According to the prevailing view among modern scholars, Maimonides and Spinoza share so much in common that in order to understand Spinoza, one must first recognize his debt to Maimonides. This is surprising since Maimonides presents himself as a defender of revelation, while Spinoza launches a devastating critique of scripture and its defenders, particularly Maimonides. But such differences, according to modern scholars, can be accounted for as the result of political accommodations to their respective audiences. Moreover, Spinoza himself suggests a profound kinship with Maimonides, not only by adopting the terms of medieval theology (form, essence, mode, attribute, substance, etc.), but also its goals (amor dei intellectualis). Spinoza, according to this view, was a God-intoxicated philosopher who simply carried the arguments of Maimonides to their logical conclusions
In this ambitious new book, Joshua Parens sets out to overturn the conventional view and restore the radical differences between Spinoza and Maimonides. In order to do so, Parens must first revise the widely accepted interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics as it appears in the Ethics. To do this, he adopts a radical and largely neglected view of the Ethics offered by the late scholar of early modern philosophy, Richard Kennington, in his article “Analytic and Synthetic Methods in Spinoza's Ethics.” According to this view, contemporary scholarship has lost track of Spinoza's argument in part because it follows Spinoza's claims (and his rhetoric) in part one of the Ethics too literally, without realizing how they are undermined in part two of the Ethics. Kennington shows that the key to grasping the Ethics is scrutinizing the question of method. The Ethics begins with a synthetic or deductive method to describe God, while the discussion of nature in part two relies on an inductive method. This methodological inconsistency cannot be easily resolved through some sort of compromise. Instead, Kennington explained that the second argument is addressed to the careful reader while the first is a decoy for theologians, for whom the deductive method and scholastic vocabulary had become a convention. Parens develops Kennington's argument by showing in detail the radical consequences that follow.
The results are astonishing. The most well-known and explicit claims of the Ethics are subverted (cf. 58). The mind-body parallelism is exposed as completely body. The three types of knowledge are effectually reduced to one, and the model of the free man crumbles under his determinism and lack of formal unity. The ranking of ways of life according to higher or nobler goals, which culminates in the philosopher's intellectual love of God, crumbles into a mere stratagem, neither better nor worse than others, for pursuing self-preservation. Indeed, Spinoza's advocacy of philosophy as a means to salvation is revealed as a clever stratagem to encourage political stability (cf. 147).
Having uncovered Spinoza's materialism and determinism, Parens turns to the second part of his project: identifying Maimonides's positions in order to show their profound differences. Here, Parens has divided his book thematically to contrast their understandings of nature and man's place in it. The first and perhaps most central difference is the meaning and goals of education. For Maimonides, desire and spiritedness are irreducible elements of human nature which, if not properly guided, threaten to destroy the possibility of happiness. Parens teaches us how to read the Guide of the Perplexed as part of the tradition stretching from Plato's Republic to Alfarabi's Attainment of Happiness, that is, as a philosophic drama which aims at organizing the soul by teaching the limits of political perfection.
As Parens begins to flesh out Maimonides's account of human nature, his differences with Spinoza turn out to be an unbridgeable chasm. Thus, on the question of education, Spinoza rejects the very idea of multiple irreducible elements of the soul in favor of a single one, the conatus, or striving for self-preservation. The traditional desire for higher objects such as the beautiful and the good are ultimately illusions which obscure the fact that, as Hobbes puts it, “whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good.” The denial of the transcendent is part of an overall political strategy to defuse religious intolerance and fanaticism. Following Machiavelli, Spinoza seeks to lower the goal of politics to safety and security (188). Parens argues that Maimonides too had sought to check violent passions that are aided and abetted by religion, but without destroying freedom or choice, or the aspiration for the good, the noble, and the beautiful. He offers a nuanced and careful portrait of Maimonides's efforts to show the harmony between the biblical and Aristotelian accounts of wisdom and teleology. As the picture of Maimonides emerges in Parens's able hands, we begin to see the profound differences between the analysis of Maimonides and that of Spinoza.
Leo Strauss observed that “it is safer to understand the low in the light of the high than the high in the light of the low.” Parens shows us that this encapsulates the teaching of Maimonides, who sought to preserve the high while allowing the low to reveal itself for what it is (e.g., 147, 157, 179, 187, 190). At the same time, he presents a sobering portrait of Spinoza who has no choice but to understand the high in light of the low. Spinoza bequeathed to modernity liberalism and all its blessings but at the cost of undermining our confidence in the very goodness of that regime. Joshua Parens's analysis helps us measure our fortune by giving us the means to see what we have lost sight of.
