The paucity of Arab states that have brought cases or requested advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a rather striking and seldom remarked-upon aspect of international litigation. True, the Palestine issue has been frequently championed through the language of international law. And yet, in over 60 years of conflict, the Palestinians have only had recourse to the ICJ on a single occasion, in the proceedings that led to the ICJ's advisory opinion on the Wall in February 2004.Footnote 1 Paradoxically, it was Colonel Qaddafi's ‘Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’, the most unpopular member of the Arab League, which had a notorious reputation for its frequent infringements of international law, that proved to be the most litigious of all Arab states.Footnote 2 As Michelle Burgis tells us in her fascinating study of Arab territorial disputes, the general reticence displayed by Arab states towards the ICJ may be a reflection of a more general ambivalence towards international law, which is seen as culturally alien to the Arab world. This may explain why the Arab League attempted to create an Arab Court of Justice and why the Organization of the Islamic Conference wanted to establish an Islamic International Court of Justice (pp. 90–3).
One explanation for the Arab world's reticence towards international legal institutions may be an awareness that the language of international law ‘is shaped through a combination of institutional biases, legal grammars, and a lexicon built from European experiences of authority over territory’ (p. 266). But it may also reflect awareness that the language of international law was instrumental in justifying the creation of Israel in 1948 and the first invasion of Iraq, while it proved to be of little avail in preventing Israel's frequent clashes with Lebanon, its occupation of Arab lands, and the second invasion of Iraq. Whilst Burgis mentions ‘Israel's presence in the heart of the Arab world’ (p. 89) since 1948 in connection with the rise of pan-Arabism, she does not address the social and psychological impact this has had on Arab mentality, which has contributed to a feeling that international law is not equipped to give their interests a fair hearing. This might explain why it took the Palestinians six decades before approaching the ICJ. The fact that the ICJ, as Burgis tells us, is ‘not capable of adjudicating these historical nuances’ and has ‘generally favoured colonial discourses’ is only likely to reinforce this distrust (pp. 267–8).
In her assessment of Arab discourse before the ICJ, Burgis, who lectures on Middle East politics and international law in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, suggests that the scholarship produced by Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) ‘should embrace Arab experiences in its project of interrogating the structures of international law’ (p. 8). The suggestion is a fair one, although describing oil-rich Qatar, Bahrain, and Libya (at least before the 2011 war), let alone Palestine and Morocco, as ‘Third World states’ might raise a few eyebrows. I mention these states because they are all the subject of Burgis's study: The territorial disputes between Libya and Chad and between Qatar and Bahrain form the two contentious cases, which she subjects to scrutiny, whilst the ICJ's advisory opinions in Western Sahara and on the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are also scrupulously examined. As Burgis tells us, these cases were chosen because ‘[t]hus far, the Court has only heard two contentious and two advisory territorial cases involving Arab states’. As these cases hail from Africa and Asia, the two continents that the Arab world straddles, ‘the book also highlights how Arab states operate in a broader discursive, postcolonial environment’ (pp. 8–9).
In interrogating the structures of international legal discourse before the ICJ in the aforementioned cases, Burgis uses the methodology produced by a combination of TWAIL and New Approaches to International Law (NAIL) (pp. 15–53). In doing so, she produces an excellent account of the way in which these schools of thought have critically engaged with the dynamics of international legal argument. Indeed, these approaches to international law inform the entire tone and content of the rest of the work, since one of Burgis's central aims is to introduce Arab scholars to these approaches to studying and understanding international law, as well as to introduce TWAIL and NAIL scholars to the Arab world. As Burgis explains, her research on ICJ discourse was informed by her understanding ‘that the construction of law in the courtroom is a process of argumentation’ (p. 34). In this connection, she relies heavily on the scholarship of Martti Koskenniemi and David Kennedy, although not uncritically. But had Burgis been willing to engage with fields of study beyond NAIL and TWAIL approaches to international law, she may have also benefitted from the scholarship produced by theorists of culture, history, linguistics, and post-colonial studies such as Edward Said, Michel Foucault, Noam Chomsky, and Frantz Fanon.Footnote 3
A central theme running through Boundaries of Discourse is that the universality of the ICJ will continue to be questioned as long as it ‘remains wedded to a past premised on less than equal political, and thus legal, capacity between European and non-European peoples’ (p. 171, emphasis in original). Burgis reached this conclusion after careful reflection, and a thorough and insightful analysis of the plethora of written statements and oral pleadings before the ICJ in the Qatar v. Bahrain case. As she notes, the ICJ has a tendency to rely on colonial documents that were negotiated in an era characterized by an inequality in relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. This tendency was sharply illustrated by the ICJ's unqualified acceptance of a controversial arbitral award from 1939 in the Qatar v. Bahrain case, which determined that Bahrain held title over the Hawar Islands. As Judge Torres Bernárdez observed:
The purpose of the whole diplomatic operation beginning in 1936 [which led to the 1939 award] was to enlarge the potential amount of ‘Bahrain oil’ by artificially . . . enlarging the ‘territory of Bahrain’, on condition that a share of any new ‘Bahrain oil’ would be allocated to the Anglo-lranian Oil Company through its subsidiary the PCL.Footnote 4
And yet, as Burgis explains, ‘the judgment failed to acknowledge the wider context of British oil interests or its undertaking towards Bahrain’ (p. 165). Once the ICJ had confirmed the ‘legal effect’ of the 1939 arbitral award, all Bahrain had to do was ‘to bolster the powerful legal position it enjoyed by virtue of the 1939 decision by relying on the principles of uti possidetis and res judicata’ (p. 166). Thus, ‘Bahrain's reliance on the legality of the 1939 Award required its general acceptance of British domination . . . . There was no room for any critical interrogation of colonial practices’ (p. 167).
Similarly, in the boundary dispute between Libya and Chad, Burgis explains that the ICJ felt more comfortable ruling in favour of Chad because it relied on colonial practice in the hope of succeeding to French title through colonial treaties. Libya, in contrast, challenged the colonial record by relying on Islamic authority over territory and, in so doing, ‘the Court did not understand the language spoken by Libya’ (p. 116). This prompted Burgis to complain that ‘in failing to question the colonial record while relying on colonial agreements and their consequent boundaries, the Court can be seen as a champion of colonialism's continuing hold over international law’ (p. 144). Similar considerations were at play in the Western Sahara advisory opinion, when the Court chastised Mauritania for its ‘misguided use of subjective or “non-legal” sociological and ethnographic data’ (p. 212) in arguing that it had ties to the territory under dispute. Again, argues Burgis, ‘the Opinion reminds us of continuities, rather than ruptures, with former instances of colonial adjudication and silencing’ (p. 198).
As Burgis observes, Arab states have a particular tendency to present their claims ‘in more emotive and inflammatory language’ (p. 266) than their Western counterparts, which the ICJ seems to be a lot less comfortable acknowledging and accommodating. This was most apparent from the written statements and oral pleadings presented to the ICJ in the Wall advisory opinion. Whether ‘inflammatory language’ is a common Arab trait, or whether it is a reflection of the passions invoked whenever the sovereignty of the Holy Land is raised in any UN forum or public debate, may be open to conjecture. Be that as it may, Burgis explains that the Court was nonetheless unable ‘to respond to all of the needs of these states and it had to retreat to the familiar territory of constrained, neutral language’ (p. 266). One explanation for this retreat is that the ICJ rarely gives credence to narratives that question ‘the legitimacy of a postcolonial order’. Instead, the ICJ has ‘indicated that such a probing of the past was outside its remit’. Thus, through ‘confirming colonial practices, the Court also revealed a law less than universal and one that struggles to translate non-European experiences during and after colonialism’ (p. 267).
In light of the revolutions sweeping North Africa and the Middle East, new governments are emerging that speak a very different language to the autocrats and petty dictators, which have been replaced in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. Undoubtedly, more instability in the region is likely, to which the continued unrest in Egypt and Syria attests. This poses a challenge for the ICJ. Will the Court be able to take into account the new discourse that will emerge in the decades ahead, one that is likely to make further references to Islamic sources of authority, or will it continue to remain wedded to its European colonial past? Can the Court even equip itself with the tools that would allow it to consider legal practices from non-European cultures? These questions are not meant to come across as facetious. Burgis has convincingly and lucidly shown in her excellent study that, of the cases between Arab states brought before the Court to date, those that have challenged Europe's colonial past as well as its colonial present have not fared well. If the Court is to maintain its image as a ‘World Court’, it needs to be more accommodating of the arguments advanced by non-European cultures; otherwise, it risks becoming irrelevant.
