Measured against the standards of Western unionism, China is far from having developed a labour collectivism. On the one hand, the official labour unions are literally part of the government; hence their paramount goal is to help the Party-state to control the society instead of organizing the workers into collective actions. On the other hand, although workers’ wildcat collective actions have proliferated in recent years, they are largely short-lived. However, this does not mean that Chinese workers are completely deprived of their collective power and have to be content with the minimal legal protections afforded in the individualized labour institutions.
William Brown, Chang Kai and the other contributors to this volume focus on China to present a rich picture of new developments in its employment relations. The editors provide chapters on general theories that are applicable to China, on comparative studies of China and other transitional economies, and a concluding chapter. The remaining chapters, contributed by Chang and his current or former students, focus on two approaches towards establishing and facilitating collective labour relations in China. Chang first presents a comprehensive discussion in chapter three of the two approaches: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The development of China's labour collectivism in the top-down approach includes the adaptions of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and its local offices, as discussed by Chang Cheng in chapter four; the experimental steps taken by the government towards collective labour issues, as discussed by Tu Wei in chapter six; and collective consultation and employment involvement as encouraged by the government, which are discussed in more detail in chapters seven (by Lei Xiaotian) and eight (by Zhan Jing). These chapters reveal how, facing pressures in a market economy, the ACFTU has made great efforts to absorb new members and remain as relevant as possible. Collective consultations, often organized by the ACFTU and supported by local governments, have proliferated across the nation in order to have as many collective labour contracts signed as possible. The government is also encouraging employee involvement in democratic management of enterprises through channels like workers' congresses.
Besides Chang Kai's discussion in chapter three, the bottom-up approach is particularly discussed in chapter nine by Meng Quan. The two authors describe how, starting from around 2010, a new wave of wildcat strikes in China spread across the major manufacturing centres, which demonstrated the great power of the workers when united. A few high-profile strikes such as that at Nanhai Honda exemplify the workers’ success in fighting for their interests beyond their minimum legal rights. Without an explicit right to strike, their successes came from the increased internal solidarity exhibited by the workers. They had begun to perceive themselves as a social group or even a social class. They had also been able to organize themselves, electing representatives and leaders, communicating efficiently among themselves, mobilizing as many fellow workers as possible, and even connecting to and taking advantage of other social actors, including labour NGOs. In chapter five, Wen Xiaoyi discusses employers’ responses, which may also be considered as bottom-up.
Both the top-down and bottom-up approaches are championed by the authors. However, they may be a little too eager to see these developments as an emerging trend leading to collective labour relations in China. Some of the authors acknowledge that the success of either the top-down approach or the bottom-up approach depends on the policies and attitudes of the government. As Chang perfectly understands, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used the collective power of the working class for revolution and class struggle before and after it came to power in China (p. 47). The CCP has always been extremely vigilant regarding attempts to form any social organization or collective force independent of its control. A collective labour movement in China, if not suppressed, will possibly lead to the formation of independent social and political groups, which will cause social instability in a country with 1.4 billion people. It is a risk the CCP will not take.
It is true that the top-down approach does empower the workers and bring them benefits. In some regions where the local governments are more pro-labour and the local ACFTU branches are more creative, the workers are able to participate in collective consultations and reach agreements that have more favourable terms with employers. However, collective consultations are mostly hijacked by employers as the ACFTU local branches and local governments usually exclude the workers from meaningful participation. The collective contracts reached do not really serve the workers’ interests and contain no more labour rights than those enshrined in law. The CCP especially will not tolerate independent collective actions organized by workers through the bottom-up approach. The successes of the independent collective actions starting around 2010 alerted the government. The contributing authors were not able to include the latest developments regarding labour relations in China. Starting around 2015, the government became unfriendly to labour lawyers, activists and NGOs who had played very important roles in collective actions of workers. And local governments now respond more swiftly and determinedly to signs of collective actions.
Panning out from the mostly cheering details provided by the authors and taking a historical perspective, it is not clear that the ruling elites in China are ready to switch from individualized labour institutions to a collective one. On the contrary, the more recent developments suggest otherwise.
