In the wake of the Arab Spring, there has been much instant punditry on the role of new media, Islamists movements, or geopolitical rivalries in the region's transition processes. Analysis of the political economy of regime change in the Arab world—and of regime continuity in the remaining anciens regimes—has been comparatively rare.
The two books under review here were published before a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in provincial Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, widely considered the trigger event of the Arab revolt. Yet they are both concerned with Arab authoritarian regimes' various degrees of brittleness, and the political economy underpinning them. Although some of the content in the two books would require updating, in more important parts they demonstrate remarkable foresight against the foil of the post-2010 events, providing analytical depth from which to examine the Arab uprising in comparative perspective.
Clement Henry and Robert Springborg's book, in particular, represents a serious attempt to build a typology of Arab authoritarianism, and one that maps remarkably well onto the outcomes of the Arab revolts so far. The edited volume by Mary Ann Tétreault, Gwenn Okruhlik, and Andrzej Kapiszewski is a looser collection of essays about stalled transitions in the Arab Gulf states. It offers less of an overarching argument, but its various chapters are nonetheless useful in understanding how the Gulf monarchies all have managed to escape revolution to date.
Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East is a thoroughly revised second edition of a book that was first published in 2001. The study of Middle East politics has produced few serious contributions to comparative politics as a discipline in recent decades. This volume provides a refreshing contrast. Although it is focused only on the Arab states, Turkey, Israel and Iran, its ambitious arguments are informed by a wider comparative perspective and non–Middle East and North African (MENA) data. It provides hypotheses about economic globalization and authoritarian politics that are potentially relevant in other developing regions.
The book's core assumption is that economic globalization represents the main challenge driving economic and political change in the Middle East region. The authors claim to detect a fundamental correlation between political openness and economic success. The main causal link between the two is trust in government and the open flow of information, mediated most of all through the behavior of the financial sector.
Against this background, and building on an analysis of MENA countries' divergent colonial legacies, Henry and Springborg divide the region's states into four types, illustrated by a wealth of descriptive data: “bunker states,” “bully states,” “globalizing monarchies,” and “precarious democracies.” Bunker states are the most repressive variant, having been captured by specific social forces, be they tribal, regional, or sectarian, and enjoy limited legitimacy and trust in society. Their administrations have only very weak rational-legal elements, and there is no independent bourgeoisie or civil society. The category includes Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.
“Bully states,” by contrast, are republics that are too autonomous vis-a-vis society. They have relatively strong administrations, and their elites are anchored in the state machinery itself rather than specific sections of society. Their state apparatus has some patches of rational-legal bureaucracy, and local bourgeoisie and civil society enjoy some (although weak) autonomy. Nonetheless, bully states are deeply involved in the local economy, try to control flows of credit, investment, and information, and are not very adept at handling challenges and opportunities of globalization. The relevant cases are Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine.
Globalizing monarchies, the third type of MENA state, are better at responding to globalization, ironically because they have historically been less integrated into colonial systems and therefore witnessed less of a nationalist and statist counterreaction. Their civil societies and local capitalist classes are stronger, giving these regimes “strategic depth” (p. 213) in the globalization process. All the same, their economies are characterized by oligopolies with close links to the court. The category includes Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf monarchies.
The final type, precarious democracies, is distinguished by the freest flow of information and the highest autonomy of capitalists and civil society. While “praetorian republics” (i.e., bunker and bully states) have largely subdued their societies, thereby depriving themselves of allies that could help in adjusting to economic globalization, precarious democracies are threatened by the numerous side payments they have to make to societal constituencies on whose support they depend. The authors subsume Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey under this category.
A core claim of the book is that a larger structural power of capital tends to go hand in hand with increased state capacity, as capital can function as a partner in executing development strategies. This is demonstrated with a useful account of the apparently quick and comprehensive, but substantially meaningless, structural adjustment programs in bunker states, where economic reform policies met no civil society resistance but were ineffective in practice.
Henry and Springborg hold that a robust civil society depends on the backing of autonomous local capitalists. The structure of the local financial sector and of private capital flows stands central in this analysis: Local capital poses the most severe threat to incumbent authoritarians in the context of Anglo-American-style capital markets that are based on open competition and free information flows. The authors explain the government-dominated credit allocation in bunker states with their fiercely authoritarian outlook.
Although the book's categories are far from watertight, they have proven remarkably prescient in explaining the way that the Arab revolts have unfolded. Speaking about the whole region, the authors describe how in the age of globalization, “structural adjustment and the role of political Islam and various ethnic identities have taken their toll, rendering many incumbent regimes even clumsier, more repressive, and burdened with ever higher costs of police and military establishments” (p. 67). One could argue that this aptly describes the structural causes of the Arab uprisings. More specifically, Henry and Springborg claim that bully states face relatively stronger negotiating partners in civil society to potentially renegotiate their social contract, whereas redrawing the line between rulers and ruled in bunker states is more likely to happen through civil war (p. 206). This has been borne out by a relatively smooth political transition in bully states Egypt and Tunisia and by the severe conflicts in bunker states Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
The authors also contend that due to a broader middle class and stronger associational traditions in Tunisia, the country “might be better positioned than Egypt to renegotiate state-society relationships and institutionalize some form of accountability and transparency, including control of the military and security services” (p. 210). Although it is too early to tell conclusively, the smoother Tunisian transition to date seems to bear out this prediction, too.
Finally, the book also appears to have implicitly predicted the survival of the Arab monarchies, which the authors credit with a stronger capacity for economic adjustment in partnership with local capital, and a better ability to absorb local opposition.
Similar to Vali Nasr's account of the rising Muslim middle class (The Rise of Islamic Capitalism: Why the New Muslim Middle Class Is the Key to Defeating Extremism, 2010), Henry and Springborg put much stock in the Islamic bourgeoisie as the historical agent that can synthesize a quest for authenticity and national dignity with economic globalization to produce a new local development paradigm. And indeed, in both Egypt and Tunisia, moderate Islamist movements with deep roots in the local petty bourgeoisie have emerged as the dominant forces from the two countries' first free elections. We can only hope that they will be as successful in rekindling economic development as the authors would have us expect.
Given the book's wide-ranging scope, some overgeneralizations and excessive “lumping” of cases is inevitable. The precarious democracy category, for example, seems to be mostly a bag of residuals with few shared features: While Turkey and Israel might have some important traits in common, Lebanon, with a weak and fragmented state that is deeply penetrated by social interests, seems a category sui generis (Iran, still in this category in the 2001 edition, has dropped out and become a bully state, by the authors' own account).
Some of the other cases also fail to fully align with the book's theory: The Algerian bunker state arguably has to face a more lively organized civil society than prerevolutionary Tunisia, however strongly rooted capitalism may be in the latter. Similarly, in the oil monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula, to the extent that there is politically meaningful civil society activity, this is largely divorced from the local bourgeoisie, which remains in hock to the ruling families, as is reflected in several of the country chapters in the edited volume. The reductionist focus on the economic basis of civil society also fails to account for the breadth of recent revolutionary movements in the region—although sources of finance are bound to become more important again in postrevolutionary politics.
More generally, the assumed link between capitalist interests and democracy, much discussed in comparative politics ever since Barrington Moore, appears to be treated too unproblematically. There are successful authoritarian developers outside of MENA that have managed to operate open capital markets, and local capitalists' showing during the Arab revolts has been remarkably weak.
One might also place generic question marks over parts of Henry and Springborg's concepts: It is not obvious, for example, that bully states are really autonomous vis-à-vis society. The Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority in Palestine treaded very carefully in their economic reform strategies and had to repeatedly adjust them to the perceived needs of a variety of social constituencies in both the public and private sector. And the underlying factor explaining the distinctions between bunker and bully states might be social cohesion and the presence of a consolidated national identity, rather than the shape of state–society relations, which is arguably just an intervening variable.
None of this is to suggest that the book is not stimulating, innovative, empirically rich and highly relevant for all students of authoritarianism and political transition. It squarely reinserts the MENA region into the analysis of the political economy of authoritarianism in which it has too long played a marginal role.
Political Change in the Arab Gulf States, though less cohesive, provides a useful corrective for some of the more Pollyanna-ish arguments of Henry and Springborg. It deals in more depth with political change in the Arab Gulf states, a region in which capitalists are relatively strong in structural terms yet politically docile, and in which relative economic liberalism can be combined with an almost complete closure of the political field, as in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Saudi Arabia. The stalling of political liberalization in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is analyzed in useful detail in several of the chapters, which cover themes as diverse as parliamentary life in Bahrain, Shiite politics in Iraq, bottom-up civil society in Kuwait, Oman's challenges of modernization, political reform in Qatar, the politics of Saudi Shiites, the relationship of economic and political reform in the UAE, women's politics under authoritarianism, new media, the role of the United States in the Gulf, and the politics of GCC defense cooperation.
The cautious tone the editors strike regarding the region's prospects for transition has been vindicated by the brutal crackdown on the Bahraini opposition in 2011 and the tightening of authoritarian rule in several other GCC countries. Their authoritarianism is, for the most part, relatively soft compared to the MENA region's “bunkers,” and they have been more successful in playing to a Western audience, thanks to their integration with the global economy. Yet the forces of political reform in GCC regimes have proved the weakest in the whole Arab world, significantly weaker than in fellow monarchies Jordan and Morocco.
Middle Eastern studies and comparative politics have experienced predictable lamentations about their failure to anticipate the Arab revolts. Point predictions of regime change, however, are and will remain impossible. A closer inspection of the recent comparative politics literature about the Arab world shows that it has much to contribute to our understanding of the shape that transitions, and nontransitions, are taking in the region. In making sense of the Arab Spring, one could do worse than working through the two rich and stimulating books under discussion here.
