The conjunction “and” in the title of this anthology is, of course, not to be taken literally; otherwise, there could be no prediction of its contents, or an avoidance of a nagging dissonance once they are made available. The book is not on mathematics, at least in the first instance, or on modern economics, or on a bit of both; the conjunction is rather a signifier for how mathematics constitutes—delineates, determines, defines—modern economics. And it is the modern incarnation of economics that is at issue, no such adjectival qualification for mathematics deemed necessary. The volume is organized under the following four categories: (i) a narrative that begins with the formalization in economics at the end of the fourth decade of the twentieth century, up to a 1991 report of a panel of the American Economic Association on graduate education; (ii) the decade 1991 to 1999 covered in a section labeled “mathematics, fin de siècle”; (iii) ten responses between 2002 to 2010 to a 1997 article by Tony Lawson, and collected under the label “millennial mathematics: methodology and ontology”; and (iv) the 2008 crisis and some introspective self-searching stimulated in the United Kingdom by Queen Elizabeth’s November 2008 visit to the London School of Economics (LSE). The volume concerns mathematical economics, or, more precisely, the utility of what used to be referred to in the 1970s LSE BSc (Econ) curriculum as “economics treated mathematically” versus the alternative option of “economics, analytical and descriptive (Economics A&D).” One wonders whether a seemingly motley collection can be revealed as such.
To be sure, anthologies are difficult to review, and especially if the review is to avoid becoming a tedious quarrel with the selection, a substitution of the reviewer’s own agenda for that of the editor’s. The book, and its writer, have first to be understood and—if the title is not a reliable guide—its subject delineated; and, as in the understanding of any work of art, the problematic identified. What is the contribution? What is the solution that is offered by the book? And what is it aimed at? Is there an agenda? Is there a use the anthology is to serve? What stakes are at issue? What is the artist doing in what he is doing and why? What is the basis of the inclusion and the exclusion, the particular parameters that guide the framing? Who selects? What crying need motivates him or her? How do questions of personal identity intersect with those of the professional, the private masked by the public? Is a community being represented, or does the editor represent himself ? In either case, how was he selected? In short, who speaks and why?
But let me turn to the review itself, and confess that its writing has been, from the very beginning, a tale of receding aspirations and ambitions. Initially, I planned a careful reading of its forty-six chapters (papers) spread over its 654 pages, but, given the time granted me, and keeping in mind the limitations of my own abilities, this has proved hopeless. A quick leafing through the introduction allowed some clarity: I would read the editor’s papers to get to know him, and also the papers of the one author whose work he uses as a point of departure for his Part III, and two of whose papers he includes in his Part IV. Since Tony Lawson looms rather large in this enterprise, I could ask how Geoffrey Hodgson and Tony Lawson sit with “mathematics” and modern economics.”
One of the key earlier contributions was Tony Lawson’s (1997) claim that mathematics assumes a close system and that closed systems are ‘extremely rare’ in the real world. The ontological argument stimulated a great deal of debate. . . . In contrast to Lawson’s emphasis on event irregularities and predictive limitations, Robert Sugden (2000) defended the role of mathematics as a heuristic tool, related to ‘credible worlds.’ (p. xxv)
And so I was thrown to a third-best procedure that brought with it an addition to the dramatis personae: to read the volume as “Lawson versus Sugden mediated by Hodgson”—a debate in and of British academia, with Queen Elizabeth II and Nobelists Samuelson, Leontief, Debreu (twice), Simon, Krugman, and Buchanan thrown in for good measure. (I follow the names in order of appearance, and note the fact that Leontief and Krugman would also have appeared twice were it not for an “excessive reprint copyright fee.”) But the implementation of even this third-best procedure (mechanism?) foundered. On reading Lawson (2009), I saw that, rather than Lawson versus Sugden, it was really “Lawson versus the Dahlem Group.” And so, in the remainder of this review, I concentrate solely on chapters 42 and 43, and use them as a synecdoche for the entire volume, hoping in the soundness of my judgment that there is enough in them to give my reader some idea of what this volume is all about, and what its title is meant to title.
Chapters 42 and 43 were independent responses to the following question that the editor of the Real World Economics Review asked in response to their earlier work.
It is agreed that the current economic crisis has shown that the standard models of academic economics are seriously wanting. Should the main emphasis of reform be on developing new formal models or to an opening up on economics to methods other than traditional modeling? (p. 571)
It was an interesting exercise for the reviewer—a thought experiment, if one prefers—to think of what the answer to the question could/would be without going, at least in the first instance, to the authorities themselves; a procedure that serves particularly well for mathematical claims. However, here, even the antecedent sentence was puzzling—either facile, or so deep that any extended investigation would risk getting stuck in its mire: what kind of showing, what kind of wanting, what kind of standardization, what kind of crisis (are some parts of our world not always in a pervasive and ongoing crisis?), and on and on. At any rate, if one skips the sentence and goes directly to the question, how could the answer be anything but affirmative? The “profession of economics,” which is presumably to say, “the practice of the professing of economics,” should surely be “opened up”—presumably, always; and the substantial numbers earning their livelihood by and through models surely be exhorted to develop “new formal models.”
In any case, it is clear that substantial work is needed to do justice to Lawson’s reply to the question. Under the rubric of mathematical-deductivist modelling, he introduces four adjectives to classify closure conditions: intrinsic, extrinsic, experimental, emergent.
[M]athematical deductivist methods in question are restricted in their applicability to closed systems, meaning those in which event regularities or correlations occur, whereas not only have such closures been found rarely to occur in the social realm, but also we have good reason to suppose they will remain uncommon. [They] are relatively uncommon even in the natural sciences. [O]utside astronomy, most of the event regularities known to natural sciences occur in conditions of controlled laboratory experimentation—or experimental closures. (p. 575)
To me, Lawson’s diagnosis of “social reality” (in the last two full paragraphs on p. 576) as not being subject to intrinsic and extrinsic closure is a masterful modeling exercise, one that parries the self-reflexive question as to whether it itself succumbs in some degree to what it professes to claim, its self-sufficiency evident in six of the seven of Lawson’s bibliographic items all referring to himself. And this move is buttressed by other fruitful dichotomies: formal modeling versus hand-waving, two differing responses of “heterodox economists . . . [to] … the unrealisticness in mainstream modelling” (p. 574), the two-fold pattern in the response to the failure of mathematical modeling, “involving an evaluation and an inference” (p. 579), the “relevance and utility of economics” (p. 580), and much else. Surely, these dichotomies constitute a ladder that Lawson will kick away, once he has reached where he wants to go. In an autobiographical tone, he writes:
If some individual sincerely believes that . . . experimenting with formalistic models is best not only for her or him, but for all of us too, that we all ought to be doing only mathematics, I am in favor of their receiving a platform. I support their being heard and accommodated generally. (p. 579)
The question is whether such a discussion should be circumscribed by an editor’s question pertaining to a financial crisis, and there is little wonder that there is an explicit expression of disapproval.
[Our] disagreement results from the way that Lawson chooses to interpret our words, by which we mean that he reads into them an interpretation that allows him to make the points he wants to make. That interpretation gives him a springboard into his argument against the use of mathematics in economics. (p. 582)
And so, with this sentence, the cat finally is out of the bag: the title could/should be read as “Mathematics in Modern Economics: For and Against.”
The Dahlem group (Colander, Fölmer, Haas, Goldberg, Juselius, Kirman, Lux, Sloth) criticize Samuelson for the epigraph to his Foundations, finding it misleading, since “it suggests that there is one mathematics,” and, in their view, “there are many” (p. 581). They also argue for a plurality of approach, and include a recitation of their beliefs.
The main emphasis in choosing a method should be on what works. . . . Thus, some economists should be developing formal models, some . . . agent based modeling, some . . . heuristic models, some statistical models, some . . . bringing . . . models to data, some . . . integrating various approaches . . . whatever approach the researcher finds useful. (p. 583)
(The ellipses indicate the various instances of the imperative “should” that I have indiscreetly erased.)
We do not believe that we should be telling the economics profession what method they should be using. [W]e believe that all economists should be concerned with . . . the events that occur in the economy, and should be clear about . . . [their] limitations as a guide for real-world policy. [W]e believe that modelers should be modest in their claims, . . . point out inappropriate uses, . . . and implications that cannot be legitimately drawn. We also believe that researchers should interpret the work of others with a generosity of interpretation that they would want from others. (p. 583)
We are in the middle of something that necessitates—indeed, demands—a facility in the methods of literary criticism, the ethics of interpretation, even though, initially and superficially, it seems to come down to the defense of “motherhood and apple pie.” But, all in all, even though there is neither mathematics nor modern economics, nor history of thought, the volume cooks a rich brew, with much to engage on methodological and institutional (sociological and political?) grounds. What it perhaps needs are some more adjectives and adverbs to be thrown in as qualifiers for the noun model.
Let me conclude by raising yet again the question of the composition of this (my) review. If I am to question the editor in his reduction of “mathematics and modern economics” to forty-six selected articles, who am I to choose to review them through a review of two (I hope not arbitrarily) selected articles from them? Can I repeat to myself the questions I put to the editor: in short, ask “Who is it that asks ‘Who speaks?’” As an attempt at transparency, let me cite two of my own pieces (Khan Reference Khan1993a, Reference Khan1993b), written so long ago that they hardly have any relevance for the “envisioning of our exceptional times” (p. 582), but, ironically, one of them did also begin with Samuelson’s epigraph, and argued for the multilingual nature of modern mathematics. And, while furnishing references that go towards pluralism, let me throw in three other volumes (Levy and Peart, Reference Levy and Peart2005; Caplan and Schotter, Reference Caplan and Schotter2008; Banerjee and Duflo, Reference Banerjee and Duflo2012) as a way towards “interaction, debate, openness and tolerance of others” (p. 579).
