1 Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) [Reference Baltag, Moss and Solecki5, Reference van Ditmarsch, Hoek, Kooi and van Der6] is a branch of logic that emerged in the late 1980s. It extends classical epistemic logic by modeling not only static states of knowledge but also the processes by which knowledge is revised. Today, the term DEL serves as an umbrella for a variety of extensions of epistemic logic equipped with dynamic operators. Among the simplest and historically most influential is the public announcement operator, which characterises one of the earliest and most studied forms of DEL: public announcement logic (PAL) [Reference Plaza14].
From both a Hilbert-style and a Kripke-semantic perspective, the different systems of DEL display strong and distinctive features. Their most striking originality, however, lies in their semantics. Unlike in classical epistemic logic, which is concerned with static sets of possible worlds, DEL focuses on transformations of these structures. After an announcement, for example, one typically moves from one model to another by altering the set of worlds or the accessibility relations between them.
The proof-theoretic side of DEL, and in particular PAL, presents a rather different picture. Several attempts have been made to develop effective proof systems for PAL. The first such attempt was the tableau method introduced in [Reference Balbiani, van Ditmarsch, Herzig and De Lima2, Reference Balbiani, van Ditmarsch, Herzig and de Lima3], where results on soundness, completeness, and complexity were established. Later, sequent calculi were proposed. In [Reference Nomura, Sano and Tojo13, Reference Wu, van Ditmarsch and Chen20], two distinct labelled Gentzen-style calculi are developed. In the former, the dynamics of announcements are represented by relational atoms, while in the latter, rules are introduced that simulate reduction axioms—reducing dynamic PAL-formulas into equivalent static ones. The first system admits a cut-elimination theorem, yielding a subformula property (modulo labels), whereas the second achieves only a weaker form of the subformula property. More recently, in [Reference Liu and Sano12], a non-labelled sequent calculus was proposed, again using reduction-style rules akin to those in [Reference Wu, van Ditmarsch and Chen20]. In this calculus, only a pseudo-analytic cut-elimination theorem has been established. Finally, it is worth emphasizing that algebraic approaches to DELs have led to the development of proof systems that also display highly interesting structural properties, in particular for logics of information updates extending beyond PAL (see, e.g., [Reference Baltag, Coecke and Sadrzadeh4, Reference Dyckhoff, Sadrzadeh and Truffaut7, Reference Frittella, Greco, Kurz, Palmigiano and Sikimić8]).
The main objective of this paper is to develop a sequent calculus for PAL that captures, by purely structural means, the dynamic character of DEL, and of PAL in particular. More precisely, our approach builds on hypersequents (e.g., see [Reference Avron, Hodges, Hyland, Steinhorn and Strauss1, Reference Kuznets and Lellmann11, Reference Restall, Dimitracopoulos, Newelski and Normann18]), and in particular on the hypersequent calculus for S5 introduced in [Reference Poggiolesi15, Reference Poggiolesi16]. In this calculus, each sequent corresponds to a world in a model, and the collection of sequents represents the set of worlds in an S5 model, namely an S5 model. We extend this framework by introducing a mechanism that allows one to move from a hypersequent—representing a given model—to a new hypersequent, which corresponds to the updated model obtained through a public announcement. We refer to these new objects as dynamic hypersequents (DHSs). DHSs provide a way to represent a model together with its successive updates in a single object. They are therefore syntactically rich while, at the same time, avoiding the inclusion of explicit semantic elements. This combination gives rise to interesting structural properties, such as a genuine subformula property or admissibility of all structural rules (contraction rules included), while preserving the possibility of extending the framework to several different information updates. In this sense, DHSs offer an original and expressive approach to syntactically capturing the dynamic nature of DEL at the proof-theoretical level.
Within this framework, we construct a DHS calculus for PAL and establish several key results like the already mentioned admissibility of all structural rules, but also the invertibility of logical rules and syntactic cut-elimination. As far as we know, none of the calculi so far proposed for PAL satisfy all these features at the same time.
The paper is structured in the following way. In §2 we will introduce the basic notions of PAL, whilst in §3 we will introduce DHSs as well as the calculus for PAL. §4 will be dedicated to the proof of the admissibility of the structural rules, and invertitbility of logical rules, and in §5 we will prove that our calculus is sound and complete with respect to PAL. Finally §6 will serve to prove syntactically the cut-elimination theorem. In §7 we will draw some conclusions and sketch several paths of future research.
2 Public announcement logic
This section provides a brief overview of the language, syntax, and semantics of PAL. Although PAL is usually presented with a set of agents
$\mathcal {A}$
and correspondingly as many epistemic modalities
$K_a$
as agents
$a\in \mathcal {A}$
, in this work, for the sake of simplicity, we consider the single-agent version of PAL. The extension of our result to the multi-agent case is left for future research but sounds natural in light of existing results for S5 with multiple agents [Reference Poggiolesi17].
Definition 2.1 (Language
$\mathcal L_{\textit{PAL}}$
).
The language of PAL
$\mathcal {L}_{\textit{PAL}}$
is composed of a countable set of atomic sentences,
$p, q,etc. $
, the classical connectives
$\neg $
and
$\wedge $
, the modal operator
$\Box $
, and the public announcement operator
$[\cdot ]$
. Formulas of
$\mathcal L_{\textit{PAL}}$
are inductively defined as follows:
We follow the standard rules for omission of the parentheses. The classical connectives
$\vee , \rightarrow , \leftrightarrow $
, as well as the dual modalities
$\Diamond $
and
$\langle \cdot \rangle $
are defined as usual.
Definition 2.2 (PAL).
Based on the language
$\mathcal {L}_{\textit{PAL}}$
, we introduce the Hilbert-style axiomatic system PAL, which is composed of the axioms and rules of inference in Table 1. As standard, we will write
$\vdash _{\textbf {PAL}} A$
, for the formula A is derivable in the Hilbert system PAL.
The axiomatisation PAL.

Table 1 Long description
The table is organized into three main sections.
1. Axioms of S 5:
* Distributivity of box (axiom K): box (A yields B) yields (box A yields box B).
* Truth (axiom T): box A yields A.
* Positive introspection (axiom 4): box A yields box box A.
* Negative introspection (axiom 5): lnot box A yields box lnot box A.
2. Reduction axioms:
* Atomic permanence: [A]p if and only if (A yields p).
* Announcement and negation: [A]lnot B if and only if (A yields lnot [A] B).
* Announcement and conjunction: [A](B land C) if and only if ([A]B land [A]C).
* Announcement and knowledge: [A]box B if and only if (A yields box [A]B).
* Announcement composition: [A][B]C if and only if [A land [A]B]C.
3. Inference rules:
* Modus ponens (M P): From A and A yields B, infer B.
* Necessitation rule (Nec): From A, infer box A.
We now present the semantics for PAL by first introducing the notion of standard epistemic model, and consequently the notions of satisfaction of a formula in a model and that of updated model.
Definition 2.3 (Epistemic model).
An epistemic model is a tuple
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
where W is a set of possible states,
$\sim : W \rightarrow \mathcal {P}(W^2)$
is an accessibility relation and
$V:P \rightarrow \mathcal {P}(W)$
is a valuation. For a model
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
and a world
$w \in W$
, we call
$(\mathcal {M},w)$
a pointed epistemic model, or simply a pointed model.
In this definition,
$\sim $
is an equivalence relation, i.e., it is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric.
Definition 2.4 (Semantics of PAL).
Given an epistemic model
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
, the semantic relation
$\vDash $
and the updated model
$M_A$
are simultaneously defined by induction as follows:
After announcement of
$ A $
, the updated model
$ \mathcal {M}_A = ( W_{A},\sim _{A}, V_{A}) $
is defined as follows:
A formula A is valid, denoted
$\vDash _{\textit{PAL}} A$
if, and only if, for all models
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
and all worlds
$w \in W$
,
$\mathcal {M},w\vDash A$
. The set of all validities is denoted PAL.
Informally, to define the updated model
$ \mathcal {M}_A $
we retain all and only the worlds in which
$ A$
is true and leave the accessibility relation between remaining worlds and valuations at those worlds unchanged. In this sense, the effect of the announcement of
$ A $
is to restrict the epistemic model to all and only the states where A holds. Therefore, announcements can be seen as epistemic state updaters.
For our purpose, we need to introduce a notation to denote a list of announcements. We do that in the following definition.
Definition 2.5 (List of announcement).
We define a list of announcement
$\alpha $
in a public announcement formula
$[\alpha ]B$
by induction in the following way:
-
• $[\epsilon ]B := B$
. -
• $[\alpha \cdot A]B := [\alpha ][A]B$
.
By consequence we have
Theorem 2.6 (Soundness and completeness of PAL).
For all formulas
$A \in \mathcal L_{\textit{PAL}}$
,
Proof. The proof can be found in [Reference van Ditmarsch, Hoek, Kooi and van Der6].
3 Dynamic hypersequents for PAL
In this section, we introduce DHSs, which extend classical hypersequents by incorporating a dynamic mechanism that enables transitions from one hypersequent to another. We introduce them step-by-step, starting from the standard notion of sequent.
Definition 3.1 (Sequent).
A sequent is a syntactic object of the form
$M\Rightarrow N$
, where M and N are finite multisets of formulas. We denote sequents by capital greek letters
$\Gamma , \Delta , \dots $
. By consequence, occurrences of specific formulas in sequents, e.g.,
$A, M\Rightarrow N$
or
$M\Rightarrow N, A$
, will be denoted by
$A, \Gamma $
and
$\Gamma , A$
, respectively. Finally, when
$\Gamma = M \Rightarrow N$
and
$\Delta = P \Rightarrow Q$
, the sequent
$M,P \Rightarrow N,Q$
is denoted
$\Gamma \Delta $
.
Definition 3.2 (Dynamic sequent).
Let
$\Gamma _1,\ldots ,\Gamma _n$
be sequents and
$\alpha _1,\ldots ,\alpha _n$
be finite sequences of announcements pairwise distinct, i.e.,
$\alpha _i\neq \alpha _j$
for all
$1\leq i\neq j \leq n$
. Then
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _1}\Gamma _1 \backslash\!\backslash \dots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n}\Gamma _n$
is a dynamic sequent. For the empty sequence
$\epsilon $
we write
$\Gamma $
instead of
$\backslash\!\backslash _\epsilon \Gamma $
. In particular then
$\Gamma $
is a dynamic sequent.
Intuitively, a dynamic sequent represents a world w in some model
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
, together with its copies in successively updated models
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha $
that w belongs to. For instance the dynamic sequent
$M\Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _A M' \Rightarrow N'$
represents the world w in the initial model
$\mathcal {M}$
as well as in the updated model
$\mathcal {M}_A$
.
Note that in a dynamic sequent
$X = \Gamma \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _1} \Gamma _1 \backslash\!\backslash \dots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} \Gamma _n$
, we call
$\backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \ \Gamma $
the
$\alpha $
-projection of X, or simply the
$\alpha $
-sequent. Note that by definition, for any
$\alpha $
, the
$\alpha $
-projection of X is unique. In particular, we call
$\Gamma $
the initial sequent.
Definition 3.3 (Dynamic hypersequent).
Let
$X_1,\ldots ,X_n$
be dynamic sequents. Then,
$G := X_1 \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ \dots \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X_n$
is a DHS.
Intuitively, a DHS is the syntactic representation of a model
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
and its successive updates
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha $
. For a better understanding, we can think of the set of updated models as a two-dimensional table, where each row represents a world and its copies (if any) in the successive updated models, and each column represents an updated model, with the different worlds that belong to it. DHSs are a linear representation of such a table. As an example, the following table represents a model
$\mathcal {M}$
with three worlds
$w, u, v$
, and three updated models obtained from
$\mathcal {M}$
by announcing, respectively, A, A and then B, and C.Footnote
1

Table 2 Long description
The table consists of four columns and four rows including the header.
Header Row:
- Column 1: M
- Column 2: M sub A
- Column 3: M sub A dot B
- Column 4: M sub C
Row 2:
- Column 1: Variable w
- Column 2: w prime
- Column 3: Empty
- Column 4: w triple prime
Row 3:
- Column 1: Variable u
- Column 2: Empty
- Column 3: Empty
- Column 4: u prime
Row 4:
- Column 1: Variable v
- Column 2: v prime
- Column 3: v double prime
- Column 4: v triple prime
The following DHS stands for the syntactic representation of the table above, where sequents
$\Gamma ,\Delta $
and
$\Lambda $
represent worlds
$w,u$
and v, respectively:
In a hypersequent G, if we only consider initial sequents, then we get the syntactic representation of the initial model
$\mathcal {M}$
, called initial hypersequent. Similarly, if we only consider
$\alpha $
-sequents, we obtain the
$\alpha $
projection of G, that is, a representation of the updated model
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha $
: this is called
$\alpha $
-hypersequent.
Definition 3.4 (Interpretation).
The interpretation
$\tau $
of a sequent
$M \Rightarrow N$
is the standard one, namely:
$(M \Rightarrow N)^\tau := \bigwedge M \rightarrow \bigvee N$
. We extend it to dynamic sequents as follows:
where, for all
$1 \leq i \leq n$
,
$\alpha _i = A_{i_1}\cdot \dots \cdot A_{i_{k_i}}$
and
$[\alpha _i]B = [A_{i_1}]\dots [A_{i_{k_i}}]B$
, for
$k_i \in \mathbb N$
.
Finally, we extend the interpretation function
$\tau $
to DHSs as follows:
We now have all ingredients to introduce the calculus
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
, which is composed by the following axioms and inference rules.
Axioms:
Propositional rules:

Modal rules:


Announcement rules:
![Two logical inference rules. Rule L dot: G | X alpha M yields N, A alpha dot A M prime yields N prime and G | X alpha M yields N alpha dot A B, M prime yields N prime all over G | X alpha [A]B, M yields N alpha dot A M prime yields N prime.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu13.png?pub-status=live)
Dynamic rules:

In both the announcement rules (L
$[\cdot ]$
) and (R
$[\cdot ]$
), if the dynamic sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A}\ M' \Rightarrow N'$
does not occur in the conclusion, we add it to their premises with
$M'$
and
$N'$
instantiated as empty multisets. So, for example, the rule (L
$[\cdot ]$
) might have the following form:
![Fractional logic rule. Numerator G | X double-backslash alpha M implies N, A and G | X double-backslash alpha M implies N double-backslash alpha dot A B implies all over denominator G | X double-backslash alpha [A]B, M implies N. Rule label (L[dot]).](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu15.png?pub-status=live)
In the rest of the paper, (L
$[\cdot ])_1$
and (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
will denote instances of the rules where the dynamic sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A}\ M' \Rightarrow N'$
occurs in the conclusion; (L
$[\cdot ])_2$
and (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
will denote instances of the rules where the dynamic sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A}M' \Rightarrow N'$
does not occur in the conclusion.
We now turn to a more informal discussion of the rules of the calculus. The propositional rules are the standard ones from classical logic, adapted to the DHS framework. The modal rules—(L
$\square _1$
), (L
$\square _2$
), and (R
$\square $
)—are essentially those introduced in [Reference Poggiolesi15], though once again reformulated to fit within the DHS setting.
The announcement rules become intuitive when viewed through the Kripke semantics satisfability relation of public announcement formulas. Consider the rules read bottom-up. For (R
$[\cdot ]$
), let
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
be a model and w be a world of that model represented by the dynamic sequent X. If
$[A]B$
is false at
$(\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,w)$
, then A must be true at w (so that it can indeed be announced): this is displayed via the sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \ A, M \Rightarrow N$
. After this announcement, however, B is false at w in the further updated model
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A}$
, which is displayed by the sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \ M'\Rightarrow N',B$
.
Similarly, for (L
$[\cdot ]$
): if
$[A]B$
is true at w in
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha $
, then one of the following two options must hold: either A is false at
$(\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,w)$
, in which case the announcement cannot be made, or else A is true at
$(\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,w)$
, so that
$w \in \mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A}$
, and B holds at
$(\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A},w)$
. The former case is represented in the left-premise by
$\backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \ M \Rightarrow N, A$
while the latter is displayed in the right-premise by
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A}\ B, M' \Rightarrow N'$
.
The dynamic rules capture important structural properties of models and their updates. Rules (Lat) and (Rat) express atomic permanence: read bottom-up, (Lat), for example, states that if p holds at w in the updated model
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A}$
—represented by
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A}\ p,M' \Rightarrow N'$
—then p must also hold at w in the previous model
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha $
—which corresponds to
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha }\ p,M \Rightarrow N$
. Rule (New) ensures that if
$w \in \mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A}$
, then w must already belong to the previous model
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha $
: hence from
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A}\ M \Rightarrow N$
we get
$\backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Rightarrow $
. Finally, (Recall) requires that if
$w \in \mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A}$
—displayed by
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A}\ M' \Rightarrow N'$
—then A must be true at
$(\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,w)$
, which corresponds to
$\backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \ A, M \Rightarrow N$
.
Finally, rule (L
$\Box _3$
) should be seen as a dynamic modal rule, since it displays the relationship between knowledge and announcements. It can be understood as follows: for
$\square A$
to be true at some world w in some updated model
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot \beta }$
, every accessible world in
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot \beta }$
must satisfy A. Hence, for any other world
$v\in \mathcal {M}_\alpha $
, either
$v\notin \mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot \beta }$
, or A is true at v in
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot \beta }$
. The latter case is represented by the rightmost premise of the rule. The former case, on the other hand, is represented by all the remaining premises: indeed, for
$v \in \mathcal {M}_\alpha $
not to belong to
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot \beta }$
, one of the following must hold (where
$\beta = B_1 \dots B_n$
):
$B_1$
is false at
$(\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,v)$
, so v does not belong to
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot B_1}$
, or
$v \in \mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot B_1}$
but
$B_2$
is false at
$(\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot B_2},w)$
, etc. This is why (L
$\square _3$
) has
$n+1$
premises, when the sequence
$\beta $
is composed of n announcements.
As an example, consider the following instance of the rule, where
$\beta = B$
and G is empty:

Let
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
be a model where
$W = \lbrace w,v \rbrace $
. Worlds
$w, v$
are represented by
$X \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot B} \square A, \Gamma $
and
$Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha } \Delta $
, respectively. Then, we have
$w \in W_{\alpha \cdot B}$
(which implies
${w \in W_\alpha }$
) and
$v \in W_{\alpha }$
. For
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot B},w \vDash \square A$
to hold, either
$v \notin W_{\alpha \cdot B}$
or
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot B}, v \vDash A$
. The first case arises when
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha , v \nvDash B$
, which corresponds, in the first premise, to the sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \ \Delta ,B$
. The second case is captured, in the second premise, by the sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot B} \, A \Rightarrow $
.
Definition 3.5.
Derivations in
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
are defined in the standard way and are denoted by
$d, d', etc.$
. The height of a derivation d, denoted
$h(d)$
, is also inductively defined in the standard way (see [Reference Troelstra and Schwichtenberg19]). As usual, we write
$\vdash _{\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}} G$
to denote that the DHS G is derivable in the calculus
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
.
4 Admissibility of the structural rules and invertibility of the logical rules
In this section, we show that the structural rules of weakening, contraction and merge are hp-admissible, and that all logical rules are hp-invertible. We also introduce new dynamic structural rules and we prove their hp-admissibility.
First of all, we introduce the following notion that will prove useful to define the structural rules.
Definition 4.1. Let
$X = \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _1} \, \Gamma _1 \backslash\!\backslash \cdots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} \Gamma _n$
be a dynamic sequent. The labels of X are all the sequences of announcements that label some sequent in X, i.e.,
$labels(X)= \lbrace \alpha _1, \ldots , \alpha _n \rbrace $
.
Lemma 4.2. All DHSs of the form
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N, A$
are derivable.
Proof. By standard induction on the complexity of A.
Lemma 4.3. The rule of internal weakening is hp-admissible.

Proof. The proof proceeds by straightforward induction on the height of the derivation of the premise.
Lemma 4.4. The rule of external weakening is hp-admissible:

Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the height of the derivation of the premise. If G is an axiom, so is
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X$
. If G is not an axiom, we distinguish cases on the last applied rule
$ \mathcal {R}$
: in each of the cases, we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premise(s) of
$ \mathcal {R}$
and then use
$ \mathcal {R}$
again. We only show one example, whilst the others can be treated similarly.
If the last applied rule is (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
, we proceed as follows:
![Two logical inference rules separated by a transformation arrow. Left shows derivation d yielding G | Y alpha Gamma, [A]B. Right shows derivation d prime yielding G | Y alpha Gamma, [A]B | X. Both use rule (R[dot]) sub 2.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu19.png?pub-status=live)
Lemma 4.5. The rule of dynamic weakening is hp-admissible, where
$\alpha \notin labels(X)$
:

Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the height of the derivation of the premise and is similar to the one of the above lemma. Note that in the inductive step, we may need to use hp-admissibility of (IW) and replace some instances of (L
$[\cdot ])_2$
(resp. (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
) by instances of (L
$[\cdot ])_1$
(resp. (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
). We provide one example below:
![G | X \\ alpha A, M implies N \\ alpha dot A implies B all over G | X \\ alpha M implies N, [A]B (R[dot]) sub 2](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu21.png?pub-status=live)
Here we use the hp-admissibility of (IW) and apply (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
to obtain the desired conclusion:
![G | X double-slash alpha A, M implies N double-slash alpha dot A M prime implies N prime, B all over G | X double-slash alpha M implies N, [A]B double-slash alpha dot A M prime implies N prime (R[dot]) sub 1](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu22.png?pub-status=live)
Lemma 4.6. All logical rules are hp-invertible.
Proof. For each rule, the proof proceeds by induction on the height of a derivation of the conclusion.
$-$
Propositional rules: We only show invertibility of (L
$\land $
), because the method is the same for the others. If
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A \land B, M \Rightarrow N$
is an axiom, then so is
$G\ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A,B, M \Rightarrow N$
. Otherwise, we consider the last occurrence of a rule
$\mathcal {R}$
in the derivation. If
$ \mathcal {R}$
has
$A\land B$
as its principal formula, then it must be an occurrence of (L
$\land )$
and the premise is precisely
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A,B,M \Rightarrow N$
. If
$A\land B$
is not principal in
$\mathcal {R}$
, we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premise(s) of
$\mathcal {R}$
and then use
$\mathcal {R}$
again.
$-$
Modal rules: (L
$\square _1$
) and (L
$\square _2$
) are hp-invertible by hp-admissibility of (IW) and (L
$\square _3$
) is hp-invertible by hp-admissibility of (IW) and (DW). We now dwell on the hp-invertibility of (R
$\square $
). If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N, \square A$
is an axiom, then so is
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Rightarrow A$
. Otherwise, we consider the last occurrence of a rule
$\mathcal {R}$
in the derivation. If the principal formula of
$\mathcal {R}$
is
$\square A$
, then
$\mathcal {R}$
is the rule (R
$\square $
) and its premise is precisely what we want, namely
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Rightarrow A$
. If
$\square A$
is not principal in
$\mathcal {R}$
, we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premise(s) of the rule and then use
$\mathcal {R}$
again. We show one example where
$\mathcal {R}$
is an occurrence of (L
$\square _3$
).

$ {\overset {(IH)}{\rightsquigarrow }}$

$-$
Announcement rules: We need to consider both versions of each rule. We first consider (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
, whilst (L
$[\cdot ])_1$
is treated likewise. If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \, A, M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \, M' \Rightarrow N',B$
is an axiom, then so is
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \, M \Rightarrow N, [A]B \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} M' \Rightarrow N'$
. Otherwise, we consider the last applied rule
$ \mathcal {R}$
. If
$ \mathcal {R}$
has
$[A]B$
as its principal formula, then it must be (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
and the premise is precisely
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \, A,M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} M' \Rightarrow N',B$
. If
$[A]B$
is not principal, we apply the inductive hypothesis on the premise(s) and then
$ \mathcal {R}$
again. We show one case with (L
$\square _3$
), whilst others are treated analogously. In the following,
$\overline {Y}$
denotes
$Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A \cdot \beta } \square C,\Delta $
:
![Logical inference rule L(box 3). Premises d 1 through d k lead to a conclusion. G | X alpha Gamma, [A]B alpha dot A Gamma prime | Y alpha dot A dot beta box C, Delta.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu25.png?pub-status=live)
$ {\overset {(IH)}{\rightsquigarrow }}$

We now turn to (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
, while (L
$[\cdot ])_2$
is treated likewise. The proof proceeds similarly, except when the dynamic sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \ \Gamma '$
appears in the premise(s) of
$\mathcal {R}$
. In such cases, we use hp-invertibility of (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
on the premise(s) displaying
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \ \Gamma '$
instead of the inductive hypothesis. Afterwards, we might need to apply a different version of rule
$\mathcal {R}$
, i.e., (L
$[\cdot ])_1$
(resp. (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
) instead of (L
$[\cdot ])_2$
(resp. (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
), and (L
$\square _2$
) instead of (L
$\square _3$
). We provide some examples, whilst other cases can be treated similarly.
If
$\mathcal {R}$
is an occurrence of (L
$[\cdot ])_2$
, we proceed as follows:
![Inference rule with premises d sub 1 and d sub 2 above a line and a conclusion below. Premises: G | X double-slash alpha Gamma, [A]B, A and G | X double-slash alpha Gamma, [A]B double-slash alpha dot A C implies. Conclusion: G | X double-slash alpha [A]C, Gamma, [A]B.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu27.png?pub-status=live)
We apply the inductive hypothesis on the left-hand premise, to obtain
$G\ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \ A,\Gamma ,A \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \ \Rightarrow B$
while we use hp-invertibility of (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
on the right-hand premise to get
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \ A,\Gamma \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \ C \Rightarrow B$
. We then apply (L
$[\cdot ])_1$
to obtain the desired conclusion:

When
$\mathcal {R}$
is an occurrence of (L
$\square _3$
) with two premises as below:
![Inference rule L(box sub 3). Premises d sub 1 and d sub 2 above a line yield conclusion G | X \\ alpha M implies N, [A]B | Y \\ alpha dot A box C, Delta. Premises involve complex sequents with alpha and box operators.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu29.png?pub-status=live)
we consider the right-hand premise only: we apply hp-invertibility of (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
on it and then use (L
$\square _2$
) instead of (L
$\square _3$
), to getFootnote
3
:

Eventually, when
$\mathcal {R}$
is an occurrence of (New) where
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \ \Gamma '$
appears in the premise, hp-invertibility of (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
directly provides the conclusion, with no need for further application of (New), as shown below:

$-$
Dynamic rules: (Lat) and (Rat), as well as (Recall) are hp-invertible by hp-admissibility of (IW). (New) is hp-invertible by hp-admissibility of (DW).
From now on, for any given rule
$\mathcal {R}$
, we denote by
$\mathcal {R}^\star $
the inverted rule,Footnote
5
that is derivable, by Lemma 4.6.
As is standard in a hypersequent framework, there is a merge rule that can be shown to be hp-admissible. To define the rule, we need to introduce the symbol
$\otimes $
for
$X\otimes Y$
, which intuitively combines two DHSs X and Y in the following way: all dynamic sequents labelled by the same sequence of announcements
$\alpha $
are merged pairwise, while the remaining dynamic sequents are simply juxtaposed.
Definition 4.7. Let X and Y be two DSs, then
$X \otimes Y$
is inductively defined as follows:
-
• if X is empty (resp. Y is empty) then $X \otimes Y := Y$
(resp.
$X \otimes Y := X$
); -
• if $X= X' \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha }\, M \Rightarrow N$
and
$Y= Y' \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha } \, P \Rightarrow Q$
then
$X \otimes Y := X'\otimes Y' \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha } M,P\Rightarrow N,Q$
; -
• if $X= X' \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha } M \Rightarrow N$
and
$Y= Y' \backslash\!\backslash _{\beta } P \Rightarrow Q$
, where
$\alpha \notin \ labels(Y')$
and
$\beta \notin \ labels(X')$
, then
$X \otimes Y := X'\otimes Y' \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha } M\Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\beta }P \Rightarrow Q$
.
For instance, if
$X = \Gamma \backslash\!\backslash _{A} \Gamma ' \backslash\!\backslash _{A\cdot B} \Gamma "$
and
$Y= \Delta \backslash\!\backslash _A \Delta ' \backslash\!\backslash _B \Delta " \backslash\!\backslash _{B\cdot A} \Delta "'$
, then
$X \otimes Y = \Gamma \Delta \backslash\!\backslash _A \Gamma '\Delta ' \backslash\!\backslash _{A\cdot B} \Gamma " \backslash\!\backslash _B \Delta " \backslash\!\backslash _{B\cdot A} \Delta "'$
.
Lemma 4.8. The rule of Merge is hp-admissible:

Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the height of the derivation of the premise. If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ Y \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha P \Rightarrow Q$
is an axiom, so is
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \otimes Y \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M,P \Rightarrow N,Q$
. Otherwise, we consider the last applied rule
$ \mathcal {R}$
: we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premise(s) of
$ \mathcal {R}$
and then use
$ \mathcal {R}$
again. We only show two paradigmatic examples.
If
$\mathcal {R}$
is an occurrence of (R
$\square $
):

If
$ { \mathcal {R}}$
is an occurrence of (L
$ {\square _3}$
) of the following shape:

we simply apply the inductive hypothesis to the rightmost premise, and conclude with (L
$\square _1$
):

Lemma 4.9. The rules of contraction are hp-admissible:

Proof. We simultaneously prove the hp-admissibility of (LC) and (RC) by induction on the height of the derivation of the premise of each rule. If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, A, M\Rightarrow N$
and
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N, A, A$
are axioms, then so are
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N$
and
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N, A$
. Else, we distinguish cases on the last applied rule
$ \mathcal {R}$
. If neither of the occurrences of A is principal, we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premise(s) of
$ \mathcal {R}$
, and then use
$ \mathcal {R}$
again. If one of the occurrence of A is principal, we start from the premise(s) of
$ \mathcal {R}$
and use the hp-invertibility of the rules before applying the inductive hypothesis; then we use
$ \mathcal {R}$
again. We only show one example, while the others can be treated similarly.
If the last applied rule is (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
, we first use hp-invertibility of (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
, then we apply the inductive hypothesis twice, and eventually we use (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
again:
![Logical derivation showing a rule R dot transformation. Left side has a fraction with d sub 1 above G | X double-slash alpha A, Gamma [A] B double-slash alpha dot A implies B, all over G | X double-slash alpha Gamma, [A] B, [A] B.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu37.png?pub-status=live)
We end this section by proving the admissibility of the rule
$New^{A}$
, which will be crucial to prove the admissibility of the Cut-rule.
Lemma 4.10. The rule New
$^{A}$
is admissible:

Proof. We proceed by induction on the height of the derivation of the premise. If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \Rightarrow $
is an axiom then so is
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N$
. If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \Rightarrow $
is of the form
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \Rightarrow \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A \cdot B} \, M' \Rightarrow N'$
—namely the dynamic sequent X contains a sequent of the form
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A \cdot B} \, M' \Rightarrow N'$
—we simply apply (New) to obtain the desired conclusion:

Finally, if
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \Rightarrow $
is neither an axiom nor of the form indicated above, we consider the last applied rule
$ \mathcal {R}$
. If
$ \mathcal {R}$
is an application of a right-rule, we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premise(s) of
$ \mathcal {R}$
and then use
$ \mathcal {R}$
again, as in the example below, where
$\mathcal {R}$
is an occurrence of (R
$\square $
):

If
$ \mathcal {R}$
is an application of a left-rule that does not involve neither A nor the dynamic sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \Rightarrow $
, we reason as before. Here is an example with (L
$[\cdot ]$
):

If
$\mathcal {R}$
is an application of a left-rule that does involve either A or the dynamic sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \Rightarrow $
, then we obtain the desired result using hp-admissibility of weakening and contraction, applying the inductive hypothesis or directly using
$\mathcal {R}$
again.
We only show the most significant cases.
$- \ \mathcal {R}$
is an application of (L
$\square _3$
) involving
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} \Rightarrow $
, with active dynamic sequent
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A \cdot \beta } \square C, \Delta $
where
$\beta = B_1 \dots B_n$
, as below:

we apply the inductive hypothesis on all the premises except the leftmost, and use
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, \Gamma , A \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A \cdot \beta } \square C, \Delta $
(that is derivable by Lemma 4.2) as a first premise to apply (L
$\square _3$
) with
$n+2$
premises:

$-\ \mathcal {R}$
is an application of (L
$[\cdot ])$
where A is the principal formula:
![Inference rule with premises d sub 1 and d sub 2 over a horizontal line. G | X double-slash alpha M yields N, A double-slash [A]B yields and G | X double-slash alpha M yields N double-slash [A]B yields double-slash alpha dot A B yields.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu44.png?pub-status=live)
We first use the hp-admissibility of (IW) to get
then we apply the inductive hypothesis, use (L
$[\cdot ])$
and then hp-admissibility of (LC) to conclude:
![Logical inference rule L dot with premises d sub 1 double prime and d sub 2 double prime leading to G | X backslash backslash alpha [A]B, [A]B, M yields N, which by rule L C simplifies to G | X backslash backslash alpha [A]B, M yields N.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu46.png?pub-status=live)
5 Soundness and completeness
In this section, we show that
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
is sound and complete.
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness).
For all formulas
$A \in \mathcal L_{\textit{PAL}}$
, if
$\vdash _{\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}} \Rightarrow A$
then
$\vDash _{\textit{PAL}} A$
.
Proof. We need to show that axioms are valid and that all rules are correct, i.e., that they preserve validity. As for the axioms, this is straightforward. As for the rules, for the sake of clarity, we only present in detail the case of the rule (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
. The other rules can be treated similarly.
For (R
$[\cdot ])_1$
, let
$\alpha = A_1 \dots A_n$
and suppose
$\vDash (G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A, M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} M' \Rightarrow N',B)^\tau $
but
$\nvDash (G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N, [A]B \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} M' \Rightarrow N')^\tau $
. Then, there are a model
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
and a world
$w\in W$
such that
so there is
$u\in W$
such that
$w\sim u$
and:
From
$(3)$
, we get
$\mathcal {M},u \vDash A_1, \mathcal {M}_{A_1},u \vDash A_2, \ldots , \mathcal {M}_\alpha , u \vDash A$
and
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A} \nvDash \bigwedge M' \rightarrow \bigvee N'$
. From
$(2)$
we get
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,u \vDash \bigwedge M$
and
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha },u \nvDash [A]B$
. From that and
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha , u \vDash A$
, we conclude that
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A},u \nvDash B$
.
However, since
$\vDash (G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha A,M \Rightarrow N \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} M' \Rightarrow N', B)^\tau $
and
$\mathcal {M},w \nvDash G^\tau $
, necessarily
Now, because
$\mathcal {M},u \nvDash X^\tau $
, either
$\mathcal {M},u \vDash [\alpha ](A \land \bigwedge M \rightarrow \bigvee N)$
or
$M,u \vDash [\alpha ][A] (\bigwedge M' \rightarrow \bigvee N' \lor B)$
. In the first case, we get a contradiction because
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,u \vDash \bigwedge M$
and
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,u \vDash A$
but
$\mathcal {M}_\alpha ,u \nvDash \bigvee N$
. In the other case, we get a contradiction from
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A},u \nvDash \bigwedge M' \rightarrow \bigvee N'$
and
$\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A},u \nvDash B$
which implies
${\mathcal {M}_{\alpha \cdot A} \nvDash \bigwedge M' \rightarrow \bigvee N' \lor B}$
, hence
$M,u \nvDash [\alpha ][A](\bigwedge M' \Rightarrow \bigvee N' \lor B)$
.
Therefore
$\vDash (G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N,[A]B \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot A} M' \Rightarrow N')^\tau $
.
We now move to the completeness of the calculus. In order to prove that
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
is complete with respect to PAL, we need to show that all axioms of PAL are derivable, as well as that the inference rules of PAL are admissible. This can be standardly carried out except for the case of the axiom of announcement composition, which requires us to show a derivability lemma (see Lemma 5.3). On the other hand, in order to prove this derivability lemma, we first need an enhanced notion of complexity of formulas, i.e., a notion of complexity of formulas that is relative to the sequents formulas belong to in the context of a DHS.Footnote
6
We thus also introduce the notion of DHS-complexity in Definition 5.2. Finally, note that many other calculi for PAL (e.g., [Reference Balbiani, van Ditmarsch, Herzig and de Lima3, Reference Nomura, Sano and Tojo13]) require some preliminary lemmas in order to show a completeness result; hence our procedure is standard in the context of proof theory for PAL.
Definition 5.2 (DHS-complexity).
The DHS-complexity of a formula A relatively to a sequence of announcements
$\alpha $
,
$c(A,\alpha )$
, is defined as
where
$c(A)$
is inductively defined as follows:
whilst
$c(\alpha )$
is inductively defined as follows:
Lemma 5.3. Let
$A, B, C$
be formulas of
$\mathcal L_{\textit{PAL}}$
, and
$\alpha ,\beta $
be finite sequences of announcements. Then, the following DHSs are derivable:
Proof. We simultaneously prove that
$(1)$
and
$(2)$
are derivable by induction on the sum of the DHS-complexity of each occurrence of C, denoted
$\overline {c}(C):= c(C, \alpha \cdot A \cdot B \cdot \beta ) + c(C, \alpha \cdot A \land [A]B \cdot \beta )$
.
Without loss of generality, we prove the result for empty G, X and
$\alpha $
. In the following,
$\beta = B_1 \cdot B_2 \dots B_{n-1}$
and we write
$\varphi $
for
$A \land [A]B$
. We distinguish the following cases, where we only present the details for
$(1)$
, whilst
$(2)$
is treated similarly.
$\bullet $
Case
$C= p$
. To derive
$(1)$
, we (bottom-up) apply
$2\times n$
times (New) to go from
$\backslash\!\backslash _{\varphi \cdot \beta } \ \Gamma $
to
$\backslash\!\backslash _\epsilon \ \Gamma '$
and from
$\backslash\!\backslash _{A\cdot B \cdot \beta } \ \Delta $
to
$\backslash\!\backslash _{A} \ \Delta '$
, then we apply
$n+1$
times (Rat) and n times (Lat) to obtain an axiom with
$p\Rightarrow p$
. We write
$\mathcal {R}^\ast $
when we apply several times rule
$\mathcal {R}$
:
![A proof tree equation. Top premises derive A implies A wedge [A]B double-slash A B implies double-slash A dot B implies C. Successive steps apply rules R dot, R wedge, and R arrow to reach the conclusion implies [A wedge [A]B]C arrow [A][B]C.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu530001.png?pub-status=live)
$\bullet $
Case
$C =\lnot C_1$
. Since
$\overline {c}( C_1) < \overline {c}(\lnot C_1)$
, we apply the inductive hypothesis. Then, we simply apply (L
$\lnot $
) and (R
$\lnot $
). This is straightforward.
$\bullet $
Case
$C = C_1 \land C_2$
. We can apply the inductive hypothesis because
$\overline {c}(C_i) < \overline {c}(C_1 \land C_2)$
for
$i \in \lbrace 1, 2 \rbrace $
. Then, we apply admissibility of (IW) and use (L
$\land $
) and (R
$\land $
). This is straightforward.
$\bullet $
Case
$C = \square C_1$
. Note that
$\overline {c}(C_1) < \overline {c}(\square C_1)$
and, for all
$\beta '\cdot B_i \subseteq \beta $
,
$c(B_i, A \cdot B \cdot \beta ') + c(B_i, A \land [A]B \cdot \beta ') < \overline {c}(\square C_1)$
. This allows us to use the inductive hypothesis to obtain the following DHSs:
By admissibility of (IW), (EW) and (DW), from each
$(i)$
we get the following
$(i')$
:
To apply (L
$\square _3$
) with
$\backslash\!\backslash _{A\cdot B\cdot \beta } \square C_1, \Gamma '$
, we need
$n+1$
premises, since the sequence of announcements here is
$B \cdot B_1 \dots B_{n-1}$
. Hence, we also need the following DHS, that is derivable by Lemma 4.2:
We now apply (L
$\square _3$
) to
$(0)'-(n)'$
and continue the derivation as follows, where
$X := \backslash\!\backslash _{A\cdot B\cdot \beta } \ \square C_1, \Gamma \backslash\!\backslash _{\varphi \cdot \beta }\ \Gamma '$
:

$\bullet $
Case
$C=[C_1]C_2$
. We use the inductive hypothesis and admissibility of (DW). Note that the inductive hypothesis applies because
$\overline {c}(C_1) < \overline {c}([C_1]C_2)$
and
$c(C_2, A \cdot B \cdot \beta \cdot C_1) + c(C_2, A \land [A] B \cdot \beta \cdot C_1) < \overline {c}([C_1]C_2)$
:

Note that Lemma 5.3 can be understood as a way of identifying dynamic sequents labelled by
$A\cdot B$
and those labelled by
$A \land [A]B$
(and more generally by
$\alpha \cdot A \cdot B \cdot \beta $
and by
$\alpha \cdot A \land [A]B \cdot \beta $
). This result has a semantic counterpart. Indeed, it can be proved that, for all models
$\mathcal {M}=(W,\sim ,V)$
and all formulas
$A,B$
,
$W_{A\cdot B}= W_{A \land [A]B}$
(see, for instance, [Reference van Ditmarsch, Hoek, Kooi and van Der6]).
Theorem 5.4 (Completeness).
For all formulas
$A \in \mathcal L_{\textit{PAL}}$
, if
$\vDash _{\textit{PAL}} A$
then
$\vdash _{\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}} \Rightarrow A$
.
Proof. Since PAL is complete w.r.t. the standard semantics of PAL, it is sufficient to demonstrate that all axioms of PAL are derivable in
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
and that the rules of modus ponens and necessitation are admissible. Modus ponens can be shown to be admissible using the cut-rule (see §6); whilst the necessitation rule can be shown to be admissible using external weakening. Derivations for the axioms of propositional logic and modal logic S5 are obtained by direct (bottom-up) proof-search (see [Reference Poggiolesi15] for details). Derivations for the reduction axioms are also obtained by (bottom-up) proof search (except for the announcement composition axiom that we will consider separately). As an illustrative example, consider the axiom of announcement and knowledge, which we prove to be a theorem by means of the following derivation:
![A sequent calculus derivation tree. Top premises lead through rules L box 2, L dot, R dot, R box, and R arrow to the final conclusion: yields [A] box B arrow (A arrow box [A] B).](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu58.png?pub-status=live)
and
![A formal logic proof tree deriving the sequent yields (A arrow box [A] B) arrow [A] box B. The derivation uses rules labeled L-dot, L-box-2, Recall, New, R-box, L-arrow, R-dot, and R-arrow across multiple horizontal inference lines.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu59.png?pub-status=live)
We now move to the axiom of announcements composition
$[A][B]C \leftrightarrow [A\land [A]B]C$
. Providing a direct proof for that axiom schema requires Lemma 5.3 that demonstrates derivability of DHSs
$\backslash\!\backslash _{A \cdot B} \Rightarrow C \backslash\!\backslash _{A \land [A]B} C \Rightarrow $
and
$\backslash\!\backslash _{A \cdot B} C \Rightarrow \backslash\!\backslash _{A \land [A]B} \Rightarrow C$
, for all formulas C. We only show the derivation for one direction, whilst the other can be obtained in a similar way:
![A formal logic proof tree deriving the conclusion yields (A and [A]B)C implies [A][B]C. The proof uses rules like R[.], R and, L[.], and R implies, referencing Lemma 5.3 in the upper right branch.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu530003.png?pub-status=live)
6 Cut admissibility
In this section we demonstrate that the cut-rule is admissible in the calculus
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
.Footnote
7
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. Propositional rules, modal rules, announcement rules, as well as (New), (Recall) and (Lat) permute down with respect to n applications of (Rat). Furthermore, any occurrence of (Rat) also permutes down with respect to n applications of (Rat) when the atom p that is removed in its conclusion is not active in either of these n applications of (Rat).
Proof. Let us first consider the permutation with 1-premise rules, which is straightforward. We show the permutability of n consecutive applications of (Rat) with the rule (R
$[\cdot ])$
, while other cases can be treated similarly. In the following, (Rat)
$^\ast $
denotes n applications of (Rat):
![Logical derivation showing G | M double-arrow N, p double-bar ... double-bar alpha A, M prime double-arrow N prime, p double-bar alpha dot A double-arrow B all over G | M double-arrow N, p double-bar ... double-bar alpha M prime double-arrow N prime, p, [A]B.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu60.png?pub-status=live)
Let us now consider the permutation with n-premises rules (for
$n \geq 2$
). As a way of paradigmatic example, we show that rule (L
$\square _3$
) permutes down with n applications of (Rat). Without loss of generality, let us assume that the first premise has been obtained by n applications of (Rat). We then proceed as follows (where
$\beta = B_1 \dots B_{k-1}$
):

Here, we use hp-admissibility of weakening on all the premises but the leftmost one to obtain the required premises and apply (L
$\square _3$
) before applying (Rat) n times:

Lemma 6.2. Propositional rules, modal rules, announcement rules, as well as (New), (Recall) and (Rat) permute down with respect to n applications of (Lat).
Furthermore, any occurrence of (Lat) also permutes down with respect to n applications of (Lat) when the atom p that is removed in its conclusion is not active in either of these n applications of (Lat).
Proof. The proof is similar to that for (Rat).
Theorem 6.3. The rule of Cut is admissible:

Proof. The proof proceeds by main induction on the DHS-complexity of the cut-formula (see Definition 5.2), and secondary induction on the sum of the heights of the derivations
$d_1$
and
$d_2$
of each premise. We distinguish cases on the last rule applied on the left premise.Footnote
8
$-$
If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N, A$
is an axiom, then either the conclusion is an axiom as well, or the cut can be replaced by several applications of the rules (IW), (EW) and (DW) on
$H \boldsymbol {\mid } Y \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha p, P \Rightarrow Q$
so to obtain the conclusion.
$-$
If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N, A$
has been obtained by a rule
$\mathcal {R}$
where the formula A is not principal, then we apply the inductive hypothesis to the premise(s) of
$\mathcal {R}$
and then
$ \mathcal {R}$
again.Footnote
9
$-$
If
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha M \Rightarrow N, A$
has been obtained by a rule
$\mathcal {R}$
where the formula A is principal, then we distinguish the following subcases. (i) The rule
$\mathcal {R}$
is a propositional rule, (ii) the rule
$\mathcal {R}$
is a modal rule, (iii) the rule
$\mathcal {R}$
is an announcement rule, and (iv) the rule
$\mathcal {R}$
is a dynamic rule.
(i) As an example, we consider the case where
$\mathcal {R}$
is the rule (R
$\neg $
), we have

Here, we consider the right premise of the Cut. We first apply hp-invertibility of (L
$\lnot $
) to obtain
$H \boldsymbol {\mid } Y \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha P \Rightarrow Q,A$
and then cut A, where this application of (Cut) is admissible by induction on the DHS-complexity of A:

(ii) Consider the case where
$\mathcal {R}$
is the rule (R
$\Box )$
. We then need to look at the right-hand premise
$H \boldsymbol {\mid } Y \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \square A, P \Rightarrow Q$
. If it is an axiom, then the conclusion is an axiom as well. If it has been obtained by a rule
$\mathcal {R}'$
where
$\square A$
is not the principal formula, we use the inductive hypothesis—with induction on the sum of the heights—and then apply
$\mathcal {R}'$
again. If finally
$H \boldsymbol {\mid } Y \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \square A, P \Rightarrow Q$
has been obtained by a rule
$\mathcal {R}'$
which is either (L
$\Box _{1})$
or (L
$\Box _{2})$
and has
$\Box A$
as principal formula, we apply the inductive hypothesis twice, to cut
$\square A$
and then A, with first induction of the sum of the heights and second on the DHS-complexity of the cut-formula. We only analyse the case of the rule (L
$\square _2$
), whilst that of (L
$\square _1$
) is dealt with analogously. We have the following situation:

We first apply (Cut) on the right-hand premise and on
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Gamma ,\square A$
. This application of (Cut) is admissible by inductive hypothesis on the sum of the heights:

We then cut the remaining A, with an application of (Cut) that is admissible by induction on the DHS-complexity of the cut-formula. Eventually, the desired conclusion is obtained by several applications of the contraction rules as well as (Merge):

Suppose now that the rule
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime }$
is (L
$\square _3$
) and the cut-formula is principal in (L
$\square _3$
). For the sake of simplicity, we show how to proceed with an example where only three premises of the rule (L
$\square _3$
) occur. The generalisation to n premises can be found in the AppendixFootnote
10
:

We first work with premise
$(c)$
in the following way:

where the first cut is admissible by induction on the sum of the heights, whilst the second by induction on DHS-complexity of the cut-formula. Then we re-use the previously obtained DHS in order to apply the same method to premise (b):

where the first cut is admissible by induction on the sum of the heights, whilst the second by induction of DHS-complexity of the cut-formula. Finally, we reach the desired conclusion with the following derivation:

where the first cut is admissible by induction on the sum of the heights, whilst the second by induction of DHS-complexity of the cut-formula.
(iii) Consider the case where
$\mathcal {R}$
is the rule (R
$[\cdot ])_2$
.Footnote
11
We then need to look at the right-hand premise
$H \boldsymbol {\mid } Y \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha [A]B, P \Rightarrow Q$
. If it is an axiom, or it has been obtained by a rule
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime }$
where
$[A]B$
is not the principal formula, then the procedure is the standard one. Consider then the case where
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime }$
is the rule (L
$[\cdot ])$
. We have the following situationFootnote
12
:
![A proof tree with two branches. Left branch (R[dot])2 derives G | X \\ alpha Gamma, [A]B. Right branch (L[dot])2 derives H | Y \\ alpha [A]B, Delta. The final (Cut) rule concludes G | H | X tensor Y \\ alpha Gamma Delta.](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260910223955793-0636:S175502032610121X:S175502032610121X_eqnu73.png?pub-status=live)
We proceed in the following way:

where the first cut is admissible by induction on the sum of the heights, whilst the second is admissible by induction on the DHS-complexity of the cut-formula.
(iv) Consider the case where
$\mathcal {R}$
is the rule (Rat)—the cases of the other dynamic rules can be treated straightforwardly. We have the following situation, where
$\alpha = A_1 \dots A_n$
and for all
$1 \leq i \leq n$
,
$\alpha _i = A_1 \dots A_i$
:

Here we go up derivation
$d_1'$
until we find an application of a rule
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime \prime }$
different from (Rat) on that atom p. There are two possibilities:
-
(1) After m applications of (Rat), we indeed find a rule $\mathcal {R}^{\prime \prime }$
different from (Rat) on that atom p. Thanks to Lemma 6.1, we can permute
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime \prime }$
down with the m applications of (Rat). We thus obtain a DHS that we can use, together with
$H \boldsymbol {\mid } Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} \ p, \Delta _n$
to cut atom p. This cut is admissible by induction on the sum of heights. We then apply rule
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime \prime }$
again,Footnote
13
to obtain the desired result.
-
(2) Alternatively, there is no such rule because $G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash \cdots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _{n-1}} \Gamma _{n-1}, p \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha } \Gamma _n, p$
is an axiom. We distinguish three cases, that we analyse in the following:
-
(2a) p is principal in $\Gamma _n$
; -
(2b) p is principal in another dynamic sequent $\Gamma _i$
(for
$1 \leq i < n$
); -
(2c) p is principal in none of them.
-
$(2a)$
We have
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X' \backslash\!\backslash \cdots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _{n-1}} \Gamma _{n-1}, p \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} p,\Gamma _n, p$
so we start from the right-hand premise
$H \boldsymbol {\mid } Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _{n-1}} \Delta _{n-1} \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} p, \Delta _n$
and obtain the conclusion by admissibility of (IW), (EW) and (DW).
$(2b)$
Let
$1 \leq i < n$
. The axiom we have is
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X' \backslash\!\backslash \cdots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _i} p,\Gamma _i, p \backslash\!\backslash \cdots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} \Gamma _n, p$
. Here, we need to look at the right-hand premise and distinguish the following cases:
-
(2bi) If it is an axiom, where p is principal in $\Delta _n$
, we start from the left-hand premise
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash \cdots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _{n-1}} \Gamma _{n-1} \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} \Gamma _n, p$
and obtain the conclusion by admissibility of the weakening rules. -
(2bii) If it is an axiom with a principal formula different from p in $\Delta _n$
, then the conclusion is also an axiom. -
(2biii) If it has been obtained by a rule $\mathcal {R^{\prime }}$
that does not operate on p, then we consider the premise of
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime }$
, and we apply a cut between such premise and
$G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \backslash\!\backslash \cdots \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha _n} \Gamma _n, p$
. The cut is admissible by induction on the sum of heights. We then apply
$\mathcal {R}^{\prime }$
again to obtain the desired conclusion. -
(2biv) If it is the result of l applications of (Lat), then, as before, we go up the derivation until we find a rule other than (Lat) on the atom p. There are two possibilities that are analogous to (1) and (2) above. Let us call them (1 $^{\prime }$
) and (2
$^{\prime }$
), respectively. As for (1
$^{\prime }$
), we proceed analogously to (1). As for (2
$^{\prime }$
), we have the situation where after l applications of (Lat), we find an axiom. We need to distinguish cases again.-
(2′a) p is principal in $\Delta _n$
, we proceed as in
$(2a)$
. -
(2′b) p is principal in a dynamic sequent labelled by the same sequence $\alpha _i$
as the axiom in the left-hand premise. Then the conclusion is an axiom. -
(2′c) p is principal in a dynamic sequent with a label $\alpha _j$
different from
$\alpha _i$
, i.e., where
$i\neq j$
. Without loss of generality, let us consider
$i < j$
. In such a case, we start from the axioms, removing the p in
$\Gamma _{k}$
(resp.
$\Delta _k$
) for all
$k> j$
. We apply the inductive hypothesis on the sum of heights, and then apply (Lat) or (Rat) as many times as needed to obtain the conclusion. Below is an example:
-

We proceed as explained above, where
$i=1$
and
$j=2$
: we start from the axioms wherein we remove p from
$\Gamma _3,\Gamma _4,\Delta _3$
and
$\Delta _4$
. We then cut p in
$\Gamma _2$
and
$\Delta _2$
and apply (Rat) to remove the atom p that still needs to be removed in
$\Gamma _1$
:

The method generalises naturally: when (Rat) has been applied m times, and (Lat) l times, if
$i < j$
, then
$m> l$
. Therefore, after having applied the inductive hypothesis, we need to apply
$(m-l)$
times (Rat) to remove the remaining atoms p in sequents
$\Gamma _k$
for all
$i \leq k < j$
.
$(2c)$
Then the conclusion is an axiom so we can just start from it.
Corollary 6.4.
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
enjoys the subformula property: all formulas occurring in a
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
-derivation ending with the DHS G are subformulas of one of the formulas occurring in G or of one of the formulas occurring as announcement in G.
Proof. Straightforward from the rules of the calculus
$\mathbf {DHS}_{\textit{PAL}}$
and Theorem 6.3.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we introduced a syntactic method for extending hypersequents to their dynamic counterparts. On the basis of this method, we developed a calculus for PAL, one of the most prominent and widely studied dynamic logics. The calculus was shown to satisfy several fundamental properties, including soundness, completeness, and cut-elimination. These results are of intrinsic interest, but they also suggest a number of directions for further research. First, we wish to establish additional metatheoretical results for the calculus of PAL, such as decidability or interpolability. In both cases, it seems reasonable to believe that standard techniques—such as the appeal to minimal derivations (see, e.g., [Reference Poggiolesi15, Reference Poggiolesi16]) in the first case, and adaptation of Maehara’s method for Craig interpolation (see [Reference Kuznets, Probst and Schuster9, Reference Kuznets10]) in the second—can be adapted quite naturally to the framework of DHSs. We also wish to investigate issues related to complexity and countermodels extraction. Second, the framework of DHSs appears well suited for the systematic development of sequent calculi for a broader class of DELs involving different dynamic modalities. As already noted, DHSs significantly extend standard hypersequents by making it possible to represent all possible epistemic PAL updates of a model. Their structure is therefore genuinely rich. It is precisely this richer structure, which can be further extended to account for other kinds of epistemic updates, that we consider sufficiently robust to capture additional DELs.
Appendix
Let us explain the general method to prove admissibility of (Cut) when the left-hand premise has been obtained by an application of (R
$\square $
) and the right-hand premise has been obtained by an application of (L
$\square _3$
) with k premises, for
$\beta = B_1 \dots B_{k-1}$
. Let
$(1), \ldots , (k)$
denote each premise of (L
$\square _3$
), let
$(i)$
denote
$G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Gamma \boldsymbol {\mid } \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Rightarrow A$
and
$(ii) G \boldsymbol {\mid } X \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Gamma , \square A$
. The derivation has this shapeFootnote
14
:

We first apply k times (Cut) between
$(ii)$
and each
$(j)$
premise (for
$1 \leq j \leq k$
), where each of these applications is admissible, by induction on the sum of heights. We denote by
$(I_1), \dots (I_k)$
the DHSs obtained this way:

We now apply the inductive hypothesis between
$(i)$
and
$(I_k)$
, with induction on the DHS-complexity of the cut-formula. We then use admissibility of (Merge), contraction rules, (DW) and (New
$^A$
) as follows, to obtain
$(J_k): G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ H \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \otimes Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot \beta } \Gamma \Delta \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ Z \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Lambda \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot B_1 \dots B_{k-2}} B_{k-1} \Rightarrow $
:

We now take
$(I_{k-1})$
and
$(J_k)$
and follow the same procedure: we apply the inductive hypothesis to cut
$B_{k-1}$
, and then use admissibility of the structural rules, thereby obtaining DHS
$(J_{k-1}) : G \boldsymbol {\mid } H \boldsymbol {\mid } X \otimes Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot \beta } \Gamma \Delta \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ Z \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha \Lambda \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot B_1 \dots B_{k-3}} B_{k-2}\Rightarrow $
. The induction is here on the DHS-complexity of the cut-formula. The derivation proceeds as followsFootnote
15
:

We proceed this way until we obtain
$(J_2): G \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ H \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ X \otimes Y \backslash\!\backslash _{\alpha \cdot \beta } \Gamma \Delta \ \boldsymbol {\mid } \ Z \backslash\!\backslash _\alpha B_1, \Lambda $
. Then, we use it together with
$(I_1)$
to apply (Cut), which application is admissible by induction on the DHS-complexity of the cut-formula. We conclude with the admissibility of the structural rules:

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the referee for the valuable remarks, which greatly helped improve the paper.


