Much of the research on the petition system in China has explored its role as a channel of political participation. Jing Chen's new book focuses on the relationship between petitions and governance in China, arguing that petitions help to ensure the regime's survival. “Aside from just managing the grievances of the masses, the petition system also helps to alleviate the information deficiencies faced by the CCP's authoritarian regime” (p. 14). This book is not the first study that points out petitions as a source of information of state authorities in China, but it is systematic research on how information collected through the petition system has been used by different levels of authorities. The book is based on systematic data the author collected through various channels.
The book has seven chapters, including an “Introduction” and “Conclusion.” The five substantive chapters address different issues concerning the roles played by the petition system as well as the factors that influence citizens' use of petitions. Chapter two briefly reviews the history of the petition system in China and then, using the data collected from a township, explains how petitions can hold local officials accountable. Residents' petitions cover a wide range of issues regarding governance, civil disputes and financial aid. Unlike many existing studies, Chen's book shows that local governments are highly responsive and have addressed the majority of the petitions.
Chapter three explains how the petition system ensures the stability of decentralized authoritarianism in China by comparing two townships. It claims that in one township (Township Ou), petitions were poorly handled, and social stability thus became a problem, whereas Township Wu managed petitions better and was thus better able to achieve social stability. Chapter four examines residents' petitions presented to national authorities in Beijing through a case study of Jiangxi province. It finds that the level of economic development measured in GDP per capita is the crucial factor that determines the occurrence of petitions across the counties in Jiangxi – counties with a higher GDP per capita are significantly associated with a greater number of petitions. This finding indeed suggests that some modes of development, such as land development, provoke conflict.
Chapter five discusses policy effects of petitions by examining two cases: agricultural tax reform and urban housing demolition policy. Peasants' petitions helped the central government to identify a serious problem with tax collection and set an agenda for the resolution of that problem. Residents' petitions provided feedback on initial regulations on demolition and subsequently led to revisions of those regulations. Chapter six focuses on the issue of who presents petitions in China by looking at individuals' attributes. The analysis is based on a survey of villagers in 12 villages in three provinces (Hubei, Anhui and Liaoning) in 2009. Household income is found to be the only significant factor that influences the probability that a person will participate in a collective petition.
Chen's book highlights the roles of petitions in helping maintaining social stability in China. It is indisputable that petitions contribute to governance in China as an important source of information, but some of the claims made by the author may need more evidence to substantiate them. For example, Chen finds that petitions are effective in making local governments respond to people's grievances (chapter two), which is different from the findings of many existing studies. If the data were provided by the local authorities, their reliability may be an issue. Local governments may claim to have solved certain issues that are not solved or not addressed in the ways stated. In chapter three, Chen finds that the operation of the petition system is important to local governance or local stability. But local problems may not be caused by the ineffective petition system per se; like other governance problems, the poor performance of the petition system may also be a consequence of ineffective governance.
Also like some other studies, this book is based on a strong assumption that authoritarian governments face significant difficulties in collecting accurate information about grassroots society. But some authoritarian governments' ability to collect information may be stronger than assumed. For example, the Chinese central government had regularly warned local officials against over taxing peasants before the abolition of agricultural tax in 2004. Those warning directives listed incidents in which peasants had lost their lives because of tax collection; many of these incidents were not reported in the media. Such directives revealed that the central government was indeed clear about the grassroots situation. In other words, there is a significant difference between the government's lack of information and its lack of action. If this is true, it is understandable that the Chinese central government is reluctant to see people petition in Beijing.
Despite these issues that need to be further clarified, this is a well-researched and well-presented book. It is a systematic study on the government's use of petitions at both the national and local levels. Its claim that petitions contribute to regime stability or resilience in China is valid. Useful Complaints should be of interest to those who wish to understand how the government interacts with the people in China and how the Chinese political system is operated.
