In Democratization in Morocco, Lise Storm approaches the topic of democratization from a new conceptual and definitional lens. Instead of focusing on the multitude of definitions that are advanced in the democratization literature, Storm's Democratization in Morocco adopts three core democratic principles that she deems crucial in the analysis of the quality of democracy in Morocco. These core elements provide a cogent framework for the whole book: reasonably free and fair elections devoid of massive fraud, with broad suffrage; basic civil liberties; and effective power of an independent government. In this empirically rich book, Storm's model focuses on the content—not the concept or the definition—of democracy in an attempt to provide a rich account of “the political games played by various political actors in specific democratic moments” (p. 6).

Democratization in Morocco is divided into two broad sections. Chapters 1–3 provide a historical tour d'horizon of the development of the Moroccan political system and the often tumultuous relationship between the monarchy and political forces. These three first chapters divide Moroccan political history into three eras. The first period focuses on the immediate years after Morocco's independence from 1956 to 1972. During this phase and shortly after his succession to the throne, King Hassan II dissolved the Ibrahim government in 1962 and established himself as the leader of the government with the stated twin goals of launching democratic reforms and promulgating a new constitution through a popular referendum.

Although Morocco had a new constitution, political parties such as Istiqlal objected to the new document with its vast monarchical powers. In the aftermath of the 1962 constitution, Morocco witnessed its first parliamentary experience, which was brief after the king dissolved it and declared emergency powers in 1965. Political parties remained in existence, but all political activities in this “state of exception” were suspended. As Storm rightly argues, the first period witnessed the struggle between the monarchy and Istiqlal as the main rival to monarchical power. The king lifted the state of exception in 1970, which opened up a political scene for parties but quickly resulted in backlash against the monarchy in the form of two unsuccessful military coups. Contrary to Storm's analysis, these coup attempts should be attributed to more than the king's willingness to invite political parties to participate in the political system.

A national entente also characterized the second period in Storm's historical analysis from 1972 to 1990, because most parties accepted monarchical privilege and sought a more reformist approach in their opposition. This consensus revolved around the territorial issue of the Western Sahara. The new opposition was spearheaded by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), which broke away from the old Union Nationale des Forces Populaires in 1975, after an internal party schism. Unlike its predecessor, USFP joined the political system and laid the foundation for its new pseudo-opposition to the state. USFP and the Party du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS) abandoned any direct confrontation of the regime; instead, they challenged the state from within the political system and lobbied for more democratic reforms. As Storm argues, Hassan II sought to open up the political system in a controlled manner in this second phase (p. 52). Storm does not elaborate on the dynamics of that monarchical management of the political system, in which the king adopted a new strategy of creating a new majority coalition made of promonarchy parties such as the Rassemblement National des Independents, the Union Constitutionnel, and the Movement Populaire, a Berber political party representing rural Berber interests. The state's strategy to saturate the political system with new parties proved successful in placating the opposition of the USFP and PPS: both municipal and legislative elections of 1977 and 1988, respectively, saw the dominance of the new majority coalition of the Rassemblement National des Independents, Istiqlal, and the Movement Populaire.

The third period in Storm's analysis from 1990 to 1996 is singled out as the most significant period in the postindependence political development toward democracy in Morocco. In this phase, the opposition Kutla grew stronger, which coincided with the rise of the Islamist movements. Faced with increased pressure, the monarch introduced various social and political reforms, such as adopting a new constitution in 1992 and a newly revised family code (the mudawwana) and increasing attention to rights of Berbers. The momentum for reforms carried through to the next period of 1996–2006 set by the adoption of a new constitution in 1996 and the provision of “reasonably competitive, free and fair elections in 1997 and 2002” (p. 96). These elections satisfy Storm's rather vague three criteria constituting her definition of democratic principles (reasonably competitive elections)—because the term “reasonably” is rather subjective and fuzzy, as it allows for a multitude of conceptual gradations—despite the numerous accounts of electoral engineering and fraud, of which Storm lists a few related to voting-identification cards and election-data manipulation.

Storm comes to a much more accurate conclusion in regard to the second principle of the respect for basic civil liberties, because Morocco still does not actively implement the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Of particular concern here is the dwindling space for freedom of the press, because the state continues to clamp down on journalists' ability to tackle some taboo subjects related to the royal power and territorial integrity of Morocco. The cases of Aboubaker Jamai of the French weekly Le Journal and Rachid Ninni's Arab daily Al-Masaʾ are particular cases in point, because both were driven to bankruptcy and voluntary exile due to state's repression.

Storm reaches a similar conclusion in chapters 6 and 7 in regard to the third core principle of democratic principles, that Morocco lacks an independent government that can exercise its power away from monarchical control. Even the historical socialist-led government of Youssoufi, which came to power in 1997, was largely hampered by the “negative cycle” of monarchical far-reaching prerogatives and constitutional powers. As Storm comments: “no government formed since the independence has had the effective power to govern; every single one has been subordinate to a nonelected elite—the King—often in practice, as well as in the constitution” (p. 160). Once in government, the USFP and its Kutla allies vowed to tackle Morocco's socioeconomic issues and introduce a measure of democratic reforms. Five years later, Moroccans grew disillusioned with the Kutla government, because socioeconomic conditions did not improve as promised by Youssoufi's government. Moroccans' cynicism toward the government grew even higher in the aftermath of the 2002 elections, which saw the new king Mohammed VI break with democratic practices and appoint Driss Jettou, a technocrat, who is not affiliated with any political party. The election of 2007, which Storm does not discuss, resulted in similar dynamics of monarchical domination of the political system because the new government led by Abbas al-Fassi is facing the same struggles of past governments.

Storm's account is commendable for its rich empirical detail and vast historical references. Her use of primary and secondary sources only adds to the strength of her overall analysis. However, her findings are largely unsurprising and do not advance any novel insights on state–opposition relations in Morocco. The first core democratic principle is fuzzy and does lend to a great deal of subjective interpretations. It undoubtedly needs more careful conceptual and definitional clarity. Of more substance, Storm's book does not elaborate on the ways the regime in Morocco has been successful in penetrating the political system and curtailing the space of dissent for political parties in the opposition. In a similar vein, what is the role of the monarchy's religious and sociocultural status in the democratization debate? How much of that religious capital affects the country's path toward democratic reforms and the mobilization capabilities of opposition forces?

In addition to institutional manipulation, political parties in Morocco also do not contest the regime's traditional sources of power and embrace the monarchy's religious status as an integral part of the political identity of Morocco. Also, political parties decry their lack of mobilization capabilities, which are primarily due to the supremacy of the monarchy in the sociopolitical sphere.

Elite consensus on the supremacy of the regime is due to the ritualization of the public discourse, which effectively isolates political parties from any direct challenge to monarchical power. The regime's ability to co-opt new discursive bases of hegemony serves to clutter the public sphere, making it less susceptible to alternative discourses from opposition forces. The use of coercion is deemphasized and is no longer a preferred method of the state. These areas could be additional avenues for future research on democratization, or the lack thereof, in Morocco.

Despite these lacunae, Storm's Democratization in Morocco is well balanced and judicious in its empirical analysis and could be used in any upper division undergraduate course or introductory graduate course on democratization in the Middle East and North Africa.