This book sets out to “trace the manner in which a systematic interrelationship between politics and political economy was developed, altered, and refined” (1) first by the “classical” political economists, then by the “neoclassical” economists. Particular (but not exclusive) attention is devoted to the contributions of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and J. S. Mill, with the “neoclassical” economists (notably, W. S. Jevons, L. Walras, and A. Marshall) more often than not agglomerated as a single entity.
The gist of the authors' narrative may be given as follows. Beginning with Adam Smith, the “classical” political economists attempted in their various ways to “reduce the understanding of civil society to its economic foundations” (55). They focused on the behavior of, and (conflictual) relationships between, social classes (landlords, capitalists, and workers) in particular historical contexts, and on the conditions favorable (or unfavorable) to material prosperity and growth in a private-property, or “capitalist,” market economy. In turn, their analysis informed their views not only on the legitimate scope for government intervention in the economic sphere, but also on matters extending to constitutional reform and the desirability, or inevitability, of fundamental political change. The “neoclassical” economists, in contrast, “divested their economic theories from direct contact with any socially specific material conditions” (56). Rather than framing their analysis at the level of socioeconomic classes, they focused on the behavior of “isolated individual utility maximizers,” many of them believing, apparently, that “Crusoe's desert island was … sufficient to capture whatever was essential about the social context” (56–57). The “political”—along with the “cultural,” “historical,” and “institutional”—was thereby separated from the “economic.” At the same time, the economic analysis did yield, for the first time, a “general presumption” in favor of laissez-faire and, therefore, a potent message to government, but the argument rested on considerations (static efficiency and optimality criteria) that were foreign to “classical” thought. The intellectual landscape had been transformed; or rather, since the authors make little attempt to disguise their own sympathies, it had been ravaged.
While the authors are doubtless to be congratulated (by some) for giving a new lease of life to an old set of clichés, there is much in this book that is deeply problematical, both with the interpretation of historical figures and with the sweeping comparisons between “classical” and “neoclassical” approaches.
In the case of Smith, it is undeniable that that he prescribed limits on the intervention of government in “economic” matters and offered comments on the sorts of activities in which he thought government should involve itself. But, as previous scholars have recognized, he was distinctly cagey about revealing his own political affiliations and his position on the need (if any) for political and constitutional reform. One might almost think that Milgate and Stimson agree with received opinion when they write that Smith had little to say about “constitution making” (68; cf. 13), except that they also refer to “Smith's views on the input that political economy might have into … constitutional reform” (6). Evidently more attracted to the latter option, if for no apparent reason, we then find Dugald Stewart in the dock for suggesting that Smith was “against radical reform of the British constitution,” in favor of “gradual change in economic policy,” and motivated by a concern with “the happiness of the nation” (110–11): all perfectly defensible views of Smith that the authors simply dismiss out of hand. In a work purporting to clarify “a systematic interrelationship between politics and political economy,” Smith's position is left as elusive as ever.
The authors' treatment of Ricardo is no less questionable, but not unexpected. Basing themselves on their Ricardian Politics (Princeton University Press, 1991), and seemingly oblivious or impervious to the criticism it provoked, the authors merely rehash their interpretation according to which Ricardo used his class-based political economy to inform a nonutilitarian species of political thought and a radical case for constitutional reform that included the extension of the franchise to workers. In fact, Ricardo's actual proposals on extending the franchise never went beyond household suffrage (his decided priority was the introduction of the secret ballot, with or without an extended franchise), he supported the “mixed constitution,” and far from wishing to see the representation of (divergent) class interests, as Milgate and Stimson occasionally suggest, his goal was a parliament that would pursue (his) policies for securing material prosperity (and happiness, in Bentham's sense) regardless of class or sectional interests (such as the interest of landowners in supporting agricultural protection, or the class interest of workers in wishing to prevent the introduction of machinery). His political thought was heavily influenced by his political economy, but not in the manner suggested by Milgate and Stimson.
Where the authors stand on firmer ground is in claiming that the early “neoclassical” economists introduced a new theoretical emphasis on exchange. But this did not mean that the “economic” was somehow divorced from the “political” (etc.), even if attention is confined to the static exchange model alone. While it is true that the model takes individuals' tastes and endowments as given, it was recognized that those “data” are themselves socially and historically determined, that outcomes may not be socially desirable, and that political action and intervention would be required to “improve” tastes (through the provision of education, for example), and even to redistribute purchasing power. As the Jevonian purist, Phillip Wicksteed, was to put it: the “chief dangers of poverty and wealth are to be found in the degeneracy of desire, and … the final goal of education and legislation alike must be to thwart corrupt and degrading ends.” But the scope of the subject did not end there. Thus, according to Jevons himself, economic theory would provide “general principles” that could, and should, be brought to bear on subjects such as “capital and labor” (recognition of economic classes did not vanish with “neoclassical” economics) and the grounds for state intervention more generally. The allegation that the “economic” had become rigidly divorced from the “political” is a travesty.
Milgate and Stimson have attempted to tackle an interesting, vast, and hugely complicated set of historical and conceptual issues. They are right to claim that “classical” writers have frequently been misinterpreted in the light of later doctrine. But in taking such an overtly partisan approach to their subject, almost to the point of demonizing “neoclassical” economics and economists, and in advancing interpretations of key figures that are in some important cases dubious, to say the least, the value of their own contribution is severely compromised. One would recommend this book only with considerable reservation.
