While the titles of each of these books seemingly place them directly in the growing literature on the resource curse, both of them range far beyond the politics of oil-rich regimes and should appeal to a much broader audience in comparative politics. Peter Lewis pursues an institutionalist approach to questions of economic development more generally, while Benjamin Smith's work fits as well or better in the literature on regime survival as it does in the resource curse literature.
Obviously, the great underlying similarity between the two works is their paired-case comparative focus on two oil-rich developing countries, with Indonesia cast in both in the role of the relatively good cop and Iran (Smith) and Nigeria (Lewis) as the respective bad-cop comparison. Smith argues that “Iran and Indonesia form a nearly ideal most-similar pair for comparison” (p. 74). Both countries have predominantly Muslim populations, similar levels of ethnic diversity, and a history or ethnic or regional separatism, and both enjoyed brief periods of constitutional democracy, which produced left-nationalist leaders who were deposed in coups by U.S.-backed authoritarian rulers who came to power facing imminent prospects of economic collapse. Each state also received huge revenue windfalls from the 1973–74 oil boom, and each saw large-scale social protests against their authoritarian regimes in 1977. Their interest to Smith derives from their divergence on two critical measures—their respective conditions at the onset of rapid development and their subsequent ability (or lack thereof) to weather political crises.
Lewis also follows a “most similar systems” design. For him, Indonesia and Nigeria are both populous countries with broad cultural diversity, a history of communal tensions, and problematic center-regional relations. Each country is predominant within its own region, and both endured comparable political upheavals in the 1960s, followed by military dominance for much of the next three decades and similarly tenuous democratic transitions in 1999. The first oil boom saw both countries rapidly transformed from agricultural economies to hydrocarbon exporters. Of particular interest to Lewis are the “strikingly different paths of governance and economic performance from the late 1960s through the 1990s” (p. 3), with Indonesia achieving relative political stability, substantial economic growth, a structural economic transformation, widespread integration into global markets, and significant poverty reduction, while Nigeria saw persistent political instability, minimal economic growth, chronic poverty, and almost no successful integration into world markets outside of oil production.
In Growing Apart, Lewis draws from the theoretical traditions of comparative historical sociology and institutional analysis and “works inductively to derive broader generalizations about the political foundations of economic development” (p. 23). His central argument is that “differences in long-term economic performance are determined by variations in the ability of states to make credible commitments to market participants” in terms of such things as secure property rights, policy stability, and the sanctity of contracts (p. 28). While governments can use a variety of informal mechanisms to bolster their credibility, ultimately the most effective types of commitment are signaled by formal institutional arrangements. Lewis explains the divergence in economic performance between Indonesia and Nigeria by their widely different abilities to make credible commitments to investors, with institutional variation as the intervening variable in his causal argument. Ultimately, for him, this institutional divergence is accounted for by distinctions between the countries in terms of the quality of their political leadership, the basis of their social coalitions, and their regional or neighborhood contexts (pp. 68, 269).
The basic problematic that Smith addresses in Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty is the lack of “a general explanation for why some oil-rich regimes survive boom- or bust-generated political shocks while others collapse” (p. 1). His dependent variable is thus the resilience of oil regimes during the volatility-induced crises of the boom–bust years of the 1970s–80s. Specifically, with his cases, why did the social protests of 1977 lead to the Shah's hurried flight to exile in 1979, while Suharto was able to ride them out successfully and remain in power for another two decades? In pursuing this question, Smith deftly and innovatively weaves back and forth between large-n quantitative research and in-depth, focused small-n qualitative case study comparisons. Methodologically, this book is a tour de force. Smith's integrated and pluralist approach to quantitative and qualitative research methods is highly commendable and should be of tremendous interest to anyone teaching a comparative research methods class.
Smith's central argument is that the impact of oil wealth on institutional development and regime survival is varied, and that this variation depends significantly on the timing of the arrival of oil revenues. In his phrasing, “the effect of oil wealth on politics and institutions is not a question of whether oil but when” (p. 193). In contrast to some of the findings in the resource curse and rentier state literatures, Smith argues that “oil and oil wealth do not carry around one set of incentives and constraints that hang over actors in all times and all places” (p. 198). Indeed, under certain circumstances, oil wealth can actually facilitate institutional development. The two key factors influencing this are the sequencing of what he terms “late development” relative to regimes confronting their political opposition and receiving their oil windfalls. Basically, rulers who have to confront significant opposition during times of resource scarcity engage in state building. When oil revenues arrive after this process has already started, they actually contribute positively to institutional development. Conversely, when oil wealth arrives in a context of weak opposition and before late development has been initiated, it has the familiar corrosive effects on institutions identified in much of the resource curse literature. In Smith's argument, oil wealth does not lead to “petro-mania” or even change things dramatically. Rather, “the windfall revenues merely magnified existing patterns” (p. 122).
Reviewing these works collectively, one finds both similarities and differences between them. Both books place significant explanatory weight on prior institutional choices, and both follow a path-dependent or institutional trajectory approach. Both also see crises as providing potential opportunities for broad-based development, although Smith spells this out with greater theoretical detail and rigor. Both works also highlight Indonesia's success in investing some of its oil revenues in developing the agricultural sector, and thus avoiding one of the common problems identified in the Dutch disease literature.
In terms of differences, Lewis is far more pessimistic about Indonesian institutions than is Smith. Some of this is perhaps due to Smith's focus on regime survival as his dependent variable. Lewis frequently describes Indonesia as having “weak” or “brittle” institutions, “frail coalitions,” and “insubstantial foundations,” while Smith seemingly marvels at the ability of the New Order regime to survive multiple boom and bust cycles over a period of decades. Lewis also sees Indonesia's relatively successful performance as “an outlier among oil exporters” (p. 62), whereas Smith criticizes the resource curse literature for focusing on what he terms the “big four” cases of Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela to the neglect of more durable and potentially more representative regimes like Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf region (pp. 36, 42). Temporally, Smith maintains a much tighter focus on the initiation of late development and the booms and busts from 1973 to 1986. Lewis's account covers the 1960s to the present and devotes considerable attention to the post-1999 democratic transitions in Indonesia and Nigeria. Smith also insists that the initiation of late development is the critical juncture in explaining Indonesia's and Iran's divergent performance (pp. 46–47), while Lewis emphasizes a series of important junctures that Indonesia and Nigeria both faced (p. 58). Finally, Lewis accords significant explanatory power to regional or neighborhood effects, which Smith does not.
Smith's discussion of methodology is at times repetitive and more extensive than some readers might want, and it certainly limits the appeal of the book to undergraduate students or more general readers. He also exaggerates the novelty of his insight on the importance of sequential timing. While he has certainly elaborated and proved this case in much greater theoretical and methodological detail than anyone else, nongovernmental organizations regularly emphasized the significance of sequential timing in their critiques of the then-proposed Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, and sequential timing features prominently in the reforms suggested by the final report of the World Bank's Extractive Industries Review, which was published in 2003. Smith also overstates the prevalence of resource curse theories predicting regime vulnerability and neglects the important work of Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon (“Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 37 [September 2004]: 816–41), which predicts the durability of resource-rich incumbents in both democratic and authoritarian systems.
Lewis's book provides an outstanding overview of various theories of development (Chapter 2) and presents concise and excellent summaries of comparative economic performance between his two case studies (Chapter 6). Its historical case study chapters (four in total) are, however, overly long and detailed and could benefit from better editing. Yet, even in this context, signature historical events, such as the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders in 1995 (p. 179) and the prevalence of resource-related conflicts in Aceh, Western Papua, and the Niger Delta (p. 290), merit only a single paragraph of discussion.
These critiques of each book are, however, minor points in the larger context of outstanding comparative research. Both of these works are serious pieces of scholarship that make major contributions not just to the resource curse literature but to the comparative politics and development literatures more generally.
