Ever since China's announcements in 2013 of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road initiative – also known as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (yi dai yi lu changyi “一带一路” 倡议), this initiative has raised much scepticism. Defined by China as a key to its future economic development and mentioned in the Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party as a major means to promote China's international cooperation,Footnote 1 this one-trillion-dollar vision is widely regarded as too ambitious and vague. Together with doubts about China's ability to raise the required resources and to rest BRI investments on a solid economic rationale, there are concerns about its ability to establish multilateral collaborations on trade, finance, and infrastructure projects in the BRI realm.Footnote 2
Certainly, such collaborations are the basis of BRI; and this vision also includes separate bilateral collaborations between China and particular countries. But the latter could go forward outside the BRI framework as well; allowing them a central place would justify the claim that there is basically nothing new about BRI.Footnote 3 Therefore, as officially stated, the substance of the BRI vision is connectivity all across Eurasia,Footnote 4 which requires the construction and governance of cross-border transportation infrastructure and economic activities throughout countries located in this geopolitical realm. The economic reasoning behind this guideline is obvious. In the words of the economist Peter Wolf, “the benefits of the comprehensive initiative will only accrue when a number of projects get built in a several adjacent countries. The effects will be limited when individual countries move forward on their own…”Footnote 5
The formation of such cross-border collaborations is highly challenging however, and scepticism about BRI centres on the creation of sustainable economic cooperation between countries that experience unbalanced economic and political development and have different trade conditions; many of them are on a low level of economic and political development.Footnote 6 Overcoming these obstacles will be hard without the involvement of a third party in providing incentives for enduring collaboration, mediation, and problem solving. As BRI's initiator and main driving force, this role should naturally be assumed by China. Indeed, one of BRI's defining documents states that under BRI, “efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road;” and “Enhancing policy coordination is an important guarantee for implementing the Initiative.”Footnote 7
In undertaking this role China will have to exercise diplomatic skills, make large economic investments, and operate efficient mechanisms.Footnote 8 These undertakings are highly demanding – and not only economically and diplomatically as has been suggested. Largely overlooked so far is that to realize the BRI, China may be forced to compromise on one of the basic features of its foreign policy: maintaining a low level of political involvement in regions beyond its traditional sphere of influence. There precisely it may have to become more involved in regional politics, inter alia by promoting and facilitating collaboration between rival countries as well as building and exercising influence in those countries’ political and business circles.
The Middle East is such a case, being an integral part of the BRI on the one hand, and a region which China has stayed away of its politics on the other. To be sure, that dilemma has been considered in China. Tian Wenlin 田文林, a Middle East expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argues that insofar as the Middle East is concerned, China should limit BRI's goals to economic development while restraining its political involvement. Failing to do so may overstretch its resources, antagonize Russia and India, and ultimately put it at risk.Footnote 9 However, such a requirement may place considerable constraints on BRI's implementation. Exploring China's business-first approach to that region, Sun 孙 and Zoubir found that protecting its expanding commercial interests there while eschewing political entanglement may prove impractical and make it harder for Beijing to reap economic benefits.Footnote 10
Aiming to provide an additional perspective on the BRI implementation puzzle while expanding the discussion on China's business-first approach to the Middle East and its complexities, in this article I intertwine these subjects by exploring the implications of China's limited political involvement in the Middle East on BRI's realization in that region. I examine the reasons why political involvement is required for BRI's implementation and the courses that BRI can take if China avoids such involvement. The exploration is conducted by a detailed examination of BRI's implementation in Israel. Israel's location at the junction of Asia and Africa and between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as its strengthening economic connections with China, economic development, and relative stability make it a natural participant in BRI. At the same time, Israel's complex relations with other Middle East countries, the subjection of China–Israel relations to the China–US–Israel dynamic, and Israel's liberal-democratic political system can raise significant challenges to BRI's implementation in that part of Asia. Tackling these challenges – mostly those related to connectivity, will presumably require significantly greater Chinese involvement in related regional and domestic affairs. To be sure, China can avoid such increased engagement and still realize some BRI-related activities. As detailed below, the BRI includes a large variety of activities that do not require heavy political involvement by China in local and regional politics. But limiting BRI's activity in Israel to such collaborations, while avoiding connectivity projects, will allow only partial exploitation of Israel's potential contribution to this vision. Arguably, this situation holds for other Middle East countries as well. Regardless of the distinctiveness of Israel's position in the Middle East, its case is not unique: regional conflicts cross basically all Middle East countries, which are similarly enmeshed in complex relations with other world powers.
The article begins with a brief presentation of China's approach to the Middle East. Next, following a short depiction of China–Israel relations it examines Israel's participation in BRI-oriented connectivity and non-connectivity projects. Then it analyses the challenges these projects face and their implications for China's engagement in the Middle East. The concluding section presents the article's main findings.
China's Approach to the Middle East
China's interest in the Middle East since the mid-1990s has largely focused on securing its access to the region's energy sources, and to a lesser degree to increase its share in its developing markets. Supplying in the mid-2010s over 50 per cent of China's imported oil and more than 25 per cent of its oil consumption, the Middle East has become an irreplaceable source for its energy needs in the foreseeable future. Concurrently, the Middle East is a growing destination for China's labour, construction companies and export goods, as well as its investments. Between 2004 and 2014 China's trade with the Middle East grew from US$40 billion to over US$300 billion, thus increasing its share in China's total foreign trade from 3.8 to over 7 per cent.Footnote 11 China's investments in the greater Middle East (a definition equivalent to China's Foreign Ministry list of West Asian and North Africa countries) between 2005 and 2016 totalled US$143 billion, about 9.5 per cent of its entire outward direct investment.Footnote 12 According to various analyses, the Middle East's share in China's economy will increase significantly in the next few decades.Footnote 13
Important as well is China's strategic interest in the Middle East. This has undergone several developments over the years following changes in China's foreign policy – in the Middle East and in the international system. Since the Maoist period China has regarded the predominance of any superpower – be it the Soviet Union or the US – in that region as a strategic risk.Footnote 14 After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, that concern was somewhat mitigated as China saw how regional resentment of the US increased and the US found it ever more difficult to cope with the region's turbulence.
But that turbulence has also been regarded by China as the source of rising radical Islamic terrorism in the region.Footnote 15 In the mid-2000s Beijing already perceived the Middle East as a threat to its national security due to connections between Muslim terrorist organizations there (e.g. Al-Qaeda) and separatist Uyghur groups in China. The Middle East fragmentation since the early 2010s and the consequent rise of Islamic State (ISIS) have heightened this concern. First, such terror organizations might inflate separatist sentiments and terror activity in the Uyghur minority by providing it with military means and know-how as well as encouragement and radical ideas. Second, these organizations, in conjunction with terrorist groups in other Muslim states along China's western borders, may execute terror attacks on Chinese territory, especially in Xinjiang. Third, radical Islamic terrorism can target Chinese workers and facilities in the Middle East (and elsewhere), which have grown significantly following China's expanding economic activity in the region.Footnote 16 China's assessment that hundreds of Chinese Uyghurs have joined ISIS fighting in Syria and Iraq – and its constraints to respond to this due to its lack of reliable regional allies as well as its incapacity and unwillingness to operate there militarily – have only intensified these concerns. Those Uyghur militants, as Beijing sees it, would return to China equipped with stronger capabilities and motivation to carry out terrorist and other anti-state activities.Footnote 17
Finally, and way behind, as China began seeking a world power position in the late 2000s, it started assigning the region greater diplomatic importance. Conceiving the Arab countries as its natural (though not always actual) allies against the superpowers since the mid-1950s, Beijing sees them as potential supporters (or followers) in its effort to modify the West-dominated world order.Footnote 18 This aspiration is closely linked to the two major interconnected considerations mentioned above: it impels China to increase its presence in that part of the world and somewhat counterbalance US dominance there, inasmuch as it does not weaken US efforts to stabilize the region or harm its relations with it on other fronts.
Achieving these diverse objectives however, requires different sets of behaviours. To maximize economic benefits China has adopted an “everyone's friend” approach, with limited political engagement in the region. As Beijing sees it, taking sides openly in regional conflicts or playing a dominant role in their resolution, confronting the US directly, and actively joining the international effort against terrorist organizations in the region (mostly ISIS) will incur substantial economic and political costs for China, and may bog it down in the region's conflicts. On the other hand, “standing aloof” may contradict China's other interests in the region. Diplomatic involvement in Middle East conflicts is regarded in Beijing as a means to enhance its world power status,Footnote 19 while the structural changes the region has been undergoing since the early 2010s provide an opportunity to consolidate its position there.Footnote 20
Attempting to address the new challenges while preserving the advantages of the limited-engagement attitude, China since the late 2000s has blended some new ingredients into its policy for the region. Contrary to its traditional approach, it has started to build bridges to opposition groups as well as highlight its involvement in the region's conflicts.Footnote 21 It has even become somewhat more active militarily (or rather semi-militarily) in the region. Among other things, it participates partially in the international anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, conducts joint military exercises in the region, and has established a military-logistic base in Djibouti. Most importantly in this respect, the Middle East has become a prominent part of China's strategic plans since the late 2000s and early 2010s to increase its engagement in its western peripheries.
Arguably, the BRI encapsulates all these goals and subsequent modes of operation while integrating the Middle East into China's grand vision. By assigning China a dominant role in developing Asian countries’ infrastructures and economies, it addresses Beijing's security concerns along its western periphery and provides it with new long-term economic growth engines. Concurrently it reshapes the global division of spheres of influence and peacefully makes China a world power of a new type.Footnote 22
Still, China's political and military engagement in the region remains limited. Its UN Security Council vetoes on Middle Eastern issues follow Russia's, its mainly symbolic peace proposals are not seriously followed up, and despite its expressed concern regarding ISIS, it refuses to join the international coalition against it. Attempting to explain this gap, An Huihou 安惠侯, China's former ambassador to various Arab states, said bluntly in 2013 that the intensity of China's involvement in the Middle East had changed, but its basic policy for that region remained the same.Footnote 23 This theme was reiterated in a 2016 RAND report, which argued that China was “eager to engage commercially with the region and remain on good terms with all states in the Middle East but most reluctant to deepen its engagement…beyond the minimum required to make money and ensure energy flows.”Footnote 24 Explaining this utilitarian approach, some Chinese sources claim that challenges at home do not allow China to invest resources in solving the Middle East's problems.Footnote 25
Another, rather more complex, explanation sees China's Middle East policy at a crossroads: it has reached the point where its basic guidelines no longer serve China's interests and intentions in the region.Footnote 26 Making the required adjustments is not easy though. One reason is that China's Middle East policy has been largely governed by two separate ministries (as well as influential economic players, notably the big energy companies): the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of commerce, neither of which has a separate Middle East department.Footnote 27 Since the mid-2010s there have been indications (e.g. the 2016 publication of China's Arab Policy Paper) that China has managed to outline new policy guidelines for the Middle East;Footnote 28 however, actual deviation from its traditional “standing aloof” approach to the region is yet to be seen.
BRI Implementation in Israel
Israel's geopolitical location makes it a natural participant in the BRI initiative – a connection also well suited to current developments in China–Israel relations, which centre on an array of economic collaborative projects. Israel indeed features in Chinese documents and analyses as one of this mega-initiative's participants. For instance, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ annual report on Israel called Israel an important (zhongyao 重要) participant country in the BRI vision.Footnote 29 Also, a Xinhua 新华 report regarded the signing of agreements between Israel and Chinese companies on the construction and operation of Israeli seaports as another step in the Sino-Israeli BRI cooperation.Footnote 30 Examining the various collaborations between the two states, Xiao Xian 肖宪, a Middle East expert at Yunnan University, argues that “in China's strategy of the ‘Belt and Road’, Israel is an important key state in the Middle East…”Footnote 31 The question, however, is to what extent and in what ways do the challenges involving the realization of BRI in Israel require China's engagement in local and regional politics. This largely depends on the nature of projects in which Israel is involved: whether they involve China and Israel alone or whether they cross borders. The latter kind is mostly associated with connectivity projects. But it also depends on the nature of China–Israel relations. The following section begins with a brief overview of these ties. Then we examine the various BRI-related projects in which Israel is, or potentially will be, involved.
Israel–China relations
China's relations with Israel have been influenced by three main determinants: Israel's close relations with the US, China's relations with the Arab world, and Israel's advanced technology. Beijing's interest in Israel goes back to the early days of Communist China, when Israel was the first Middle East country and one of the first non-Communist countries to recognize it. Israel has also consistently supported Beijing's One China principle, although diplomatic relations between the states were formed only in 1992. Yet the bilateral aspects of the relations have always been subject to broader developments and considerations. Israel decided in the early 1950s to avoid diplomatic relations with China out of concern for the US response. Then China's rapprochement with the Arab world and its political radicalization ruled out that possibility. Relations began to heal in 1979, due to China's interest in Israeli military technologies. Assuming that the US would not object, Jerusalem acquiesced and the two states thereafter collaborated in defence technology for two decades, during which diplomatic relations were established after Beijing assumed that the Arab frontline against Israel had been fragmented.Footnote 32
In 2000 these relations faced their first serious crisis, when just before Israel was to deliver to China the Phalcon airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) it had purchased several years before, Jerusalem succumbed to US pressure and cancelled the deal unilaterally. Five years later Israel irritated Washington again, and was obliged to renege on its commitment to maintain (or upgrade) the Harpy assault UAVs it had supplied China in the 1990s. Consequently, the US and Israel agreed that all sensitive technology transfers from Israel to China would be subject to US monitoring.Footnote 33 That put an end to the Sino-Israeli arms sales and placed them under intense strain generally. Diplomatic relations continued and bilateral trade even increased, but China ultimately understood the impact of the US on its relations with Israel and cooled off its connections with Jerusalem.
That changed in 2011, when Beijing resumed improving its relations with Israel – for reasons that can only be speculated. One consideration was probably the combination of China's growing dependence on Middle East oil and its realization following the Arab Spring that it should increase its engagement in, and understanding of, this region. Israel's outstanding stability as against the regional chaos, and its relative openness made it a plausible basis for activity.Footnote 34 This was supplemented by three complementary considerations. First, China's quest for advanced technologies increased Israel's attractiveness due to its high degree of innovation.Footnote 35 Secondly, in the late 2000s China decided to start playing a big power role, among other things by gradually counterbalancing US diplomatic dominance.Footnote 36 Strengthening relations with traditional US allies – Israel included – was probably part of it.
Thirdly, China apparently looked for cooperation with Israel on counterterrorism. Now Israel is not the ideal partner for China. Its counterterrorism activity against Palestinian groups is harshly criticized by Muslim states – China's traditional partners in the Middle East. On the other hand, as Chinese analyses of Israel's confrontation with Muslim terrorism show, China seems to deem such cooperation useful; these analyses suggest that Israel's operational experience and methods in counter-Muslim terrorism is relevant for China.Footnote 37 And indeed, in the early 2010s some cooperation between the states started. Reportedly, this included – but was not necessarily limited to – training of China's People's Armed Police units by Israeli Border Guard units in various counterterrorism-related activities.Footnote 38
Israel welcomed Beijing's rapprochement. Well aware of China's astonishing economic burgeoning, it regards economic connections between them as a significant growth engine. Politically, it assumes that unlike European countries China distinguishes economic from political affairs. In particular, Jerusalem assumes that Beijing will not exploit their economic relations to manipulate Israel's conduct in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Footnote 39 In May 2014 Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the recent economic agreements concluded with developing economies, including China, were “our answer to those who seek to isolate us.”Footnote 40 The tension between Netanyahu and the Obama administration was relevant in this context. That same year he said: “Israel should build a set of interests with everyone. For example, China is greatly interested in Israeli technology… Israel should form a set of interests and partnerships with all world powers.”Footnote 41
And indeed, starting in the early 2010s there could be no mistaking the strengthening China-Israel relations. The first and probably clearest sign (whose symbolism was overlooked in Israel) was Beijing's 2011 invitation to Israel's defence minister Ehud Barak. Until the cut-off of the arms transfers between the two states in 2000, the Ministry of Defence played a major role in the Sino-Israeli relations. The invitation of the Minister of Defence – the same person who as prime minister had ordered the cancellation of the Phalcon deal a decade earlier – reflected Beijing's willingness to let bygones be bygones and was followed by a stream of high-level exchanges between the countries, including the visit in May 2013 of an Israeli prime minister (Netanyahu). Learning from past lessons, the two states shifted the centre of gravity from military to economic relations. Beside its direct benefits, such a focus was acceptable to both the US (in Israel's case) and the Arab states (in China's case). And indeed, economic collaboration, which till then had been largely limited to trade, expanded significantly: growing Chinese investments in Israel, business and governmental scientific-technological collaboration, and – most important in the BRI context – a surge of Chinese involvement in national-scale infrastructure projects in Israel.Footnote 42
Still, overcoming the 2000 and 2005 crises and the successful shift to economic collaboration notwithstanding, the fundamental factors underlying relations remained unchanged. The US-Israel understandings on Israel's technology transfers to China kept the US a crucial factor in China–Israel relations. Similarly, China's pro-Arab line did not harm its expanding collaboration with Israel, but it remained a source of Israeli concern.
Israel and BRI-related connectivity projects
As BRI's clearest feature and goal is connecting China with other parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe through a web of land and sea routes, Israel's possible involvement in the enterprise can lie in two separate realms: first, in view of its geopolitical location it can serve as an important transition point for BRI's ground and maritime routes. Second, as one of the most politically stable and economically and technologically developed countries along BRI's Asian routes, it can serve as a regional hub for BRI-related economic and logistic activities. Among other things, it can be a destination for large-scale transportation projects, and concurrently host industrial and logistic centres established or served by Chinese companies. The most ambitious project in this context is the planned railroad that will form a ground transportation line between the Red Sea, and by extension the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean. That line, known as the Red-Med railway, will connect Eilat on the Red Sea to Ashdod on the Mediterranean. According to Israel, it may also join up with the Jordanian railway system at Aqaba.Footnote 43
To be sure, when the decision to build that line was taken, Prime Minister Netanyahu already regarded the project as a part of his government's strategic decision to enhance economic ties with China. Chinese firms were envisaged to fulfil a major role in the construction work, and the entire project was aimed at developing a Chinese economic interest in Israel.Footnote 44 Later, after China announced the BRI plan, Netanyahu repeated this message: presenting a plan for the Eilat–Ashdod railroad in December 2013, he mentioned that such a transportation line “will be important for global trade and Chinese trade.”Footnote 45 A few weeks later he reiterated this idea: “China has to ship many of its goods to major Western markets, including Europe…The Eilat–Ashdod train is first of all an economic connection from China to Europe.”Footnote 46 And indeed, from the very beginning the Israeli transportation ministry started searching for a Chinese company to lay the railway.Footnote 47
By providing a land route that supplements the Suez Canal, such a railroad may well blend with BRI's logic. First, the capacity of the 350-km high-speed railway is greatly constricted in comparison with the Suez Canal, but it still provides some alternative, thus serving China's strategic intention to minimize dependency on specific transportation routes. Secondly, if BRI is largely about providing investment and work opportunities for Chinese companies,Footnote 48 the construction of this multi-billion-dollar project meets this goal as well.
In addition, Chinese companies seem interested in having a foothold in Israeli seaports. In 2014 the China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) won tenders to build a new port in Ashdod, and in 2015 China's Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) won a tender to operate the new port in Haifa for 25 years.Footnote 49 While Ashdod port may be the terminal of the Red-Med railway, Haifa port could be a major hub on another sea–land pathway in BRI. In November 2016 Israel completed the construction of a railway from Haifa to Beit She'an, a city on Israel's eastern border. The long-term plan, as already discussed between the Israeli and Jordanian authorities, is to connect the railway to the Jordanian railway system through Sheikh Hussein Bridge – the international border crossing between Irbid in Jordan and Beit She'an in Israel, and perhaps even connect Jordan to other Middle East states.Footnote 50 Such a route, if it materializes, can connect the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf, and may provide Chinese companies various opportunities to construct and operate its diverse components. It may also serve as another ground alternative to the Suez Canal and provide opportunities for Chinese companies to establish industrial parks and logistics hubs along its route.
Other BRI-related projects
A different type of Israeli involvement in BRI is its participation in financial, economic, scientific-technological, and even cultural initiatives associated with it. BRI's declared content is highly comprehensive. Activities associated with it include, inter alia, the reduction of trade barriers and expansion of mutual investments, industrial coordination and professional training, financial integration, cultural and academic exchange, and tourism expansion.Footnote 51 In line with this list, basically any economic, scientific-technological, or cultural activity between Israel and China can be regarded as implementation of BRI.Footnote 52 This, however, does not make much sense since such activities can take place regardless of BRI. In other words, their very existence does not in itself indicate the implementation of BRI in Israel.
Non-connectivity activities that Israel has undertaken and that can be associated more distinctly with BRI are its decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and to conclude a free trade agreement (FTA) with China. From China perspective, Israel's application for membership of AIIB has indeed indicated its interest to be part of the BRI. The opening paragraph of the section “Israel's Positive Response to ‘One Belt, One Road’ Proposal” in China Academy of Social Sciences’ 2016 Blue Book on Israel depicts Israel's positive response to China's invitation to be one of AIIB's founding members.Footnote 53 From Israel's perspective, however, the application to AIIB was involved with only marginal risks and costs and could therefore be made. Israel announced its willingness to join AIIB after other US allies had joined the bank. Nor was its price too high: a capital subscription of US$749.9 million in five annual instalments.Footnote 54 The benefits, on the other hand, were deemed quite considerable. According to Israel's foreign ministry, being part of AIIB provides Israeli companies the chance to integrate into various infrastructure projects. In addition, after being excluded from regional Asian frameworks since the 1950s, the attachment to AIIB provided Israel a rare opportunity to join “major Asian organizations.”Footnote 55 Finally, Israel regarded this move as a way to consolidate its relations with China. Its formal announcement of its participation in AIIB included the following: “The establishment of AIIB is one of the most important initiatives in terms of Chinese foreign policy and in particular for President Xi Jinping…”Footnote 56
The formation of the FTA with Israel (whenever it materializes) is regarded by China as part of the BRI as well. A Global Times article explained that China “will actively promote FTA negotiations with countries and regions along the routes of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”Footnote 57 The formation of an FTA with Israel is part of this strategy. Indeed, when announcing the launch of FTA discussions with Israel, China's Ministry of Commerce spokesman said that “Israel is China's major economic and trade partner in the Middle East and along the route of China-proposed ‘belt and road’ initiative.”Footnote 58 Yet it is noteworthy that the China–Israel FTA neither promotes regional connectivity nor involves aspects of regionalism. Thus its implementation does not require any deepening of China's political involvement in the region.
The Challenges of BRI Implementation
The fullest form of Israel's participation in the BRI initiative is the laying of the visionary Red-Med and Haifa–Beit She'an–Jordan railroads. The realization of these projects is also the most challenging task. Of the two, the Haifa–Beit She'an–Jordan project seems more feasible because important parts of its physical infrastructure are already in place and Chinese companies are involved: as noted, China's SIPG has received the concession to operate the new terminal of Haifa port, and China has already signed agreements with Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the construction of railroads.Footnote 59 Still, the materialization of this route depends on the conclusion of agreements and arrangements between Israel and Jordan concerning the integration of their railway systems, including related commercial and financial aspects. This is a challenging task because of the political-legal-bureaucratic complications that accompany any such agreement, but also because of the ideological-political baggage that encumbers any interaction between Israel and Arab countries. To be sure, since the signing of the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1994, and as part of it, the two states have collaborated economically on various aspects. Economic interaction is also going ahead between Israel and other Arab countries.Footnote 60 However, these activities – for example, the supply of natural gas by Israel to Jordan – draw criticism in the Jordanian public and are downplayed by the involved parties.Footnote 61
Even if a ground transportation line between Israel and Jordan is established, its uninterrupted operation – hence its profitability – might be stymied by local and regional conflicts. As past events indicate, eruption of crises between Israel and the Palestinians, or between Israel and other Middle East players, can severely impact Israel's connections with regional states with which it already has diplomatic relations. For instance, the cooling off of its relations with Turkey following the Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, in which Turkish citizens were killed during an attempt to penetrate the blockade on the Gaza strip, severely damaged Turkish-Israeli economic cooperation. Such an outcome can befall the Israeli-Jordanian railroad if a regional crisis in which Israel is involved erupts, even if Jordan is not directly involved in it.
This kind of challenge is less likely in the Red-Med project – especially if it does not include Jordan – because the smooth operation of this line is not dependent on any third party. But it may face other substantial difficulties. Economically, the cost-effectiveness of this project is questionable since the railway's capacity is only a small fraction of the Suez Canal volume. In addition, when the price of oil is low, sailing to West Africa around South Africa may still be a cheaper and shorter alternative to using the Red-Med railway.Footnote 62 Thus, it is more realistic to regard the Red-Med railway as an expensive small-scale backup to the Suez Canal rather than an alternative. Politically, the negligible capacity of this line notwithstanding, it may still irritate Egypt, whose economy depends heavily on the Suez Canal. Reportedly, after the plan to build this railroad was revealed, Egypt sent a message to China about its opposition to such a project.Footnote 63 This circumstance may thwart Israel, which ascribes great strategic importance to its relations with Cairo, and probably also China, which has invested hundreds of millions dollars in construction work to secure and improve the Suez Canal.Footnote 64 And if the Red-Med project does include Jordan, then many of the complexities detailed above in the context of the Haifa–Beit She'an–Jordan railroad will be applicable in this case too.
Israel's complex position in the Middle East can impact BRI implementation indirectly as well. In addition to physical infrastructure, connectivity throughout Eurasia requires political stability and security in this region. As of the mid-2010s, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict no longer tops the list of destabilizing factors in the Middle East,Footnote 65 but under radical circumstances Israel can still undermine the region. Jerusalem's threat to launch a military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities was such a case. If such an attack had been executed it might have flared into a regional conflict with far-reaching consequences. While the likelihood of an act on that scale is quite small, it cannot be ruled out.
A different type of challenge to BRI projects in Israel relates to the unique features of China–Israel relations. Over the years China and Israel have collaborated in various areas in which they share similar or complementary interests. Still, their relations have remained subject to the US–China confrontation and to China's pro-Arab policy. To overcome this obstacle they have shifted the focus of relations to civilian economic fields, but this has not eliminated them entirely. One development that should be noted in this respect is a rise in China–US tension in the Middle East; should this occur, Israel may become subject to American pressure to cool its China zeal. As long as Israel's special relations with the US remain unchanged – and no change is envisaged in the foreseeable future – it will reluctantly, but undoubtedly, comply with such a demand. Scenarios that lead to such an outcome are countless, and it is pointless to predict how they will unfold. It is not unreasonable to venture, however, that such developments may take place. Another possibility is that closer relations between Israeli and Chinese companies will intimidate US companies operating in Israel and lead them to reconsider their involvement there.Footnote 66 In that case Israeli companies – or the Israeli authorities – can be expected to reconsider the cost–benefit of economic collaboration with China.
Such reconsideration by Israel may result from developments other than deterioration in China-US relations. From the start of Chinese companies’ involvement in infrastructure projects and investments in Israel, this involvement has been subject to criticism by Israeli politicians, officials, scientists and businessmen. A large part of the criticism concerns China's possible draining of Israel's technological advantage.Footnote 67 But it also concerns national security calculations. According to some critics, the Middle East is part of the China–US global confrontation, and due to its global and regional interests China is inclined to develop good relations with Iran, Syria and other fierce rivals of Israel. For these reasons there have been warnings in Israel that China is becoming a stakeholder in the Middle East whose interests may contradict Israel's. Efraim Halevy, former head of the Mossad, Israel's intelligence organization, explained bluntly his objection to the participation of Chinese companies in the Red-Med project: “China is promoting major projects in our area intended to establish points of influence, via the sea and via the ports, which could assist the enemies of Israel, among other things, to greatly increase their capabilities against Israel.”Footnote 68 Such criticism is augmented by concerns about the close affiliation of many Chinese corporations to the Chinese regime. Such companies, opponents have claimed, should be regarded as an extension of their regime, and by acquiring local companies they further Chinese governmental control of important Israeli connections and access to information, technological resources, and other essential assets.Footnote 69 Even if these charges are groundless, under certain political circumstances they can keep Chinese companies out of infrastructure projects in Israel.
Finally, BRI realization in Israel can face challenges on the state level. The current momentum of Chinese companies’ involvement in Israel's infrastructure projects is the outcome of particular political circumstances in Israel: enthusiasm of the Netanyahu government for relations with China, and strong support for transportation infrastructure projects. One major force behind these trends, particularly the latter, is Israel's Minister of Transportation Israel Katz. Serving in this post for eight years at the time of this writing, when the average ministerial term in Israel since 1990 has been little more than a year,Footnote 70 and occupying central positions in the ruling Likud party,Footnote 71 Katz was able to initiate an exceptional number of large-scale transportation infrastructure projects during his term in office. In addition, Katz promoted the participation of Chinese companies in the construction work, claiming that those companies offer cheap tenders and speedy schedules, as well as partly financing the contracted projects.Footnote 72
Considering Israel's cumbersome bureaucracy and the political-economic-legal barriers that normally hinder large-scale infrastructure projects, the current political conditions in Israel are highly supportive of BRI-associated projects there. These conditions, however, cannot be taken for granted and may change following changes in the government or changing of the government.
BRI Implementation: Implications for China's Engagement in the Middle East
Materialization of the BRI in Israel, more particularly the Red-Med and Haifa–Beit She'an–Jordan connectivity projects, entails various challenges at all levels of analysis. These challenges are related to certain features of China–Israel relations, such as Israeli concern over China's relations with other Middle East countries, but also to factors above and beyond that level: possible spillover of China–US tension to the Middle East, negative sentiments in the region to any sort of collaboration with Israel, or political developments inside Israel. Broadly speaking, these challenges can be divided into three groups, each concerned with the materialization of a certain set of conditions: first, reduction of Arab resistance to cross-border economic collaborations with Israel, forming such collaborations, and confirming their sustainability; second, management of potential US concerns over Israel's participation in large-scale and cross-border economic projects associated with China; third, expanding and confirming Israel's support for intensive Chinese involvement in national-scale infrastructure projects or cross-border economic collaborations. In view of the projects of concern and the challenges they involve, creating the conditions underlying their realization requires a large degree of involvement by Beijing in regional and domestic politics in the Middle East.
Handling Arab resentment is mostly relevant to the Haifa–Beit She'an––Jordan railroad. Given the political and legal-financial complexities it entails, active mediation between the involved states seems almost a must for its materialization. Among the undertakings that a mediator may need to carry out are presenting the parties with a vision they can share, providing them with a set of incentives to operate the project, sharing some of the financial burden related to the establishment of this line, and perhaps also erecting a cover for the project to play down Israel's role.Footnote 73 In addition, the mediator will have to play an active part in the negotiations and the long-term operation of this project, including the formulation of creative solutions whenever a regional crisis threatens the operation of this line. Such measures require Beijing to become closely acquainted with the Jordanian and Israeli bureaucracies and legal-economic ecologies, as well as with their political and economic interests and sensitivities. It must also build means of influence within the relevant sectors in each country, as well as showing willingness to exercise those means as appropriate. The Red-Med requires active involvement also because of its questionable cost-effectiveness and the resistance it is likely to face by various groups both in Israel and in Egypt. In view of these challenges, the project's initiation can be expected to require, inter alia, a combination of financial investments and political lobbying among large circles of decision makers, politicians (from coalition and opposition parties alike) and opinion makers.
Concurrently other measures may have to be applied to prevent or address US reservations against, and Israeli concerns over, Chinese involvement in strategic projects of this kind. These may include, but not be limited to, more extensive dialogues between China and each of the countries on its intentions and activities in the Middle East, greater collaboration with the US in the region, sharing a heavier burden of the stabilization efforts taking place there, and better clarifying the contents and limits of its various relationships in the Middle East. In addition, China will have to convince the Shi'ite allies in the region, as well as Russia, that these projects do not put their interests in the region at risk.
These requirements notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that China is probably better equipped than most other powers to play a leading role in such initiatives. Maintaining good relations with all the involved parties and being already engaged in large-scale construction and logistics projects in the region, it is regarded as a pragmatic power with no direct interests in regional conflicts. Even when it officially supports one side (as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) this has only limited practical implications. Beijing's ability in 2009 to force the Turkish President Erdogan to tone down his attacks against China's crackdown on the Uyghur population also demonstrates its ability to impose its will on regional players when it has a clear interest to do so.Footnote 74 And if needed, China can seek assistance from other world powers that share similar interests of regional stability and cooperation.
Conclusion
Realization of BRI-associated connectivity projects in the Middle East requires China to become involved in, and expand its understanding of, local and regional politics in the region. It will also have to assign greater space to Middle East dynamics in its strategic plans, and to broaden its dialogue with other world powers and regional players about its intentions and moves in that region.
Since the announcement of the BRI no such cross-border connectivity project has been initiated in the Middle East. Concurrently, although China's involvement in that region has consistently expanded, and against rising expectations, its political involvement there has stopped short of playing a dominant role in regional conflict resolution or stabilization efforts. Its refusal to join the international coalition against ISIS, its marginal involvement in the Syrian crisis, and its feeble effort in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – three conflicts in which Beijing claims to be involved – illustrate this.Footnote 75 As long as this approach remains unchanged – and such a change is yet to be seen, the prospects for the initiation of BRI-related cross-border connectivity projects in the region are limited.
This does not mean that the BRI is not being implemented in the Middle East or that it will not affect China's approach to the region. Whether the Middle East is or is not associated with the BRI, China is extensively involved in the development of transportation infrastructures there, as well as in other types of economic collaborations and arrangements with Middle East countries. It is reasonable to assume that it will continue playing a substantial role in economic development projects across the region, especially when they do not require it to take risks or invest substantial resources in regional issues.
The same logic applies to BRI's implications for China's approach to the Middle East. While BRI expands China's economic interests there, the evidence at hand does not support the possibility that it reflects, or motivates, a revision of Beijing's “standing aloof” approach to the region. China is aware of the possibility of such a drift and for the time being has managed to avoid it. Refraining from cross-border connectivity projects in the region may be part of this. However, as suggested by Sun and Zoubir, its increasing involvement in the Middle East may impose unbridgeable contradictions on its traditional approach to the region, which will eventually force it to increase its political engagement there. This may initiate a circular process, in which growing political involvement and expanding economic interests motivate each other. Such a dynamic, however, is yet to take place and China's BRI realization remains governed by Beijing's basic guideline concerning the region: maximizing economic benefits while keeping its intricate politics at arm's length.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the generous support of the AJC Asia Pacific Institute (API) and the East-West Center in Washington.
Biographical note
Yoram EVRON is a senior lecturer in the department of Asian studies at the University of Haifa. His publications include China's Military Procurement in the Reform Era: The Setting of New Directions (Routledge, 2016), articles in journals such as Journal of Strategic Studies, The Pacific Review, Journal of East Asian Studies and several book chapters and policy papers on China-Middle East relations and China's national security.
