Kimberly Hale’s aims in this book are admirably ambitious and wide-ranging, and she shows herself clearly up to the task of achieving them. Hale aims to show that the separation between modern natural science and political philosophy that has prevailed since the Enlightenment is harmful to political societies, and that Bacon’s New Atlantis provides a profound reflection upon this truth that is worth recovering and learning from as we strive to maintain political liberty in the context of modern technological society.
Hale begins by examining the source of the Atlantis myth in Plato’s Timaeus and Critias, arguing that the relationship between Bacon’s New Atlantis and Plato’s dialogues is primarily one of affinity rather than contrast; both Bacon and Plato recognize “that philosophic wisdom must be used in the service of political life,” as well as “the necessity of concealing certain truths from casual observers” (p. 28). Hale then turns in the three chapters that follow to a treatment of Bacon’s New Atlantis, beginning with a discussion of its place within Bacon’s thought as a whole before turning to a detailed interpretation of this work itself. Hale argues that the New Atlantis is in fact a dystopia rather than a utopia, and that Bacon intended to paint “a picture of the future tyranny inherent in modern science,” demonstrating thereby “how carefully English scientists must foster liberty, while still seeking to persuade the public about the virtues of science” (pp. 115–16). In the final two chapters, the author turns to broader questions of science and technology in relation to modern political philosophy and society, providing intriguing discussions of the relationship of Bacon’s thought to that of Hobbes and Condorcet, as well as provocative reflections on the proper role of political philosophy in contemporary political societies.
There are gems of profound insight scattered throughout the book, but it is not until the final two chapters (pp. 119–44) that Hale demonstrates her ability to accomplish the important tasks to which the book is directed. In the earlier chapters—containing the Introduction, the discussion of Plato, and the treatment of the New Atlantis itself—Hale’s own voice struggles to emerge from a cacophony of secondary sources and to provide a clear unifying thread to guide the reader through her summaries and interpretations. Especially in the Introduction but continuing throughout these chapters, Hale is frequently preoccupied with the interpretations of others to an extent that distracts significantly from her primary purpose, obscuring her thesis and leaving the reader perplexed regarding the importance of particular discussions in relation to her larger aims. Too often the claims of other scholars, rather than her own claims, serve as the primary touchstone for Hale’s discussions; and since there is far less unity in the former than in the latter, the result is a choppier and more disjointed treatment of Bacon’s thought than one would like.
A particularly problematic instance of this preoccupation consists in the unnecessarily pervasive reliance on certain elements of Leo Strauss’s thought throughout. Hale frequently quotes Bacon’s assertion that “[c]oncerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired in both these respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter” (e.g., p. 41), and refers repeatedly to the imagery of a candle casting both light and shadows, as well as the language of “showing what cannot be told,” “the careful reader,” and similar phrases. For Hale’s Bacon, as for some of the most important political thinkers in Strauss’s account, “Truth is not an unmitigated good” and has to be “danced” around with “extraordinary rhetorical skill” (pp. 112, 125, 144).
To her credit, Hale explicitly states at the outset that she will generally follow Struass’s interpretive approach (p. 10), but she does not expend enough argumentative effort to establish the appropriateness of adopting this approach to Bacon in particular. Although the desirability of writing carefully and artfully concealing the truth may indeed be a relevant consideration in the case of some philosophers, and although Bacon may indeed have pursued this course of action, it is far from clear that this is an aspect of Bacon’s work that should be appreciated—as Hale seems to—rather than censured. After all, as she acknowledges, Bacon himself was exiled from political life in disgrace anyway, he was immediately succeeded by Thomas Hobbes who boldly published a dangerous political elaboration upon Bacon’s thought and did not face execution or complete ruin as a result, and very few since his time have come to the appreciation of Bacon’s main purpose in the New Atlantis that Hale attempts to draw out from the shadows of his concealment.
The only way to maintain an appreciation for Bacon’s artful concealment of the truth in the face of these considerations lies in some notion of the intrinsic—rather than merely instrumental—value of such concealment, a notion that seems to carry much weight in Hale’s account and inspires her explicit discussions of poetry (pp. 44, 49–50). Although this is a common opinion among many excellent scholars who have been broadly influenced by Strauss, it is one that I find ultimately indefensible. The truth is a common good that is not diminished through being possessed by many, and knowing the truth is the goal of the highest and best part of all human beings, our reason. The temptation to treat the truth as a private possession—as this idea of the intrinsic desirability of hiding the truth implies—is to my mind gravely misguided and even immoral.
Although these considerations may taint the earlier part of Hale’s treatment to some extent, her reflections on “Science, Technology and the Founding of Modern Political Philosophy” in the final two chapters (pp. 119–44) provide an abundant reward for the patient reader. This section of the book is filled with profound insights that one hopes will serve as the basis for future elaboration. One of the most fertile of these insights is the following: “Natural science is now almost wholly based in experimentation, while political philosophy has so lost sight of the question of the nature of the whole that its students can barely understand the actions and consequences of science” (p. 131). Hale makes the convincing, timely, and important argument that the divorce of natural science from philosophy, and from political philosophy in particular, that has occurred since Bacon’s time is a problematic development.
In these final pages, the author also drives home her important contention that Bacon provides a sort of bridge between the “ancients” and “moderns” and explains how this is obscured by Condorcet’s mistaken elaboration upon certain Baconian points. In light of Hale’s concluding reflections regarding Condorcet and the French, the reader might well raise the intriguing question of whether Bacon’s Anglo-American legacy through John Locke and some of the American Founders presents a more encouraging picture of the relationship between natural science and political philosophy. Readers of Hale’s book will eagerly look forward to her future contributions to these important questions raised by her treatment of Bacon.
