I. INTRODUCTION
With more than 3,300 long-term care (“LTC”) facilities receiving COVID-19 related fines between March and November of 2020, the pandemic brought longstanding concerns regarding these facilities into the public eye.Footnote 1 As of November 25, 2020, more than 100,000 staff and residents of LTC facilities had died from complications associated with COVID-19.Footnote 2 By February 4, 2021, there were over 162,268 LTC facility related COVID deaths accounting for around 36% of all U.S. deaths.Footnote 3
Although researchers have not found an overall relationship between private equity-owned facilities and COVID deaths, anecdotal accounts suggest that facilities owned by private equity firms have fared worse than those that are not private equity-owned during the pandemic.Footnote 4 These accounts mirror a decades-long criticism that private equity ownership has a negative impact on LTC.Footnote 5 On the other hand, some have argued that any issues found in private equity ownership are also found in for-profit ownership in general.Footnote 6 In a Canadian study regarding outbreaks of COVID-19, for example, researchers found that non-profit and municipally-owned LTC facilities fared better and had less “extensive outbreaks” than those owned by for-profit companies.Footnote 7
While this Note examines the debates around private equity ownership in some detail, its purpose is not to make a claim about whether private equity ownership is better or worse than other forms of ownership. Rather, this Note explores how strategic incentive structures can align the efficiency and profitability goals of private equity firms with facility goals of providing the best quality care for the growing elderly population in the United States.
In this Note, I use the term LTC facility as an umbrella term, capturing skilled nursing facilities (“SNFs”), assisted living facilities, and residential care facilities.Footnote 8 This Note will not discuss home health care, although further discussion of private equity ownership of these kinds of elder-care organizations is warranted in the future.Footnote 9
This Note uses an organizational political economy framework, a sociological framework that examines “the complexity of organizational-community interactions [by taking] into account the effect of the external environment on how organizations shape themselves in response to market and regulatory incentives, constraints, and opportunities present in that environment.”Footnote 10 This theory engages the historical and contemporary social context of organizations by analyzing the conditions under which certain behaviors occur or do not occur.Footnote 11 While this framework has been used to understand the behavior of corporations in industries such as banking, food manufacturing, steel, energy, and health care, it is also appropriate to analyze the LTC industry, a highly regulated but highly diversified industry.Footnote 12 This framework shapes the Note’s overall questions: What roles can organizational incentives play in addressing the apparent misalignment between the goals of private equity and the goals of patient quality of care in the LTC industry? Further, under what conditions can the goals of private equity-owned LTC facilities be aligned with patient quality of care? These questions consider the role of both government and industry partners in promoting alignment between profit maximization and human-centered quality of care prioritization. In response to these questions, I posit three possibilities for incentive alignment: (1) organizational-level pay for performance geared towards performance-based metrics that provide facility-wide benefits; (2) time-bound incentives that include long-term sustainability metrics alongside short-term profit maximization; and (3) investor-specific incentives geared towards connecting investor priorities to the longer term health of the facility.
The next Section of the Note provides a brief background and historical context for LTC facilities within the United States. Section III delves into several important aspects of private equity ownership of LTC facilities, both the development of the phenomenon as well as the implications as discussed in the research literature. Section IV discusses different value-based patient care models including pay for performance, bundled savings, and accountable care organizations. Section V builds on the same goals associated with value-based models by proposing a preliminary theory of incentive alignment focused not on individual provider incentives but organizational level financial incentives to promote an increased quality of care for LTC patients. Specifically, it posits that the COVID-19 crisis provides the opportunity to experiment with these incentive structures in ways that may be beneficial to private equity-owned LTC facilities in the future. Section VI makes concluding remarks about the implications of these ideas and describes their potential overall impact.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. The History of LTC and Statutory Provisions in the United States
LTC is “a set of health, personal care and social services delivered over a sustained period of time to persons who have lost or never acquired some degree of functional capacity.”Footnote 13 These individuals include those with chronic conditions, those with permanent disabilities, and the elderly.Footnote 14 LTC facilities are becoming ubiquitous in our society as the population gets older and health care prolongs life but does not necessarily ease illness.Footnote 15 The number of facilities has risen gradually from 1,200 facilities with 22,000 licensed beds in 1939 to 15,600 facilities with 1.7 million licensed beds in 2016.Footnote 16 As of 2018, 14 million adults in the United States were in need of some form of LTC.Footnote 17 Some estimates suggest that by 2030, as many as 24 million Americans are expected to need LTC.Footnote 18
In the United States, institutional care has a long history dating back to the colonial period. In the original colonies, English Poor Law required that families provide care for their elderly and infirmed family members.Footnote 19 However, those members of the community that needed support but did not have any family connections were left on their own.Footnote 20 Almshouses developed as a response to this issue.Footnote 21 First founded in Boston in 1664, almshouses were a catch-all space to house elderly, orphaned, and mentally ill individuals, whose only similarities were that they were poor and had no family to care for them.Footnote 22 Almshouse conditions were awful and inhospitable, meant to keep people from applying and, if accepted, to keep them from staying too long for services.Footnote 23 Over time, these institutions evolved into various new organizations including orphanages, mental asylums, and an early form of public LTC institutions primarily for housing the elderly and focusing on their medical care.Footnote 24 In response to the horrible conditions in and stigma around almshouses, “women’s and church groups [established] special homes for the elderly”Footnote 25 while others worked to eradicate such institutions altogether.
In the first three decades of the twentieth century, proponents of old-age pensions argued that a radical shift was needed in order to really support individuals in old age who could no longer compete economically in society.Footnote 26 The Great Depression troubled historical notions of poverty as a moral failing, and news reports exposing almshouse conditions shifted public support away from these institutions and towards providing financial support so individuals could support themselves.Footnote 27 The federal government responded by developing Social Security.Footnote 28
The Social Security Act of 1935 was enacted to institutionalize pensions for the elderly.Footnote 29 In a statement at the signing of the Act, President Roosevelt acknowledged:
[w]e can never insure one hundred percent of the population against one hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of life, but we have tried to frame a law which will give some measure of protection to the average citizen and to his family against the loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old age.Footnote 30
Under this Act, states could receive financial support for the care of the elderly, but funds could not be used to support public old age institutions.Footnote 31 The statute specified that money would be provided to the state to support old age assistance only “with respect to each individual who at the time of such expenditure is sixty-five years of age or older and is not an inmate of a public institution.”Footnote 32 These requirements were not without critique, but the Supreme Court supported the prohibition in a 7-2 decision.Footnote 33 However, this requirement did not preclude individuals located in private institutions from receiving support.Footnote 34 This caveat facilitated a significant and rapid shift from public facilities to private facilities.Footnote 35 Over the next ten years, however, it became clear that direct pensions to beneficiaries did not ameliorate the need for institutional care for the elderly.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, two major changes led to the proliferation of LTC facilities. First, the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act allowed money to be allocated directly to LTC providers including public institutions.Footnote 36 This change was conditioned on funded states developing licensing programs for the facilities.Footnote 37 Second, the Hospital Survey and Construction Act (“Hill-Burton Act”) supported building health care infrastructure including hospitals and public health centers.Footnote 38 The definition of public health center was to be determined on a state-by-state basis.Footnote 39 The 1954 amendments to the Hill-Burton Act included funding and support for non-profit organizations that built LTC facilities.Footnote 40 These amendments allocated matching funds from the federal government for states that built SNFs that conformed to the mandated regulations.Footnote 41 Although the two aforementioned changes led to increased development of LTC facilities, rules around licensing were not enforced or standardized.Footnote 42 Many facilities remained unregulated and by 1960, 44% of the beds in LTC facilities did not meet quality standards.Footnote 43
The Social Security Act was amended to create Medicare and Medicaid, which provided more financial support for elder care.Footnote 44 President Johnson praised this development in his remarks regarding Medicare, saying, “[c]ompassion and reason dictate that this logical extension of our proven Social Security system will supply the prudent, feasible, and dignified way to free the aged from the fear of financial hardship in the event of illness.”Footnote 45 The Medicare Program focused on doctor visits and hospital care, covering 100 days of nursing home stays following a three-day or more hospital stay.Footnote 46 Medicaid, on the other hand, was an outgrowth of the Kerr-Mills Act, which was meant to primarily cover the poor in SNFs.Footnote 47 Medicaid covered longer stays in LTC facilities and became the largest payer for facility stays overall.Footnote 48
Unlike Medicare which became primarily nationalized, Medicaid operated under a federalist structure prioritizing state rights in determining Medicaid eligibility.Footnote 49 “Under this legislation, the federal and state governments [became] the largest payers for Long Term Care: nursing home utilization increase[d] dramatically, along with government expenditures.”Footnote 50 The Moss Amendments were passed in 1968 to standardize regulations associated with facilities that received Medicaid and Medicare funding.Footnote 51 In 1974, the federal government finalized regulations to enforce standards around LTC facility staffing, safety, and service delivery.Footnote 52 Finally, in 1977, the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”), which would later be renamed The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), was developed to promulgate certification standards and a certification process for LTC facilities.Footnote 53
While statutory changes increased the number of LTC facilities, the industry continued to struggle with issues arising from low quality care. Fires from poorly maintained properties and ill-managed disease were only two of the many ways that patients and staff in LTC facilities lost their lives.Footnote 54 Furthermore, the Institute of Medicine found that many patients were “being abused, neglected, and given inadequate care.”Footnote 55 In 1987, the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (“Reform Act”) mandated that institutions receiving Medicare or Medicaid had to guarantee that residents could maintain the “highest practicable, mental and psychosocial well-being.”Footnote 56 The Reform Act required nursing homes to provide certain services to every resident, including periodic assessments, a comprehensive care plan, nursing services, social services, rehabilitation services, pharmaceutical services, dietary services, with additional requirements for larger facilities.Footnote 57 For example, the Reform Act required a full-time social worker to be employed by the facility if it had over 120 beds.Footnote 58 Furthermore, the Reform Act outlined a Bill of Rights for residents, developed a certification process, and instituted an enforcement system if the facility was not in compliance with the Reform Act’s requirements.Footnote 59 Monitoring under the Reform Act is primarily a state-specific function, either directly or under contract with CMS, which inserts some variability in actual compliance enforcement.Footnote 60
After a couple of decades of small changes to federal LTC facility quality standards, the Affordable Care Act Nursing Home Transparency Provisions (“ACA Nursing Home Provisions”) provided a significant positive transition regarding quality care requirements and compliance.Footnote 61 The primary goal of these provisions has been to “increas[e] transparency throughout the healthcare system and [strengthen] consumer information systems.”Footnote 62 Facilities affected by this statute are required to disclose information regarding, but not limited to, ownership and management, spending, staffing, and resident needs.Footnote 63 Furthermore, the ACA Nursing Home Provisions mandate the development of compliance programs, internal quality assurance, and performance improvement plans.Footnote 64 However, similar to previous efforts, the enforcement varies by state.Footnote 65
B. LTC Facilities Today
Today, LTC facilities provide, among other things, significant nursing care services.Footnote 66 The majority of these facilities are certified through CMS.Footnote 67 However, because most LTC facilities receive Medicaid funding, and Medicaid funding and standards differ by state, they are subject to significant state variation as well.Footnote 68 At the same time, state laws govern licensure and certain standards of care.Footnote 69 Therefore, LTC facilities in some states fare better than others depending on the availability of state funding and varying compliance requirements.Footnote 70
The vast majority of LTC facilities are private for-profit or non-profit corporate entities, while the remainder are government-owned.Footnote 71 Non-profit organizations reinvest their income towards the public benefit for which they are organized; for-profit organizations work to generate income, the excess of which is distributed to investors.Footnote 72 Government-owned organizations operate using tax revenues as well as other state and federal resources.Footnote 73 Some researchers who have studied the differences between ownership structure and quality of care identified lower quality of care in for-profit settings.Footnote 74 Regardless, it seems that for-profit entities in LTC continue to increase in number.Footnote 75 Chain ownership, i.e., ownership of two or more facilities under one entity, is also increasing, leading to further consolidation of the LTC industry.Footnote 76
As discussed in the previous Section, the ACA Nursing Home Provisions, as well as the Reform Act, developed several requirements for nursing facilities, including maintaining enough nursing personnel on a 24-hour basis to provide the required care in accordance with patient care plans.Footnote 77 However, quality standards continue to be a significant problem. For example, while there are direct provisions requiring registered nurses to be available in the facility, in reality, much of the physical care in nursing facilities is administered by certified nursing assistants (“CNAs”).Footnote 78 The majority of CNAs receive limited compensation, have limited education, and are expected to work long hours leading to burnout and eventual staff turnover.Footnote 79 Some states have attempted to compensate front line facility staff more equitably through targeted increases in state Medicaid funding, but there is still much to be done.Footnote 80
Ongoing issues continue to be associated with quality of care in LTC facilities. Furthermore, many facilities perform poorly on metrics such as staffing levels, pain control, and patient infections.Footnote 81 This reality coupled with high staff turnover has caused significant issues in patient well-being generally and even more so during the current COVID-19 pandemic.Footnote 82 Further issues arise with the continued proliferation of private equity investment in the industry. The next Section delves further into this part of the LTC facility narrative. It describes, first, what is meant by private equity ownership and then moves into discussing some of the current implications of private equity ownership on LTC facilities.
III. PRIVATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP OF LTC FACILITIES
A. How is Private Equity Ownership of LTC Facilities Structured?
Private equity ownership in health care generally has increased dramatically in the last decade, rising from $41.5 billion in deals in 2010 to $119.9 billion in 2019.Footnote 83 Private equity ownership in LTC has increased significantly over the same period.Footnote 84 With around 11% of LTC facilities across the country now owned by private equity firms, it is important to engage with the implications of this common ownership structure.Footnote 85 Furthermore, the Private Equity Stakeholder Project reported that “in 2020 there were 43 private equity driven nursing home acquisitions valued at $1.5 billion.”Footnote 86 These numbers suggest that private equity acquisitions of LTC facilities have not slowed and there are no indications that they will slow in the near future.
Private equity firms are characterized by short term investments.Footnote 87 Unlike traditional corporate ownership, private equity ownership is set up for investors to make money within a short period of time, usually between three and ten years, after which the asset is liquidated.Footnote 88 In this structure, the longevity of the company is not the goal. Instead, the immediate profit benefits are the primary drivers of action.Footnote 89 This system can operate in multiple ways, but the most common process is the leveraged buyout (“LBO”).Footnote 90 During the time of ownership, the private equity firm exerts management control of the company in order to maximize its profitability.Footnote 91 Once the time period for investment is completed, the portfolio company is sold and the profits realized are distributed between the investors of the original fund and the private equity firm itself.Footnote 92
B. Benefits of Private Equity Ownership of LTC Facilities
Proponents of private equity ownership of LTC facilities argue that private equity ownership increases management efficiency, facilitates technological advances, and leads to more coordinated care for patients.Footnote 93 Additionally, private equity firms have the resources to infuse the facility with legal, health, and compliance expertise.Footnote 94 The managing firms may institute considerable organizational changes or continue to manage the facility as is. For example, while some cross-sectional research has shown that private equity-owned LTC facilities have lower staffing, some longitudinal studies show that, in fact, it might be that private equity firms are purchasing portfolio companies that already incorporate a strategy of low staffing levels.Footnote 95 This makes intuitive sense, given the goal of short-term profitability. The less time new management has to spend on changing operations toward profit maximization, the fewer resources need to be introduced into the facility to implement needed changes, and the faster a facility meets that goal. Overall, after private equity purchase, LTC facilities tend to expand and run more efficiently.Footnote 96
Some research has shown that private equity efficiency models increase financial performance.Footnote 97 Specifically, increasing productivity has meant reducing costs for customers, which, from the consumer’s perspective, is a significant benefit.Footnote 98 Additionally, researchers found that there was “no direct evidence of a decline in quality metrics for long-stay residents in private equity owned nursing homes in Ohio relative to other for-profit nursing homes in the state.”Footnote 99 From this perspective, the effects of private equity ownership in health care are contingent on the extent to which profit maximization incentives are aligned with the social goals of quality care at a reasonable cost.Footnote 100 The organizational changes implicit in LBOs mean a company will likely improve its overall financial performance and maximize value when providing services.Footnote 101 This stream of research reports that private equity nursing homes “show better financial performance than other for-profit nursing homes.”Footnote 102 Despite these reported benefits, there are substantial criticisms of private equity ownership of LTC facilities.
C. Criticisms of Private Equity Ownership of LTC Facilities
Strategies undertaken by private equity firms have a direct impact on the company itself and an indirect impact on the patients and staff. Private equity-owned LTC facilities tend to be located in urban markets as part of a larger chain of facilities.Footnote 103 Additionally, because profitability for the LTC facilities tends to be based on the facility’s ability to extract as many funds as possible out of government subsidies, such as Medicare and Medicaid, private equity-owned facilities are often located in states with higher elderly populations.Footnote 104 For facilities more dependent on Medicare, which provides reimbursements for shorter time limits for patient stays, private equity firms may make management decisions that either institute or maintain previous strategies that promote shorter stays, which increase the amount of admissions for each bed.Footnote 105 Under these circumstances, the goals of profit maximization and human-centered patient care may not be aligned with the reimbursement and regulatory structure that creates perverse incentives for owners to deprioritize patient care.
In March 2021, The House Ways and Means Committee on Oversight held a hearing on “Private Equity’s Expanded Role in the U.S. Health Care System.”Footnote 106 During this hearing, speakers testified to some of the significant concerns around private equity in the health care industry.Footnote 107 These testimonies called attention to the ways that incentives in private equity ownership tend to be distinct from—and have distinct outcomes from—traditional corporate ownership.Footnote 108 While the private equity incentive structure might be successful in reducing cost inefficiencies and increasing productivity, it has also led to a deterioration in patient care while the firms continue to be able to capitalize on government subsidies.Footnote 109 For example, patients, especially in rural areas, have little to no choice between LTC providers, and, since the facilities are structured to retain government subsidies that are not tied to patient quality care, there is no incentive for the private equity firm to prioritize care.Footnote 110 Additionally, private equity ownership may result in less money for operations because the organization’s ongoing increased debt from financing the purchase leads to less money earmarked for patient care.Footnote 111 This is especially the case if the strategies identified for maximizing profit are not aligned with the strategies identified for providing quality patient care.Footnote 112 Furthermore, there is limited business rationale for providing patient-centered care because the income does not come directly from the consumers/patients, but rather from external sources such as Medicare and Medicaid.Footnote 113
An additional criticism of private equity ownership of LTC facilities flows from their structure as either LLCs or limited partnerships.Footnote 114 Unlike corporations, which must organize according to corporate rules within a given state, LLCs are primarily contractual entities with limited requirements outside of the private agreements between the parties involved.Footnote 115 These entity forms allow for maximum flexibility in management decision-making because there is very little, if any, reason for them to seek approval or explain their reasoning.Footnote 116 This means that decisions like staffing reductions and other cost-cutting strategies tend to occur without any accountability or transparency mechanisms in place and without regard for the actual needs of patients.Footnote 117 Furthermore, these LLCs or limited partnerships are embedded in multiple layers and complex matrices of other LLCs and limited partnerships that make it difficult for outsiders to understand who owns what.Footnote 118 This added complexity allows private equity firms to benefit from the financial investments without having to deal with the reputational risks associated with reductions in actual patient care.Footnote 119
Private equity’s profit maximizing incentives can be particularly detrimental to consumers because they can lead to a breach in the implicit contract to provide the best care possible.Footnote 120 In health care, patients have limited knowledge about their best care options while LTC staff themselves are positioned to make the best decisions for their patients. The asymmetry in knowledge and understanding means patients depend on providers to decide how they will be cared for and treated during their stay.Footnote 121 These contracts are not explicitly stated, “so profit maximizing incentives can lead firms to renege on implicit contracts to provide high quality care, creating value for the firms at the expense of patients.”Footnote 122
D. Current Implications on the State of the Research
In sum, although there continue to be strong sentiments on both sides of this debate around the risks, benefits, and consequences of private equity ownership of LTC facilities, the research literature continues to be mixed. Some researchers have asserted that it is unclear whether the detrimental impacts are a product of private equity specifically or “whether in the absence of private equity, other sources of capital—such as public equity, venture capital, health systems, and insurers—would similarly exploit existing market failures and legal loopholes in the health care system.”Footnote 123 They argue that the issue is more upstream and that the majority of the policies should be focused on general market dysfunction.Footnote 124 Others have found that private equity ownership over and above general for-profit ownership leads to some of the most egregious negative effects.Footnote 125 These researchers have outlined some of the outcomes that tend to occur with private equity acquisitions.Footnote 126 While the business becomes more efficient, patient quality of care declines.Footnote 127 Overall, characterized by such issues as excessive bedsores on patients, unnecessary drug provision, and resident rights violations, “private equity ownership appears to be responsible for at least a large share of the negative effects that some studies have found following chain or other corporate acquisitions.”Footnote 128
The remainder of this Note will focus on some of the responses to concerns about private equity ownership of LTC facilities, a discussion on management-focused and patient-focused incentive strategies, and a theoretical discussion of incentive alignment strategies for and limitations of private equity ownership of LTC facilities.
IV. ALIGNING FINANCIAL AND PATIENT CARE INCENTIVES
Since the Affordable Care Act was passed in 2010, health care providers have been encouraged to form accountable care organizations, which are “clinically integrated organizations of primary care physicians and other providers that, through various payment mechanisms, are rewarded for both raising the quality and lowering the cost of care provided to their patients.”Footnote 129 In the health care industry, there has been some significant movement toward value-based models for increasing patient care by linking financial incentives to patient quality of care.Footnote 130 This includes pay-for-performance strategies, bundled payments, and shared savings.Footnote 131
In pay-for-performance strategies, “providers who perform well on selected quality and efficiency measures receive higher payment rates or bonuses while those who perform poorly often receive lower payments.”Footnote 132 “Risk-based alternative payment models such as bundled payments and shared savings hold providers accountable for the cost of care by shifting financial risk to providers.”Footnote 133 Accountable care organizations are health care organizations where providers “voluntarily come together to provide coordinated care and agree to be held accountable for the overall costs and quality of care for an assigned population of patients.”Footnote 134
There are two primary forms of incentive structures in these value-based models: relative attainment and absolute attainment.Footnote 135 A relative attainment incentive structure measures performance of a provider relative to others and is one way to account for the inability to determine an objective measure of patient outcomes. This is especially the case when some patients may be sicker than others and need different kinds of care.Footnote 136 However, a relative incentive structure “can promote a race to the top, creating perverse incentives for providers to allocate resources to improvement on a measure that may not yield the greatest clinical benefit and which may lead to overtreatment of patients.”Footnote 137 Absolute attainment models provide clear thresholds and benchmarks for providers to hit to experience a benefit.Footnote 138 However, with absolute attainment thresholds, “some payers express concern that this approach removes the motivation for providers to continue to improve once the threshold has been attained.”Footnote 139 This also “creates budgeting challenges for payers, who will not be able to estimate how many providers they will need to pay.”Footnote 140
In addition to the organizational challenges of incentive structures for individual providers, there are also agency considerations. Research on financial incentive impacts on professionals has emerged with two interesting findings:Footnote 141 (1) providers are generally responsive to incentive structures and adjust their actions to receive the highest benefit;Footnote 142 (2) however, providers’ attitudes toward the incentive arrangement affects the strength of their response. Footnote 143 Specifically, “improved performance was substantially stronger among those physicians who … indicated relatively less concern about the incentive program as a threat to their autonomy.”Footnote 144 Therefore, as long as providers do not see an incentive scheme as a threat to their ability to make autonomous decisions, incentive structures can have a significant impact on provider performance. Additionally, “professionals will demonstrate greater responsiveness to the incentives if they believe that incentive-related performance targets are important to promote their professional goals.”Footnote 145
While value-based patient care has provided interesting ways to experiment with improving patient care by shifting the risk of health care from patients to providers, our common and statutory laws still furnish protections for providers in such a way that allows them to shift the burden back to patients.Footnote 146 Providers can choose and retain their clients based on the provider’s chances of receiving financial incentives.Footnote 147 In LTC, this means that the riskiest patients in need of LTC will struggle to find a facility that will accept them.Footnote 148 Furthermore, while strategies that incentivize individual or groups of providers can be beneficial, these methods do not necessarily focus on the role of the larger organization where these providers operate (e.g. hospitals or care facilities) and its own risks and responsiveness to incentives.
In LTC, given that most of the individual providers are lower-status licensed or non-licensed workers and have limited decision-making power, individualized incentives may fall short of what is needed to make any significant changes in patient care.Footnote 149 Additionally, the ownership structure of private equity-owned facilities is particularly complex so it is difficult to determine which individuals actually have the power to impact structural shifts within the individual facility.Footnote 150 These are just some reasons why the individualized incentives associated with accountable care organizations may, on their own, have limited utility in improving patient care in private equity-owned LTC facilities. In response to these potential challenges, the next Section theorizes an organizational-level incentive structure.
V. PRELIMINARY THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF REGULATORY-ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES TO ALIGN PATIENT QUALITY CARE WITH FINANCIALLY EFFECTIVE PRIVATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP OF LTC FACILITIES
While much of the literature regarding health care performance incentives focuses on the individual professional,Footnote 151 individual incentives are insufficient and ignore the structural contexts under which professionals make decisions. In terms of private equity ownership of LTC facilities, an incentive structure that benefits the organization as corporate person may be more effective than one geared toward individual professionals. There are at least two important reasons for this shift.
First, while in general health care, physicians, licensed nurses, and nurse practitioners continue to be the dominant care providers, LTC facilities are staffed primarily by unlicensed aides and lower-status licensed workers, with only a small number of licensed professionals.Footnote 152 In 2016, 63.9% of all full-time nursing home staff were CNAs, with registered nurses making up only 11.9% of the full-time staff.Footnote 153 For LTC, this means that individual provider incentives are less applicable because aides, though providing the day-to-day care, are not the ultimate decision-makers around that care. A focus on individual incentives through value-based models is not necessarily effective if the caretakers are not the ultimate decision makers. If there is limited autonomy, as in the case of CNAs, individual incentives will not impact action.
Second, for LTC facilities, the goal is patient quality of life. While LTC facilities employ nurses and other medical professionals, the primary focus of LTC facilities is not actual medical care, but patient well-being. Patients are probably in the facility because positive outcomes are limited, whether their care is for end of life or recovery from a serious medical issue.Footnote 154 Therefore, a value-based model focused on patient outcomes would not necessarily be sensible.
Even given these critiques, there are two examples of value based models in the LTC arena. The first example is the Skilled Nursing Facility Value-Based Purchasing Program implemented by CMS.Footnote 155 For this program, the metric used for evaluation is hospital readmission. This metric does not account for differences in “patient social risk factors” and does not provide any real impact on actual patient quality care.Footnote 156 The second example is the LTC ACO launched by Genesis HealthCare.Footnote 157 There has been a lot of excitement regarding its potential and as of 2019, it had succeeded in significant savings for providers.Footnote 158 However, this model still focuses primarily on the associated physicians and has no impact on the internal operations of the given facility outside of the physician relationship. The facility takes on limited or no risk and patient quality of care is not necessarily increased.Footnote 159 The incentives are towards reducing patient stays and hospital readmissions, but not on patient quality of life per se.Footnote 160
Overall, the goal of a private equity firm is to make money for their investors, not health care providers. If all the incentives are targeted at individual providers, there are limited reasons for a private equity-owned facility to promote this kind of structure. There is ultimately no benefit to the private equity firm at the level of the individual provider. It is for these reasons that an incentive approach should be on the organizational level.
A. Organizational-level Pay for Performance
One way to make an incentive structure more relevant is to shift the reimbursement rate incentives from individual providers to the private equity-owned facility or facility chain as a whole. Specifically, an organization—and not the workers—would receive a higher reimbursement rate if patient care metrics are within certain parameters. Some theorizing around value-based payments has suggested a similar idea, considering metrics such as improving staffing, maintaining infection control, and prioritizing services that benefit patient quality of life.Footnote 161 Furthermore, to account for the issues associated with absolute as well as relative measures, instead of creating one threshold, one could create a graduated reimbursement schedule where reaching the highest level of patient care results in the highest reimbursement from Medicaid and Medicare. Although this would not have an impact on organizations that primarily take on private paying patients, adding a secondary incentive of graduated substantial healthcare payments to providers of LTC services could fill this gap. For example, this could mean a simple incentive payment each year as long as patient quality of care remains high.
The Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) plan under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act in 2020 included a proposed structure similar to the one I suggest. The CARES Act planned to tie incentive payments to patient well-being in terms of COVID-19.Footnote 162 Specifically, HHS set aside $2 billion to provide nursing homes with incentive payments if their COVID-19 infection rates were below the infection rates in the county where they were located.Footnote 163 Thomas Engels, the previous administrator for the HHS Health Resources and Services Administration, said, “we anticipate that linking payment to performance will be an effective means of holding nursing homes accountable, stimulating innovation, and encouraging them to reach beyond their own walls for infection control expertise and support.”Footnote 164
This kind of organizational level reimbursement or grant for performance would have the additional benefit of adding more resources to facilities for operational improvements. More precisely, private equity-owned facilities are critiqued because they are often purchased using an LBO, and therefore tend to spend much of their resources paying interest on the accrued debt from the purchase.Footnote 165 This reduces the amount of money available for staffing and other technical improvements that could improve patient care. Incentivizing the facility with infusions of capital based on patient care may propel the structural changes needed to create conditions for the best possible care. This strategy would balance the managerial and financial efficiency motives of the private equity firm with the patient-care metrics for the facility itself.
Critics might argue that this approach rewards facilities for merely providing the services they should already be providing to patients. To this, I would respond that the graduated approach is a key component to this model. Specifically, the better the patient care, the higher the reimbursement or grant payment. This is a simplified response to a complicated issue, and it would take significant time to develop the appropriate metrics and measurements. Nevertheless, this would be a worthwhile endeavor. Additionally, others might argue that the funding required to make this organizational incentive worth it to facilities may be out of reach for federal and state governmental entities. This concern is valid given the amount of funding currently allocated to LTC.Footnote 166 However, the COVID-19 pandemic brought attention to the experiences of patients in U.S. elder care facilities and, created a significant opportunity for reassessing the governmental budgets to reallocate appropriate resources in this area.
B. Time-Bound Incentives
One of the issues with private equity ownership of LTC facilities is that they are only owned over a short period of time and are meant to maximize profit in the immediate term.Footnote 167 An incentive program to stretch out the amount of time LTC facilities are owned by private equity firms may be beneficial. One option is reducing tax burdens based on the longevity of the ownership. Another option is developing graduated incentive payments based on how long the company is owned by the same firm. Finally, it might be worth considering a schematic that weighs patient care over time. Instead of length of ownership alone being incentivized, length of ownership with increasing patient care benefits is incentivized. For example, the longer patient care continues to be at higher quality levels, the larger the incentive or tax benefit for the organization. These kinds of time-bound incentives prioritize stability and long-term strategy over short-term gains.
One criticism of this approach may be that it could have the unintended consequence of private equity firms retaining ownership of LTC facilities even longer than is actually beneficial for investors. The goal for firms is to hold investments long enough to realize profits (the harvest period), but not so long that the returns on the investments begin to flatten.Footnote 168 Furthermore, during the fund formation phase, private equity firms may have more difficulty navigating investment relationships without a distinct possibility of short-term gains. While these consequences present potential challenges, these concerns also assume that shifting to a long-term strategy is not in line with short-term gains. This is not necessarily true. In fact, this approach may allow for more innovative ideas around management strategies that take both short-term gains and long-term sustainability into account. For example, investors may take more seriously other options for acquisitions other than the LBO and all of its debt implications.Footnote 169
C. Investor-Specific Incentives
A third theoretical incentive structure entails connecting the individual level to the organizational level by incentivizing the private equity investors as additional stakeholders in the process of LTC private equity ownership. Profit maximization in the short-term is the goal for private equity because these investments directly impact investors.Footnote 170 While the general partner in an investment fund has direct control over a firm’s investments, the investors or limited partners have indirect control through financing power.Footnote 171 Thus, an engaged investor has the opportunity to request certain management practices especially if they align with the potential for higher returns.Footnote 172 To this end, structuring an incentive process where both the facility and the investors receive financial incentives for patient quality of care can make a difference. This can occur through slightly increasing the investor percentages on their returns or even delivering direct cash to investors. This structure aligns investor goals with the goals of the LTC providers and brings divergent interests together.
There is one significant challenge to this theoretical approach. The process of engaging directly with private investors may not be simple because of the complexities around the structure of private equity investments.Footnote 173 Many times, it can be difficult to even figure out which facilities are owned by private equity firms, so it may be particularly difficult, if not impossible, to determine who the actual investors might be.Footnote 174 While this may be the case, if an investor-incentive process is well-drafted and codified, it is less important to determine who the investors are and more important to make sure that information about these structures are distributed to them when they are making investment decisions.
D. Overall Criticisms and Responses
Even though these theoretical musings for aligning incentives may be provocative, there are at least two criticisms that I can anticipate. First, an incentive structure does not appropriately deal with the criminal and civil infractions that are pervasive in the LTC industry in general. While this might be true, the current liability structure has not served to effectively curb these infractions either.Footnote 175 In fact, they create increased opportunities for developing loopholes.Footnote 176 Instead of reaching for the best, organizations are reaching for the bare minimum.Footnote 177 Furthermore, these ideas are not meant to and would likely not impact the behavior of those purely bad actors seeking to do harm. The incentive structure is focused on those organizations that are “neutral,” i.e., their goal is profit maximization and is not human-centered. However, if a human-centered approach can be associated directly with profit maximization, then the theoretical strategies outlined above would be the most rational course of action.Footnote 178
A second criticism is that any financial incentive would need to be substantial enough to actually impact decision-making within a private equity firm.Footnote 179 If they are not, then these kinds of incentives would only reach those facilities in need of extra financing and might create the unintended consequence of a larger gap between patient care in private equity-owned versus not private equity-owned facilities. While I agree that this is a real concern, it also depends on the incentive structure. If it is only tied to financial resources for the firm, then the federal and state governments will never have enough funding to properly incentivize the well-financed firms. However, if these financial incentives help support the private equity-owned facility’s bottom line by increasing its profitability, this could have an impact on how the owning firms decide to do business.Footnote 180 The goal here would be to structure an incentive program that focuses on the owned organization itself and not on giving money directly to private equity.Footnote 181
VI. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought significant concerns about patient care and safety within LTC facilities to the forefront of public discourse. This time has also exacerbated the debate around private equity-ownership of these facilities and the direct impact it has on patient care. The research is mixed on this, recognizing that it is not a foregone conclusion that private equity ownership has a negative impact on patient care. In fact, what the research seems to show is that if patient care is not aligned with private equity goals of short-term profit maximization, then patient care is subordinated to the larger profit motive. This means that aligning the financial goals of private equity ownership with the human-centered patient care goals can solve, some, if not most, of the patient care issues.
Value-based patient care models were developed in earnest based on requirements of the ACA Nursing Home Provisions and will continue to proliferate given the ongoing significant statutory incentives to do so.Footnote 182 However, these value-based models have been primarily focused on individual providers and patient outcomes based on curative care. In LTC, however, the patient care orientation is or at least should be palliative, which means incentives need be focused on the systems in place to facilitate this care as opposed to patient outcome measures.Footnote 183 With private equity owned facilities, these systems are not developed by the internal workers, but by the external management of the private equity owners. It is for this reason that I suggest that organizational level financial incentives would be a more effective way of incentivizing private equity-owned LTC facilities to focus on patient care.
In this Note, I posited three types of incentive structures. First, I suggest a pay-for-performance scheme geared toward the organization itself and not the individuals within the organization. Much of the management of these organizations remains outside of the facility itself, so targeting the actual facility-level structure set up by the private equity firm makes more sense. Second, an incentive structure that is time-bound and encourages longer term ownership of facilities, may provide an impetus for extended private equity LTC ownership. This facilitates a longer term orientation to profit maximization. Third, a structure that includes providing incentives directly to the investors would allow for alignment between those investing and patient care orientations. Even with these initial theoretical suggestions, there are significant potential pitfalls. Specifically, the suggestions do not necessarily alleviate the problems associated with the worst actors, and the incentives still need to be significant enough to have an impact on the decision-making of a private equity firm. Additionally, not all private equity firms are created equal, and they do not follow the same kinds of strategies.Footnote 184 Though one incentive structure might work for one firm, it may not work with all firms. For example, while an investor-specific incentive may be a good strategy for a firm with active or more socially conscious investors, it may be less effective if the investors of the firm are more passive. Further elaboration and theorizing about the details would help overcome these and other concerns.
Overall, I conclude where I began. In the United States, for as long as LTC facilities and similar institutions have been in existence, they have struggled to provide the best care for those that seek their services. These patients are either members of a vulnerable population or are seeking help at a particularly vulnerable point in their lives. Focusing on whether private equity ownership is better or worse for LTC facilities and their patients misses opportunities to develop solutions. Instead, we can try to alleviate some of the negative consequences by creating a space to pursue better patient quality care. We can pursue this strategy even as our society continues to question whether private equity firms should be able to pursue these ownership opportunities at all.
