I. INTRODUCTION
It was at the beginning of the 1960s that the economics of education emerged as a field of inquiry in its own right and became institutionalized. In recent years, several articles concerned with the history of thought have related this process of institutionalization (cf. Teixeira Reference Teixeira2000, Reference Teixeira2005; De Meulemeester Reference De Meulemeester2007; and De Meulemeester and Diebolt Reference De Meulemeester and Diebolt2004). Footnote 1 As is noted in these articles, questions of education were not in the past entirely absent from economists’ writings. In William Petty’s work, for example, there is an attempt to measure the value of the lives of soldiers killed in battle, while studies by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Alfred Marshall, among others, investigate the externalities of education, its funding, and the influence of education and training on wages.
However, it was not until the period following the Second World War and the emergence of human capital theory that a decisive turning point was reached in establishing a field of economic analysis specifically dedicated to education. According to the historians of thought listed above, there are a number of reasons for this. While economists had long tended to consider the demand for post-compulsory education as a demand for a consumption good (Blaug Reference Blaug1976) and, ultimately, to be less concerned with the effects of education on the labor market, other factors exerted a positive influence: in particular, the intellectual context of the period. After all, this postwar period saw a revival of interest in theories of economic development, in which education was seen as a means of breaking free from underdevelopment, and the development of theories of growth that highlighted the existence of a residual for which the quality of the labor supply (i.e., education) was a possible explanation (De Meulemeester Reference De Meulemeester2007). The methodological individualism advocated by Milton Friedman, along with the shift towards formalism in the 1950s, also paved the way for the acceptance of human capital theory at the same time as it contributed to the development of that formalism. Similarly, the affirmation of economists’ belief in the virtues of the market (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan and Rutherford1998) was undoubtedly another favorable factor. Finally, the availability of statistical data meant that econometric techniques could be used to test the hypotheses formulated on the basis of theory. And beyond the economics profession itself, the postwar period was dominated by Keynesian thinking and acceptance of the notion that the state could intervene financially, particularly through expenditure on education. Against this background, human capital theory, with its concept of rate of return, emerged as a favored tool for determining funding decisions.
Nevertheless, the increasing importance that was initially attached to human capital theory did not go unchallenged (see, for example, Blaug Reference Blaug1985; Teixeira Reference Teixeira2000). The challenge came in the first instance from the dominant school of thought, what is generally known as “signaling” (Spence Reference Spence1973) or “filter” (Arrow Reference Arrow1973) theory, which qualifies or calls into question a key idea in human capital theory: namely, that the product of education is an increase in individuals’ productivity. However, further challenges very quickly came from studies based on different paradigms, notably those produced by the radical economists. It is this critique that we seek to document here.
This critique of human capital theory was part of a wider tendency that, in conjunction with the social and political agitation the USA went through in the 1960s, saw the emergence of a radical approach to economics. In this approach, the neoclassical economists of the time were criticized for their inability to account for the difficulties of the period, such as the destruction of the environment and inequalities in wealth and racism and sexism (Edwards and MacEwan Reference Edwards and MacEwan1970; Lee Reference Lee2004), as some of the economists targeted did in fact acknowledge (Lindbeck Reference Lindbeck1972).
In the field of the economics of education, the radical economists took a very similar line in their critique of human capital theory. For them, human capital theory was incapable of truly capturing the role that education institutions played in the functioning of the economy. Consequently, a new theory of the education system had to be developed. It had to be positioned on the same terrain as the contested theory: that is, it had to ask the same questions and use the same tools. From this point of view, the work of the radical economists was certainly part of the debates that helped to shape the economics of education as a field of inquiry in the 1960s.
Our efforts to understand the nature of the radical critique that was emerging at the time and that gave rise to publications in the most prestigious academic journals, such as the American Economic Review, the Journal of Human Resources, or the Journal of Political Economy, will be divided into three sections. In the first section, we will examine the radical economists’ analysis of the employment relationship, since the characteristics of this relationship were to shape their analysis of the role of the education system. In the next section, we will outline their analysis of the role of educational institutions, focusing more particularly on the work of Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and Richard Edwards, who are probably the ones who made the greatest contributions to the development of a radical approach in this field. In the final section, we will reconsider the radical economists’ aim of developing an alternative to human capital theory.
Thus, our aim is not to relocate the radical analysis of education within a more extensive history of ideas in order, for example, to discuss differences from, or correspondences with, classical economics. Neither is it to investigate possible and no doubt important links with the sociology of education. Footnote 2 And finally, we are not seeking to discuss, from an econometric point of view, the relevance and limitations of the applied economic studies carried out by the radical economists, as has been done in the case of human capital theory, for example (cf. Rosen Reference Rosen and Ehrenberg1977; Willis Reference Willis, Ashenfelter and Layard1986). Each such undertaking would require its own dedicated article.
As far as methodology is concerned, the following choices were made. First, we decided to focus on the work of the radical economists from the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s. The 1980s marked a break within the radical school (Reich Reference Reich1993; Tinel Reference Tinel2004), even though the origins of that break probably go further back in time (Mata Reference Mata2009). This choice of time period enables us to deal with a relatively coherent set of analyses. Second, while a number of articles by the radical economists drew on the history of economic and social phenomena, which was one aspect of their originality (Blaug Reference Blaug and William Coats1983, p. 229), we decided to focus primarily on the logical organization of their argument, without engaging systematically with the history as such. Finally, we chose to concentrate on the work of the ‘founding fathers’ and to disregard analyses that claim to be affiliated with, or to have been influenced by, them.
II. THE RADICAL ECONOMISTS’ ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The field of labor economics is undoubtedly the one in which the radical economists’ critique was taken furthest (Spencer Reference Spencer2000). The central notion around which their argument is structured, and which explicitly draws on Marxist analysis and terminology, is that of conflict (Rubitzer Reference Rebitzer1993; Klein Reference Klein1992), which has its origins in the very nature of labor, which cannot be regarded as a commodity. Labor is, after all, embodied in the person of the worker, who can decide whether or not to become involved, or, to put it in more modern terms, whether or not to make an effort. Consequently, employers have to be “able to compel the worker to act in a manner that he or she otherwise would not choose” (Bowles Reference Bowles1985, p. 19), their objective being “to extract more labor from the worker than is embodied in the value of labor-power (the wage)” (Gintis Reference Gintis1976, p. 37).
However, this conflict does not arise out of the diverging interests of individual employees and their employer, as is assumed in mainstream economics, with its concepts of informational asymmetry and incentives to exert effort. For the radical economists, this conflict between individuals (employee and employer) is above all an expression of class conflict, in this case between workers and their employers, who own the means of production.
From this starting point, the radicals’ analysis was to develop around three main themes, which are not of course independent of each other (Bowles Reference Bowles1985). The first is work organization; the second, labor force segmentation; and the third, work discipline and on-the-job effort. We will examine these three themes in succession before going on to outline the links between them and education.
According to the radical economists, work organization and the different forms it has taken in the course of history do not depend, or at least not solely, on technical considerations. More than anything else, work organization reflects the conflicts of interest that exist between the employer and employee classes, with the former seeking to establish their control over the latter. In this sense, production should be seen “as a social as well as technical process” (Bowles and Gintis Reference Bowles and Gintis1975, p. 75). It is from this perspective that Stephen Marglin (Reference Marglin1974), in an influential article (Tinel Reference Tinel2004), analyses the “putting-out system.” This is a form of work organization in which workers, who are provided with raw materials, are given the task of producing, in their own homes, finished products that are then bought back from them (Tinel Reference Tinel2004). Marglin then seeks to show that, from a technical point of view, capitalists are not indispensable to the production process. Having pointed out the weakness of Adam Smith’s Footnote 3 argument based on specialization, he puts forward the idea that this form of work organization had its origins largely in capitalists’ desire to interpose themselves between workers and the market in order to extract profit from them. If workers had been able to combine the various tasks and produce the entire product themselves, they would have been able to sell it and take the profit for themselves. Consequently, argues Marglin, “Separating the tasks assigned to each workman was the sole means by which the capitalist could, in the days preceding costly machinery, ensure that he would remain essential to the production process as integrator of these separate operations into a product for which a wide market existed” (1974, p. 70). Nevertheless, the putting-out system came up against its limits, largely because workers continued to determine the hours they worked and the intensity of their effort. Capitalists were therefore obliged to develop another form of work organization in order to strengthen their control over their employees.
This interpretative framework, which emphasizes the importance of the conflicts between capitalists and workers, was also to be used to analyze more recent forms of work organization. Edwards (Reference Edwards1978), for example, was to draw on it in order to account for the emergence, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, of a form of work organization in which employers exerted control through technology. According to Edwards, this form of work organization was a response to the limitations of the paternalistic form of work organization that had prevailed previously and in which employers exerted control directly and in person. They intervened in the production process by specifying the tasks that each worker had to carry out, and evaluated, recompensed, or penalized them as they saw fit. This form of direct control became difficult to maintain as firms became more concentrated and increased in size. Their response was to create ever more layers of management and recruit ever more managerial and supervisory staff in order to exert control over workers. However, the interests of the supervisory staff (general foremen, supervisors, superintendents) came into conflict with those of the capitalists who employed them and those of the employees in the lower echelons of the hierarchy whom they were supposed to be controlling. It was these contradictions that led capitalists to put in place a system of control based on machines and technology, what Edwards calls “technical control.” He gives numerous examples of production systems in which the tasks to be performed and the work rate are dictated by machines and their execution speed. With this type of work organization, “the actual power to control is thus vested in the line itself rather in the person of the foreman, and the power relations are made more invisible” (Edwards Reference Edwards1978, p. 117). However, the conflicts did not disappear for all that. After all, technical control went hand in hand with the recruitment of extremely low-skilled workers who were easily interchangeable. This interchangeability was a threat to employees, since the most recalcitrant of them could be dismissed and easily replaced. On the other hand, workers were much more closely linked to each other through the technical equipment. Consequently, it was easy for them to bring the production line to a standstill. Moreover, their low skill levels meant they constituted a more homogeneous and therefore more solidaristic workforce. It was in an attempt to overcome these limitations that the bureaucratic control system was put in place. In this system, production was organized on the basis of rules and procedures that were specific to the firm and institutionalized hierarchical power. These rules and procedures defined and described the work that each employee had to do and also specified the rewards to be given for adequate performance and the penalties to be imposed in the opposite case. They also laid down the conditions under which workers could be dismissed and defined a series of jobs and hierarchical levels to which individuals could be promoted. Thus, “each job appeared more unique and individualized by its particular position in the finely graded hierarchical order, by the job criteria which specified work activities,” as a result of which “[i]ncreasingly the individual worker came to face an impersonal and massive organization more or less alone” (Edwards Reference Edwards1978, p. 120).
Over and above these examples, the idea that class conflict is at the heart of the history and hence of the evolution of the various forms of work organization is fundamental to any attempt to understand the radical economists’ analysis of the role of the education system. Indeed, it was these various forms of work organization that were to determine what are now fashionably known as the ‘competences’ that workers had to possess and through which the role and organization of the education and training system could in turn be explained. We shall return to this later.
The second theme arising out of the radical economists’ interpretation of the employment relationship is labor force segmentation. Footnote 4 It is also closely linked to their analysis of the education system. The notion of segmentation, as it appears in their writings, has to be understood in its broad sense. It applies to the external labor market but also to employees already in post: that is, to the internal labor market as well. In both cases, the purpose of segmentation is to heighten employers’ control over workers. For employers, there is after all a risk that employees might develop a shared social identity, voice solidarity with each other, and ultimately join forces (Gintis Reference Gintis1976, p. 48). This threat is characteristic of the technical control system, which, as has already been noted, used workers with low skill levels who therefore constituted a homogeneous workforce (Reich et al. Reference Reich, Gordon and Edwards1973; Edwards Reference Edwards1978).
In order to counter the rise of this ‘class consciousness’ and prevent the formation of alliances, employers would seek to “divide and conquer” (Wachtel Reference Wachtel1974). The use of female or immigrant labor, which enabled employers to exploit the antagonisms between different groups of workers, is an example of such a strategy. Footnote 5 Later, with the emergence of bureaucratic control, this would take the form of ‘job ladders’ that led some employees to be promoted on the basis of their qualifications or work experience while others remained at the starting level. From this point of view, labor force segmentation is not exogenous to the economic system (Reich et al. Reference Reich, Gordon and Edwards1973) but rather reflects, above all, the interests of employers. The same applies to discrimination, which means there is no a priori reason why it should disappear, contrary to the argument advanced during the same period by Gary Becker (Reference Becker1957). Footnote 6 Nevertheless, such segmentation, if it is perceived as unfair by employees, can help to strengthen their solidarity and consequently turn out to be counterproductive for employers. For this not to happen, segmentation must appear legitimate to employees (Gintis Reference Gintis1976), and the education system can be one of the ways in which such legitimacy is achieved.
The last theme emphasized by the radical economists is employee discipline and employee involvement in work. This theme is not unconnected with the previous two, since the choice of forms of work organization, on the one hand, and segmentation strategies, on the other, are also ways of obtaining that discipline and involvement. However, this question also appears in the radial economists’ analyses in two, mutually complementary forms. The first, drawing on a classic Marxist concept, is that of the ‘army of unemployed’ (Bowles Reference Bowles1985, p. 17), whose very existence is a threat to employees and thus serves to discipline them. The second concerns the role of the education system, and more specifically its influence on ‘preferences’ and ‘class consciousness’ (Wachtel Reference Wachtel1974). We will return to this question as well.
III. THE RADICALS’ ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF EDUCATION
One of the accusations the radical economists brought against mainstream economics was that it was unable to account for the problems of American society at the time, and this led them to attach particular importance to education.
They did so initially as teachers. Bowles offered the following explanation:
The first year I taught introductory economics, one of my students asked me something like this: in view of the fact that scientific knowledge is freely available and people’s biology is relatively similar around the world, why it is that some nations are so rich and others so poor? Another wanted to know whether this came about because ‘they’ were incompetent or because ‘we’ exploited ‘them’. I had no answer; my training in neoclassical economics had left me totally unprepared to address these questions … the chasm between the important issues of the day and what economists taught was simply too gaping for many of my generation to tolerate. I decided that I could not face my students unless I reeducated myself. (Arestis and Sawyer Reference Arestis and Sawyer2000, p. 73) Footnote 7
As a result, the radical economists sought to develop a different approach to the teaching of economics. It was for this purpose that radical economics textbooks were to be published and Bowles was to establish courses at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst that combined neoclassical, post-Keynesian, institutionalist, and Marxist approaches (Tinel Reference Tinel2004). At the same time, the radical economists also sought to promote courses that used different teaching methods and practices: for example, by questioning the role of grades or using ‘innovative’ teaching materials, such as films or poems (see, for example, Bramhall Reference Bramhall1975; Edwards and MacEwan Reference Edwards and MacEwan1970).
This desire to reform the teaching of economics was not motivated solely by pedagogical considerations. It was also linked to the role played by the education system in the organization of society, which, according to the radical economists, enabled employers to more firmly establish their control over their employees. Thus, reforming education was for them a means of thwarting this control and reducing the inequalities that flowed from it (Edwards and MacEwan Reference Edwards and MacEwan1970; Bowles Reference Bowles1974).
This analysis was to be developed principally by Bowles, Gintis, and, to a lesser extent, Edwards. It was an essential element in the internal coherence of radical thought, since it was closely linked to the analysis of the employment relationship already outlined above. However, it was also fundamental in that it lay at the heart of the debates that helped to shape and institutionalize the economics of education in the period following the Second World War. The aim of the radicals’ analysis of education was, after all, to develop an alternative to, and a critique of, human capital theory. Thus, we begin by outlining, in this section, their analysis of the economic role of education before going on to examine this critique in greater detail in the following section.
The radical economists’ argument was based on the idea that “the arena of class struggle has been extended to include the schools and colleges” (Bowles Reference Bowles1974, p. 101) and that consequently “the social relations of production are replicated in the schools” (Bowles Reference Bowles1978, p. 788). Developing this line of interpretation, the radical economists were to emphasize the role of the education system during the bureaucratic control phase, which, in the USA at least, tended to predominate at the time they were writing. They highlighted two essential functions fulfilled by education, over and above the transmission of knowledge in their strict definition of it: a socialization function, in this case preparation for the labor market, on the one hand, and a legitimation function, on the other. These two functions contributed to the reproduction of inequalities, in which children from modest family backgrounds were allocated to the lowest positions in the corporate hierarchy and hence in their turn occupied the same modest positions in the social hierarchy their parents had occupied. Let us examine these two functions in turn.
First, education prepares young people for the labor market by facilitating the segmentation of the labor force. The education system is indeed organized hierarchically by level of qualification, the nature of the teaching (more or less ‘vocationalized’ or technical), and even the reputation of individual schools (Bowles Reference Bowles1973). During the bureaucratic control phase, firms were organized in accordance with rules that segmented the workforce into various hierarchical levels whose purpose was to ‘divide and conquer.’ The educational hierarchy further reinforced the segmentation operated by firms by allocating individuals to the various levels of the hierarchy on the basis of qualifications (Bowles Reference Bowles1971).
However, the socialization of labor function also operates through the internal functioning of the education system. The rules that characterize bureaucratic control lay down a set of work criteria attached to each job, on the basis of which workers are evaluated by their hierarchical superior. However, it is difficult to specify precisely and completely in advance the work to be carried out. The rules are therefore necessarily incomplete. Consequently, the immediate supervisor has a certain degree of freedom to intervene directly. However, this also encourages firms to seek out employees with personal characteristics, which, although not directly productive, facilitate the employer’s task of maintaining control over them. Thus, at the bottom of the hierarchy, priority will be given to potential employees whose behavior is rule-oriented, since authority and control are mediated through rules, as well as to those likely to obey the spirit of the rules so that they are “transcend(ing) the particular rules to carry out the intent of the rules” (Edwards Reference Edwards1978, p. 58). For positions further up the hierarchy, employers will be looking for “loyalty” and “commitment,” qualities that, despite the need at this level for greater autonomy, will lead employees in these positions to identify with the firm by internalizing its objectives and values (Edwards Reference Edwards1976).
The education system produces such characteristics (or skills) through the way in which it functions. In class, pupils must respect the teacher’s authority. They also learn to accustom themselves to the existence of rules such as punctuality or discipline. Furthermore, for those children likely to occupy positions in the lowest echelons of the corporate hierarchy, autonomy and creativity are not qualities sought out and recognized by schools (Gintis Reference Gintis1971). On the other hand, for a pupil likely to fill the highest positions, behaviors characterized by self-confidence, initiative, and “authority over much of his own affairs” will be valued (Bowles Reference Bowles1974, p. 108) and demanded of them once they have been recruited.
Moreover, impersonal relations and a competitive spirit are also encouraged in both these types of organization (firms and schools), and the rewards for good effort go beyond mere personal satisfaction; they include promotion and pay rises for employees and, for pupils, a good report from teachers (Bowles Reference Bowles1971, p. 5; Gintis Reference Gintis1971, pp. 274–276). Thus, there is what the radical economists call a “principle of correspondence” between the functioning of a firm and that of the education system.
Nevertheless, this correspondence cannot be analyzed as a mere balance between labor supply and demand, and neither can it be a reflection of individuals’ capabilities and merits. For the radical economists, indeed, it was merely an expression of the education system’s role in reproducing social inequalities (Bowles, Gintis, and Meyer Reference Bowles, Gintis and Meyer1975, p. 233).
Several factors are at work in this reproduction process. The first is the differences in the financial resources available to schools in the USA; a lack of money means that schools in the poorest areas cannot afford to have low pupil–teacher ratios, which in turn explains the drive to instill obedience and discipline, which are also the qualities expected in the workplace. Neither can lessons be varied and thereby help to develop creativity. In the better-funded schools in the socially more advantaged areas, on the other hand, pupils are able to develop other qualities: namely, those required for the higher levels of the corporate hierarchy, such as independence, autonomy, and self-confidence. The second factor at work here is the way in which teachers, guidance counselors, and school administrators define what constitutes success for their pupils. After all, their attitudes are influenced by the social class to which the pupils belong: “Schools often encourage students to develop aspirations and expectations typical of their social class” (Bowles Reference Bowles1971, p. 24). The last factor is the educational ambitions that families nurture for their children, which will vary in intensity, depending on the families’ social position. Over and above such ambitions, the values families transmit to their children are also going to coincide with their social position and their place in the corporate hierarchy, which in turn will reinforce the influence of the education system: “working class parents value obedience, neatness, and honesty in their children, while higher status parents emphasize curiosity, self-control, and happiness” (Bowles Reference Bowles1973, p. 353).
Besides the socialization function—that is, the preparation for the labor market just mentioned—the radical economists also stressed the education system’s legitimation function. The idea here is that it is through the education system that individuals are persuaded that it is fair and natural—i.e., objective and inevitable—that they occupy different social positions and, in particular, lowly or more elevated positions in the corporate hierarchy, depending on whether or not they succeeded in the education system (Bowles, Gintis, and Meyer, Reference Bowles, Gintis and Meyer1975).
However, this legitimation is not recompense for the investment individuals make in their education. On the contrary, for the radical economists, this legitimation function lies at the heart of the conflicts of interest between the social classes. Indeed, since success or failure in the education system depends on an individual’s social class in accordance with the mechanisms described above, the purpose of the legitimation function is simply to gain acceptance for the social inequalities in education.
This process of acceptance depends on, among other things, the emphasis within the education system on values such as sacrifice and effort. It is also linked to the fact that young people spend a relatively long time in education, which tends to make the selection that takes place seem objective and fair. Finally, this acceptance is further reinforced by the endogenous nature of preferences (Gintis Reference Gintis1974). Families’ educational expectations and ambitions depend, after all, on their social class. However, as already noted, educational success is socially biased, to the disadvantage of the lower classes. Thus, this social bias in the functioning of the education system tends to reinforce families’ initial expectations and ambitions and thereby leads them to accept the inequalities.
Ultimately, the result of this dual socialization/legitimation function is that, under the guise of meritocracy, the education system reproduces social inequalities from generation to generation, thereby catering to the interests of employers.
Nevertheless, the economic role played by the education system is fragile. The very inequalities it helps to reproduce may push it to the limit. It is in this sense that there is a contradiction between accumulation and the reproduction of the social order (Bowles Reference Bowles1978; Carnoy Reference Carnoy1971). The protest movement that emerged on American campuses at the end of the 1960s illustrates this idea. After all, the development of mass higher education may have been a way of producing the skills required for economic growth. However, this response to economic needs was not to be allowed to interfere with the positions occupied by the economic elite educated in the most prestigious universities. Thus, the development of two-year colleges and post-secondary technical institutes, of lower quality, went hand in hand with that of mass higher education but, contrary to their expectations, did not enable the students who attended them to attain the positions they hoped for in the corporate hierarchy, against which they finally rebelled (Bowles Reference Bowles1974).
As we have just seen, the radical economists’ analysis of the economic role of education puts the emphasis on the social inequalities in access to education. The other forms of inequality in education, notably those linked to gender or to ethnicity, are not absent but analysis of them is less well developed. This is due, first, to the fact that the various forms of inequality are seen as cumulative (Glenn Reference Glenn1985). Second, and perhaps above all, it is due to the central role played by class conflict, which results in the other forms of conflict and inequality being underplayed (Folbre Reference Folbre2012).
Nevertheless, these other forms of inequality of access to education are included in the radical economists’ analysis of the historical dynamic of the education system and also underlie their analysis of the family.
After all, the radical economists did not limit their studies to the period of bureaucratic control referred to above, even though it predominates in their writings. This period is integrated into a broader historical analysis. From the point of view of the history of the American education system, therefore, the various forms of educational inequality, whether related to social class, gender, or ethnic origin, should be understood as the counterpart of employers’ wishes to incorporate (or exclude) particular categories of the population into the wage labor system. This applies, for example, to the development of public elementary and secondary education in the nineteenth century, which was a way “to integrate peasant labor, both immigrant and native, into the burgeoning corporate capitalist relations of production.” Similarly, “the recent period of education change and ferment … is a response to the integration of two major groups into the wage labor system: uprooted Southern blacks, and the once respectable ‘solid’ members of the pre-corporate capitalist community or the small business people, the independent professionals, and other white collar workers” (Bowles Reference Bowles1974, p. 104). Footnote 8
Furthermore, the family—as we have seen—plays a central role in social inequalities in access to education through the values it transmits and through family expectations. However, the family’s influence on the other forms of inequality of access to education, particularly that related to gender, is only implicit in Bowles’s and Gintis’s work. The fact that gender inequalities within the family were initially analyzed, at least by some of the radical economists, Footnote 9 as a consequence or ‘by-product’ of class conflict undoubtedly explains this characteristic of their early work. Nevertheless, in their later work, Bowles and Gintis (Reference Bowles and Gintis1986) did investigate the question of gender inequalities within the family. Taking up arguments previously advanced, for example, by Nancy Folbre (Reference Folbre1980) or Heidi Hartmann and Ann Markusen (Reference Hartmann and Markusen1980), they argue that conflicts and inequalities within the family should be conceptualized differently from class conflict. The family is said to have the ability to produce gender inequalities by itself, as it were. The explanation is a psychological one. It is linked to the role mothers play in the care and upbringing of children, which leads young people to develop different personalities depending on their gender and to reproduce the structure of the family in which they grow up. Mothers’ role in the upbringing of their children is reinforced by the difficulties women encounter in entering the labor market, which increase their economic dependency on men, and by public policies, which may be unfavorable to them (Folbre Reference Folbre1984). For all that, the link between the family’s ability ‘to endogenize preferences’ with respect to gender (McCrate Reference McCrate1988) and the subsequent educational trajectories of boys and girls was not explicitly made in the analyses of the period. The development of economic studies focused principally on questions of child raising within the family, on the one hand, and, on the other, a shift in Bowles’s and Gintis’s concerns, which led them to attach less importance to the education system, undoubtedly explain this situation.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY
The radical economists’ analysis of the role of the education system sought to account for inequalities in access to education (the trade-off for employers’ desire to control employees) and the consequent inequalities in social position. Broadly speaking, at least three major explanations can be advanced to explain these inequalities. In the first, social positions are regarded as a reflection of individual choices, mediated notably through their investment in education. This is the starting point for human capital theory. In the second, social positions are regarded as not having been chosen by individuals at all. Rather, they are explained by an individual’s inherent characteristics, particularly his or her genetic characteristics. This notion was the basis for what the radical economists called “IQism.” From this perspective, as Bowles and Valerie Nelson summarize it (Reference Bowles and Nelson1974, p. 39), “The poor are poor because they lack mental skills.” In the third and final explanation, social positions are not the result of individual choice, either. This time, however, genetic considerations play no role. Rather, social position depends on the mode of social organization, and in particular on the education system and its mode of functioning. This last explanation is that advanced by the radical economists. It implies that inequalities in social position are in no way ‘fair’ or ‘normal.’
While the radical economists certainly attempted to challenge IQism (Bowles Reference Bowles1973; Bowles and Nelson Reference Bowles and Nelson1974; Bowles, Gintis, and Meyer Reference Bowles, Gintis and Meyer1975), it was undoubtedly human capital theory that was their principal target. They acknowledged, first, that human capital theory had added to the complexity and richness of analysis of the labor supply and in that sense constituted an advance. In human capital theory, indeed, labor is regarded as a factor of production that is itself produced. Second, it is no longer regarded as homogeneous, and social institutions (such as education and the family) are reintroduced into the sphere of economic analysis (Bowles and Gintis Reference Bowles and Gintis1975). For all that, human capital theory is not, in their view, completely satisfactory, hence the desire to put forward an alternative theory. The radical economists’ critique was targeted at four main aspects of the theory: the definition of the concept of human capital, the failure to take account of interclass conflict, the refusal to consider the education system as a black box, and the stability of individual preferences.
The first aspect concerns not only the definition of the concept of human capital but also the returns to education. In human capital theory, these returns depend on the productive nature of education: i.e., on the fact that education increases individuals’ productivity through the acquisition of cognitive skills. The radical economists do not deny that this is so. However, they stress the idea that the education system also develops characteristics that are not directly productive; these behavior traits are sought after and rewarded by employers. As already noted, these may be, for workers in the lowest levels of the hierarchy, obedience, rule orientation, and respect for authority. These not-directly-productive characteristics were not initially taken into account in human capital theory. As Sherwin Rosen (Reference Rosen and Ehrenberg1977, p. 17) in fact acknowledged, these are a “different kind of human capital than crude notions of labor efficiency and skill that underlie most empirical work.”
These characteristics could be incorporated into a more broadly conceived concept of human capital, as Assar Lindbeck (Reference Lindbeck1972) or Mark Blaug (Reference Blaug1976) note. This applied, in a way, to empirical analyses based on human capital theory that incorporated explanatory variables such as gender, ethnic origin, or age (Edwards Reference Edwards1976). The radical economists’ critique of this more broadly conceived concept of human capital was somewhat different. They called into question the internal coherence of the approach adopted by human capital theorists, noting that the incorporation of these not-directly-productive characteristics should have given rise to a much more complex notion of the firm than that represented by the production function, which still had great resonance at that time (Tinel Reference Tinel2002). Thus, Edwards (Reference Edwards1976) noted that “when economists consider race, sex, and other ‘ascriptive’ characteristics, there is no place in the model for these characteristics per se to bear any direct or intrinsic relation to the actual process of production” (p. 52).
However, the radical economists’ critique is not solely conceptual and theoretical. Edwards (Reference Edwards1976), for example, drawing on surveys carried out in firms, notes that the behavior traits identified by theoretical analysis do indeed have a positive influence on wages and supervisors’ evaluations of workers’ performance. This use of empirical analysis is important, since it demonstrates the radical economists’ desire to inhabit the same territory and use the same tools as the human capital theorists.
The second criticism concerns the failure to take account of social class. This flows directly from the first one. According to the radical economists, after all, the nature of the not-directly-productive characteristics reflects the conflictive relations between social classes. To ignore them, as human capital theory does, is to absorb labor “into a concept of capital in no way enriched to handle labor’s special character” (Bowles and Gintis Reference Bowles and Gintis1975, p. 74). All individuals become capitalists. It is for this reason that human capital theory emerges as “the most recent, and perhaps ultimate, step in the elimination of class as a central economic concept” (Bowles and Gintis Reference Bowles and Gintis1975, p. 74). This undoubtedly explains why the radical economists’ critique focused on this last theory, rather than on other mainstream approaches to education that emerged at the same time, such as signaling theory (Spence Reference Spence1973) or filter theory (Arrow Reference Arrow1973).
This positioning of human capital theory stemmed from the fact that its research program was characterized “by ‘methodological individualism’, that is, the view that all social phenomena should be traced back to their foundation in individual behavior” (Blaug Reference Blaug1976, p. 830). It followed from this that, if individuals accumulated different amounts of human capital, it was because they had a rational interest in doing so. This did not mean that the influence of the family environment was denied (Rosen Reference Rosen and Ehrenberg1977, p. 9). It was of course taken into account. Nevertheless, the real nature of that influence remained vague, as Blaug (Reference Blaug1976, p. 843) notes:
whether measured in terms of income, occupation, or education, we can never be sure whether the reported measures of family background refer to pre-school investment, to later investments complementary with schooling, to post-school influences, or simply to certain attitudinal changes that provide children in certain homes with a set of self-fulfilling aspirations.
However, whatever interpretation might be offered, the influence exerted by the family environment is not analyzed in terms of interclass conflict. For the radical economists, on the other hand, it was this last unit of observation that should be adopted. This means that the different amounts of human capital that individuals accumulate, and the ensuing differences in earnings, reflect these class conflicts, mediated by the mechanisms described above, rather than the behavior of individuals acting in their own interests, even though they (and human capital theorists with them) believe they are conducting themselves freely (Teixeira Reference Teixeira2011, p. 682). Thus, Bowles (Reference Bowles1972), for example, presents some empirical findings that tend to show that the influence of education on earnings is somewhat limited and that variables indicative of social class have a greater impact. Consequently, education cannot be seen as “a powerful vehicle for the equalization of economic opportunity, the redistribution of income, and the elimination of poverty” (Bowles Reference Bowles1972, p. S219).
The third object of the radical economists’ critique is the status human capital theory attributes to the education system as an organization. In his 1964 book, Becker begins by analyzing firms’ investment in on-the-job training. However, his analysis does not specify the ‘production function’ of human capital, the way in which this training increases workers’ productivity. Becker then transposes his analysis of on-the-job training to the education system, noting that “a sharp distinction between schools and firms is not always necessary: for some purposes schools can be treated as a special kind of firm and students as a special kind of trainee” (p. 31). Once again, however, nothing is said about the production function of human capital, so that the education system, like the firm, remains a black box. The same observation applies to the work of the other main proponents of human capital theory. This is what leads Bowles (Reference Bowles and Hansen1970) to conclude, “The growing popular interest in education has been paralleled by the development of an immense literature on the role of human capital in economic growth and the distribution of income. And yet nobody really knows how education is produced” (p. 11).
On the other hand, the radical economists’ efforts to understand the production of education reflects a long-standing interest, particularly for Bowles, as his early writings show (cf., for example, Bowles and Levin Reference Bowles and Levin1968a and Reference Bowles and Levin1968b; Bowles Reference Bowles and Hansen1970). Footnote 10 This concern arose out of epistemological considerations that led the radical economists to advocate greater realism (Flaherty Reference Flaherty, Durlauf and Blume2008). However, it is also linked to their analysis of the firm and its organization. After all, to take the view, as the radicals did, that the production of goods and services depends not only on technical considerations but also on conflictive interclass relations (and that, consequently, firms recruiting in the labor market seek out workers with characteristics that are not directly productive) should lead to an understanding of how such characteristics are produced in the education system and constitute a point of entry into the ‘black box’ of the education system. Once again, this criticism was supported by empirical studies that attempted to show how the not-directly-productive characteristics sought by firms were also valued in the education system (Edwards Reference Edwards1977; Gintis Reference Gintis1971).
The final criticism concerned the nature of preferences. Human capital theorists regard preferences as exogenous and stable over time (Blaug Reference Blaug and William Coats1983). For the radical economists, on the other hand, they are endogenous and evolve over time, since they are constructed in the education system, as already noted, as well as in the workplace and the family (Gintis Reference Gintis1974; McCrate Reference McCrate and Samuels1996). However, since these institutions (firm, family, school) are influenced by interclass conflict, to regard preferences as fixed is to ignore these conflicts and their influence. This accounts for the radical economists’ desire to understand how this endogeneity functions by incorporating the internal functioning of firms and the education system into their analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Human capital theory was a key element in the establishment of a field of economic analysis specifically dedicated to education. From within the mainstream, it was challenged for a time by ‘rival’ theories (signaling and filter theories). However, challenges also came from competing paradigms. We have attempted in this paper to outline the critique of human capital theory developed by the radical economists in the 1970s. The nature of this critique seems to us to place it at the heart of the debates that helped to shape the economics of education as a field of inquiry in its own right.
Since the 1970s, the radical economists’ work on the economics of education seems to have attracted less attention. Thus, the recent histories of ideas that trace the emergence and institutionalization of the economics of education in the period following the Second World War, which we mentioned in the introduction, make virtually no mention of it. Blaug’s earlier analysis (Blaug Reference Blaug1985) is one exception. The same observation can be made of the history of ideas in labor economics, a field of inquiry that has close links with the economics of education. Footnote 11 For their part, those studies that have sought to put the ideas of the radical economists into historical perspective have also paid relatively little attention to their analysis of the role of education in the labor market (Rebitzer Reference Rebitzer1993; Spencer Reference Spencer2000; Tinel Reference Tinel2004), that of Elaine McCrate (Reference McCrate and Samuels1996) excepted. Recent issues of economic journals devoted to the economics of education Footnote 12 seem equally neglectful of the radical economists’ work, even though it could certainly have been used to illuminate certain topics.
Several factors may have contributed to this lack of interest, which also applies more broadly to radical thinking in general beyond the specific field of the economics of education. We can suggest a number of these factors, all of which of course merit further investigation and qualification.
The first concerns the existence of different paradigms and, within each paradigm, the hyperspecialization of research fields (Teixeira Reference Teixeira2011), which may lead to a lack of awareness or neglect of research conducted in another field or another paradigm. Second, the radical analysis of education may also have been considered very close to the sociology of education, which may have made it less attractive to economists. Third, there are the various influences to which the diffusion of ideas is not wholly immune (Dow Reference Dow2000). Thus, even though a number of the radical economists were educated in the most prestigious universities, notably Harvard, and even though their ideas were quickly taken seriously by part of the mainstream (Tinel Reference Tinel2004), they encountered difficulties in obtaining permanent positions in academia, which contributed to their marginalization (Mata Reference Mata2009, Reference Mata2010). The fact that at least part of the radical school ran out of steam was also probably a factor, as was the “incorporation” of another part into the mainstream (Flaherty Reference Flaherty, Durlauf and Blume2008; Reich Reference Reich1993). At the same time, mainstream economists have been active in this process of incorporation. Footnote 13 For example, the inclusion in studies by human capital theoreticians of what are called ‘soft skills’ (Heckman and Kautz Reference Hechman and Kautz2012) can be interpreted as a desire on the part of these economists to revive the notion of “not-directly-productive characteristics” that was emphasized by the radical economists. Similarly, the emphasis on historical contingencies that was so dear to the radical economists has been incorporated into the mainstream notion of path dependency (Reich Reference Reich1993).
