The theory of recognition as developed by Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor, and Nancy Fraser informs many current theoretical debates in political and social theory. The literature on how recognition theory could be applied to the different domains of social and political philosophy has mushroomed, since there are conflicting views over the meaning of the idea or concept of recognition. Furthermore, for some time now, there has been a resurgence of interest in the origins of the concept of recognition in the history of theological, moral, and political thought. A majority of political theorists identify Hegel as indisputably the most influential theorist of the strongly intersubjective conception of personhood associated with modern recognition theory. Yet, at the same time, several scholars have recently argued that earlier thinkers developed similar kinds of ideas and should therefore be credited with developing the idea of recognition before Hegel. For instance, this is the task of Axel Honneth's latest book Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European Ideas (Cambridge University Press, 2020). Tony Burns's ambitious and clearly written study, Social Institutions and the Politics of Recognition, volume 1, From the Ancient Greeks to the Reformation, is an important intervention in this ongoing debate. It is the first of a three-volume series focusing on what past authors have said about the institutional dimensions of the politics of recognition from antiquity to the present. The second volume, From the Reformation to the French Revolution (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), which continues the story told in the first volume, has also now appeared.
The book here under review organizes the historical narrative around the theoretical debate on the internal affairs of social institutions, as it manifests itself in different contexts and time periods. It covers the period from the ancient Greeks until the end of the sixteenth century and deals with a number of major thinkers and some minor ones in the history of Western political thought. Burns argues that an elaboration of internal micro-politics of social institutions in the history of political thought allows us to understand the various ways “social identities” are constructed through the struggle for recognition. He adopts a nonstatist understanding of politics in arguing that a more nuanced understanding about ethical relationships within social institutions will contribute not only to the history of political thought, but also to our present understanding of the politics of recognition. Instead of psychological dimensions of recognition, the book focuses on the various ways that social institutions (such as the division of labor and corporations) have been conceptualized as involving hierarchical social roles of superiors and their subordinates. In exploring how the struggle for recognition is tied to the struggle for and against authority, Burns maintains that most ancient and medieval authors have dealt with the relationship between the struggle for recognition and authority “uncritically,” and their approach has been “a conservative one” (15). In view of this evaluative statement, Burns could have then analyzed how hierarchical forms of social institutions enable the internalization of social norms; indeed, such norms provide the glue for societies and lead to pathologies within the self. Yet, Burn predominantly focuses on the emancipatory and democratic potential of the internal politics of social institutions. For instance, he points out that Roman Stoics developed a theory of recognition that was linked to the critique of hierarchical social institutions (107). He underlines that the ideas of limited government and delegated authority from below in the Catholic Church—within the Conciliar Movement in the late Middle Ages—points towards later democratic political thought (192). Moreover, he maintains that “the anarchist critique” of the hierarchical social institutions in the Radical Reformation in England points towards radical politics during the English Revolution (238).
Burns demonstrates a formidable knowledge of the relevant secondary literature and refers to an extensive number of original sources. Yet, he is reluctant to accept the view that concepts obtain their meaning only from their uses in their respective historical contexts. The central analytical concept of the study is a Hegelian understanding of “civil society” as the social space that stands midway between the family and the state. The book is also clearly inspired by Hegel's view of “corporations” which combine the particular interests of individuals through mutual recognition and provide the unity of civil society. The central premise of the book is that in the history of political thought there has always been a close association between institutional roles and social identity. Therefore, in order to understand Hegel's views about the politics of recognition correctly, “we must locate them squarely within this particular intellectual tradition, which runs continuously down from Plato to the present” (12). To apply the concepts of “civil society,” “corporations,” and “the struggle for recognition” (in the Hegelian sense of these words) to the various contexts of political thought in antiquity and the Middle Ages is historically a risky move.
Burns's interpretation of past authors through the lens of Hegel's terminology leads to several bold arguments. For instance, already Plato envisioned the domain of social life that exists between the family and a strictly political state (45), and Plato “is one of the first defenders of the principle of corporatism” (52). The “corporatist way of thinking about Athenian society” establishes a similarity between Aristotle's and Plato's social theories (55). Moreover, Burns argues that it is possible to apply the core analytical concepts of modern sociology and philosophy to the examination of premodern texts. For instance, he is interested in the views that seem to anticipate the theories of Emile Durkheim (106), Jean-Paul Sartre (103), and Ferdinand Tönnies (58). It is obvious that the history of political thought continues to mean many things. Many of the historians in this domain tend to stress that the awareness regarding historical difference should make us largely reluctant to draw strongly normative claims about past ideas. By contrast, Burns tends to read later theoretical discussions back onto the premodern thinkers and congratulate them on being ahead of their time. Rather than scrutinizing past ideas and concepts in their historical context, Burns's textual analysis is occasionally based on the problematic assumption of fixed concepts of historical analysis and on a teleology that assumes gradual improvement. Yet, interestingly, he argues that the material derived from the premodern history of political thought allows us to think about social relationships “in terms of a spectrum of possibilities” (248). This will help contemporary political theorists to think harder about institutional frameworks that cause social pathologies or provide the incentives for struggles against social injustices.
