Introduction
The research material I will present in this article comes from the archives of the High Council for Immovable Historic Works and Monuments (HC – Gayrimenkul Eski Eserler ve Anıtlar Yüksek Kurulu), which functioned as the sole decision-making mechanism for historic preservation in Turkey from 1951 to 1983.
The national and international politics of the cold war created the context for the HC gradually to extend its authority and exercise power until the 1980 coup d’état reshaped Turkish society and the state. Both national and international political dynamics of the country framed an urban heritage management scheme through the actions of several power structures, among which the HC was the most powerful. The goal of the article is to analyse these dynamics in order to understand their impact on the conservation of historic environments.
The archives of the HC, which have been largely neglected, provide a rich seam of material, revealing, for example, how cold war politics shaped historic environments, and how the conflict between secularism and conservatism in Turkey is revealed in interventions regarding cultural heritage. The focus of this article is the political dynamics of urban conservation in the HC, which was a predominantly male group of experts who became powerful decision-makers.
The role of experts in heritage studies has been under scrutiny since the 1980s. Françoise Choay has suggested that intervention by specialized professionals not only requires knowledge, but also a doctrine of national heritage.Footnote 1 I suggest that the HC wanted to pass beyond the practicalities and to implement such a doctrine. In order to do so, the HC had to cope with other, greater state powers. In the 1950s, the HC had to respond to the destructive urban projects of a repressive government. This government was increasingly critical of the Republican reforms enacted since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 as a modern secular nation-state, replacing the Ottoman Empire's centuries-old Islamic monarchy. In the 1960s and the 1970s, while a bipolar global power balance existed, the HC continued to do its duty in a turbulent period marked by the violence of militant political organizations. I suggest that it was mainly in these two decades that the HC exercised its power to define and implement its own heritage doctrine.
Turkey was not the only country where the heritage management system was controlled by experts. The authority of experts in managing cultural heritage has long been a focus of critical heritage studies.Footnote 2 Some scholars have provocatively argued that everyone is a heritage expert,Footnote 3 whereas other scholars have reacted by arguing that we need experts in heritage studies as much as we need them in any other field for the sake of a well-functioning society.Footnote 4 This article uses the example of Turkey to argue that when experts operate as a state apparatus through bureaucratic and legislative arrangements, they establish lasting power structures. Laurajane Smith showed that ‘authorized heritage discourse’ is the main tool that experts utilize to sustain and concentrate their power.Footnote 5 Expert knowledge becomes ‘common sense’ or ‘good sense’ through international charters and by repetitive use of certain concepts such as ‘safeguarding’, ‘future generations’ or ‘respect for monuments’, which also feature in a similar form in the HC archives, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. It should be noted that the authorized heritage discourse that the HC generated was aligned with the international conservation movement of the period; this article focuses on the acts and decisions of the HC as responses to political dynamics.
What are the HC archives?
The HC was responsible for all the cities of Turkey, and its archives encompassed a substantial amount of paper materials (principle decisions (ilke kararlari), case decisions, drawings, maps, photographs, etc.) dispersed all over Turkey. However, there are effectively three sets of copies. One copy is in the archives of the Ministry of Culture in the Ulus district in Ankara. Another copy is in the archives of the local preservation board of İstanbul (Preservation Board No. 4) which is located in the Eminönü district in İstanbul. And a third copy is in the archives of the local preservation boards (which replaced the HC following the 1980 military coup).
The Ankara archives of the committee provide very limited information. A small number of documents are kept in a folder in no particular order. The condition of the documents in the Ankara archives is poor. The İstanbul archives of the HC are combined with the archives of the Republican era preservation committee, the Commission for the Preservation of Antiquities (Muhafaza-ı Asar-ı Atika Encümeni) and provide a rich vein of material with which to evaluate the attitude of the committee. The decisions on singular cases on a historic building or a historic site are found in the archive of the local board where that historic building or site is located.
The archives in local preservation boards are kept in good condition and, depending on the capacity of the local authority, materials may have been digitized. In the İstanbul archives, none of the materials have been digitized and some documents are not readable due to the deterioration of the paper on which they are written. The Ankara archives are in the worst condition of all. The recent digitization projects also added to the corpus of the HC archives. In particular, the Ali Saim Ulgen Archive, digitized by the İstanbul-based Salt Research Institute, provides materials that are not found in the physical archives.
The primary source of materials used in this article is the İstanbul archive. It includes all the principle decisions (ilke kararlari) which created a framework for decision-making. Even though an inventory of this archive, which categorizes the decisions, exists, permission to research the archive is granted only by the Preservation Board No. 4, and unfortunately the lack of a structured admission process results in arbitrary judgements.Footnote 6 The situation reflects Aykac's comment that by controlling archival access, a state-led heritage-making process is also activated ‘in order to construct a unified heritage discourse and avoid multivocality’. Digitization of archives and the provision of open access is vitally important for any research related to heritage.Footnote 7
The HC: an autonomous preservation council with ‘frightening power to sanction’
Doğan Kuban, one of the most eminent art and architectural historians of Turkey who also served as an HC member, has defined the HC as a committee with ‘frightening power to sanction’.Footnote 8 But how can a council intimidate? What is there to be scared of in a historic preservation council? The answer is the ‘power to sanction’. The sanctions of the HC were legally binding and could include fines, destruction, termination of construction and even imprisonment. How can a preservation council have acquired such power?
The HC was not the first public body created for decision-making in matters of historic preservation. Even in the late Ottoman period during the second constitutional era, the Permanent Committee of Old Monuments (Asar-ı Atika Encümen-i Daimisi) was established in 1917 through an initiative taken by the director of the İstanbul Archaeology Museum, Halil Edhem Eldem (1861–1938).Footnote 9 This committee continued to operate with the ratification of the Republican parliament in 1925, and its name was converted into modern Turkish as Eski Eserleri Koruma Encümeni (EEKE). The committee tried to save architectural monuments whose existence was threatened by ambitious urban modernization projects in İstanbul.Footnote 10 In 1933, a second committee, the Council for the Protection of Monuments (Anıtları Koruma Kurulu), was formed following the orders of the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to generate a roadmap for the conservation and restoration of the archaeological and architectural heritage of Turkey.Footnote 11 In these early years, the decisions of experts and preservation actors reflected an ideological dilemma between constructing the new modern nation-state and preserving the legacies of the Ottoman Empire.Footnote 12 However, none of these earlier committees had as much power in decision-making and sanctioning as the HC; its authority was even greater in these matters than the authority of central government.
The initiative to form the HC was taken by one of the most prominent names in historic preservation in the Republican period in Turkey, Ali Saim Ülgen (1913–63). He completed his studies with state funding, first in Germany and then in France during World War I. During this period, he visited many European countries and analysed how preservation was systematized. He later published his observations in 1943 in Protection and Repair of Monuments – I, the first book of a projected four-volume publication, the last three of which were never written.Footnote 13 In this book, Ülgen both underlined the impact of Viollet-le-Duc in European cities and emphasized how specialized committees managed historic preservation in European countries. Contrary to what Ahunbay has suggested,Footnote 14 there was no emphasis on either la carta del restauro or the 1931 conference in Athens where Gustavo Giovannoni presented la carta italiana del restauro.Footnote 15
The HC was founded in 1951 by the Ministry of Education, which had managed and regulated archaeological activities and museums since the period of modernization in the later Ottoman era. The HC was established by Law No. 5805 (sayılı kanun), which was a brief eight-article law that outlined the function of the committee, number of members, their disciplines and level of expertise, conditions of resigning, per diem regulations, etc. The fifth article stressed the limits of the authority of the council: ‘Article 5: government organizations and institutions, legal entities and individuals are obliged to obey the council decisions.’Footnote 16 Only the State Council (Danıştay) could overrule the HC's decisions; however, the penalties were not well defined.
The HC held its first meeting on 27 October 1951 in Ankara with nine members. In this first meeting, the head of the HC was Celal Esat Arseven (1875–1971) who was a retired professor at the Architecture and Urban Planning Department of the Academy of Fine Arts. The nine members selected four other members of the council as stated in the law; and they held the second meeting on 5 November 1951. Other members of the HC were Ekrem Akurgal, professor of archaeology at Ankara University; Orhan Alsaç, the architect at the Ministry of Public Works; Orhan Çapçı, the general director of the General Directorate of Pious Foundations (VGM – Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü); Arif Müfit Mansel, a professor of archaeology at İstanbul University; Tahsin Öz, the retired director of the Topkapı Museum; H. Kemal Söylemezoğlu, a professor at the Architecture Faculty in the İstanbul Technical University; Kamil Su, the general director of the Old Monuments and Museums; A. Hamdi Tanpınar, the literature professor at İstanbul University; Osman Turan, the professor for the study of the Middle Ages at Ankara University; Behçet Ünsal, the architectural historian at the Fine Arts Academy; and Mithat Yenen, the assistant director of the Bank for Cities.Footnote 17 The council met four or five times a year in the early years and the meeting agenda had very few items proposed by members. In the second half of the 1950s, the number increased as the HC's authority began to be recognized by other public departments. The HC agendas can be considered a natural extension of governmental problems because most of the issues related to correspondence with local authorities who asked for opinions on whether this or that structure could be demolished or if it was deemed historic.
The 1950s marks a sharp change in modern Turkish history because a new party, the Democrat Party, won the elections in May 1950, bringing an end to the Republican era single party regime. In other words, this election broke the direct link between the state and the party. Despite the economic development of the first half of the decade, economic problems accumulated in the second half and government policies adopted an authoritarian tone against opposition.Footnote 18 In this new era, the HC was able to gain power, and exercised it during the following decades.
Constructing authority: the early 1950s and the HC
The 1950s marked an important stage for Turkish democracy. A new political party, Demokrat Party (DP) challenged the Republican Party, won successive elections both national and local, and either reversed or slowed many of the reforms until the army staged a coup d’état and executed the prime minister. The US support helped the Democrat Party implement its agenda throughout the 1950s. In the late 1940s, the United States had supported Greece and Turkey through the Truman Doctrine, devised to forestall the spread of communism in the Middle East. The Marshall Plan provided economic support to encourage investment, after Turkey's accession to NATO membership which reinforced the US–Turkey alliance. What followed was the Americanization of daily life in street markets, universities, gastronomy culture, journals, theatres, cinemas, books, night life, home appliances, etc.Footnote 19 American aid was mainly used for industrialization in agriculture and water management.Footnote 20
Coincidentally, the new government and the HC both acceded to power in the same year. For Kuban, ‘[A]lthough founded by Democrats when in power, the concept of conservation represented by the Council was not part of the cultural baggage of the government, nor of its prime minister. Thus, the Council's greatest fight was against Prime Minister Menderes’ reconstruction activities.’Footnote 21 By underlining Prime Minister Menderes’ reconstruction activities, Kuban was referring to ‘the Redevelopment of İstanbul (İstanbul'un İmarı)’ Project which started a year before the 1957 elections. However, the HC's attitude towards this project was complicated. In the early 1950s, before the Redevelopment Project, other public departments were unaware both of the existence of the HC and that they were legally bound to follow the HC's decisions. During this period, the HC was sometimes put in charge of supervising conservation works.Footnote 22 After the Kapalıçarşı (Grand Bazaar) Fire which burnt down 1,364 shops for 28 days in October 1954, the Ministry of Public Works promulgated a specific law for the restoration works and the HC was charged with scientifically scrutinizing the basics of the projects and the specifications of the changes implemented.Footnote 23
One of the earliest decisions undertaken by the HC concerned the use of lead as a finishing material on domes;Footnote 24 the HC agreed that, instead of lead, concrete could be used to cover shallow and small domes.Footnote 25 In 1953, the HC decided that measures needed to be taken to adopt new functions for old structures. This decision emphasized that the new functions should be adequate for the longevity of the authentic features of the converted structure.Footnote 26 The HC also had a role in the formulation of a new law about the properties of pious foundations (vakıf) in 1954.Footnote 27 With this law, the VGMFootnote 28 became the owner of all vakıf structures.Footnote 29 During the preparation of this law, the HC was also consulted and approved the law.Footnote 30
An important moment for the HC in this period was the Tenth International Byzantine Studies Congress which was organized in İstanbul on 15–21 September 1955. In advance of the congress, the government set aside a budget for the repair of the Byzantine monuments.Footnote 31 The HC made a decision to improve visitors’ paths for international visitors and asked the directorates to include a programme for spatial rearrangements in their annual budget.Footnote 32 However, memories of the events of 5–6 September, which was a pogrom against minorities, probably had a greater impact on international participants than the Byzantine monuments.Footnote 33
Another significant conservation project was the restoration of the city walls of İstanbul along with Rumeli Castle (located on the city walls on the Bosphorus) to celebrate the 500th year since the Conquest of Constantinople. Unlike other projects that were completed within a very limited time and budget, this project lasted three years and a significant budget was spared. The HC approved the conservation project and collaborated with the municipality to investigate whether it was correctly implemented.Footnote 34 In April 1955, a group of experts met to discuss the methods to be adopted in the restoration. They investigated the reports and the conservation projects. The participants of the meeting were the head of the HC, the head of the EEKE, the head of Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu (TTOK), the director of the İstanbul Museum, Prof. Albert Gabriel, the members of the city council and the local authorities.Footnote 35 This project was delayed and was only able to be realized in time for the commemoration of the 505th year of the Conquest in 1958. Even though the HC was active during this period, the Redevelopment was the main project through which the HC established its authority.
Concentrating power: the Redevelopment and the HC
The Redevelopment Project was launched approximately one year before the 1957 elections.Footnote 36 After the launch of the project, the whole of İstanbul became a construction site in less than a year. The main criticisms levelled at it concerned the pace of constructions, the wide extent of expropriations and the lack of a master plan.Footnote 37 In addition, the commentaries on the Redevelopment's implementation process present the most bizarre cases of decision-making in urban projects. For instance, Aydın Boysan noted that Menderes would show a point on a historic square with his fingers, then a team of workers would excavate that point, and planners would update the master plan accordingly.Footnote 38 Kuban described how Menderes would grab a stone from the ground and throw it to the other side of the road to mark the new length,Footnote 39 or he would call officers from his Baghdad visit to say ‘I decided to demolish the building across from the Spice Bazaar (Mısır Çarşısı). Start the expropriation process.’Footnote 40All this demolition was in preparation for the construction of major traffic arteries.Footnote 41 However, Gül has stressed that the plans were prepared; the prime minister informed the public even in the early stages of İmar, and the projects were approved by the relevant authorities.Footnote 42 In a 1957 municipal publication, the planned projects and completed works were published clearly.Footnote 43
The Redevelopment may appear to have been a response to İstanbul's urban problems which had emerged with rural migration,Footnote 44 such as insufficient infrastructure, but the project was also a public relations strategy,Footnote 45 According to Tanıl Bora, the interest in construction was a common feature of Turkish right-wing conservative political groups. This legacy, which Bora has traced as far as the politics of Turkey in the 2010s, began in the Menderes era.Footnote 46 The General Directorate of Highways (KGM – Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü) played an important role in this process. The KGM was established to construct inter-city roads with US support and consultation. However, it also defined the standards of İstanbul's new roads to be constructed in the course of the Redevelopment.Footnote 47
As a result, some structures were half-buried under the new road whereas others had their foundations exposed above the new level. The destruction and removal of historic structures were undertaken with the consent of the HC.Footnote 48 The parallels between the DP and the HC can also be traced in their shared focus on İstanbul. Prior to 9 January 1956, the council had 35 meetings and made 463 decisions. More than half of these decisions were on İstanbul (244); 32 were on Bursa, 21 were on Edirne, 4 on Ankara and the rest (162) were on other cities.Footnote 49 These numbers are noteworthy because they can be paralleled by the actions of the DP regime. In the 1950s, the Republican attention on Ankara was criticized and İstanbul was again at the centre of state investments. This shift of focus was a symbolic one; it demonstrated disapproval of the Republican regime for neglecting the former Ottoman capital.
When the actors of Redevelopment celebrated these projects as the ‘second conquest of İstanbul’ in newspapers, journals and on the radio, they affirmed that İstanbul was becoming a dominant space, which is produced with technology to realize a master's work, rather than simply a series of construction projects.Footnote 50 Paul Virilio, who has argued that military (wars) and technology (roads, speed) were the main agents that produced the urban character of European cities, located modernity in its relation to roads (dromocracy). For him, Haussmann's Paris, for instance, is under permanent siege by roads.Footnote 51 The Redevelopment operation also showed that the same link between roads, modernity and siege existed. However, this time, the link was so apparent that even in the state publications Redevelopment was promoted as an urban programme in which İstanbul was conquered (besieged) by civilization (modernity) through road construction. Naturally, this conquest damaged the historic character of the city.
The HC's muteness in response to the widespread destruction during the Redevelopment process cannot be due to its professional incompetence. On the contrary, its members were highly intellectual, well-educated, influential individuals. Despite the power granted by legislation, the HC was reluctant to use its power to avoid a conflict with central government. As a result of this attitude, historic structures were demolished, but power was concentrated in the HC. This power could be used for raising standards in preservation in the absence of a central power.
Two decades of chaos: Turkey in the 1960s and the 1970s
According to Pierre Bourdieu, ‘the state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital’.Footnote 52 In the two decades following the 1960 coup d’état, various power structures continuously attempted to start a process of concentration. However, these attempts failed to establish ownership of the state and no centralized authority was able to exercise power. Nevertheless, when the army handed over power to an elected parliament, none of the political parties could manage to organize a functioning coalition. The army intervened once more in March 1971 by starting a ‘state of exception’ where basic human rights were suspended, and torture became a common practice.Footnote 53 Simultaneously, the emergence of a strong working-class movement alerted the US. The potential influence of Iran's Islamic Revolution on Turkey, the infamous Cyprus problem and the western need for a secular model in the Middle East were factors that contributed to social and political chaos.Footnote 54
The 1960 constitution was written by intellectuals and university professors under the management of the army. In the 1950s, the intelligentsia and the politicians had been two opposed communities. With the new constitution, power was rebalanced.Footnote 55 Since then, this constitution, which would be rewritten in 1980 with another army intervention, has been either praised for producing a liberal constitution or criticized as an elitist attempt to grab power.Footnote 56 The constitution formulated the state as a ‘social state’ and generated a liberated space for social movements. In the global cold war context, the tension between right- and left-wing sympathizers accelerated. In the late 1960s, everyday life in Turkey became politically explosive. The universities were battlegrounds where the two groups were in continuous conflict. The situation was completely out of the control of the government by 1971; banks were robbed, US officials were kidnapped, leftist professors were attacked, militant groups were formed among both left- and right-wing communities. Another army intervention formed a new government which suspended basic rights of the 1960 constitution and declared martial law in 11 cities, mainly the Kurdish cities but also İstanbul and Ankara. Turkey was no longer a social state.Footnote 57 I argue that it was this social and political chaos that helped heritage experts create a zone of authority within the state structure.
Preserving cultural heritage under chaos
The new constitution had already provided a new reference that is cited in almost all HC decisions: the 50th article of the new constitution stated that ‘the state ensures the protection of all the monuments with historic or cultural value’. This article was added to the constitution at the last moment during discussions in parliament. The methodology that would be applied to protect monuments was left blank.Footnote 58 Another milestone came in 1973 with the acceptance of the first law on old artifacts. Historic Artefacts Act No. 1710 (1710 sayılı Eski Eserler Kanunu) was promulgated on 25 April 1973. Until then, preservation law had been based on the 1906 Decree on Old Assets (Asar-ı Atika Nizamnamesi) which was mainly concerned with the export of archaeological artifacts. The new law was a milestone; it redefined cultural heritage, shifting its scale from objects to areas. Even though the Ministry of Culture had already been established in 1971, its related directories were mainly responsible for museums, archaeology and movable heritage, whereas the HC continued managing immovable heritage under the Ministry of Education. However, it should also be noted that the HC was always autonomous even though it operated under a ministry. In the societal chaos, the HC could generate a preservation scheme that was parallel to post-World War II European developments.
The HC was dedicated to defining restoration standards. It asked the Ministry of Education to apply for International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) membership in 1966Footnote 59 – Turkey became a member in 1969 – and asked other preservation-related departments to send their officers to UNESCO training sessions.Footnote 60 The Venice Charter was another important development that had an impact on Turkish preservation culture.Footnote 61 The HC formed a sub-committee to discuss and adapt the text to the Turkish context.Footnote 62 An autonomous second sub-committee was formed with members from universities and other state departments, including two HC members, to prepare a report on the principles of restoration to be urgently submitted to the HC.Footnote 63 After this process, the Venice Charter was accepted as the main regulatory text defining the principles of restoration in Turkey.Footnote 64
The text was translated into Turkish by Cevat Erder, who also served as the director of ICCROM from 1981 to 1988.Footnote 65 Erder, a Turkish archaeologist, also took the initiative in the establishment of the first conservation department in Turkey, for the ‘Maintenance and Repair of Historic Monuments’, in the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, in 1966. METU was founded with American aid to address the needs of the Middle East.Footnote 66 Architectural preservation began to be conceived of as a scientific discipline that required specialized expertise. The new conservation department accepted the Venice Charter as the definition of the foundational principles of the department. In the journal in which Erder's translation was published, Erder also criticized the HC for being too discreet and not publishing either their conservation approach or their decisions on various restoration projects.Footnote 67 As a heritage expert, Erder had demanded information on the working system and principles of the HC. After a delay of three decades, la carta del restauro was also translated into Turkish by another heritage expert, Doğan Kuban.Footnote 68
It should be noted that in the post-war period, in Europe and in the Anglo-Saxon world, there was a heritage boom.Footnote 69 One of the driving forces was the early 1960s’ UNESCO campaign in Nubia which was followed by the 1964 Venice Charter. US cold war policies had supported this campaign aligned with water and agricultural interests in the Middle East. As part of the same policies, Turkey had also received funding to undertake a major restoration project on the Sardis archaeological site.Footnote 70 The extensive research and careful implementations in Sardis reveal the theoretical concerns to uphold then universally valid principles, such as using original materials and distinguishing new materials from old ones in restoration works.Footnote 71
As the HC started to update preservation standards, it also forced other departments to enact these decisions. For instance, when the General Directorate of Pious Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü), which owned the Çifte Hamam, an Ottoman bath in the Sultanahmet Square, asked the HC if the baths could be repurposed as a museum of mannequins, the HC opposed this new use since it contradicted the principles outlined in the Venice Charter, and took a decision that the Çifte Hamam would be immediately restored as an Ottoman bath.Footnote 72 In the following decade, the Venice Charter was internationally criticized for not responding to practical needs. Most articles conflicted with each other. Moreover, implementations that strictly followed the rules of the Venice Charter were also criticized. Erder contributed to these international debates and argued that the Venice Charter also needed to be understood as an item of cultural heritage and should be preserved rather than being strictly followed as a doctrine.Footnote 73 This wave of conservation movements paved the way for the emergence of strong non-profit organizations in the 1970s.Footnote 74
In 1973, Turkey's first law on old artifacts was accepted by parliament. The most significant change it brought about was the introduction of the ‘conservation site’ (sit alanı) as a legal and regulatory category. Formerly, all the building lots (parsel) had been individually designated over large areas. Then the buildings in the parsel would become listed as a ‘registered structure’ (tescilli yapı) and the land deed would be annotated as a ‘historic structure’ (tarihi yapı). With this new law, areas could be registered as sit alanı instead of parsel. With this conceptual shift, Turkey was two years ahead of the Declaration of Amsterdam.Footnote 75 The Declaration of Amsterdam (Council of Europe, 1975) underlined the need for ‘integrated conservation’ which mainly addressed a conservation process rather than conservation of buildings.Footnote 76 In this process, local authorities were given a significant role in generating a conservation-minded urban policy. In Turkey, on the other hand, this process was mainly controlled by a single authority, the HC, which imposed its own understanding of historic preservation on local authorities who mostly reacted against this attitude. The new law also acknowledged the role of cultural heritage in economic development through tourism. The main motivation for the new law was these economic concerns.Footnote 77
The set of circumstances that defined historic preservation in the 1960s and 1970s can be summarized as the better institutionalization and conceptualization of architectural and urban heritage. The scale of ‘cultural heritage’ was redefined; European developments were simultaneously followed and adapted; there were attempts to raise the capabilities of the state to manage these developments, and the legislative background was also carefully designed with the new law in mind. However, this mind shift did not only prompt a centralized management system, but it also echoed a direct ‘translation’ of the 1970s’ European developments that conceived of historic preservation as a planning problem rather than an architectural problem. Esra Akcan used the term ‘translation’ to understand the process of transportation of people, technology, information and images, and she has argued that each translation exists on a spectrum between ‘appropriating translation’ (a foreign idea is assimilated to the local context) and ‘foreignizing translation’ (readers are reminded of the foreignness of the language).Footnote 78 I suggest that the HC's translation stood closer to the ‘foreignizing translation’ on that spectrum.
Preserving sit alanı: an unknown matter/a problem of definition
Despite the efforts to improve standards in historic preservation, throughout the 1960s, the lack of a national listing system for registering historic structures was still a problem for the HC. France's well-structured listing system was a source of aspiration for Turkish experts, yet the council lacked the manpower, time and budget to systematize a listing scheme. In addition, the regulations for the HC itself needed to be redefined.Footnote 79
Following the 1960 coup d’état, the new minister of education, Ahmet Tahtakılıç, had visited the HC and together they decided a new protocol could be signed between the Ministry of Education and the HC to redefine and improve the latter's structure. This protocol had improved the power of the HC by reinforcing its role in decisions about the sites of historic structures and their surroundings.Footnote 80 Accordingly, the workload of the HC increased; according to a letter presented to it by a member, Tahsin Öz, the HC was already overloaded with more than a hundred agenda items for each meeting whereas earlier meeting agendas would have had seven or eight items on them. In addition, new regulations held the HC responsible for the surroundings of historic structures. Öz's suggestion for resolving this problem was to study western methods for creating local conservation boards.Footnote 81 Even though local conservation boards were never established, the number of members was increased to allow representation for other departments, such as the Ministry of Tourism and Promotion (Turizm ve Basın-Yayın Bakanlığı).Footnote 82
With increased power, the HC could now make statements about issues that were not necessarily related to historic structures; for example, it criticized the poor quality of construction of new mosques.Footnote 83 Despite the efforts to improve standards in historic preservation, throughout the 1960s, old structures were steadily collapsing. To expedite the decision-making process in İstanbul, the HC generated a listing system in 1970 with three categories: buildings in which both the interior and the exterior should be preserved, buildings for which only the exterior should be preserved and buildings that could be demolished with HC consent. Footnote 84 This system was improved and applied to all listed structures in 1978.Footnote 85 However, the lack of a national inventory was still a problem for the HC.
The main problem regarding sit alanı designations was that no one knew exactly what a sit alanı was. For many municipalities, master plans were already causing enough problems since their implementation required expertise, a budget and specialized personnel that most municipalities lacked. During the preparation and approval process, plans would swiftly become outdated by new developments. When the HC designated an area a sit alanı, the local authorities would find themselves in a hopeless situation. The conflict between development and preservation was itself a cold war phenomenon. US support of historic preservation had stopped in the late 1960s and was replaced with support for regional development. Agricultural and water management investments initiated with that support, as seen in the case of Sardis, mostly contradicted regulations for the protection of archaeological areas.Footnote 86
The problems of municipalities regarding sit alanı designations were outlined via questionnaires in a doctoral thesis supported by the HC.Footnote 87 For the HC, designating a sit alanı simply meant to draw lines on a map in a regular meeting. For the lives of people who lived within those boundaries, and for local authorities, on the other hand, a sit alanı designation would have an immense impact. However, the process of designation lacked clarity. Many stakeholders shared authority over historic areas. When the HC designated an area a sit alanı, the authorities were obliged to prepare conservation master plans (KAİP – Koruma Amaçlı İmar Planı) which would overrule the existing master plans. According to the head of the HC, Orhan Alsaç, KAİPs should promote conservation, be integrated with and well connected to the new development zones, respect the values of the site and finally raise public consciousness.Footnote 88 However, it was confusing to work out which authority would be responsible for preparing a KAİP, which authority would implement it and which authority would control the implementation process. Was it the municipality, the ministry or another governmental body? Even if the stakeholders were clearly defined and even if they had the resources to prepare a KAİP, they would nevertheless hit the bureaucratic wall. In some cases, the approval of a KAİP would take years and meanwhile, the historic area would become even more dilapidated. Moreover, when a site was declared a sit alanı, the residents in that area would deliberately tear down their own property or expedite the deterioration mechanisms to evade their obligations with regard to the building lot. The building would become irreversibly damaged and there would be nothing left to restore. The condition of the infrastructure of the site would also subsequently become worse. Thus, when the HC decided that an area should be conserved, ironically it just worsened the condition of that area. The boundaries of sit alanıs were another problem for the authorities. These boundaries were determined by the HC without any research, sometimes without even a site visit for visual inspection. The HC would draw the boundaries as wide as possible and as a result, local authorities could not take any action within the designated area because until the HC defined temporary conditions prior to preparation of KAİP, no construction would be possible in a sit alanı.
Increasing authority under chaos
The political and social problems of Turkey and problems in the governmental structure had generated a chaotic bureaucratic scheme which the HC exploited to increase its own authority. This process and the power dynamics involved are evident in the letters from the HC to several public bodies. One example of this situation is the response of the HC to the Ministry of Tourism and Promotion's request to define precautions for structures becoming lost due to rapid urbanization.Footnote 89
It is decided that in almost all the old settlements in Anatolia, which has a magnificent past, there exist very significant buildings for both art and architecture history documenting social, economic and cultural levels of their period; that it is a duty before everything else to transfer to future generations these diverse buildings which provided the most accurate information on former civilizations for the present day; that rapid urbanization cannot be an excuse to destroy these cultural values;…that preservation of buildings with cultural value is an issue in the 1961 constitution as much as it is a personal responsibility for future generations; that this responsibility towards future generations cannot be taken only by the state or by individuals; that it is the most natural act for historic property owners to preserve their properties with a consciousness towards history; that the state supports these individuals in this duty which has certain burdens; that the state support is a requirement of the 50th article of our constitution and the Old Artifact Law with no. 1710.Footnote 90
Similarly, in other letters the HC failed to clearly state what action it really required from the office that received the letter. These letters were mostly written to educate their readers. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Justice also received a letter from the HC asking them to give priority to the cases of illegal activities that the HC reported to the prosecution office.Footnote 91 In 1978, the HC asked the Ministry of Justice to regulate penalties for graffiti, signboards, etc., relating to old structures.Footnote 92 The HC also criticized municipalities for having an anti-preservation attitude and advised the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) to collect a portion of taxes to fund restoration projects (‘in very small amounts like two pennies (kuruş)’ from municipal costs, leisure activities (‘cinema, theatre, bars’), housing permits, etc.).Footnote 93 Finally in 1980, the HC sent a letter to parliament:
Even though it is a constitutional requirement for the state to protect our old artifacts which are properties of our state and invaluable documents of our culture, so far, the state has not provided any support for the owners who have protected, on the contrary, those who have demolished artifacts and caused the loss of old artifacts have become rich with the new buildings they constructed and presented a bad model for good citizens.
…we request…also in this new law…90% tax reduction should be provided.Footnote 94
These letters received a critical reaction since the HC was an office established under the Ministry of Culture, despite its autonomous structure. While the HC exploited the bureaucratic chaos to preserve cultural heritage, this increasing power signalled the first steps of reaction within the state itself. The HC was a source of inconvenience for local authorities.Footnote 95
The council was conceived of as an elite making decisions behind closed doors. Çeçener, the general secretary of the HC stated that no application from individuals would be accepted: ‘I would be rude and tactless to those disrespectful ones who came to the council to ask for information about their cases. I kicked out many people like this. I was also very intolerant to those architects who were trying to get their work done by being close to the council.’Footnote 96
In September 1980, a military coup redefined the power relations from scratch, excluding the HC. The coup transformed Turkey into a neoliberal state.Footnote 97 After three decades, the HC was terminated in one of the most dramatic political events in modern Turkish history. The head of the HC desperately wrote letters to new ministries as well as to the leading field marshal of the coup asking for an appointment; however, he received no response.Footnote 98 In 1981, the Ministry of Development and Housing sent a confidential document to the HC. Most parts of this document were redacted and only the sentences that concerned the HC were readable. The HC's response to the ministry's letter was that the country urgently needed an inventory of old structures and a listing mechanism to register all old structures.Footnote 99 Ironically, this was an issue that the HC had suffered from since its establishment by Ali Saim Ülgen.Footnote 100
In 1983, a new ‘old artifacts law’, Law No. 2863, was accepted by the parliament. The new law also systematized tax regulations for historic structures. This time, the HC made no contribution to the preparation process. Under this law, the HC was replaced by regional boards, regional councils for Conservation of Cultural and Natural Assets (Kültür ve Tabiat Varlıklarını Koruma Bölge Kurulları) along with a new Ankara-based High Council. In this structure, the High Council made principle decisions and regional boards made decisions based on these principle decisions. Moreover, the objections to the regional council decisions would be evaluated by the High Council. This law set up an institutional fragmentation process that led to the contemporary heritage management scheme operating in Turkey. This law has been in force since 1983.
Conclusion
In the 1950s, the Turkish parliament comprised a group of elected elites that represented the reaction of the voters who had been repressed by Republican power in the preceding decades. Throughout the 1950s, the new government gradually increased its power and initiated extensive urban projects in İstanbul. Most of these projects were controversial in terms of the damage they caused in historic quarters of the city. In this period, the HC operated as a scientific body under a strong centralized authority and it responded to this authority by complying with its needs. When a coup d’état detained all government members in 1960, a new breaking point was also defined in terms of historic preservation. In this period, the HC could finally find a power gap to impose its own standards on historic preservation. European developments were contemporaneously adopted into the Turkish preservation system. The next two decades saw increased political and social chaos: militant political terror became a part of daily life, and the HC was at the height of its power. The lack of a central governing structure generated a liberated bureaucratic space where the HC could practise its own power to improve the standards of preservation in Turkey. However, these standards were limited to bureaucratic policies that did not answer to local needs. In 1980, the HC's power was surpassed by another coup d’état. Even though the HC defined and imposed high standards in historic preservation for three decades, these standards mostly remained as unworkable policies.
