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Languages flex cultural thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 April 2017

CERI ELLIS*
Affiliation:
Division of Neuroscience & Experimental Psychology, University of Manchester
GUILLAUME THIERRY
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Bangor University
AWEL VAUGHAN-EVANS
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Bangor University
MANON WYN JONES
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Bangor University
*
Address for correspondence: Dr Ceri Ellis, Division of Neuroscience & Experimental Psychology, Faculty of Biology, Medicine & Health, Room 3.316, Jean McFarlane Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Rd, Manchester, M13 9PLceri.ellis@manchester.ac.uk
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Abstract

Recent studies have revealed remarkable interactions between language and emotion. Here, we show that such interactions influence judgments made regarding cultural information. Balanced Welsh–English bilinguals categorized statements about their native Welsh culture as true or false. Whilst participants categorized positive statements as true when they were true, they were biased towards categorizing them as true also when they were false, irrespective of the language in which they read them. Surprisingly, participants were unbiased when categorizing negative statements presented in their native language Welsh, but showed a reverse bias - categorizing sentences as false, even when they were true - for negative statements when they read them in English. The locus of this behavior originated from online semantic evaluation of the statements, shown in corresponding modulations of the N400 peak of event-related brain potentials. These findings suggest that bilinguals perceive and react to cultural information in a language-dependent fashion.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 
Figure 0

Table 1. Experimental design and example of a statement ‘set’

Figure 1

Figure 1. An example of how statements were presented

Figure 2

Figure 2. Behavioral results. (a) Accuracy scores (average % provided above each bar) for truth judgments as a function of Language and Truth-value, split by Valence. Note: Errors bars represent SEs. (b) Reaction Time (average provided above each bar) for truth judgments as a function of Truth-value and Valence. Note: Errors bars represent SEs.

Figure 3

Figure 3. ERP responses to true vs. false statements, collapsed across Language and Valence. Waveforms depict averaged brain potentials at the six electrodes included in the analysis (C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CP2, CPz). The grey bar indicates the analysis time window (300–500 ms post-stimulus).

Figure 4

Figure 4. ERPs elicited by correct responses to true and false statements presented in the native (Welsh) and second (English) language. Waveforms depict averaged brain potential variations over the 6 electrodes where N400 amplitude was maximal (C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CP2, CPz).

Figure 5

Figure 5. Relationship between “Pride” and “Defense” index on the one hand and N400 mean amplitude modulations by truth-value on the other. (a) Positive statements. Top, Difference in accuracy between true and false conditions, i.e., the “Pride index”. Bottom, N400 mean amplitude difference between false and true conditions. (b) Negative statements. Top, Difference in accuracy between false and true conditions, i.e., the “Defense Index”. Centre, N400 mean amplitude difference between false and true conditions. Bottom, Correlation between cross-language difference in defense index and mean N400 amplitudes.