intensities and types of connections to their homeland, they will also vary in size, concentration, and even political relevance across countries. Furthermore, nations hosting diaspora populations will have different diplomatic relationships with that group's homeland as well as different security procedures for targeted minorities. What constitutes a hate crime also varies considerably across countries in the West. For example, while denying the Holocaust might constitute an anti-Semitic hate crime in Germany or France, it is not a criminal act in the United States (Lipstadt Reference Lipstadt2012).

While there are limits to universalizing the findings presented in this paper's analysis as it focuses on an individual homeland and corresponding diaspora, this research should provide a critical baseline for scholars seeking to develop a greater understanding of the homeland-diaspora nexus, particularly as it relates to how homeland conflict can affect diaspora insecurity. Specifically, American Jewry's connections to Israel, real, exaggerated and imagined, are critical in explaining when and why they will be the target of hate crimes in the United States.