Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2005
Does a human right to healthcare imply individual obligations to healthy behavior? Or put another way: Is a self-induced condition a relevant criterion for some sort of restriction of this right—like withholding or modifying treatment in circumstances where choices have to be made? For instance, should a drunk driver bear the costs of medical care that he needs after a car accident he has caused? Should there be a difference in healthcare entitlements between the smoker with a heart attack who is seriously overweight and the 60-year old man who has always taken excellent care of himself and is suddenly stricken by leukemia? And how should we think about the risk-taking behavior of all the persons going on a skiing holiday or an exotic hiking trip?I am grateful to Claire Dawson, Kurt Devooght, Bart Engelen, Doris Schroeder, Ronald Tinnevelt, Toon Vandevelde, and two anonymous reviewers for their editorial assistance and helpful comments on a previous draft.
Does a human right to healthcare imply individual obligations to healthy behavior? Or put another way: Is a self-induced condition a relevant criterion for some sort of restriction of this right—like withholding or modifying treatment in circumstances where choices have to be made? For instance, should a drunk driver bear the costs of medical care that he needs after a car accident he has caused? Should there be a difference in healthcare entitlements between the smoker with a heart attack who is seriously overweight and the 60-year old man who has always taken excellent care of himself and is suddenly stricken by leukemia? And how should we think about the risk-taking behavior of all the persons going on a skiing holiday or an exotic hiking trip?
These are all examples of topics raised in discussions about the role of personal responsibility in healthcare. On the one hand, it is reasonable to hold people responsible for the consequences of their actions. Society then should not bear the costs of situations for which agents are responsible. On the other hand, however, it is not clear what this idea implies in the field of healthcare. To what extent should we allow personal responsibility to play a role in allocating healthcare services or resources, or in distributing the costs of receiving healthcare?
In this paper I explore these matters by concentrating on three issues. First, I investigate the moral component of what it means to say that there is a human right to healthcare and search for the basis and scope of such a right.1
Following the authors of Health and Human Rights, I take the human rights approach as something that “seeks to describe—and then to promote and protect—the societal-level prerequisites for human well-being in which each individual can achieve his or her full potential.” In: Mann JM, Gruskin S, Grodin MA, Annas GJ, eds. Health and Human Rights, New York: Routledge; 1999:2. As such, I understand a human right to hold both an ethical or moral component and a legal component of established rights and obligations. From the standpoint of ethics, human rights serve as a statement of the aspirations of peoples and governments toward ideals that are not always attained in practice. The legal component refers to the recognition and protection of these aspirations by governments through actual domestic legislation and international agreements. This article focuses primarily on the moral component by concentrating on the extent to which human rights are guidelines for how governments should behave, rather than on various legal descriptions of how they actually do behave.
From the moral viewpoint, the statement that there is a basic human right to healthcare means four things.2
Partially based on: Buchanan A. Philosophic perspectives on access to health care: Distributive justice in health care. The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 1997;64(2):90–5.
Dworkin R. Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth: London; 1977; Waldron J. When justice replaces affection: The need for rights. In: Waldron J. Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1993:370–91.
Why are certain interests, in this case healthcare interests, so important that they deserve such special protection? What is it about healthcare that is so special? A possible answer is that healthcare is special because of its instrumental power. Healthcare is the means to an end that is highly valued in most cultures: good health and a long life free from pain and disability. Without life-long access to appropriate healthcare, our chances of attaining this goal are likely to be impaired. Yet the high value of good health alone cannot explain the particular status of healthcare as a focus of moral concern. There are many things we value highly, like companionship, aesthetic pleasure, love, and other such benefits to which we do not necessarily have a right. So in addition, three main arguments deserve attention: fair equality of opportunity, basic healthcare needs, and collective social protection.
First, contemporary healthcare involves a complex and heterogeneous framework of institutions, services, and policy measures that aim at prevention of disease and disability, restoration of health where possible, and personal and social support and care for the long-term ill or disabled. As such, healthcare greatly affects the risk of persons getting sick, the likelihood of being cured, and the degree to which one will receive support. Within this line of reasoning, healthcare theorist Norman Daniels has pointed at the way in which healthcare protects our level of normal functioning and consequently our opportunities to form, pursue, and revise our life-plans.4
Daniels N. Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1985:27–8; Daniels N. Health-care needs and distributive justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1981;10(2):149–79; Daniels N. Justice, health, and healthcare. American Journal of Bioethics 2001;1(2):2–16.
Veatch RM. Voluntary risks to health. Journal of the American Medical Association 1980;243(1):50–5; Veatch RM. What is a “just” health care delivery? In: Veatch RM, Branson R, eds. Ethics and Health Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: Balinger Publishing Company; 1976: 127–53.
Second, the effect of healthcare services on opportunities in life is a general fact that is common to all. This is ultimately grounded in the concept of basic needs or, as David Braybrooke has called them, “course-of-life-needs.”6
Braybrooke D. Meeting Needs. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1987:29–75.
Frankfurt H. Necessity and desire. In: Frankfurt H. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1988:104–16.
Likewise, healthcare needs are those things that every person needs in order to maintain or restore normal and healthy functioning (like adequate nutrition, shelter, sanitation, unpolluted living and working conditions, and preventive and curative medical services), or that a person needs to equal normal functioning as much as possible (like glasses, wheelchairs, hearing aids, and guide dogs). Essentially healthcare needs are basic needs: universal in character, necessary for the fundamental projects of every person, and generically originating from human vulnerability. Very often the advantages of health and the burdens of illness are arbitrary effects of a natural lottery (like one's genetic makeup) or social conditions (being poor) or of bad luck (being at the wrong place at the wrong time) or good fortune (accidental discovery of cancer at a curable stage). Although there are interpersonal differences in healthcare needs to reach a normal functioning level, enjoying reasonably good health, being able to function normally, and through this having normal opportunities for a fulfilling life are of fundamental value for every person, and eliminating or reducing barriers that undermine this value, like disease, illness, or injury, is a basic moral obligation for every just society.
Third, it would be unreasonable to expect that individuals generally should be able to gain sufficient access to healthcare by relying solely on their own private resources for several reasons. First, healthcare needs are more unequally distributed than other basic needs like food, clothing, and shelter (some people need considerably more healthcare than others, whereas people's need for food and clothing is generally the same). Second, healthcare needs can be highly unpredictable due to the element of luck. Third, the fulfillment of healthcare needs has an important impact on a person's range of opportunities. And finally, healthcare can be catastrophically expensive. If private resources could generally cover healthcare needs, there would be little point in declaring entitlements to healthcare. This means that whereas it might be reasonably expected that people can adequately provide for food, clothing, and shelter from their own private shares of income and wealth, this does not apply to goods like healthcare services, which are an appropriate object of collective cost sharing schemes. Private insurance alone cannot provide sufficient access to care for everyone because those who are most in need of healthcare, as well as those with especially high risk of ill health, will not be able to purchase affordable coverage, if they can find insurance at all. That is why we speak of a collective obligation on the part of society as a whole.
The final characterization of the human right to healthcare concerns its scope. Historically, the right to an adequate level of healthcare has been classified under the second generation of economic, social, and cultural rights (which also include food, work, social security, education, etc.). Societal obligations under this category differ from the obligations under the first generation of civil and political rights (which include the rights to life, liberty, freedom of movement, freedom from torture, etc.). Whereas civil and political rights must be guaranteed immediately, governmental obligation for economic, social, and cultural rights involves action to ensure that these rights are progressively realized.8
See note 1, Mann, Gruskin, Grodin, Annas 1999:25.
To begin with, the right to healthcare cannot be an unlimited right. It cannot be a right of everyone to have access to whatever healthcare services would be of net benefit to the individual. Rationing of healthcare has to be a fact of life. We must set priorities. Three reasons support the argument that the right to healthcare must be a limited right. First, healthcare is not the only important good in life. This could be called the external dynamic of scarcity in healthcare. Given that resources are finite, we must consider what economists call the “opportunity costs” of providing healthcare for all. We must acknowledge that resources must be preserved for other social needs, like housing, education, scientific research, and so forth. It would not be rational for a society to devote all its resources to healthcare.9
Rawls J. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 2001:173–4; see note 2, Buchanan, 1997:92
Second, the right to healthcare is the right to an adequate level of care, not the right to all types of care that would be of net benefit. This refers to the internal dynamic of scarcity. Taking the continuation of technological development into account, there are virtually no limits to how much we could spend on healthcare. Every advance in medical science creates new needs that did not exist previously. Consequently, the nature of healthcare is such that supply often generates its own demand.10
Butler J. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing: Principles and Practices. London: Cassell; 1999:5–49.
Third, healthcare is not about the endless provision of resources and services to increase personal happiness. Although meeting healthcare needs may have a tendency to promote happiness, its moral importance is derived from the way in which it protects functioning and opportunity. As such, the notion of an adequate level of care is that of a floor, not of a ceiling.
The guideline of basic healthcare needs and of fair equality of opportunity suggests a path for giving content to the idea of a decent minimum of healthcare and for setting priorities in the allocation of resources. It asserts that collective moral obligations exist to provide healthcare at the level needed for persons to receive a fair chance in life. Nevertheless, unless additional qualifications were introduced, acceptance of these arguments for a right to healthcare would place immense burdens on society. After all, they lead to the conclusion that society is morally obligated to funnel resources toward bringing persons ever closer to the goal of fair equality of opportunity. However, a vast array of disabilities, injuries, and diseases limit opportunity, and many persons are so seriously affected that they could never be restored to a position of equal opportunity, even if immense sums were spent to bring them closer to that ideal. These arguments then need to be held in check by an account of allocation that avoids unreasonable demands on social resources in order to implement the right to healthcare. One of the possibilities might be rationing by responsibility.
If we assume that all citizens enjoy a basic human right to a decent minimum of healthcare, based on the arguments of fair opportunity and basic healthcare needs, can particular individuals then forfeit that right even when they wish to preserve it? The matter is less about whether a person loses the full range of entitlements under the right to healthcare than about whether he or she will have to carry the costs themselves, pay higher premiums, or forfeit the right to certain forms of care.11
Losing the full range of entitlements would be impossible because healthcare also involves public health measures like the provision of clean water, adequate sanitation, vaccination, and so on.
Fundamentally, this question turns the original matter around. From the human rights perspective, interest in health has always been primarily focused on governmental actions and their responsibility for regulation and monitoring of societal-level health determinants.12
See note 1, Mann, Gruskin, Grodin, Annas 1999:2–3.
The first argument in support of rationing by responsibility is grounded in the antisocial character of irresponsible health behavior. Just as a person can forfeit his or her right to liberty by criminal behavior, one could argue that a person can forfeit his or her right to healthcare by failing to act responsibly. It is unfair that those contributing to the insurance pool pay the extra costs of those who voluntarily engage in risky actions that increase their need for medical services, and it is fair to withhold societal funds from needy persons whose medical needs resulted from voluntary risk taking. This conclusion does not conflict with the rule of fair opportunity because those who are voluntarily risking their health have had the opportunity to be healthy.
Related to the first argument is the idea that duties are owed to the state. Society has a right to expect a decent return on the investment it has made in public health measures, medical facilities, nursing schools, funding for biomedical research, hospital subsidies, and many other parts of the system that pertain to healthcare. This sounds reasonable, because society is not a trough filled with services and resources that should always be at our free disposal. Citizens have rights but also duties. In this sense, one could argue that sensible care for oneself and one's health is a moral duty. It is part of what free and adult citizens with a sense of justice may expect of one another.
A third argument goes deeper and is based on the idea of moral arbitrariness. This idea refers to what we consider to be relevant or irrelevant in matters of justice. In A Theory of Justice John Rawls wrote: “The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust…. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.”13
Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1971: 102; rev. ed. 1999:87; see also Miller D. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1976, repr. 2002.
Dworkin R. What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1981;10:283–345, reprinted in Dworkin R. Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 2000:65–119.
As such, a fair and just healthcare system mitigates arbitrary health inequalities by providing equal access to a general healthcare framework—safe environment, good quality care, support, and so on—thus contributing to equality of opportunity. If a person has more healthcare needs (requiring hemodialysis, for instance, or a wheelchair) due to unequal bad luck, it would be unfair if society did not fulfill these healthcare needs and in that way reinforce unequal opportunity. Morally arbitrary health differences that we know how to overcome or mitigate may not determine unequal results.
Consequently, does society have a moral obligation to mitigate the differences in health for which we are personally responsible? No, it does not. When society provides the general health framework and the opportunity to be healthy, the poorer health status of individuals who voluntarily smoke and drink heavily is not unfair because in cases of voluntary risk taking, the differences in healthcare needs are no longer considered to be morally arbitrary. On the contrary, they are the result of gambling. For this argument, Dworkin's distinction between two kinds of luck is useful. If a person is made worse off because gambles he has made turned out badly, that is, because he has had poor option luck, then egalitarian concerns are not triggered. If on the contrary, he fares worse than others because of matters outside his control, then he is a victim of poor brute luck, and egalitarian concerns come to the fore.15
See note 14, Dworkin 2000:73–5.
All in all, the third argument in favor of rationing by responsibility makes individual choice central. In cases of health gambling the so arisen healthcare needs are no longer generic, archetypical, and common to all, but result from personal preferences or desires. So in that case, they are “volitional” or “adventitious” needs, resulting from poor option luck.16
For reference of the term “volitional needs,” see note 7, Frankfurt 1988:107. For “adventitious needs,” see note 6, Braybrooke 1987:29–33.
The fourth argument in favor of rationing by responsibility is practical. Suppose society explicitly chooses to punish risk-taking behavior—whether by excluding individuals from some healthcare entitlements or by demanding higher insurance premiums, and suppose that this would scare a considerable number of people away from smoking, drinking, unsafe sexual activities, and other forms of hazardous behavior. Wouldn't this be a very efficient way to prevent unnecessary and avoidable healthcare costs? If doing so would help to maximize cost-effectiveness in healthcare, why would we be against it?
In the final argument the criterion of personal merit is made central. Meritarian conceptions are above all grading ones: They refer to all kinds of qualities or performances with respect to which individuals may be graded. Advantages are allocated in accordance with amounts of energy expended (efforts) or kinds of results achieved (achievements). What is judged is particular conduct that distinguishes persons from one another, and not the fact that all the parties are human beings. Merits are “acquired,” that is to say, they represent what its possessor has made of her natural endowments and environmental opportunities. What should be stressed is the importance of meritarian criteria in our general thinking about justice. Dworkin's argument of the responsibility cut has roots in common experience and perception. People generally sense a difference between nonmeritarian health crises and nonpure cases in which merit considerations do not seem wholly irrelevant. People do tend to feel and think differently about the drunk driver who has caused a car accident and the teenage cyclist who was hit in the accident and now suffers brain damage; about the smoker having a heart attack who is seriously overweight and the 60-year-old man who has always taken excellent care of himself and is suddenly stricken by leukemia. Furthermore, cases like that of the leukemia patient who has always taken excellent care of himself raise reactions such as “this is undeserved!” People generally sense that benefits and burdens should be distributed in a way that is proportional (or at least related) to effort. In some final reckoning merit considerations seem not wholly irrelevant to many health crises. If this were not the case, the issue of rationing by responsibility in healthcare would not even be a topic of discussion.
Arguments against the possibility of forfeiting the right to healthcare maintain that even if we agree that the notion of merit plays a very important role, the idea of justice is not exhaustively characterized by it.17
Dworkin G. Taking risks, assessing responsibility. Hastings Center Report 1981;11:26–31.
To begin with, the practical applicability of the admission of merit considerations in the instance of healthcare delivery appears limited. A policy of withholding societal funds cannot be justified unless several conditions are met. First, it must be possible to identify and differentiate various causal factors in morbidity, such as natural causes, social environment, and personal activities, and it must be confirmed that a pertinent disease or illness resulted from personal activities, rather than some other cause. Additionally it must be shown that the personal activities in question were autonomously undertaken in the sense that the actors were aware of the risks and voluntarily accepted them. Furthermore, locating the autonomous risk takers would require a rigid and complex framework of research policy. To make such a policy legitimate, considerable moral objections, for instance privacy considerations, would have to be overcome. Finally, all this would have to be cost-effective.
Regarding the first condition, although it is possible to define general risks from identifiable types of conduct, it is virtually impossible to draw an unambiguous link between an example of that conduct and a particular health consequence. Medical needs often result from many influences of very different kinds varying from genetic predispositions, personal actions and habits, and environmental and social conditions.18
See also Sen A. Why health equity? Health Economics 2002;11:659–66.
Second, the argument in favor of rationing by responsibility shows great confidence in the free, voluntary, and independent character of individual choice making. However, if we want to make choice central, we have to be sure that the participation in risky behavior is truly voluntary. Nicotine is now widely recognized as a potently addictive drug, and alcoholism and eating disorders are diseases in their own right. But if many people in a cultural group or class behave similarly, this behavior might acquire the qualities of a social or cultural norm, in which case we might wonder just how voluntary the behavior is. A denial of a person's right to healthcare would be unfair if the person could not have acted otherwise or could have acted otherwise but only with great difficulty. At the very least, the proposition that individuals voluntarily bring many of their illnesses upon themselves must be challenged and tested in each situation in which it is invoked.
In addition to the previous issue, problems of rigidity in policing the system become relevant. To locate voluntary risk takers, officials would have to investigate the causes. In the worst-case scenario, these officials would be authorized to invade privacy, break confidentiality, and keep records in order to document health abuses that could result in restriction of the right to healthcare. In such cases the natural jungle, in which morally arbitrary differences (as in race, gender, or health) determine the results, makes room for a social jungle, in which people could be punished by society as a result of an infinite series of responsibility questions about their health behavior. This immediately raises doubts about the ethical viability of such measures.
Furthermore, we know that in real life people routinely trade health risks for other benefits. They do so when commuting longer distances for a better job, practicing certain sports, or taking a skiing holiday. So if patients needing treatment for smoking-related diseases can be fairly penalized because they smoke, we should apply the same stricture to those who drink too much alcohol, eat too much fat, drive too fast, work too hard, go out too late, go on skiing holidays, or indulge themselves in sports like mountain climbing or boxing. Within such a policy only few of us might qualify for the treatment we require in our hour of need. Although there is some plausibility to the claim that rational people should refrain from trading their health for other goods, refusing ex ante to allow any trade-offs of health for other goods may seem unjustifiably paternalistic. Fundamentally, implementing the possibility of forfeiting the right to healthcare might entail forfeiting freedom.
Moreover, one might wonder whether health enforcement would indeed be cost-effective. One of the major reasons for the debate on responsibility in healthcare is the problem of increasing costs. The argument is based on the idea that those who choose to run health risks cost the rest of us money, and it is fair that they should pay it back, either by paying larger insurance premiums or by forgoing healthcare for their self-induced conditions. However, there is good reason to believe that this strategy would lead to counterintuitive outcomes. In addition to the fact that the organization of health enforcement would carry high financial costs besides its morally unattractive features, it ironically proves that some risk taking requires less rather than more medical care, because it results in earlier and quicker deaths. Cost-effectiveness research to compare healthcare costs has shown that low-risk, nonsmoking men with low blood pressure generate far higher healthcare costs per year of life than high-risk men who smoke and have high blood pressure. Altogether, it seems that people with some unhealthy life styles actually save society more in overall expenditures for both healthcare and social security than they cost.19
Leichter H. Public policy and the British experience. Hastings Center Report 1981;11:32–9, incorporated in Leichter H. Free to Be Foolish: Politics and Health Promotion in the United States and Great Britain. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991; Russell LB. Some of the tough decisions required by a national health plan. Science 1989;246:892–6; Schwartz RL. Life style, health status, and distributive justice. In: Grubb A, Mehlman MJ. Justice and Health Care: Comparative Perspectives. New York: John Wiley and Sons; 1995:244–8.
In addition to practical problems, the concept of fair equality of opportunity remains an important element. As outlined above, fair equality of opportunity is one of the foundational ideas for a human right to healthcare. It helps us to bear in mind two things. Initially, the moral objections against private pocket payment of healthcare fundamentally come down to the fact that it results in a policy of exclusion (only the healthy and wealthy will be able to purchase insurance and medical care) on a domain that is much too important to allow exclusion, that is, the domain of guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity for all. A policy of inclusion is one of the basic reasons for a moral right to healthcare.
Additionally, fair equality of opportunity is a forward-looking concept. It provides the moral basis for a fallback framework that contributes to all persons' receiving a fair chance in life. Because of this, it would be unfair to cut off fair equality of opportunity in the future because of past behavior. Although it sounds paradoxical, holding people responsible for their ends means that in assuming the presence of fair institutions, we are acting as if they can exercise their underlying moral power to form but also to revise their conceptions of the good and valuable.
Doesn't the above argumentation imply that society is a trough of means and services, freely available to everyone after all? Is the debate on the role of personal responsibility with regard to the right to healthcare irrelevant? No, it is not. Three elements should be stressed.
First, responsibility is an important value. People's behavior has an effect on their health, and society should not hesitate to underscore the importance of sensible health behavior by making people conscious of the influence they have on their health needs. However, in the name of fair equality of opportunity, society should continue to be forward-looking, both in providing incentives to avoid hazardous behavior and in offering medical help.
Regarding incentives, consciousness-raising health campaigns show respect for individual autonomy while appealing to people's rationality to take care of their health. The same goes for cost-sharing. It is fair to require individuals who engage in certain risky actions that result in costly medical needs to pay higher premiums or taxes. Risk takers may be required to contribute more to particular pools such as insurance schemes or to pay a tax on their risky conduct, such as an increased tax on alcohol and tobacco. These requirements may fairly redistribute the burdens of the costs of healthcare, and they may deter risky conduct without disrespecting autonomy. The return individuals may expect on their taxed consumption is healthcare protection for themselves.
Third, it would be unjust to refuse care to people in need, even if it is clear that they were responsible for their condition. Contributing to fair equality of opportunity should continue to be one of the fundamental moral goals of healthcare. This should not change because of past behavior, as only then can the basic human right to healthcare be a truly inviolable right.