Plato’s theory of recollection is presented in the Meno as a response to the paradox raised by Meno concerning inquiry. Unfortunately, the theory is sometimes dismissed by scholars insofar as they argue that it should not be taken seriously, or is a ruse to get Meno to continue the inquiry, or both.Footnote 1 The exhibition that Plato presents does not appear to help in this regard and can be read to support the view that the theory of recollection should not be taken seriously. In the exhibition, Socrates examines a slave’s opinion of a geometrical problem and shows that the slave can both recognize his own ignorance in regard to the answers he gives and arrive at the correct answer only by means of questions. Socrates implies that, because the slave answers with only his own opinion, the answers he gives are his own. The standard reply is that Socrates simply leads the slave to the answer, and he can do this because he already knows the answer.Footnote 2 An argument against this view, as I present in this paper, is that the methodology which Plato uses to bring about the act of recollection exhibited in the examination of the slave alleviates this concern. But even scholars sympathetic with the view that Plato is presenting a genuine problem with Meno’s paradox and a genuine response to that paradox with the theory of recollection state that Plato does not have Socrates’ exhibition illustrate the best method of recollecting.Footnote 3 On my view, just the opposite is the case or at least, the methods used are well-suited for recollecting. I contend that once we determine the method or methods that Socrates employs in the examination of the slave, we will find that the examination of the slave is a much more defensible exhibition of the theory of recollection and responds to at least one aspect of Meno’s paradox. The methodology answers how one is to inquire when one knows nothing at all of the thing sought.
Determining what methods are employed in the examination is no easy task. Scholars have addressed this issue, but they offer either an insufficient answer or an incomplete one. The standard answer in the literature is that Socrates employs elenchus.Footnote 4 This answer is either uninformative or insufficient. If these scholars take elenchus to mean question and answer, the only method announced (82e4-5, 84c11), the view is uninformative. For Plato, any method can proceed by means of question and answer. In the Meno, Socrates proceeds by question and answer when employing both the elenchus (71d-79e) and the method of hypothesis (87b-89c).Footnote 5 In the Phaedo, Socrates employs the method of hypothesis by means of question and answer (102a-107b). Plato also has the Stranger proceed by question and answer while employing collection and division in both the Sophist and Statesman. But if the scholars understand elenchus to mean refutation or cross-examination, then the answer is insufficient. Only one stage in the exhibition proceeds by means of refutation or cross-examination: the stage where the slave comes to recognize that he does not know what line doubles the area of the original square. There are scholars who hold this view as well, but none specify what method is used to move the slave from aporetic ignorance,Footnote 6 the recognition that one does not know anything at all of the thing sought, to true opinion.Footnote 7 I call this the positive part of the examination.Footnote 8
I argue that Socrates employs the method of hypothesis for this stage of the exhibition. But this is not sufficient to clarify the role of the methodology in the exhibition. I show that elenchus is a necessary step in the exhibition, and the method of hypothesis picks up where the elenchus leaves off to enable the slave to solve the geometrical problem. In other words, the two methods joined together are sufficient for a successful exhibition of the theory of recollection in respect to a geometric problem.Footnote 9 This view faces various challenges, especially those articulated by Gregory Vlastos and Hugh Benson. Vlastos holds that the two methods are radically distinct and would not be employed by the same thinker, especially in the same inquiry.Footnote 10 Benson does not hold this view and has shown good reason to doubt Vlastos’s view, in particular insofar as elenchus is used only to rid the interlocutor of one’s false conceit of wisdom, but he suggests that no method is necessary in the latter part of the exhibition. The exhibition succeeds if it shows one instance of recollection. Benson also argues that the elenchus of the slave and the positive part of the examination are not intrinsically linked. On his reading, Plato vacillates on this issue in the Meno.Footnote 11 Finally, Benson claims that the question that governs both parts of the examination is the same. In other words, the question does not shift in the second part of the examination but remains the same question, making the two inquiries in the Meno – the one between Socrates and Meno and the other between Socrates and the slave – ultimately unparallel.
I argue against all four of these views. In the first section, I present the preliminaries necessary for my argument in regard to Meno’s paradox and how it arises. I argue in the second section that the elenchus is viewed as a necessary step in the examination, and, just as important, that the elenchus leaves the inquirer to address the issue in the form of a problem, whether something is x or not x, and to use the method of hypothesis to continue the inquiry once the slave is relieved of his false conceit of wisdom. The third section offers several reasons to accept the view that Socrates tacitly employs the method of hypothesis in the positive part of the examination. I also show that the question shifts in the positive part of the examination, throwing into doubt Benson’s reading of the examination. If both arguments hold, then the examination exhibits one instance where Plato employs both methods in a sustained inquiry, questioning Vlastos’ position. The consequence of my view is a more unified interpretation of the Meno. The examination of the slave mirrors the entire inquiry with Meno throughout the dialogue.Footnote 12 The Meno really presents a sustained inquiry into the nature of virtue, albeit an unsuccessful one.
I
Preliminaries. The examination of the slave is Socrates’ exhibition of the theory of recollection. The theory of recollection is posited to overcome Meno’s paradox. The paradox is often presented as a paradox of inquiry and this is the way Socrates presents it (80e1-5), but scholars such as Dominic Scott and Roslyn Weiss argue that Meno’s paradox is not one but two paradoxes, a paradox of inquiry and a paradox of discovery.Footnote 13 Both scholars argue that the paradox of inquiry should not be taken seriously. I cannot resolve these issues concerning Meno’s paradox in this paper, but, on my view, it is not necessary for my argument. Whether or not we take the paradox of inquiry seriously or whether we take the theory of recollection to solve that paradox, Meno poses a general problem that needs to be addressed: How does one proceed in an inquiry when one knows nothing at all about the thing sought?Footnote 14 This is the first question that Meno poses to Socrates in his formulation of the paradox (80d5-6), and there is good reason to take it as implied by Socrates’ formulation of the paradox (80e1-5). If Socrates cannot respond to this issue, then Meno would have good reason to assume that anyone in his state of aporetic ignorance cannot continue to inquire. The methodology used in the examination of the slave addresses that issue.Footnote 15 In particular, the method of hypothesis is presented as such a method that one can employ when one knows neither the what is of the thing sought nor what sort it is (87b2-5). By showing that the method of hypothesis is employed in the examination of the slave, the examination minimally responds to one horn of the paradox of inquiry: one can continue to inquire when one does not know anything at all of the thing sought.
I need to address two questions to clarify my own view. How does the paradox arise in the first place? What does Socrates mean when he says he does not know anything at all about virtue or whatever object is under inquiry? I take the two questions to be related, but the second question needs to be answered first. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates distinguishes between two kinds of questions and the answers given in respect to each. Meno initiates the dialogue by asking whether virtue is teachable or is acquired by practice or by nature or in some other way. By appealing to the language Socrates uses, we can label this kind a “what sort” question. We might call the thing that answers a “what sort” question a quality of that thing. Socrates then informs Meno that he cannot answer the “what sort” question unless he knows what virtue is (71a5-b7). But since Socrates does not know what virtue is, he must ask what virtue is. We can label this kind of question a “what is” question. The thing that answers a “what is” question is a real definition, which expresses the nature or ousia of a thing (72b1).Footnote 16 Now, the assumption that one cannot answer a “what sort” question prior to knowing what a thing is (71a3-6, 71b3-5) is often called the priority of definition. This assumption admits of various interpretations. The one I find most plausible is that the assumption implies only that the person does not know anything at all of the thing sought, not that one has either no idea or no opinions about the thing in question.Footnote 17 In other words, since to know what sort a thing is one must know what it is, then, insofar as one does not know what a thing is, this person also fails to know any sort the thing happens to be.
We can now answer how the paradox arises. Given that Meno cannot answer what is virtue, Meno does not know anything at all about virtue. We can now say what this phrase means in respect to the interpretation of the priority of definition I accept. It means in this context that Meno does not know the real definition of virtue, so he also does not know any of the qualities virtue has. Given this circumstance, Meno cannot specify virtue, assuming that a specification of virtue would be either what it is, e.g., knowledge of the good, or what sort it is, e.g., something teachable. It is possible that Meno could specify virtue by means of an opinion, but if he is not aware that this opinion is true, which seems to be implied by the fact that Meno admits he cannot say anything about virtue, then he can equally take virtue to be specified by his own opinion or the negation of it, e.g., virtue is something teachable or not or virtue is knowledge of the good or not, which is really no specification at all. But it is easy to see under this view that the method of hypothesis could be employed when someone is in this position. Meno could take either opinion as given and seek its condition.
Finally, I should speak briefly about the different parts of the examination of the slave. I follow Irwin and Benson in dividing the examination of the slave into four stages.Footnote 18 The first stage is where Socrates elicits the slave’s opinion about which line doubles the area of the original square (82b8-e3). In the second stage, the slave’s original answer is refuted, as well as his second answer (82b12-84a2). The slave comes to recognize that he does not know. The third stage is where the slave is led from aporetic ignorance to true opinion about which line doubles the area of the original square (84c9-85b6). The fourth stage does not actually occur in the dialogue but is suggested by Socrates. This stage is when the slave would reach knowledge of the issue by repeating the same questions many times and in different ways (85c9-d1). These latter two stages I have also called the positive part of the examination. Marking off the distinct stages is helpful both in showing that there is a parallel between the inquiries with Meno and with the slave and for determining whether and how the stages are connected.
II
Elenchus (Meno 82b9–84d2). Most scholars claim that Socrates proceeds by means of elenchus throughout Socrates’ examination of the slave.Footnote 19 As we have seen, there is good reason to doubt this view, and the third section will provide more evidence against this view. What is more critical for my view now is whether the use of the elenchus plays a necessary role in the exhibition of recollection. Benson claims that Plato is inclined to vacillate on this issue. I argue against this view. Elenchus is necessary if the interlocutor who is to recollect begins the inquiry with a false conceit of knowledge. But I also show that elenchus plays another role that is key for recollection. Once the interlocutor is refuted and is led to give up his own false conceit of knowledge, such a person is in the right position to address the inquiry in the form of a problem, since he now knows nothing at all of the thing sought. A problem, as understood in this context, is expressed in the following form: either it is x or not x. This move sets up the next stage of the methodology, as I argue, to employ the method of hypothesis so as to move the interlocutor from aporetic ignorance to at least true opinion.
Benson’s view of the role of elenchus should be questionable simply on the grounds that three separate passages within the examination of the slave state otherwise:
(1) Observe him recollecting in order, as one must recollect (82e12-13).
(2) Do you see, Meno, what point he has now reached on the path of recollection? (84a4-5)
(3) Look what he will discover from this aporia, inquiring with me, with me doing nothing other than asking questions and not teaching (84c11-d1).Footnote 20
In Benson’s defense, he cites the first two passages, and he also cites two other passages that speak against the interpretation I am defending.Footnote 21 I comment only on the first of these passages to show that it by itself cannot support any supposed vacillation of Plato’s views on what is necessary for the interlocutor to recollect.Footnote 22
The passage is as follows:
If someone asked him these same questions again and in a variety of ways, you know that in the end he would know these things less accurately than no one. . . . Without anyone teaching him, but only asking him questions he will come to know, recovering himself this knowledge from himself. . . . And isn’t recovering knowledge, in oneself, recollection? (85c10-d7)
Benson reads this passage to suggest that recollection is illustrated only by the third and fourth stages of the examination. But this reading ignores my third passage quoted above. If the third stage begins with the slave in aporia over the issue at hand, and the slave is to discover the correct answer from this aporetic state, and it is the third stage that is repeated over and over to arrive at knowledge, then the aporetic state is crucial for the third stage to occur. If the aporetic state is arrived at by means of elenchus, then elenchus is in no way ignored at 85c10-d7. Now, Benson could respond that this passage emphasizes only the stage where the slave already has true opinion of the matter at hand, but then the passage suggests only that the fourth stage illustrates recollection properly. But this is not what Benson states nor can it be his view. The third stage is necessary to recover knowledge from oneself since it arrives at an intermediary step. So, if the passage makes reference to the third stage as well, it must also make reference to the aporetic state with which the interlocutor enters this stage. This leads us back to the view that the elenchus is a necessary step in order for someone to recollect.
I turn now to a more detailed argument for this view by unpacking each of the three numbered passages cited above in respect to their context in the Meno. The first passage emphasizes two things that are important for my argument. First, the act of recollection to be exhibited by the slave will occur in a certain order, and, second, this order is necessary for the act of recollection to occur.Footnote 23 It is reasonable to read the claim of the first passage as pointing back to what Socrates just revealed about the slave’s knowledge of geometrical figures and his answer in respect to what line doubles the area of the given square. So, to understand what the order is and why it is necessary for this particular act of recollection to occur in this order, we need to go back to the previous passage where Socrates begins his initial questioning of the slave (82b9-e3). Socrates asks what the slave recognizes concerning the square, both what sort of figure it is and how to determine the area of it. He then asks the slave how one would double the area of the square that Socrates has just drawn in the sand, a square with an area of 4. The slave answers that one would double the length of the side of the square to double the area. Socrates has just elicited from the slave his opinion on this particular matter, and, more importantly, the slave believes that this is the correct answer on how to double the area of the given square (82e2-3).Footnote 24 Both Meno and Socrates recognize that this opinion is not correct (82e8-9). So, it is only the slave who begins with a false conceit of knowledge.Footnote 25 What is necessary for someone to recollect if he begins an inquiry with a false conceit of knowledge is to relieve him of this conceit. Socrates does just that, and the method by which Socrates does this is elenchus. The necessity of employing elenchus in this case of recollection is that the one who is to recollect begins from a certain state – believing that one knows when one does not.Footnote 26 We may find that there is another reason to employ the elenchus as we unpack the other two passages.
The second passage supports this reading of the first passage. It emphasizes how far the slave has reached on his path of recollection. At this point in the act of recollection, Socrates pauses to provide a commentary on what has happened so far. Benson argues (in my opinion, persuasively) that Socrates’ commentary only emphasizes that the slave has come to recognize his ignorance, and, in doing so, the slave is relieved of his false conceit of wisdom.Footnote 27 Socrates does not state that the slave realizes his answers were false, but merely that the slave does not know and no longer believes that he knows.Footnote 28 Socrates also convinces Meno that the slave was not harmed by being in this aporetic state, i.e., being numbed (84b6-8). The elenchus really has done something useful for the slave. He would be glad to seek for the answer although he does not know, whereas before he simply would have assumed that he did know and would not seek the correct answer (84b9-11) nor try to recollect.
With this reading, I agree with Benson that there is a parallel between the inquiry with Meno in the first part of the Meno and the first two parts of the examination of the slave. But someone could object to this view in the following way: The slave does know something of the thing sought; namely, he knows that what is sought is the line of the square that has an area of 8.Footnote 29 Meno, on the other hand, knows nothing at all of what is sought and admits that this is so (80b4). There is a way to salvage the parallel and in fact to make the parallel stronger than the one Benson presents. Benson actually denies that the question with which Socrates begins the examination of the slave is a “what is” question.Footnote 30 I agree with Benson that the question hardly conforms to the standard “what is” question, such as “What is courage?” or “What is virtue?” On the other hand, there is a way to understand the question analogously to a “what is” question. What is sought and the question asked at the beginning of the examination is what line will constitute the square with double the area of the original square (82d7-e2). If we understand the length of the line as constituting the “what is” of this kind of square, and the area of the square as the sort of square it is, then there can be an even stronger parallel between the two inquiries.Footnote 31Further, this can resolve the issue between the apparent discrepancy between the aporetic states of the slave and of Meno at this point in their inquiries. If the length of the line is the what is and the area of the square is the sort, then the slave is in the same aporetic state toward the thing sought. The slave knows neither the length of the line nor whether this sort of square is even possible – whether this sort of square exists. The slave is not aware of the existence of incommensurable lines. This second passage comes immediately after the slave announces that he does not know (“by Zeus”) what line would constitute the square with the sort of area sought (84a1-2). On my reading, the second passage announces the fact that the slave has reached the same state of aporetic ignorance as Meno has in respect to virtue. Both the slave and Meno know nothing at all of the thing sought, and if Meno’s paradox is not solvable, neither of these two could proceed with their respective inquiries.
The above objection, though, could be made stronger. The slave still has a specification for the thing sought, whereas Meno does not. The slave seeks the sort of square with an area of 8. Here, we can appeal to a claim in Aristotle to help show how the slave is really in a state of aporia and does not know anything at all of the thing sought. Aristotle states the following in Posterior Analytics II.8:
When we know incidentally that something exists, necessarily we have no grasp on what it is; for we do not even know that it exists, and to seek what something is without grasping that it exists is to seek nothing. (93a24-27).Footnote 32
Since the slave either does not know that such a square exists or knows it only incidentally, assuming it to exist only because Socrates asks him to seek it, the slave cannot determine whether he is seeking something or seeking nothing at all. We can see that this is akin to Meno’s state. He does not know whether virtue is teachable or not, whereas the slave does not know whether this sort of square exists or not. The specification that the slave seems to have, the sort of square with an area of 8, is no help at all for his seeking the line, because the slave cannot answer whether there is this sort of square or not.Footnote 33
Given that Socrates has led both Meno and the slave into acknowledging a false conceit of wisdom concerning the thing sought, this step is crucial for the proper understanding of the third passage.Footnote 34 Socrates announces that the slave will discover the answer from this state of aporia, inquiring along with Socrates. I take this passage to imply that the third stage begins with the inquirer being in this aporetic state. I see no way that Benson can deny this view, considering he holds that the point of elenchus is to rid the interlocutors of their false conceit of wisdom and, insofar as they are rid of this false conceit, they recognize their ignorance in respect to the thing sought. Socrates clearly emphasizes that the slave will discover what he will discover in the rest of the examination from this aporetic state.
If this is correct, it lends support for my overarching interpretation of the examination of the slave. The aporetic inquirer cannot answer the “what is” question. Such a person cannot say anything in respect to such a question.Footnote 35 But he can take either the “what is” or the sort problematically, i.e., take one side or the other as given, and seek the conditions by which the “what is” or sort will hold or not hold. The method of hypothesis is introduced in the Meno to do just this in respect to solving a geometric problem. As already noted, Socrates also makes clear that the method of hypothesis can be employed when someone knows neither what the thing is nor what sort it is (86d8-e4, cf. 87b2-4). Both Meno and the slave are in this state in respect to their inquiries.
But one could take Benson’s view of the matter: Why expect any determinate method to be employed at all? Having a determinate method does not seem essential for the examination to exhibit that recollection is the case, just that an instance of it occur. In response, it is clear that Plato presents recollection to take place in stages. I need only refer back to the first passage. Socrates emphasized there that the act of recollection will proceed in a determinate order, as it must. Now, if one stage has a method and the other does not, there would be a lack of symmetry in the inquiry. In other words, one would have a determinate way of proceeding and the other would not. But it could be the case that the other part of the inquiry could employ various methods. I object not to this view but simply to the view that no method at all is employed to move the slave from aporetic ignorance to correct opinion. What needs to be shown is that there is good reason to accept that a method is employed and that this method is the method of hypothesis. I turn to these issues now.
III
Method of Hypothesis (Meno 84d3–85b7). There seems at first glance little textual evidence on which to base the claim that the method of hypothesis is employed in the third stage of the examination of the slave. The literature either remains silent or merely is suggestive or simply claims one would be hard pressed to find any sign of the method of hypothesis.Footnote 36 This makes the present task all the more daunting. Below I show that there is good reason in support of my argument that the method of hypothesis is employed, at least tacitly. To aid my overall interpretation of the examination, I also provide more evidence that this stage of the inquiry is linked to the previous. This latter point is necessary to show that Plato sees an intimate link between the two methods and that together they form a certain methodology, or a certain part of one, for resolving problems and possibly seeking and discovering definitions.
I argue for this reading in the following way. First, the method of hypothesis is appropriate to employ in the third stage of the examination of the slave. We know from the previous section that the slave is in a state of aporetic ignorance concerning the thing sought. Socrates clues us in that the slave will reach the next stage of his act of recollection starting from this aporetic state. We also know that the inquiry concerns seeking the side of the square that will have double the area of a square with an area of 4. If we put these facts together, we can safely say that the slave is faced with a geometric problem. A geometric problem is one where the inquirer seeks the construction of a figure with a given specific description that is not yet known to the inquirer to be a possible construction. In a geometric problem, one can assume the figure sought as constructed and then seek what conditions are necessary and sufficient for such a figure to be constructed. The inquirer seeks conditions until he finds something already known that shows the conditions either to hold or impossible to hold, proving the figure to be constructible or not. This is a form of problem reduction, and the method of hypothesis is introduced in the Meno as a form of problem reduction. Second, I argue that one set of questions Socrates asks the slave in the third stage can be interpreted as setting up the conditions by which the geometric problem can be solved and then another set of questions as aiming to show that these conditions do hold, given what is already known to the slave. I expand this argument, then, to show that one can present a direct parallel between what occurs in this third stage of the examination and the geometric problem Socrates uses to illustrate the method of hypothesis at 86e-87b. I end this section by responding to possible objections of this reading.
Problem reduction starts from the given problem that one cannot solve then seeks an equivalent problem that one can solve. Here, it is the slave who cannot solve the problem in its present form: he cannot find the line by which the area of the original square is doubled. Socrates, Meno, and the educated reader know why the slave cannot solve this particular geometric problem. The line by which the area of the original square is doubled is incommensurable with the side of the original square. The slave, not knowing of the existence of incommensurable lines and relying only on his ability to count to seek the line, will never arrive at the construction of the square without such knowledge or at least without abandoning his reliance on counting for seeking such a square. So, we can see, if my view is correct, that one shift in the inquiry will be from someone who employs counting to seek the line of this square to one who constructs the square sought by means of what is known.Footnote 37 This shift also moves the inquiry from answering something akin to a “what is” question to answering a “what sort” question. The inquiry seeks the conditions by which this sort of square, the square with an area of 8, is possible or impossible. I show that this shift is signalled by means of Socrates’ questioning. Problem reduction, as I show below, begins with the first set of questions Socrates asks in the third stage. These questions set up the conditions by which the problem can be solved. But solving the problem also will answer the original question Socrates poses to the slave because the slave will find the line that constitutes such a square simultaneously.Footnote 38 If all of the above holds, there is now a complete parallel between the inquiry with Meno throughout the Meno and that with the slave, at least in terms of methods employed. Both inquiries begin with elenchus because each interlocutor has a false conceit of wisdom, and each inquiry continues, once they are relieved of their false conceit, by the method of hypothesis.
Now, problem reduction is successful when it uses what is known to show whether the conditions hold or not for the equivalent problem, thus solving the original problem as well. The second set of Socrates’ questions leads the slave to see that the conditions hold so that the square can be constructed, thus finding the line by which the square is constituted. My interpretation is that Socrates actually is working backwards in respect to solving this geometric problem. Instead of starting by assuming the figure sought as constructed and seeking the conditions, Socrates starts from what is known to the fact that what is known plus the diagonal cutting the area of each square in half is equivalent to the fact that the square can be constructed.Footnote 39 This should not upset my interpretation because both lead to the same result – finding the conditions by which the problem can be solved. Before we turn to see how the questions Socrates asks seeks these conditions, let us work out, preliminarily, what is known by the slave, in order to see how a hypothesis can be formulated and employed in this stage of the inquiry.
The slave has learned that when one doubles the line of the original square, one produces a square with quadruple the area of the original. He also knows that this square has four squares within it, each the size of the original square (83b3-4), but the square sought is half of this area (83c6-7). All of these facts Socrates exploits in leading the slave to solve the problem at hand, as we will soon see. But if we concentrate on the last fact and what it highlights, i.e., the relation of the area of the two squares, we can see that the problem of construction can now be posed in respect to this very relation. From this known relation, we can formulate the following hypothesis: If a square can be constructed out of half of the area of the square with an area of 16, then there is a square with an area of 8, and if no such construction is possible, then there is no such square.Footnote 40 I now turn to the questions that Socrates asks the slave, showing that they lay out the above conditions by which this hypothesis can be formulated.
The initial question by which the third stage begins is significant to quote in full:
Now, you tell me, is this four-foot square not our figure? Do you understand? (84d3-4)
There are three features of this question that are pertinent to my interpretation. First, Socrates does not solicit another opinion about the original question posed. Rather, Socrates begins from something already agreed upon. The beginning to this part of the inquiry suggests that no elenchus will take place, and this is confirmed insofar as Socrates does not cross-examine any of the slave’s opinions in the third part. Second, the square is introduced by means of its area—not by means of its line, as it was originally to the slave (82b9-c2). On my reading, this signals a shift in approach to the problem posed to the slave. If problem reduction is being employed, this would mean that Socrates takes the area of the square sought problematically – taking the area of the square as given and seeking its conditions.Footnote 41 Third, Socrates introduces the square as “our area.” Although most interpreters of the text take Socrates to draw a new square in the sand rather than refer back to the previous one drawn, scholars such as Benson take this fact to signal a new beginning of the inquiry. I agree with him, but the new beginning to the inquiry can just as much signal a new method as abandoning anything that occurred previously. By Socrates’ referring to the figure as “our square,” the two inquiries are shown to be linked. I interpret this to mean that neither the original inquiry nor what was accomplished in the elenchus has been abandoned. We will literally observe, as Socrates just informed Meno (84c11-d2), the slave discovering the answer to the problem out of his aporetic state.
So Socrates begins his line of questioning in order that the slave acknowledge that the new square drawn has an area of 4. Constructing three more squares of equal size, Socrates’ questions lead the slave to admit that this new larger square has an area of 16 and is four times as large as the original square (84d4–e2). Socrates then reminds the slave that they are seeking the square double the area of the original square (84e2–3).Footnote 42 This line of questioning reviews what is known by the slave: the square with double the side is four times as large and what is sought is a square twice as large. But this line of questioning should also remind the slave of the relation between these two squares. As was made clear during the elenchus (83c6-7), the square sought is half the area of the one now before the slave.Footnote 43 So, if the slave were familiar with geometry and the method of hypothesis, he would be able to construct the hypothesis stated above from this line of questioning. Nothing more is needed to formulate the hypothesis, since this relation sets up the relevant conditions by which the problem can be solved. What will make this reading even more plausible is if the next set of questions leads the slave to see that the conditions to solve the problem are shown to hold.
We can also address another issue usually raised in respect to the third stage of the inquiry: the objection that Socrates merely leads the slave to the answer, rather than the slave recollecting inwardly to find the answer. During this part of the examination, Socrates has not led the slave toward any determinate answer. If Socrates wanted simply to lead the slave to the answer, it would have been more efficient to draw the 16-foot square and then draw the diagonals. Although one could still defend the reading that Socrates merely leads the slave to the answer by taking a more circuitous route, another reading, just as plausible, is that these questions lay out the problem reduction for the slave.Footnote 44
It is at this point that Socrates draws the diagonal, without naming it, and asks the slave if this line divides the original-sized square in half; the slave answers that it does (84e4–85a2). Socrates then draws the square constructed via the diagonals, gets the slave to acknowledge that this figure is a square insofar as the slave agrees the lines are equal, and then asks the slave how large is this square constructed from the diagonals (85a2–4). The slave does not understand how large the figure is (85a4–5). What the slave fails to grasp is that, since the diagonal halves the area of the original square, thus all the diagonals together construct a square with half the area of the quadruple-sized square, a square that is twice the area of the original.Footnote 45 These questions, then, can be read to show that the conditions of the hypothesis hold. There is such a square and its line is the diagonal. What happens next in the inquiry can also support this reading. Given that Socrates has just fed the slave the answer, we can see that this is not sufficient for the slave to recognize the answer to which he has been led. If we read the text merely as Socrates feeding the slave the answer, we might be missing the point. These questions are not just to lead the slave to the answer but also to show that a certain method can be used to seek the solution to the given problem. Of course, there is no reason to claim that Socrates is not leading the slave to the answer, but from the fact that the slave does not recognize the solution is before him through the questioning shows that being led to an answer is not sufficient for learning.Footnote 46 It is not until the slave recognizes the conditions are met at least implicitly to solve the problem that he draws the conclusion that the square constructed from the diagonals is the square sought.
To reinforce this interpretation of the questions, if we note the steps that Socrates takes the slave through after this point (85a5), we can see that the hypothesis could be there implicitly, and the slave appeals to it at some level. The first step Socrates takes is to get the slave to see that there are four of the original-sized squares in the figure drawn and that the diagonal (not yet named) cuts each of these squares in half (85a5–6). Socrates then leads the slave to recognize the relation between the area of the square constructed from the diagonals and the area of the original square by means of the area produced by the diagonal cutting the original square in half (85a7–9). The slave calculates that the square constructed from the diagonals has four of these figures and the original-sized square has two of these figures (85a7–8). He then calculates that the relation of 4 to 2 is double, so the square constructed from the diagonals has an area of 8 (85a7–b1). The exhibition ends when the slave points at the diagonal to answer the question by which line is area of the original square doubled (85b1–3). Where might the slave appeal to the hypothesis? The first question in this series (85b5-6) attempts to get the slave to acknowledge the hypothesis. If the diagonal cuts each of the four original-sized squares in half and the square constructed from the diagonals of these squares is possible by being constructed with the square that is four times larger, the slave could then grasp the hypothesis and use it to solve the problem. Unfortunately, the slave does not discover the hypothesis but must resort to counting the areas and determine the relation of the two areas by that means.Footnote 47
I can now show that there is a parallel between the third stage in the examination of the slave and the inquiry that Socrates uses to illustrate the method of hypothesis at 86e–87b. The parallel is grounded on the fact that each inquiry has four key aspects of the method of hypothesis: (1) the hypothesis is used to draw a conclusion, (2) something serves as the hypothesis, (3) there are determinate conditions given by which the problem can be solved either affirmatively or negatively,Footnote 48 and (4) determinate conditions are shown to hold or not to hold that answer the problem either affirmatively or negatively.Footnote 49 I will assume the Cook-Wilson-Heath-Knorr interpretation of the problem presented at 86e-87b, more for the sake of expediency to present the parallel than for any other reason.Footnote 50 This interpretation takes the problem reduction in the example given in the text (86e4–87b2) to be whether the given area, the area to be inscribed in a circle as a triangle, placed along the diameter of the circle as a rectangle falls short of the diameter by a rectangle similar to itself or not; that is, by some sort of proportion.
If my interpretation above is correct, both of the inquiries begin with a problem. In the examination of the slave, the problem is whether there is a square with double the area of the original or not, and what is sought is whether there is a line that constitutes such a square. In Socrates’ example of the method of hypothesis, the problem and what is sought is whether a given area can be inscribed into this circle as a triangle or not (86e6– 87a1). Given the description above of how Socrates proceeds here, I take Socrates to perform a problem reduction implicitly. He starts from a known square with a known area, the square that is quadruple the original area. He reduces the problem by the following hypothesis (of course, without telling the slave or Meno he is doing this): if a square can be constructed out of half of the area of the square with an area of 16, then there is a square with an area of 8, and if no such construction is possible, then there is no such square.Footnote 51 This interpretation of Socrates’ inquiry with the slave parallels the example at 86e–87b as follows: if we want to know whether a given area can be inscribed in a circle as a triangle, it is known that the area of a triangle can be given as a rectangle. So, the problem of the inscription of the given area as a triangle is reduced to the problem of whether a rectangle with the given area stretched along a given line of the circle exceeds or falls short of that same given line by a certain proportion or not; that is, by a similar rectangle with a certain area also along the line. This hypothesis can be given as follows: if the area as a rectangle stretched along the line of the diameter falls short of a given proportion, then one result occurs, and if the area does not fall short, another result occurs.
We can see from the above parallel that the third aspect of the method of hypothesis is present in Socrates’ examination of the slave. There are conditions specified that will resolve the problem.Footnote 52 The conditions are given in the hypothesis. Socrates shows the slave that the conditions hold such that they can construct a square out of half of the area from the square with quadruple the area of the original. This step is the fourth aspect of the method of hypothesis. We can also see that the conditions given in the hypothesis is the main hypothesis. This hypothesis is used to draw the conclusion that the line that constitutes the square with double the area exists. So, the first and second aspects of the method of hypothesis are also present in the examination. In other words, the problem is solved in the examination of the slave when he recognizes that the square constructed from the diagonals of the original-sized squares is half the area of the square with four times the area. Although the slave solves the problem by means of counting, he could use the implicit hypothesis to solve the problem, as we saw above. He also arrives at a correct opinion that he did not have before, so a certain stage in the process of recollection has occurred (85c–86a). The problem is solved in the example at 86e–87b when the inquirer finds out if the area of the original figure can be stretched out as a rectangle on the given line that is equal to the determined proportion, or not. As we see, the two passages and their inquiries parallel nicely. We have yet another good reason to take the method of hypothesis to be employed in the examination of the slave to move the slave from aporetic ignorance to at least true opinion, if not possibly knowledge, and possibly an act of recollection.
I turn now to address three potential criticisms of my view and what appears to be an unfortunate consequence – that my view seems to eliminate the need to posit the theory of recollection at all. First, an objection to my reading is the fact that there is no mention of the method of hypothesis either before the examination or during it. We are not notified that the method is employed and the method itself is introduced in the text only after the examination. But no method is mentioned for the third stage of the examination, so it is no objection that this particular method is not mentioned during or prior to it. A more serious version of this objection would be that no method is mentioned because no method is needed to exhibit an act of recollection. Plato needs to present only one instance of it occurring to exhibit that recollection is possible, as Benson claims. There are two problems with this view as I see it. First, the exhibition would not address all aspects of Meno’s paradox. Meno clearly asks how one would inquire into that which one knows nothing at all what it is (80d5-6). The method of hypothesis answers just that question; the theory of recollection by itself does not. Benson acknowledges that this is the case. So, as I have shown above, if there is a good sign that the method is employed tacitly, there is good reason to accept that Plato intended us to read the exhibition with the slave this way.Footnote 53 Second, if Benson’s view is that no method is necessary but rather to show one instance of successful inquiry when the inquirer knows nothing at all of the thing sought, then his view falls prey to Weiss’s criticism that Socrates teaches the slave because Socrates has knowledge of what is sought.Footnote 54 On Weiss’s view, the questions Socrates asks are derived directly from this knowledge. My view avoids this criticism. The method of hypothesis can be employed when no one knows anything at all of the thing sought. Socrates’ knowledge in this particular case becomes inconsequential to the examination. Theoretically, if the slave were trained in geometry and did not know the answer to the geometrical problem presented, he could use the method of hypothesis on his own to find whether the construction of such a square is possible.Footnote 55
Another serious objection is that the slave does not actually use the hypothesis even tacitly to solve the problem; he counts the number of triangular shapes in the two squares and recognizes their relation. But this objection can be handled by pointing to the fact that the slave arrives at only correct opinion and not knowledge. If the slave grasped the hypothesis and used it to solve the problem, Socrates might have concluded that the slave arrived at knowledge of the matter.Footnote 56 This view can be reinforced by the fact that Socrates acknowledges that the slave could arrive at knowledge by asking the same questions but in different ways. One of these ways could be such that the questions make clear to the slave how to formulate the hypothesis and use it to solve the problem.
Finally, one could still doubt that the method of hypothesis is even tacitly present and another method could have been used that could also be derived from the ordering and nature of the questions. Here, I would appeal to two distinct things. First, my interpretation offers the most economical approach to the examination of the slave. The method of hypothesis is immediately discussed after the exhibition. If another method is employed, it is not discussed or used anywhere in the dialogue. Second, the method of hypothesis was also introduced as a method that could be employed when those enquiring are in aporia. The method is appropriate given the condition the slave is in and the kind of problem the slave faces, a geometric problem.
But my overarching view of the examination of the slave seems to question the need of the theory of recollection to solve the paradox of inquiry or for the slave to arrive at knowledge. I claim at the beginning of this paper that the methodology in the examination would present a more plausible defense of the theory of recollection, but the opposite seems to be the case. The theory appears unnecessary given that the methodology solves the paradox of inquiry.Footnote 57 A reading of the text supports this view. Socrates seems to backtrack on his own claim at the end of this part of the dialogue when he says:
I do not affirm confidently other things in respect to the argument, but I do contend at all costs in both word and deed that we would be better men, both more courageous and less idle, if we believe that one must seek that which one does not know rather than if we believe that it is neither possible to discover what we do not know nor necessary to seek it. (86b6-c2)
He insists only that we believe that we can seek what we do not know, not, as it seems, that we believe that recollection is the case. The methodology used in the examination insures that the inquiry can continue even though the inquirer acknowledges his aporetic ignorance. Given my arguments about the methodology, it seems reasonable to say that Plato signals the theory of recollection is merely a ruse to get Meno to continue the inquiry.
Weiss expresses this criticism even more strongly in regard to the examination: “But, of course, the slave-boy is not recollecting. He does not recall to mind something that is (or was) already in his mind. . . .The only process in evidence is the slave-boy’s reckoning, that is, his doing multiplication and counting.”Footnote 58In other words, the slave does not look inward, as recollection demands, to arrive at the true opinion that the diagonal is the line by which the area of the square is doubled. Weiss takes this as obvious on the grounds that the slave arrives at this opinion by means of counting and comparing the two things he just counted, the number of triangles in each square. I argue that the matter is not as obvious as Weiss presents it, but rather it is not decisive in the text whether the slave looks into himself to recollect, just as Socrates suggests that the theory of recollection is true (86b1-6) and then claims not to stand confidently by the theory itself.Footnote 59
What decides this issue is where the true opinion comes from with which the slave answers at the end of the examination. We already know that Weiss says that Socrates teaches him. We have also seen the response to this view. The method of hypothesis can be used when there is no one who knows the answer. But, on her view, Weiss could accept this point and simply deny that the slave actually uses the hypothesis to solve the problem. He calculates, and he has a specification by which he can determine that the problem is solved. What is wrong with this view? One problem is that we do not know if calculation cannot be employed in an act of recollection. Weiss seems to rule it out completely. But Plato does accept that there is an order to recollection and, if my above arguments are correct, a method. It is not simply looking inward for the answer, although looking inward is a condition necessary to recollection. On those grounds, calculation may not be ruled out as a tool in recollecting an answer to a question.
Weiss can still insist that the slave is taught. But what are the means by which he is taught? Socrates proceeds by means of analysis, using the method of hypothesis, which does not proceed by means of axioms to deduce certain truths from those axioms. So, even if we want to accuse Socrates of teaching, he does not present his teaching as a matter of synthesis, moving from something already accepted to something that follows, but rather as analysis, moving from a given to the conditions by which that given will hold. The slave must make the upward motion on his own, even if he is guided by questions from someone else. But does he need to have true opinion or knowledge already in his soul in order to recognize the correct answer?
Once again, the answer to this question is unclear, and we can show this is so with the parallel case of virtue and Meno and Socrates’ inquiry. It is often assumed that there is a clear difference.Footnote 60 Geometry has well-established axioms and proofs. Ethics does not. We will see that this may not make as much of a difference between these two inquiries as is normally thought. Let us start with the slave. The difference between the two inquiries appears to be as follows. The slave knows what must hold for the problem to be solved: a square with twice the area of the original. In order to solve this problem, it is true that the slave has certain assumptions from which he starts. He knows how to determine the area of the square. But Meno and Socrates do know what things are teachable – that which is a kind of knowledge (87b6-c6). They also know what things are not teachable: when there are no teachers or learners of a subject (89d6-9). The big difference may be that the slave knows what a square is and at least some of the qualities of a square. It seems possible that the slave could move from this knowledge to the fact that the diagonal is the line by which the area of a square is doubled. It is not clear that Meno and Socrates can make the same move, given that they do not know what virtue is, unless they already have knowledge of it in their souls.
But isn’t this also the case for the slave? For the slave to have knowledge that the diagonal is the line by which the area of the original square is doubled, the slave must know that there are incommensurable lines. Has Socrates taught that to the slave? It seems not. How, then, would the slave come to recognize this fact? Whether Plato thinks that recognizing this fact would be possible independent of the theory of recollection or whether the theory offers the best explanation is not clear. We do know that the Meno does not touch on this problem or the problem of how someone comes to know the axioms of geometry. So, I see no definitive evidence that determines whether the slave actually recollects, i.e., looks into himself, for the answer, or not, and this is all I want to argue about this matter.
IV
Conclusion. I have shown that there is good reason to accept that Socrates tacitly employs the method of hypothesis to move the slave from aporetic ignorance to correct opinion. More importantly, I have also shown that the two methods, elenchus and the method of hypothesis, can be employed in a sustained inquiry. Although the elenchus is emphasized to rid an interlocutor of one’s false conceit of wisdom, the refutation seen aright enables the interlocutor to raise a problem that can return the inquiry back to the initial issue. The slave’s inquiry moves from addressing what line doubles the area of the square to whether such an area is possible. The slave eventually answers what line doubles the area of the square and can do so employing the method of hypothesis. Unfortunately, Meno’s inquiry with Socrates does not admit of the same success. The method of hypothesis does not lead them back to answer the original question about the nature of virtue. But that is no reason for us to conclude that the method of hypothesis is not instrumental in an inquiry into the nature of virtue or that the theory of recollection is not Plato’s epistemological view of how it is possible to arrive at truth from the state of aporetic ignorance. We do not learn from the Meno alone how best to pursue the “what is” question Socrates poses to Meno, but we do at least learn how it is possible to continue the inquiry when faced with aporetic ignorance in regards to such a question, and that it is at least possible to return back to answering the “what is” question when employing the method of hypothesis.
