BACKGROUND

Oscar Van Overeem, a Dutch collector, purchased a Buddhist statue for 40,000 Dutch guilders (US $20,500) in 1996 in Amsterdam from a collector who had acquired it in Hong Kong. The statue was displayed as part of the “Mummies: Life beyond Death” exhibition mounted by the Drents Museum in the Netherlands in 2014. While the statue was on display at the Hungarian Natural History Museum in the spring of 2015, it was recognized as the statue of Zhanggong-zushi by Yangchun villagers from Fujian Province. “Zhang” is the last name of the Buddhist monk, and “gong” is a grandfatherly honorific title; “Zushi” is an honorific title in southeast Chinese culture. The statue of Zhanggong-zushi was stolen in 1995 from Puzhao Temple in the village of Yangchun. Since the spring of 2015, the villagers of Yangchun have been engaged in the difficult task of recovering the statue.

Responding to pressure brought on by international attention, Van Overeem stated through a social network in May 2015 that he was willing to return the statue to the village. However, in late 2015, Van Overeem attached three conditions to his return of the statue. First, he demanded the statue be enshrined at a grand temple such as Nanputuo Temple in Xiamen. Second, he demanded the Chinese government provide him assistance in research on a subject completely unrelated to the statue. Third, Van Overeem insisted the statue be included with other items of Chinese cultural heritage so that if someone were to buy all of the items for China, no one could determine the price paid for the statue. While agreeing to the second condition of research assistance, the Chinese authorities refused the first and third conditions. Following the collapse of diplomatic efforts at the end of 2015, fearing their case might be barred by a statute of limitation, the Yangchun villagers hired lawyers to sue Van Overeem for the restitution of the statue at the Sanming Intermediate People’s Court in Fujian Province. And, in June 2016, a lawsuit was also filed in the Netherlands for the restitution of the statue. ^{Footnote 1} The Dutch Court will hold a first hearing for the dispute in July of 2017.

WHY THE LOCALS CARE ABOUT THE STATUE

UNDERSTANDING FOLK RELIGIOUS RELICS IN CHINESE CULTURE

In order to understand why the statue of Zhanggong-zushi commands such unparalleled devotion among Yangchun villagers, one must first understand the nature of folk religious relics in Chinese culture. Folk religion, popular beliefs, or shenism, is not regulated in Chinese law, but folk religious relics are subject to the laws protecting cultural relics. Folk religion has existed widely for a long history in China and is presumed to be the most predominant religion among Chinese. Chinese folk religion has combined with institutional religions such as Taoism and Buddhism to constitute the Chinese religious system. Although practices such as the worship of ancestors and local deities predate history, Chinese folk religion has over time incorporated elements of institutional religions. Similarly, Confucianism and Taoism have assimilated elements of Chinese folk religion. Elements of Buddhism, Taoism, ancient divination, and witchcraft are apparent in Chinese folk religion’s practices and rituals. ^{Footnote 4} The Yangchun village has also deified and enshrined a second god, known as Chenggong Zushi, but the original statue of Chenggong Zushi was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution in order to protect the statue of Zhanggong-zushi as a substitute. The fact that Zhanggong-zushi has survived so many campaigns to destroy diffused religion during the past millennium is regarded as a miracle.

Although, to a certain extent, Chinese religious practices and beliefs are pragmatic and practical to the point of sometimes being materialistic, worshiping Zhanggong-zushi is an integral part of the religious and cultural life of the Yangchun villagers. They recall the miracles of Zhanggong-zushi. Traditional rituals remain vital. During the Spring Festival, a celebrating deity parade is held so that all the villagers can welcome Zhanggong-zushi and other deities into their houses; each summer, villagers hold a ceremony at the Puzhao Temple to pray for a good harvest; and all Yangchun villagers return home each year to celebrate Zhanggong-zushi’s birthday at the temple. Typical of this process, Zhanggong-zushi was a Buddhist monk in his life, and the statue containing his mummified body is in the shape of a Buddha. However, unlike other Buddhist statues in other places in China, the statue of Zhanggong-zushi, when he was enshrined at the Puzhao Temple, features hair on the top of his head and he is fully clothed and wears a golden crown.

The worship of Zhanggong-zushi also typifies the worship of flesh body bodhisattvas in Chinese Buddhist culture. Chinese Buddhists worship two types of “sariras” (the remains from cremation of Buddha’s or a saint’s body). The first are pearl or crystal-like bead-shaped objects that are purportedly found among the cremated ashes of Buddhists; the second are called flesh-body bodhisattvas, Buddhist mummies, whole-body sariras, or living Buddhas, which are the corpses of Buddhist monks and nuns that have not decomposed. Although this peculiarly Chinese Buddhist worship of flesh-body bodhisattvas contradicts the fundamental Buddhist concept of impermanence, Buddhism has undergone a long process of localization in China since its arrival there from India. Traditional Buddhist teachings and practices have mixed with local Chinese culture to create a distinct Chinese Buddhist tradition.

The worship of flesh-body bodhisattvas is a distinctive feature of Buddhism’s localization in China. Although strongly advocated in traditional Buddhism, cremation runs counter to ancient Chinese funeral rituals and the early Taoist belief in the immortality of life and body. Cremation also runs counter to the Confucian doctrine of filial piety since it is held that the body, hair, and skin have all been received from the parents, and the idea that everyone shall take good care of his own body is the foundation of filial piety. The intactness of the body was regarded as sacred in pre-Qin Confucianism. Upon being introduced into China during the Han Dynasty, Buddhism gradually recognized and adopted such local Chinese ideas and elements. The worship of flesh-body bodhisattvas began in the Six Dynasties (222–589) and prevailed in the Tang Dynasty (618–907). ^{Footnote 5}

Chinese flesh-body bodhisattva worship serves a number of purposes. Such worship commemorates eminent monks and heroes whose flesh bodies are considered emblematic of their superior spiritual achievement. The worship of flesh-body bodhisattvas goes beyond the adoration of sacred relics in Western religions in so far as it embodies Chinese ancestral veneration. Showing respect to one’s ancestors is a well-known aspect of filial piety and is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. Worshiping flesh-body bodhisattvas also involves praying for blessings. The principle of dukkha, meaning suffering or unsatisfactoriness, is one of the most important Buddhist concepts. The Buddha is reputed to have said: “I have taught one thing and one thing only, dukkha and the cessation of dukkha.” Flesh-body bodhisattvas are believed to have extraordinary powers that can bring blessings to devotees, which will allow them to transcend the dukkha of painful experience. In addition, flesh-body bodhisattvas are sacred relics in Chinese Buddhism, embodying and attesting to the transmission of the teachings of the Buddha from one generation to the next. Finally, the souls of flesh-body bodhisattvas are believed to persist inside the mummy, and they are worshiped as fully conscious agents capable of bestowing favors and providing guidance as they communicate and interact with their devotees. ^{Footnote 6}

Acknowledging and giving thanks for people’s good deeds is highly praised in Fujian culture. It is said that Zhanggong-zushi was a skilled doctor who healed many patients and saved the villagers from an outbreak of the plague. Due to the village’s remoteness, it was difficult to get medical assistance, and doctors were highly esteemed by the villagers. Because he saved their ancestors, generations of the Yangchun villagers have revered Zhanggong-zushi. Because the villagers consider Zhanggong-zushi to be their benefactor, they consider themselves obligated to return the favor that Zhanggong-zushi conferred upon their ancestors. And the worship of Zhanggong-zushi is more than ordinary ancestor worship in so far as Zhanggong-zushi’s body’s resistance to decay has been deemed a miracle. As a result, Zhanggong-zushi is worshiped by the villagers as their god.

TREATMENT OF HUMAN REMAINS

Since the statue of Zhanggong-zushi contains a mummified human body, the claim for the restitution of the statue is reminiscent of claims for the return of the Mokomokai, the preserved heads of the Maori, the Indigenous people of New Zealand, because both cases concern the treatment of human remains. Since the 1980s, New Zealand has officially requested the return of the Maori heads that are held in museums and private collections around the world. Among these cases of Maori heads, the case of the return of a Maori head from the collection of the Rouen Museum to New Zealand is worthy of attention, as it has signaled a sea change in the attitudes to the repatriation of human remains held in French museums. ^{Footnote 7}

In this case, the Maori head entered into the city of Rouen’s museum collection in 1875 and was displayed as an exotic curiosity. For Europeans, the head exemplified an ethnographic interest, even an artistic one, while Maori Aboriginals believe their ancestors’ remains should be respected in their home area without being disturbed. On 19 October 2007, the municipality of Rouen voted to adopt a resolution authorizing the return of the head to New Zealand. ^{Footnote 8} However, the French minister of culture was publicly opposed to the return, and a petition was filed to the administrative tribunal of the city of Rouen for summary judgment to halt the execution of the city council’s resolution. The opposition referred to two sections of the French Heritage Code, which provides that “the collections of the museums of France are inviolable (Article L 451-3)” and that “goods constituting collections of the museums of France, and belonging to a legal person, are in the public domain and are hence inalienable. Any decision to declassify such goods cannot be made without the assent of a scientific body (Article L 451-5).” Thus, they argued that the head was a chattel in the public domain and needed to be declassified by the National Scientific Commission before its return. ^{Footnote 9} However, according to the city of Rouen, the declassification proceedings were unnecessary because the head was not a part of the museum collection or public domain. The municipal council’s resolution specified that “regarding human remains, Article 16-1 of the Civil Code, enacted pursuant to the Bioethics Bill of July 29, 1994, as modified, stipulates that they cannot be objects of proprietary rights: so the principle of inalienability of public collections cannot be applied to them.” ^{Footnote 10} However, the resolution was overruled by the summary court. In the decision, the judge stated that the human remains that constitute the Maori head were not within the scope of application of the foregoing sections of Article 16-1 of the Civil Code, subject to provisions of the Heritage Code; instead it was subject to the provisions of the Heritage Code. The return of the head required a declassification following the assent of the National Scientific Commission of Museum Collections of France. ^{Footnote 11}

From the foregoing debate on the applicable law of the Maori head, we can see that the legal nature of human remains is a controversial issue. On the one hand, whether human remains can be of property interest is an issue provided in civil law. According to Jie Huang, in both the common law and civil law systems, the law on dead human bodies generally outlaws the sale of dead corpses and a person cannot own somebody else’s corpse even if he or she is a bona fide purchaser. ^{Footnote 12} On the other hand, some human remains are treated as cultural objects, which are subject to laws on cultural property. In addition, the legal trade of cultural property is allowed in almost all countries. In the concurrence of civil law and cultural property law in this particular case, the French judge deemed that the Maori head was subject to French cultural property law.

In Dutch civil law, the question whether or not human remains can be an asset is also difficult to answer. It has been written by the Dutch lawyer L.P.W. van Vliet that

So under Dutch law, the Zhanggong-zushi statue, which is a mummy, can be seen as an asset more easily than human remains themselves, and the trade of the statue, as a result, has been treated probably as the trade of a chattel.

In China, a dead body shall not be disposed as a commodity for profit. In special situations, a state may take appropriate measures to dispose of a dead body, but such disposition shall consider the decedent’s will and the heirs’ feelings and should comply with public interests and humanitarianism. ^{Footnote 14} Nevertheless, historic human remains discovered in ancient tombs or enshrined in religious sites are protected as cultural relics, while the Cultural Relics Protection Law of China does not distinguish human remains from other kinds of cultural relics. ^{Footnote 15}

In the last two decades, some laws have been developed to regulate the treatment of human remains. In France, in order to expedite the many red tape issues around the repatriation of human remains, two Rouen senators proposed a new bill that would allow the repatriation of the Maori heads from France, and it was passed by the French government on 5 May 2010. It signals a sea change in the attitude toward the repatriation of human remains in French museums. On 9 May 2011, the Maori head from the Rouen Museum was handed back to New Zealand, which was the first repatriation of Maori human remains from France. ^{Footnote 16}

The International Council on Museums’s 2006 Code of Ethics for Museums defines human remains and sacred significance as “sensitive materials,” and it requires that the acquisition, research on, and exhibition of such sensitive materials shall be “accomplished in a manner consistent with professional standards and take into account the interests and beliefs of the community, ethnic or religious groups from whom the objects originated.” ^{Footnote 17} In the United States, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act was adopted in 1990, which requires federal agencies and institutions that receive federal funding to return Native American “cultural items” to lineal descendants and culturally affiliated Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations. ^{Footnote 18} In the United Kingdom, the Department for Media, Culture and Sport has produced non-statutory guidance on the implementation of the provisions of the Human Tissue Act 2001 relating to the return of human remains. The aim of the guidance is to

In the Netherlands, the Dutch government has not yet developed any legislation concerning the collection, exhibition, or repatriation of human remains. ^{Footnote 20} In 2005, the Ethnographic Museum of Leiden returned a Maori head to New Zealand, which signals the first official restitution of human remains in the Netherlands. ^{Footnote 21} Since museums have been increasingly confronted with these complex issues, the Ethical Committee of the Netherlands Museums Association adopted the Code of Ethics on Collecting and Exhibiting Human Remains, a guideline for all associated Dutch museums in 2007. ^{Footnote 22} In principle, human remains may only be exhibited for educational, scientific, or research purposes. In 2009, a restitution claim of six human skulls of Urk from the collection of the University Museum of Utrecht was presented to the Ethical Committee of the Netherlands Museums Association. In the verdict, the Ethical Committee advised the University Museum to return the skulls to the people of Urk, thereby acknowledging the important role of humans as the performative embodiment of local culture and religion. On 5 June 2010, the Urker skulls were officially returned to the people of Urk. ^{Footnote 23} The return of the Urker skulls reflects that the Dutch museum’s adherence to the Code of Ethics and demonstrates that it is in favor of the restitution of human remains if such human remains are of cultural or religious importance for a cultural group.

In the case of the Zhanggong-zushi statue, Van Overeem is a private person, not a museum, and the Code of Ethics for associated Dutch museums is not binding on him. In addition, to the extent that no international convention respecting cultural property applies to this case, the dispute has been characterized simply as being a dispute over the ownership of an object by a Dutch court. ^{Footnote 24}

THE GOD’S DIFFICULT JOURNEY BACK TO THE VILLAGERS

If the claim for the return of Zhanggong-zushi is characterized as simply being a dispute over the ownership of an asset, the rules regarding good faith acquisition and statutes of limitation will come into play. Chinese civil law has not yet established a rule whether stolen goods are subject to good faith acquisition. ^{Footnote 25} In China, the original owners of stolen goods mainly recover their goods from the judicial organs. For example, if an object is stolen from an original owner and then sold to a third person, the police or courts will restore the object to the original owner when the case is solved, even if the third person has acted in good faith. If the original owner cannot be found, the goods will be delivered to the national coffers. ^{Footnote 26} Even though this practice has been criticized, there is no rule protecting the interest of the bona fide purchaser of stolen goods in China. In addition, cultural relics are limited merchantable goods provided by Chinese law, the circulation of which is subject to administrative law. ^{Footnote 27} The flow of cultural relics is subject to the Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics and other administrative regulations. ^{Footnote 28} As a general rule, only privately owned cultural relics are subject to trade, and the exportation of all cultural relics has to be authorized by the Chinese custom authority. If Van Overeem were a Chinese citizen and the statue of Zhanggong-zushi was situated in China, it is clear that the villagers would get the statue back to the temple by resorting to the Chinese police. However, this case involves foreign elements since the defendant is a Dutch citizen and the subject matter is situated in the Netherlands. In accord with Chinese conflict of law, this is a foreign-related civil case.

Property rights are protected in the law of torts and property law in China. Article 2 of the Tort Law provides that infringement upon the rights to ownership is subject to tort liability, and Article 15 specifies the methods of assuming tort liability, include the return of property. ^{Footnote 29} Meanwhile, Article 34 of the Property Law stipulates: “As for the untitled possession of a real property or movable property, the right holder may petition for returning the original object.” ^{Footnote 30} In view of the lack of a unified Civil Code when the lawsuit was filed, claims for the restitution of stolen property can be based on tort liability or rights in rem in China, and the claimant who is aiming to recover property can choose to file a lawsuit pursuant to the law of torts or property law. If the claimant chooses to sue the defendant pursuant to tort liability, he has to demonstrate that the loss was caused by the negligence of the defendant according the Chinese laws of tort, while there is no such requirement in property law. ^{Footnote 31}

Tort liability is governed by the law of the place of tortious act. In this case, the lawyers opted to sue the defendant pursuant to the law of torts for the restitution of the statue of Zhanggong-zushi, which has been accepted by the Sanming Intermediate People’s Court. It is not known why the lawyers filed the suit under tort law, but it has been reported that the lawsuit in China was meant to interrupt the limitation of action. The last day that the Chinese court can protect the rights to restitution of the statue of Zhanggong-zushi is 16 December 2015; otherwise, the claim will have lapsed the maximum 20-year limitation period in Chinese law. ^{Footnote 32}

Even though the Chinese court, in all probablity, will rule in favor of the claimant, according to Chinese law, it is highly likely that the judgment as such will not be enforced in the Netherlands due to the jurisdictional issue. Under Chinese law, a court has jurisdiction if the tortious act occurs in the place where the court is located. However, under Article 431 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), a foreign judgment shall not be enforced within the territory of the Netherlands in the absence of a treaty or a statutory provision. ^{Footnote 33} Thus, if no treaty applies, the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not possible in the Netherlands, and the case will have to be adjudicated again by the competent Dutch court. ^{Footnote 34} As explained by Dutch lawyers, according to judgments in 1993 and 1995, the Supreme Court considerably narrowed the scope of Article 431 of the CCP. At present, in cases in which no treaty applies, the Dutch courts in general do not recognize a foreign forum as the forum non conveniens, the procedural rights of the defendant are safeguarded in the procedure, and the judgment does not violate public order. ^{Footnote 35} In this case, neither bilateral nor multilateral treaties concerning the enforcement of foreign civil judgments exist between China and the Netherlands. With respect to foreign judgments that are not subject to a treaty in the Netherlands, one of the conditions that must be met is that the judgment is rendered by a convenient forum. Whether the Chinese court will be accepted in the Netherlands as a convenient court is one of the issues since the plaintiff has sued in a Chinese court.

Under Dutch law, a foreign court can be considered a convenient forum according to internationally acceptable standards. Generally acceptable are the forum contractually agreed to by the parties, the forum of rei sitae (in matters relative to real estate), the forum loci delicti (in matters relative to tort), and the forum of a subsidiary or branch. ^{Footnote 36} As discussed above, Chinese courts have jurisdiction to tort claims if the tortious act takes place in China and if the stolen property is based on tort liability pursuant to Chinese law. In the case of the statue of Zhanggong-zushi, the Sanming Intermediate Court is deemed the forum of loci delicti under Chinese law. It appears that the Sanming Intermediate Court would be accepted as a convenient court since the forum loci delicti is an internationally acceptable standard in consideration of convenient forum in the Netherlands. If so, the judgment rendered by the Chinese court will be enforced in the Netherlands if the other conditions are also met.

Indeed, excluding an owner from his property constitutes an infringement upon his property rights. When a person seeks to recover an asset held by another, the matter is prima facie within either the law of torts or the law of property. In classical Roman law, a claimant could go into court and simply assert his ownership of the goods in question: “That cow, Buttercup, is mine!” Such an assertion was called vindicatio, a purely proprietary claim. ^{Footnote 37} Dutch law protects property rights pursuant to property law, and revindication is the principal action for the owner and other title holders against infringement. ^{Footnote 38} Alternatively, there is no equivalent of vindicatio in English common law, and English law protects property rights pursuant to the law of torts rather than property law. ^{Footnote 39} Nevertheless, the fact that a restitution claim can be based on property law and tort law in China overshadows the jurisdiction and the application of law in this case. If the Dutch court characterizes the dispute over the ownership of the statue of Zhanggong-zushi as a property dispute, the Chinese court may not be accepted as a convenient court because the plaintiff is normally expected to sue the defendant in the country where the defendant is domiciled.

If so, the decision made by the Chinese court would not be enforced in the Netherlands. That is probably why the lawyers have also filed a lawsuit in the Netherlands for the restitution of the statue. In general, civil law systems favor good faith possessors insofar as a bona fide purchaser may obtain valid title even from a thief. If the villagers sue him in the Dutch court, whether Van Overeem acquired the statue in good faith and whether the case has been barred by a statute of limitation would be examined. If Van Overeem can establish that he had acquired the statue in good faith or as a result of the application of a statute of limitation, the Dutch court will rule against the villagers.

CONSIDERATION OF RELIGIOUS VALUE IN A PROPERTY DISPUTE

This case also brings into stark relief the now decades long controversy surrounding the question of the ownership of cultural objects. “Culture” embodies group-oriented notions of value, while “property” focuses on the individual’s right to possess objects. If a judge rules that Van Overeem acquired the good title to the statue through a good faith acquisition or as a result of the application of a statute of limitation, the villagers will lose their god forever. Instead, their god will likely continue to be placed on display in museums, labeled as “a mummy from Fujian.” Their god will be stared at by museum visitors rather than worshiped on the altar at the Puzhao Temple, his holy home. According to the villagers of Yangchun, sacrifices should be made to worship Zhanggong-zushi rather than an admission being charged. Staring directly at Zhanggong-zushi should be prohibited as a sacrilege. However, such cultural or religious concerns are not regarded as being germane to a civil dispute over the ownership of objects. Such disputes are litigated over the manner the object was acquired, the passage of time, and the choice and application of law. Positive law frowns upon the restitution of cultural objects that were removed long ago.

Although no civil court has ever treated a dispute concerning the allocation of cultural objects as raising issues surrounding an infringement of religious rights, consideration has been shown to the cultural/religious significance by the courts. The case Bumper Development Corporation, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Police for the Metrolopis, et al., which concerns how to treat cultural significance in disputes over cultural property merits attention. In this case, a twelfth-century bronze Nataraja (a sculpture of Shiva dancing) was ordered returned to its Indian claimants. ^{Footnote 40} In 1976, this object was found by a landless Indian laborer at the site of a ruined Hindu temple. The temple in the state of Tamil Nadu had lain in a ruinous state, and no one had worshipped there for centuries, but one of its surviving relics was recognized to be an object of religious worship known as a sivalingam. The bronze Nataraja was eventually acquired by the Bumper Development Corporation in good faith in 1982. The title of Nataraja was one of the main issues tried by the judge—that is, whether any of the “claimants” had a superior title to the Nataraja than Bumper. There were five claimants in this case: the union of India, the state of Tamil Nadu, the Thiru Sadagapan who claimed to be the fit person of the temple on his behalf, the temple itself suing through Sadagapan, and Sivalingam, who was added as the fifth claimant at a late stage of the trial.

In the judgment, the judge decided that the temple, who was suing as its “fit person,” had a valid title and superior title to the Nataraja compared to that enjoyed by Bumper. Bumper appealed the findings of the judge, and the Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s decision. The court held that, in accordance with the demands of justice, the ruined temple was accepted as a party to the proceedings and, as such, was entitled to sue for the recovery of the Nataraja in the English court. In using the principles of comity, justice, and public policy, the court ruled in favor of the claimants. Public policy played a significant role in the decision:

As Sandy Ghandhi and Jennifer James note, the reasoning behind the decision and resort to the principles of comity and the criterion of public policy will ensure a wider application of this decision, and, thus, it is a most welcome development for the international protection of cultural property. ^{Footnote 42}

Even if the court rules in favor of the villagers, if Van Overeem fails to establish that he acquired the statue as a bona fide purchaser for value and if the villagers’ claim has not been barred by the passage of time, this case highlights the need for the courts to consider religious and cultural elements in disputes involving cultural objects. For anyone other than the Yangchun villagers, it makes no difference whether the statue is reverently ensconced in the Puzhao Temple or owned and loaned out for display from time to time by a Dutch collector. Some non-Yangchun would even argue that a collector such as Van Overeem may be better able to better preserve and study the statue. Many view folk religious beliefs as nothing more than quaint superstition and question its very legitimacy. The terrifically unaffordable sales price requested by Van Overeem is the polar opposite of the religiously motivated Yangchun villagers’ plea for the return of their god. For Van Overeem, the controversy simply involves money. For the villagers, the controversy involves the most deeply felt religiosity.

As John Lagerwey, a scholar of Chinese religion, points out, regardless of whether it is scientific, Chinese folk religion provides psychological benefits of worship and systematically preserves and transmits accumulated wisdom. In fact, in the Chinese folk region, the faithful must locate themselves within a specific spatial system; they must be modest and prudent because the gods are watching. In a sense, fear of the gods becomes a kind of wisdom. For example, some villagers have explained they do not dare lie to Zhanggong-zushi. Unless we understand the religious meaning of the statue of Zhanggong-zushi as it functions within its cultural and religious surroundings, we cannot begin to comprehend the under-funded villagers’ perseverance in pursuing their unlikely claim against Van Overeem. However, although it is highly valued by groups such as the Yangchun villagers and has been the key motivation in some instances where restitution has been accomplished, the importance to date of “culture” or “religion” has not been recognized as an independent, persuasive theory in cases concerning the restitution of cultural objects. Thus, the difficulties confronting the Yangchun villagers in their attempts to bring the statue of Zhanggong-zushi back to its altar in their village demonstrates the insufficient legal protection afforded to cultural groups and their spiritual and religious beliefs. In the real world, the power of a Chinese folk religion’s god is minimal when confronted by the power of the laws and judiciaries of foreign nations. If their case goes against the Yangchun villagers, the statue of Zhanggong-zushi will remain under the control of Van Overeem, and Zhanggong-zushi’s religious function will continue to be frustrated. Being separated from their god Zhanggong-zushi is spiritual torture for the Yangchun villagers. Will a court of law in a modern, Western nation ever display any meaningful deference for the spiritual beliefs and cultural traditions of a small group of people living in a remote part of a faraway, foreign, Eastern country? Will the god win this time?