Courage is not only the perquisite of human beings. A dog can be courageous. If a small canine fights a much larger one to assert its rights, we'd probably say that the animal displays courage. I suppose that we understand “courage” in English as meaning that the creature displaying it will take considerable risks to maintain what it see as its rights. We don't care much how the animal (or human) reasons about its risks or its rights in such an engagement. Courage, except in dictionaries, is not necessarily a moral virtue, though its display is usually greeted with approbation.
And so it was in ancient Greece. Terms such as tolmē or tharsos (and perhaps rhōmē), which mean courage, bravery, or daring (or fortitude, for rhōmē), could be used of humans or animals, and moral choice is not a requisite of their appearance (Iliad 17.570 speaks of the “tharsos of a fly”). Andreia, the word that is the focus of Ryan Balot's latest book, is also used in Greek for courage or bravery. Conceptually, however, the word looks like it should have been more limited in application than either tolmē or tharsos. This is because andreia means, at root, “manliness” (it is an abstract formulation of the Greek word for man, anēr). This word, and its adjectival form andreios, may sound as if they should be gender and species specific. A Greek speaker might have felt it strange to apply “manliness” to an animal, for example, or to a woman or to a child. But they did. Andreia is used of a woman at Sophocles, Electra 983, and andreios is used of animals by Aristotle (HA 488b17). It is not necessarily gender or species specific. If it can be applied to animals it cannot be considered to imply, exclusively, a moral virtue.
How is all this relevant to Balot's very enjoyable and very thoughtful book? Balot believes that there emerged, in democratic Athens, a very special and unparalleled variety of andreia or courage (3): “an intrinsically worthwhile excellence of character, on the basis of which ethical agents knowingly strive to overcome difficult, dangerous, painful, or frightening obstacles or uncertainty, with a view to achieving noble ends.” We all wouldn't easily recognize this definition and it is one that non-Athenian and many Athenian Greek speakers would not have recognized either. If not gender specific (though in practice in Balot's book it is), it is species specific and it is moral.
Balot's andreia is nothing like the dog's “courage” of my first paragraph. Balot's andreia is a moral quality that an individual, in this case an Athenian man, chooses (hence “knowingly strive”). No dog can claim that. Nor can most courageous modern humans. Athenian courage, therefore, represents a strange combination of daring and choice. Displayed by men, it is directed towards the safety of the polis. Balot believes that this enabled and was enabled by Athenian democracy. It affords happiness and flourishing (eudaimonia): the individual and the community are inextricably intertwined; by advancing the well-being of the city and community, andreia advances the eudaimonia of the individual. If Athens was great and to be admired, it looks like we can thank its andreia.
Balot attempts to demonstrate the nuances of the appearance of this moral version of andreia in a variety of Greeks texts (and some contexts) drawn primarily, with the exception of Homer (where courage is driven by a need to keep face before other warriors), from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. So we find historians such as Thucydides (especially in Pericles's funeral speech, which urges a combination of “character and intellect as key constituents of courage” [44]; such courage will allow both the individual and the city to flourish and achieve eudaimonia), and Herodotus (Persians act bravely out of fear of what may happen to them if they do not, and so too in their way do Spartans). Greek theater is important for it “deepened the citizens' appreciation of their own ideals [such as andreia], as well as their own limitations in living up to those ideals” (279). So Aeschylus's Persians is “primarily a source of the Athenians' deeper understanding of themselves as courageous democrats” who act not through fear, like the Persians, but through choice (81). In Euripides's Suppliants and other plays, Athenians were invited to “rethink their seemingly ‘reflexive,’ knee-jerk emotional responses” (18)—a figure such as Theseus offers an ancestral model of courage based not just on action but self-assessment and reason. And in a play like Aristophanes's Lysistrata, the women seem to offer a harmonious combination of thought and action. “Manliness” becomes for once, but only once, womanliness.
Plato's Laches offers an admonitory portrait of two famous Athenian generals, Laches and Nicias, who united within their military actions both daring and reason to produce andreia. Oratory displays this strange virtue as well, sometimes invoking its pros and its cons. Lysias, in his funeral oration, has the speaker calling up the past as a model where there “were heroes who courageously gave their lives for the city, ‘respecting … the city's laws rather than fearing … danger when they met the enemy’” (227). Demosthenes in his funeral oration, on the other hand, could illustrate how Athenians sometimes did not live up to their own ideology of courage and backtracked to the Persian or Spartan motivators of shame and fear. And Isocrates in the Panegyricus and the Panathenaicus dramatizes “the dialectic between pro-democratic arguments [for Athenian andreia] and critical responses to the demos's ideology and behaviors” (17).
This is a very enjoyable and intelligently synoptic book that leads us through some of the high points of Greek literature (understandably Athenian) and tries effectively to show how many of its texts are better understood by looking at them through the lens of andreia. The reader ends up unexpectedly with a stimulating and sometimes provocative (Greek theater may offer more than political nostrums) overview of the development of Athenian culture within the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. In many ways Balot offers an ideal introduction to Greek thought and democracy.
But this is a discursive history, a history of the ways in which many Athenian men may have thought and talked and written about andreia rather than what they actually did that was courageous. It's very hard to believe that an Athenian man fought any differently in real life from the dog from my first paragraph. This is above all a book about persistent Athenian popular ideals of courage. It sometimes seems to confuse a utopian reality with utopian words about reality. I suspect that there are other reasons for Athenian uniqueness and for Athenian democracy. I suspect that the reality of their courage may have been more Pavlovian than moral, just as it is with my dog. One must, notwithstanding, admire the power of Balot's synthesis even when it can become a little pro-Athenian and Whiggish. You can disagree with details of Balot's book while greatly admiring its thrust and ideal.
Balot gives clues at various points as to why he wrote this book: “We ask individuals to sacrifice themselves and their own good, narrowly understood, for the political community or for their fellow citizens, without providing a clear explanation of the individual's essential relationship to the political community, to his fellow citizens, and to the good of both” (299). The practice of Athenian andreia, Balot argues, provides just such a clear explanation and justification. Citizen soldiers are willing to sacrifice themselves consciously for the benefit of their community. The soldier's well-being (eudaimonia) is so intimately entwined with that of his community that such a choice is obvious. Balot, I suspect, would like to see the possibility of such eudaimonia within the countries in which he has taught.
