Mao, on several occasions, publicly credited Japan’s invasion of China for enabling the Communists’ rise to power. Without the Japanese Imperial Army—he once told visitors from Japan—he and his followers “would still be in the mountains and would not be able to come into Beijing to watch Beijing Opera” (Mao Zedong on Diplomacy. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998: 353).
While these remarks were no doubt self-deprecating humor aimed at charming foreign diplomats, they contain more than a grain of truth. In the mid-1930s, the Communists were chased out of their strongholds in southern China. Encircled by Nationalist forces in the loess plateau of northwestern China, they fortuitously avoided annihilation when Zhang Xueliang, a warlord allied to the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, kidnapped Chiang and made the hostage promise to end the campaign against the Communists and to form a united front against Japanese aggression.
The fluky event in December 1936, known as the “Xi’an Incident,” is widely recognized as a major turning point in modern Chinese history. Yet, influenced by what Hans van de Ven called the Stilwell-White paradigm, many historians of China also see the Nationalists as being responsible for their own demise. The classic exponent of this view is Lloyd Eastman’s The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). Eastman argued that the Nationalists were increasingly characterized by a loss of purpose, factionalism, corruption, and political oppression through 1927–1937. In his view, the Nationalist dream of modernizing China was already gone before the war with Japan broke out.
This book—in the footsteps of William Kirby’s Germany and Republican China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), Julia Strauss’s Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927–1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), and other more recent publications—questions the accepted wisdom. The flap copy highlights that it “fundamentally challenges the widely accepted idea that the key to the Communist seizure of power in China lay in the incompetence of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government.” By studying the fiscal performance of the Nationalist government through the prism of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, the author shows that the Nationalist government’s receipts from tariffs, its single most important source of revenue, was increasing and sustainable up until 1937. It was only after coastal China was overrun by Japan that the Nationalists’ state-building project collapsed.
The book is divided into seven chapters. The introduction chapter takes the reader through the literature in English on the Nationalist government, the nominal central government of China from 1927 to 1949, and introduces the object of study, the Maritime Customs Service, a foreign-managed institution charged with collecting customs duties for the Chinese government from the 1850s to 1949.
Chapter 1 discusses how the Nationalist government shrewdly took advantage of shifting foreign sentiments induced by its rise to national dominance in 1927 to restore China’s tariff autonomy, including the right to set tariff rates over and beyond the 5 percent cap imposed by Western powers during the Second Opium War (1856–1860).
Chapter 2 recounts the pragmatism displayed by the Nationalist government in its management of diplomacy and trade. By suppressing its populist instincts and avoiding overtaxation, which would have caused a collapse in trade, the Nanjing-based regime steadily increased tariff revenues between 1927 and 1937. Improving finances in turn increased domestic and foreign bondholders’ confidence in China’s political outlook, thus strengthening the prices of Chinese government bonds.
Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the operations of the Maritime Customs and highlights that besides its primary role in assessing and collecting tariffs, the agency also contributed to China’s modernizing efforts in other ways, for example, by producing quality trade statistics, disseminating knowhow through its application of technical knowledge, and strengthening the Nationalist government’s legitimacy through its operations in parts of China where Nanjing had no direct control over.
The pragmatism and effectiveness of the Nationalist government are again emphasized in the next two chapters. Chapter 4 investigates the tariff policies on sugar, kerosene, chemical fertilizer, and cigarettes and concludes that when setting tariff rates, the Nationalist government put revenue concerns above its declared desire of protecting infant industries. According to Chapter 5, while smuggling activities were widespread under Nationalist rule, the government was largely successful in containing the damage and protecting its tariff revenue.
The pace of the discussion accelerates in Chapter 6, where the focus shifts to the post-1937 period. In the months that followed the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalists lost control of China’s eastern seaboard and with it, the coastal and inland ports that together yielded 80 percent of the Maritime Customs’ revenue. Fighting for its very survival, the Nationalist government resorted to predatory means, including the resurrection of the notorious lijin tax under the new name of Wartime Consumption Tax, to raise revenue. And by doing so, it dug its own grave.
Without a doubt, this book is a useful addition to the literature on Republican China, which separates the two millennia of imperial rule and the chaotic Maoist period in Chinese history. In conjunction with the recent revisionist literature, it is persuasive and effective in arguing that the Nanjing decade (1927–1937) was not an inconvenient and forgettable interlude that saw China drifting sideways. Instead, the decade should be viewed as an integral part of China’s quest for modernization during which both mistakes and strides were made. The use of new archival materials on the Maritime Customs adds richness to its analysis.
This said, one wonders if the Maritime Customs is the most appropriate institution to scrutinize if the objective is to overturn the negative verdict on Chiang’s Nationalist government. After all, the Maritime Customs was already a well-oiled machine before Chiang’s takeover. The book makes a convincing case that the Nationalists did not kill the goose that lays the golden egg, but that is not a high bar to gauge their performance.
Furthermore, the extent to which the book challenges conventional wisdom is also questionable. Historians of the traditional view did not claim that the Nationalist government was approaching imminent collapse on the eve of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Eastman, for one, acknowledged that China changed markedly—in many ways for the better—during the Nanjing decade. But he and others also contended that these changes were largely concentrated in the cities. In the countryside, where the bulk of the population lived, the regime’s attitude was one of indifference and neglect. It did not make any meaningful attempt to reduce the heavy rent burden on the tenant farmers, spread literacy, or improve the lives of rural residents through other means.
In 1935, import tariffs contributed almost 50 percent of the Nationalist government’s revenue even though foreign trade only accounted for 6.3 percent of China’s GNP. The central importance of the Maritime Customs to Nanjing’s fiscal wellbeing was, in itself, an oddity that reflected the regime’s extreme urban bias and its limited capacity to transform a society that was fundamentally and overwhelmingly rural. Paradoxically, the book ends up strengthening my perception that the Nationalists were quite capable of controlling points (now ports in addition to cities) but not entire areas. In this regard, by highlighting some bright spots in the Nationalists’ governing record, it might have inadvertently brought attention to the Achilles’ heel that caused their eventual downfall.
