Among the polities associated with “Oriental despotism,” the Ottoman Empire was not the most absolutist. Certainly, despotic forms of power were an important feature of sultanic rule, but the Empire was also the bearer of a semiconstitutional tradition of judicial practices. In the capacity of caliph, the sultans represented Islam and the holy shariʿa law, a set of norms, rules, and canonical practices that also set limits to the exercise of political power. Thanks to the shariʿa, the common people had access to a normative standard by which to evaluate and/or judge their superiors. Shariʿa constituted a moral and political ideal against which complaints or disapproval could be articulated. The legitimacy of the ruling dynasty was based on its identification with Islam. A contract-like relationship between four different estates or orders (men of knowledge, warriors, traders, and farmers) was assumed, the philosophical expression of which was the theory of the “circle of justice.”
With the fall of the empire, this order, based on the idea that the exercise of religion was dependent on the existence of the state, and vice versa (din ü devlet), was also dissolved. This did not happen overnight but rather was the result of a process that stretched over more than a century. But what came after the break-up of the old order? What kinds of political formations took shape? These questions form the nub of the issues described and analyzed in Frederick Anscombe's State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands.
This work, based mainly on secondary sources but also research in the archives, is impressive, and a challenge for author and reader alike in its breadth and detail. The outline follows the standard periodization of late Ottoman and post-Ottoman history. It is divided into three parts: the first, which starts in the second half of the 18th century and concludes with the end of the empire, contains five chapters, while the second and third parts covering the mid-war and postwar periods, respectively, are based on a tripartite geographical division: the Balkans, republican Turkey, and the post-Ottoman Arab lands. Thus, what distinguishes this study from previous studies in the same field is its comprehensiveness in both time and space. It stretches from the decades preceding the early modernization period, namely the second half of the 18th century, to our own times. Geographically, it encompasses all the lands under Ottoman rule at the time—the Balkans, modern Turkey, and the Arab Middle East, including North Africa. Given this scope, one would expect a sweeping and overgeneralized narrative, but this is not the case. The analysis is quite “thick” and well founded in terms of historical detail. Indeed, one could easily imagine this as a three-volume project. Although its being compressed requires extra concentration on the part of the reader, the advantage of having so much material in one package should not be underestimated. The very fact that 250 years of history in an area stretching from North Africa to the Persian Gulf is presented between two covers adds to the sense of connectedness and continuity in the period in question. The medium is part of the message.
What lends coherence to this extensive study is the theorization of modernity, which is at the heart of the book. The author is not fully at ease with the emphasis generally given to the modern nation-state and nationalism within that scheme. His aim is to “supplant” that narrative with a more open-ended mode of analysis: “To replace the standard story lines of historical development across the region, the book offers a replacement narrative built on the themes of state, faith, and nation” (p. 11; emphasis mine). At the core of the analysis stands a concern for the relationship between state and society, the transformation of this relationship during the transition from an Ottoman to a post-Ottoman society, and the obstacles and dilemmas encountered in that process. On the one hand, the analysis deals with external-related issues, such integration into the global economy and interference by strong international actors leading to colonialism and neocolonialism. On the other hand, it penetrates into internal developments such as urbanization, socioeconomic inequalities, state formation, and the construction of consensus-based national communities, all of which posed enormous challenges.
That a Western European model of the nation-state was not easily built on post-Ottoman soil is, according to the author, too often overlooked—an observation he convincingly sustains as he steers his narrative between the Balkan countries, modern Turkey, and the Arab Middle East. The basic contention in Anscombe's analysis is that it has been difficult to mobilize the masses around nationalism as a secular political ideology. Instead, religion has come to play an important role. This point is especially valid for the Arab Middle East, but also for Turkey and the Balkan countries (especially during the last few decades). The idea that runs throughout this work is that the role of religion has either been underestimated or misinterpreted. Why did nationalism as a secular political ideology not work as a common, legitimizing ideology for many countries in this region?
According to Anscombe, that question begs a historical answer, which the book provides well through a long-term perspective. Ottoman historians have not always done full justice to the role of Islam in upholding legitimate authority, whether in relation to the classical, the late, or the final period of Ottoman rule. Without being fully acknowledged, Islam has, even in post-Ottoman times, continued to play an important role. Anscombe notes that, “[o]ne assumption that I see no reason to question is that nationalism is … just a form of politics. Religion, however, is more complex. All religions focus primarily on the relationship between the believer and God [but it] is the social aspects of religion, which over centuries have shaped populations’ senses of morality and ethics…that are of primary interest here” (pp. 6–7). According to Anscombe, political authorities have taken advantage of the potential for religion to mobilize the masses for various social and political objectives. Nationalism seems to have been especially sensitive when it comes to establishing strong links with religion. Based on this “religion-joins-nationalism” analysis, the author tells his story about the predicaments facing nation-states and nationalisms in post-Ottoman societies—a historical narrative that is both intriguing and of high literary quality.
However, the analysis also leaves certain questions unanswered, because it wavers between two interpretations—one stronger than the other—of how absorbed into political discourses Islam has become. The weaker interpretation of this nationalism/religion construction suggests that religion, along with acknowledged linguistic and ethnic factors, plays a larger role than previously thought in the formation of nations and nationalism. However, considering the overall thrust of the book, such a reading forecloses an intriguing, more powerful exposition: why can't Islamism, just like nationalism, be “just a form of politics”? What if Islamism—Islam in its contemporary politicized form—replaced nationalism as a comprehensive political ideology, if Islamism became nationalism? As an outgrowth of the tree of Islam, Islamism represents something new and different from traditional schools and interpretations. It represents a trend closely related to state-individual relationships under modernity, a topic covered well in Kemal Karpat's The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), which is missing from Anscombe's references. These are important issues that need to be considered in relation to recent developments in Turkey and the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq, which destabilize and threaten the whole region. In his assessment of Islam as a political ideology, Anscombe seems hesitant to go this far. Yet despite such indecision and ambivalence, his analysis remains an unmistakable call for a paradigm shift (“replacement narrative”) in regard to the connection between Islam, Islamism, and nationalism.
